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Abstract 
 
Information and communication technologies are increasingly being infused into city 
systems and services as part of a growing trend to make cities ‘smart’. Through the 
design and implementation of these efforts, large information technology (IT) 
providers are interacting with local government policy and planning processes via: 
(a) strategy—project objectives, priorities and approaches; (b) engagement—which 
actors are involved, the roles they play and the interactions between and among 
them; and (c) representation—how the local government portrays the project through 
narrative and brand. In the discussion below, I argue that as smart projects multiply, 
interactions around this proliferation will pave the way for IT providers to more 
broadly inform urban governance processes. For in effect, IT providers are not just 
selling smart technologies. Rather, they are propagating a set of assertions about the 
role, structure, function and relationships of local government. These assertions are 
informed by neoliberal and entrepreneurial principles, bound up with the concept of 
smart, and attractively wrapped within the smart city imaginary. This imaginary is 
largely created by IT providers, and cannot be pursued without them.    
 
Within my approach, I view smart initiatives not simply as technical but social and 
political strategies, for while these projects are about technological innovation, they 
are also about ‘innovations’ in the relationships, interactions and discourse that 
surround them. To capture both the discursive and material realities of these projects, 
my methods of examination included key informant interviews and case study 
analysis of two cities in the United States, Dubuque, Iowa and Portland, Oregon. I 
focus specifically on smart projects led by IBM, an influential actor in the smart city 
market, and use Dubuque as a primary case study with Portland for comparison. My 
work provides an in-depth view of the IT provider IBM alongside the rise of the 
corporate entrepreneurial smart city, and sheds light on what these initiatives might 
mean for municipal administrations and city residents in similar urban environments. 
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On the Path to ‘Smart’ 
 
1 Introduction 
  
The ways in which people perceive, interact with, and operate within cities is 
increasingly being shaped by the unseen. In any given moment, there is a barrage of 
information being exchanged between people, between objects and between people 
and objects. Individuals and organizations connect through phone calls, email, 
instant messaging, video chatting, images, texts, tweets and social connectivity 
websites, among others. Residents report on the functioning of city services through 
sites such as FixMyStreet, Walk Score or OpenPlans.1 Police and emergency 
vehicles send signals to traffic lights to permit quicker response times; the global 
positioning system (GPS) helps drivers better understand transportation flows. 
Cameras—lodged within automated teller machines (ATMs), stores, gas stations, 
street lights, building entrances, traffic intersections, etc.—visually record 
individuals’ comings and goings. Electrical grids report power line problems, and in 
some cases self-repair; while automated buildings report water leaks and inefficient 
usage (Hill, 2008; The Economist, 2010a, 2010c). With every passing second, data 
multiplies exponentially, rapidly expanding across all aspects of city life. This 
information is incessant, ubiquitous and ever-changing—shaped by, and 
continuously shaping and reshaping, urban environments.  
 
With this rising presence of data, local governments are increasingly considering 
how the technologies that generate these data can be utilized to improve urban 
infrastructure, services and planning. The result has been the emergence and 
proliferation of ‘smart’ initiatives, or new urban forms associated with the increased 
use of and reliance upon technology (Hollands, 2008). Examples of these projects 
include congestion charging in Singapore and Stockholm that through wireless and 
sensor technologies enable automatic, real-time payment without cars stopping for 
tolls (IBM, 2009a, 2011a; Stockholmsforsoket, 2006); a transportation and 
                                                 
1 For example, see: https://www.fixmystreet.com/, https://www.walkscore.com/ and 
https://openplans.org/.    
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emergency response command center in Rio de Janeiro that integrates and analyzes 
in real-time data from over thirty government agencies (IBM, 2010b); the 
Amsterdam Smart City initiative that brings together business, citizens and 
government to develop projects to help conserve energy (Deakin and Al Waer, 
2011); and the networked master plans for Songdo and Masdar (Fast Company, 
2011; Ouroussoff, 2010). As the market for these types of projects grows, large 
technology providers clamor to spread their wares, leaving an indelible mark on a 
growing number of cities around the world.  
 
1.1 Aims, Objectives and Approach 
 
My investigation explores this mark on cities by examining how information 
technology (IT) providers are interacting with urban governance through the design 
and implementation of ‘smart’ projects, and sheds light on potential implications of 
this trend. To illuminate these issues, I look at the IT provider International Business 
Machines (IBM) and how, through its Smarter Cities2 projects, the organization has 
interacted with local government policy and planning processes in two American 
cities—Dubuque, Iowa and Portland, Oregon. I focus on IBM for two reasons. 
Firstly, IBM is my employer and has been for the duration of this research.3 This 
insider status has provided me with full access to a wealth of data and individuals 
that would not have been afforded to me had I chosen to examine case study projects 
implemented by one of IBM’s competitors. Secondly, IBM is considered by industry 
analysts4 to be one of the first and leading providers in the ‘smart’ city market 
                                                 
2 “Smarter Cities” has been trademarked by IBM to refer to its solutions and services within the 
‘smart’ city market. In the context of this research, it should be noted that when I refer to Smarter 
Cities my reference goes beyond just the trademark. Rather, I am explicitly referencing IBM’s entire 
campaign to develop and expand its presence and work in this market, including relevant research, 
marketing, advertising, sales, communications, products, offerings, operations, presentations, 
websites, social media, webinars, and enablement materials, among others. When specifically 
referencing this IBM campaign, I keep Smarter Cities capitalized so it is not to be confused with the 
generalized nomenclature of ‘smart’ within urban discourse that typically refers to the adoption of 
these technologies within urban environments.  
3 I further discuss my relationship with IBM and the constraints and limitations this posed for my 
research in Chapter 3.  
4 Industry analysts such as Frost and Sullivan (World News, 2014), Navigant Research (PR 
Newswire, 2013), Forrester Research, Inc. (2013) and IDC (IBM, 2013b) ranked IBM as the lead 
provider of ‘smart’ city solutions for 2013 and 2014.   
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(Hamm, 2009b; IBM, 2013a; PR Newswire, 2013; World News, 2014)—evidenced 
in part by the fact that in the five years since I began this research, the company has 
gone from implementing roughly fifteen ‘smart’ city projects to over ten thousand 
(IBM, 2014b). IBM’s role and presence in the smart city market make it an 
important actor to understand (McNeill, 2014; Söderström et al., 2014).  
 
Due to this focus, my analysis is informed by IBM’s definition and understanding of 
the concept of ‘smart’. ‘Smart’5 as defined by IBM, and as implicitly agreed upon by 
the local government actors participating in IBM projects, refers to the merging of 
physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, grid, water) and natural systems (e.g. waterways, 
weather) with digital infrastructure (broadband,6 Internet and data centers) to create 
new technical systems within cities (Bevan and Briody, 2009; IBM, 2009a). As such, 
the aim of smart initiatives, according to IBM, is to enable the continuous capture, 
aggregation and analysis of data from various types of systems to provide insight in 
ways that allows more effective and efficient, or optimized, operations. Within this 
context, IBM, and the actors with whom it collaborates, perceive a smart city as one 
that takes advantage of data and advanced analytics to gain insight, integrate 
disparate systems, predict consequences and suggest proactive responses (Dirks and 
Keeling, 2009; Dirks et al., 2009; IBM, 2009a). Within recent years, IBM’s 
definitional framework has been slightly broadened to include a more citizen-centric 
perspective (IBM, 2014b, 2014j) in an attempt to create new business opportunities.  
 
Given that my research explores the intersections of the public and private sectors in 
addressing urban issues, and that IBM’s Smarter Cities’ strategy and approach 
construes the city as a market (Watson, 2010), I have grounded my analysis in 
conceptual literature that sheds light on theory surrounding the private sector’s 
growing role within the public sphere, namely that from the neoliberal and urban 
entrepreneurial traditions (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 1989a; Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). This literature—situated within a certain place, era and time—
                                                 
5 From this point forward, when I use the term smart it will refer to IBM’s definition of the concept 
unless otherwise noted. Thus, I will no longer use single quotation marks to signify the that this term 
has various meanings and understandings.  
6 “The term broadband refers to the wide bandwidth characteristics of a transmission medium and its 
ability to transport multiple signals and traffic types simultaneously. The medium can be coaxial 
cable, optical fiber, twisted pair, DSL local telephone networks or wireless” (Carty, 2002, p. 4).  
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theorizes about the spread of capitalistic strategies and systems, and posits how they 
have informed, and are purportedly continuing to inform, the public sector. Hence, 
these traditions provide a conducive framework for understanding IBM’s strategy 
and approaches to smart city projects and the ways in which the organization steers 
interaction with local governments. In addition, to enable exploration into a broader 
set of actors interacting with local government policy and planning processes, I 
employ a conceptualization of urban governance that goes beyond elected officials 
and formal structures of government to include a wider coalition and set of actors 
addressing urban affairs (Harvey, 1989a). These conceptual underpinnings and 
definitions are described further in Chapter 2.  
 
Initial key informant interviews with urban experts and technical consultants who 
have worked with smart projects helped me identify my framework for analysis and 
research questions. In these interviews, interviewees repeatedly acknowledged three 
main areas in which IT providers seemed to interact most frequently with urban 
governance. These areas include: (a) strategy—i.e., project objectives and how to 
prioritize and achieve them; (b) engagement—in terms of which actors are involved, 
the roles they play, and their interactions with and expectations of each other; and (c) 
representation—or how the local government portrays the project through narrative 
and brand. I elaborate on this analytical framework in Chapter 2, and the 
methodology for these interviews in Chapter 3. Based on this framework, my 
research addresses several questions: How are smart projects, steered by IT 
providers, interacting with local government city objectives, priorities and 
approaches, and what might be the implications of this interaction? How are smart 
projects changing the roles and expectations of local government and city residents, 
and what is the role of the IT provider within this transformation? And, how might 
smart project narratives and brands be informing the redesign of urban governance 
mechanisms?  
 
While exploring these questions, I view smart initiatives not simply as technical but 
social and political strategies, for these projects are concerned not only with 
technological innovations but also with ‘innovation’ in the relationships, interactions 
and discourse that surround these interventions. I look at projects where the tech 
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provider7 and / or local government have self-described their efforts as smart. I do 
not set out to ascertain if these efforts are smart or to evaluate their level of 
smartness. Although observations made from exploring these questions may point to 
wider tendencies of the smart city trend within other urban environments, these 
findings are not necessarily germane to all similar types of cities or situations. My 
assertions are more likely to be applicable to smart efforts by other large IT 
providers in American cities of similar local governance structure and size.  
 
Since the number of urban environments where smart technologies are being infused 
across city systems and services is increasing (Fast Company, 2011; PR Newswire, 
2013; The Economist, 2010c), and since other large technology providers are also 
gaining opportunities to become involved in urban governance through smart 
projects, it is important to understand this trend in closer empirical and analytical 
details. To date there has been “little critical reflection on the wider implications of 
technologically rooted entrepreneurial urban development” or the consequences of 
these initiatives (Kitchin, 2014a, p. 2). In academia, those within the sciences or 
computer sciences have focused on smart technologies and associated policies 
(Batty, 2013; Harrison et al., 2009; West, 2011), while other analyses of smart have 
tended to focus on the discourse created around the concept (Greenfield, 2013; 
Hollands, 2008; Shelton et al., 2014). While these are useful areas of analysis, they 
fall short of providing “detailed genealogies of the concept and initiatives”, the 
evolution of associated rhetoric, and empirical case studies that compare and contrast 
smart projects in different cities (Kitchin, 2014a, p. 1). My research begins to fill 
these gaps by offering an in-depth view of a smart city IT provider alongside the rise 
of the corporate entrepreneurial smart city, and from these findings, suppositions on 
what these initiatives might mean for municipal administrations and city residents in 
comparable urban environments. 
 
                                                 
7 Throughout this work, I refer to information technology providers as both IT providers and tech 
providers. The “tech provider” nomenclature is common parlance within the IT industry. I believe the 
shortening of “information technology provider” to “tech provider” within the industry, while less 
awkward, also reflects to an extent a common theme within this industry—the attempt to simplify the 
complex to increase (or at times decrease) transparency and understanding. While I do not examine 
this specific aspect of simplification within my work, I do explore simplification by the IT provider as 
it relates to smart projects. 
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1.2 Structure of Thesis 
 
In Chapter 2, I describe the conceptual underpinnings that informed my research and 
analysis framework. I begin by discussing the emergence of smart initiatives, the 
various applications and manifestations of the smart concept, and potential broader 
implications of these endeavors. I then look at theories around the context within 
which these projects have emerged, including neoliberal and urban entrepreneurial 
traditions that highlight the intersections of the public and private sectors within the 
public domain. In this discussion, I elaborate on how the assumptions of smart align 
with urban entrepreneurial characteristics and a neoliberal ethos applied to localities. 
I end this chapter by situating my framework for analysis within conceptual debates 
around what I have defined as strategy, engagement and representation. In Chapter 3, 
I present my methodology. For each research technique employed—desk research, 
key informant interviews and case study analysis—I explain my approach to the 
method, how it contributed to my analysis and the advantages and disadvantages of 
this method in the context of my research. I complete this chapter with a discussion 
on my insider status with IBM and the challenges and risks associated with this 
positioning.  
 
To identify key issues and trends to inform my case study analysis, I provide a 
deeper examination of conceptual debates and theories around my analytical 
framework of strategy, engagement and representation in Chapter 4. I juxtapose this 
conceptual analysis with the perspectives of IT providers, thereby giving insight into 
how different actors are defining and understanding smart initiatives. I look at 
strategic aspects of and approaches employed within smart projects, and the typical 
engagement arrangements around them in terms of the types of actors involved and 
their interactions with and expectations of each other. I discuss, on a broad level, 
how these smart project strategies, approaches and partnership arrangements may 
influence aspects of urban governance. I then look at the role of narrative in urban 
planning, and how smart project narratives may be informing the redesign of urban 
governance mechanisms due to the way that they shape how urban problems are 
understood and conceived, which in turn informs the solutions that are devised to 
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address these challenges. I end this section by discussing how smart projects can be 
construed as not only a technological ‘fix’ but also a ‘brand fix’ for cities.  
 
Before turning to my case studies, I devote an entire chapter to explore the IT 
provider IBM in Chapter 5. I discuss the evolution of IBM’s Smarter Cities 
campaign and look at the narratives that this actor has created around smart 
initiatives. I highlight the ways in which IBM has been able to disseminate its 
Smarter Cities stories and brand through the implementation of these projects and the 
associated narratives and partnership arrangements that go along with them. I 
provide a critical analysis of the IT consulting that is part of these endeavors, and 
look at how IBM has helped shape the smart city market, including the approaches of 
other smart city providers. I end with a discussion of how IBM’s Smarter Cities 
campaign, while affecting external forces and actors, also has had impact internally 
on the firm.  
 
Chapter 6 through 9 are my city case study chapters, where I apply observations and 
suppositions from Chapters 2, 4 and 5 to see how these have or have not manifested 
in smart projects in Dubuque and Portland. Findings from each case study city are 
detailed in two chapters. The first chapter on the Dubuque case study, Chapter 6, 
starts with an overview of the city and its sustainability strategy and looks at how the 
local government is pursuing smart technologies through the city’s Smarter 
Sustainable Dubuque endeavor, which involves a range of smart technology projects, 
including smart water and electricity portals. In this chapter, I look at how IBM has 
interacted with the local government around the strategy and engagement 
arrangements associated with these projects, and what the implications of this 
interaction might be. In Chapter 7, I examine the narratives and brand created around 
smart projects in Dubuque, and how the IT provider IBM has shaped these forms of 
representation, which have gone beyond smart projects to inform the way that the 
local government represents the city.   
 
In Chapter 8, the first case study chapter on Portland, I introduce the city by 
providing a brief social and historical context and then discuss aspects of IBM’s 
interactions with strategy and engagement processes, viewed through the lens of a 
  
 18 
research project on crowdsourcing to inform urban planning. Chapter 9 outlines the 
Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities project in Portland, where a systems thinking 
modeling tool was developed to inform decision making and resource allocation. In 
this chapter, I examine IBM’s interactions with urban governance around project 
strategy and representation. This chapter provides insight into a case where IT 
provider interactions have had negligible effect on the local government and / or its 
processes—an example that contrasts the Dubuque experience, where the local 
government’s boosterish approach to smart has led to this concept being integrated 
into aspects of city strategy, engagement arrangements and representation.  
 
I conclude my investigation in Chapter 10, which discusses key findings from my 
analysis of smart projects in Dubuque and Portland. In this chapter, I explore how 
together, these case studies offer snapshots of two cities’ very different paths to 
smart. In one, the local government charged forward without hesitation, seeking the 
dazzling images of the smart city proffered by IBM. In the other instance, the local 
government treaded slowly considering the value of the journey and the desirability 
of the destination. I end this chapter by discussing how, through interactions around 
smart projects, IBM was able to promote its assertions about local government and 
governance. This IBM vision is informed by entrepreneurial and neoliberal 
principles, and reinforces the notions of the privatization, commodification and 
marketization of public provision. Extrapolating from these observations, I explore 
the implications that these endeavors may have for local governments and city 
residents in similar urban environments.  
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2 Debates and Conceptual Underpinnings 
 
Cities8 are often viewed as centers for innovation and creativity, enabling the 
intermingling of people, knowledge and resources to bring new ideas to fruition 
(Florida, 2002, 2008; Glaeser, 2011). Just as cities have enabled the creation of new 
technologies, technologies have played a key role in the configuring and 
reconfiguring of urban environments. Over the past two centuries the power elevator 
(Goodwin, 2001), the skyscraper (Dupré, 2008), sewer and sanitation systems 
(Melosi, 2000), electrification (Hughes, 1983; Nye, 1990), the subway and rail 
systems (Middleton, 2003), the car (Naess, 2006), and telecommunications (Graham 
and Marvin, 1996) have all affected the growth and development of cities. Recent 
debates within urban discourse, especially within advanced capitalist milieus,9 have 
increasingly shifted to discussion around integrating smart technologies into city 
systems and services (Hollands, 2008). This trend is touted by those supporting 
smart projects as the next paradigm shift within cities to spur growth and 
development. As noted by Marvin and Luque (2013), smart projects are “being 
represented as the response to almost every facet of the contemporary urban 
question” (p. 2).10 Given this emphasis on applying smart projects to ameliorate 
varied urban challenges, it is critical to understand the nature and evolution of the 
smart city trend.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the debates and conceptual literature key to informing my 
research approach and questions. I begin by looking at the technological precursors 
to smart, for the application of information and / or communication technologies to 
urban systems is not a new phenomenon. I then discuss the concept of smart and the 
various ways in which it has manifested and been applied—reflecting to some extent 
the elasticity of the term, and how this affords tech providers with a myriad of ways 
                                                 
8 Conceptualizations of what comprises a city vary. For the purposes of this research, I view cities not 
as active agents but things (Harvey, 1989a), as fluid and dynamic versus stable and bounded (Amin 
and Thrift, 2002, p. 37). Through my work, a city is seen as a public urban sphere “made of multiple 
orders of value and groups of people often running parallel to each other” (Farais, 2010, p. 19). 
9 This trend of the concept of smart being woven into debates about urban development is most 
predominant in Western countries (Hollands, 2008), but is not confined to them, also appearing for 
example in initiatives in China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates (Fast 
Company, 2011).  
10 Marvin and Luque (2013) refer to this as “Smart Urbanism”.  
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to package and sell these technologies. I follow with a section that explores 
suppositions about the broader implications of this for urban environments.  
 
After reviewing the concept and some of the potential consequences of smart 
endeavors, I turn to examine the conceptual literature that informed my analysis of 
IT provider interactions, namely select works from the neoliberal and urban 
entrepreneurial traditions (Agranoff, 2003; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 
1989a; Peck and Tickell). Given that private sector and public sector interactions are 
at the center of smart projects, this literature proved useful in illuminating various 
theories around how these sectors come together to address urban issues and 
challenges, and what their roles, processes, perspectives and models within this may 
be. I end with a discussion that outlines my research questions and explains my 
analytical framework to explore these questions—for this framework has shaped the 
way that I have organized and relayed my findings and observations in Chapters 4-
10.  
 
2.1 Technological Precursors to Smart Projects  
 
Smart projects did not appear in a vacuum. Rather they stem from decades of 
advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) and their 
applications within urban environments. Three advances have been critical in setting 
the stage for smart projects city to emerge: fiber optics, cellular phones / networks 
and the Internet. In the 1990s, copper wires began being increasingly replaced with 
optical fibers, or bundles of thin strands of glass or plastic that carry signals through 
burst of laser light, creating the “infobahn”, or information superhighway (Mitchell, 
1995, pp. 3-5). Around the same time, telephones became mobile, free from the 
cable network that tied them (ibid.). Soon after, the commercial expansion of the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense’s network, 
ARPANET, was replaced by a National Science Foundation-funded network that 
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opened protocols to expand for broader communication between computers, birthing 
the Internet (Roberts and Steadman, 1999, Chapter 8, kl. 6457, 658411).  
 
Concomitant to advances in ICT, sensor technologies have also improved, leading to 
a huge rise in instrumentation. As of 2010, there were already one billion transistors 
per human and four times more radio frequency identification (RFID) tags than 
people in the world (Dirks et al., 2009, p. 1; IBM, 2009a, p. 9; Palmisano, 2010a). 
Significant within this trend, and also a key component of the smart city, is the 
exponential rise of people acting as sensors by providing information through cell 
phones, digital cameras, and / or the Internet—there are over five billion mobile 
subscriptions and over two billion people on the Internet (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2010; Mobithinking, 2010). This rising instrumentation 
has implications for cities as it is extending the technical to human (Bijker and Law, 
1992; Latour, 2005), moving sensors from the hands of experts and into the hands of 
everyday users:  
 
Anything and anyone—machines, devices, everyday things, and particularly 
humans—can become a sensor, gathering and transmitting information 
about the real world. (The Economist, 2010a)  
 
And, as objects are progressively more equipped with sensors to generate data, they 
are also increasingly being made to communicate with each other, providing 
knowledge about the systems in which they are connected. There are about 30 billion 
networked objects in the world (Press, 2015), creating an “Internet of things” 12 
where the physical is wrapped with virtual, and is growing exponentially (IDC, 
2009; Schmidt, 2010). This web of interconnectivity between objects and / or people 
is changing city landscapes and the relationships between and among things and 
people within cities in ways that IT providers are deeming to be smart.  
 
                                                 
11 For all Kindle edition books that do not contain page numbers I provide the chapter number and 
Kindle location for referencing.   
12 The concept of an “Internet of things,” where real and virtual worlds are connected, dates back to 
the late 1980s and stems from the work of Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) researchers on 
ubiquitous computing in Silicon Valley (PARC, 2011).  
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Yet, despite the way smart city projects are being packaged and sold, the notion 
behind using “rational, rigorous and more ‘scientific’ methods of quantitative and 
computational data analysis” to make a city smart is not new (Shelton et al., 2014, p. 
2). For over a century, planners and engineers have sought to make the management 
of cities more scientific, and to date, “grand solutions to social planning” have not 
yielded great results (Shelton et al., 2014). As sagely noted by Anthony Townsend 
(2013), “if the history of city building in the last century tells us anything, it is that 
the unintended consequences of new technologies often dwarf their intended design” 
(p. 14). An examination of modeling and its application to cities provides a good 
example of such grand solutions and unintended consequences. Initial applications 
date back to the 1950s with military, computer science, business and electrical 
engineering applications being foisted onto urban environments (Townsend, 2013, 
pp. 79-81). During the Second World War, Norbert Wiener from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) conceived “cybernetics”, the idea that information 
flows created by sensing and feedback mechanisms can optimize performance within 
any kind of system. In his cybernetics hypothesis, interactions between things (or 
variables) within a system can be represented by mathematical equations, and 
predictions can be made by changing inputs and then observing ripple effects that 
show up within the system. This concept of cybernetics was applied to modeling 
transportation, land use and social services in American cities like Pittsburgh and 
New York City. Almost immediately, problems with this approach became apparent 
(Townsend, 2013, pp. 79-81).  
 
Joe Flood (2010) examined this approach to urban planning through modeling in his 
book The Fires: How a Computer Formula Burned Down New York City--and 
Determined the Future of American Cities. In this work, Flood demonstrates the 
risks and vulnerabilities associated with reducing complex city issues to data and 
algorithms by examining how such a model failed in New York City. Under the 
auspices of the RAND Corporation and its computer models, city leaders were 
guided to make decisions to save millions of dollars by closing several fire stations 
in some of the city’s poorest neighborhoods. This over-zealous focus on efficiency, 
fused with an overreliance on technocrats and algorithms, resulted in a series of 
difficult-to-control fires in the South Bronx, the Lower East Side, Harlem and 
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Brooklyn over the next decade, leaving thousands dead and hundreds of thousands 
displaced. Despite this blatant failure of urban modeling, RAND sold its approach 
across the United States, laying the foundation for technocratic decision making, a 
mainstay of smart endeavors, to take hold (Flood, 2010, pp. 19-24, 263-277). This 
application of computer modeling is just one example of how over time technologies 
have been packaged and sold to local governments. Smart projects provide a myriad 
of new examples of how technological advancements can be marketed and 
commodified within urban environments.    
 
2.2 Unpacking the Concept of Smart 
 
With the rise of ICT, local governments have increasingly explored strategies and 
programs to integrate these technologies across city services and systems—a pursuit 
generating diverse nomenclature, including: “wired” (Dutton et al., 1987 in Kitchin, 
2014b), “cyber” (Graham and Marvin 1999), “digital” (Ishida and Isbister, 2000 in 
Kitchin, 2014b; Yovanof and Hazapis, 2009 in Nam and Pardo, 2011), “intelligent” 
(Komninos, 2002; Moser, 2001 in Nam and Pardo, 2011), “virtual” (Albino et al., 
2015; Nam and Pardo, 2011), and “ubiquitous” (Albino et al., 2015; Townsend, 
2013), among others (Castells, 1996; Graham and Marvin, 1996, 2001). The term 
smart was first used in the 1990s to typically refer to the application of ICT to city 
infrastructure systems, with the California Institute for Smart Communities being 
one of the first actors to explore how a community could be designed to become 
smart. A few years later, the Center of Governance at the University of Ottawa 
broadened the term’s application by expanding the concept to include a governance-
oriented approach instead of a sole emphasis on ICT (Albino et al., 2015). Since, the 
term smart has taken hold across government, academia and the private sector, and 
has quickly become an urban labelling phenomenon (Albino et al., 2015; Kitchin, 
2014b). 
 
A review of relevant literature however—whether blogs, news articles, press 
releases, books, case studies, academic journals or technical “white papers”—makes 
it clear that despite all this rising attention to smart cities, there is no commonly 
shared definition of the term (Albino et al., 2015; Hollands, 2008). Rather, it varies 
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according to city, context, conditions, project, city system, technologies, local 
government, tech provider and individuals, among others. Viewpoints of smart held 
by local governments, the private sector, civic actors, city residents and academics 
vary, between and amongst each other (Hollands, 2008; Kitchin, 2014a):  
 
Ask an IBM engineer and he will tell you about the potential for efficiency 
and optimization. Ask an app developer and she will paint a vision of novel 
social interactions and experiences in public places. Ask a mayor and it is 
all about participation and democracy. (Townsend, 2013, p. 15)  
 
This elasticity and variability of the concept has benefitted tech providers, enabling 
them to package and sell their technologies in numerous ways; for smart is portrayed 
within urban discourse as a panacea to many city-life woes (Marvin and Luque, 
2013; Miller, 2013). The term itself tends to carry positive connotations—for 
example, if a project, program or policy is not smart, then it is likely to be 
ineffective, inefficient or unwise (Hollands, 2008). It is a label that automatically 
infers “positive transformation” (Söderström et al., 2014, p. 5). Yet, degrees of smart 
remain fuzzy. Since it is a self-designated label assigned by city officials or those 
implementing smart projects or policies, and is without standardized indicators to 
measure levels of smart, it can become difficult to say how much smart exists in 
reality or remains a matter of clever marketing—or, lies somewhere in between 
(Albino et al., 2015; Hollands, 2008; Söderström et al., 2014).  
 
Reproach of smart projects within broader urban discourse can be challenging, for it 
is tough to be critical of these initiatives without sounding like a Luddite. If you are 
against smart initiatives, you may be seen as being against progress, efficiency and 
enhanced understanding. Frequently within urban discourse, smart is portrayed as the 
only way forward. As noted by Alan Wiig (2015), narratives about the smart city 
“cast a largely uncritical eye on the entire process, assuming there is no other path 
forward but to use information technologies to ‘solve’ urban problems” (p. 260). It 
would seem that smart narratives are constructed in ways to diminish debate. To an 
extent, technology is driving the conversation, rather than the conversation driving 
the technology—hence giving power to the term, and the IT providers that harness it.  
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2.2.1 Taxonomies and Applications of Smart  
 
Several academics have conducted taxonomies of the varied conceptualizations and 
applications of smart to help better elucidate the underpinnings of this trend (Albino 
et al., 2015; Kitchin, 2014b; Nam and Pardo, 2011; White, 2015). Each of these 
various applications reflect different approaches that tech providers have undertaken 
to package and sell smart technologies. In addition to smart projects emphasizing the 
application of ICT, they have also included focus on learning environments (Coe et 
al., 2000; Deakin and Al Waer, 2011; Florida, 2005); innovation (Deakin and Al 
Waer, 2011; Florida, 2005); changes in urban governance practices (Deakin and Al 
Waer, 2011; Kitchin et al., 2015; Steinert et al., 2011; White, 2015); economic 
development (Caragliu et al., 2009; Hollands, 2008); sustainability (Duany et al., 
2010; ICC, 2010; Steinert et al., 2011; The Climate Group, 2008); and branding 
ploys (Hollands, 2008; Shelton et al., 2014). Despite this wide variation, it is clear 
that smart is not just the employment of ICTs in city operations (Hollands, 2008; 
Caragliu et al., 2011), nor is smart an end in itself, rather it is a means to other 
desired outcomes (Eger, 2009, p. 48).  
 
Figure 1. Fundamental components of the smart city 
 
Source: Nam and Pardo, 2011, p. 286.  
 
In their analysis of the varied applications of the concept, Taewoo Nam and Theresa 
Pardo (2011) categorized smart endeavors into three dimensions: technology 
(infrastructures of hardware and software), people (creativity, diversity and 
education), and institutions (governance and policy)—finding that variations of the 
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concept are mutually connected and not independent of each other, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. They conclude that “given the connection between the factors, a city is 
smart when investments in human / social capital and IT infrastructure fuel 
sustainable growth and enhance a quality of life, through participatory governance” 
(Tam and Pardo, 2011, p. 286).  
 
Rob Kitchin (2014b), in his article “The real-time city? Big data and smart 
urbanism”, classifies varied understandings of smart into two main camps, one with 
a narrow aperture focused on using sensors and ICT to monitor and manage city 
operations; and the other with a broader vision linked to the development of a 
knowledge economy. In the first instance, “pervasive and ubiquitous computing and 
digitally instrumented devices” are built into and across city infrastructure and 
systems to “monitor, manage and regulate city flows and processes, often in real 
time” and mobile devices are used by city residents to engage with the environments 
around them and share data they create through this engagement (Kitchin, 2014b, p. 
2). In so doing, Kitchin proposes that the city becomes more “knowable and 
controllable”, thereby enabling improved performance of city services and increased 
participation (2014b, p. 2).  
 
In the second instance, where smart is applied more broadly, Kitchin states that it 
refers to the development of a knowledge economy within a region or urban 
environment. In this conceptualization, a city that is smart is one where its economy 
and governance are “being driven by innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship, 
enacted by smart people” (2014b, p.2). Here, information and communication 
technologies are used as platforms for spurring ideas and innovations and bringing 
them to fruition—i.e., ICT is combined with human and social capital to spur urban 
growth and development (Caragliu et al., 2009 in Kitchin, 2014b). In elucidating the 
difference between these two visions of the smart city, Kitchin notes that in the first 
instance, ICT is primarily used to manage and regulate the city from a “largely 
technocratic and technological perspective” (2014b, p. 2). In case of the latter, the 
smart city vision “encompasses policies related to human capital, education, 
economic development and governance and how they can be enhanced by ICT”, 
where technologies enable innovation and growth (ibid.). Despite these variations, 
  
 27 
Kitchin posits that there are underlying themes that unite the two—a neoliberal ethos 
that prioritizes “market-led and technological solutions to city governance and 
development” and a prioritization of data capture and analysis to inform decision 
making, with data as an essential component to make a city smart (2014b, p. 2).  
 
There have been several academics who have explored the broader conceptualization 
of smart as classified by Kitchin (2014b), where a city becomes smart by using 
technology to create a knowledge economy (see Caragliu et al., 2011; Coe et al., 
2001; Florida, 2005). In this vein, Mark Deakin and Husam Al Waer (2011, 2012) 
have explored how ICT can be applied within urban environments to foster 
innovative and creative partnerships that may not have emerged otherwise due to the 
“information-rich and highly communicative qualities” of the smart transition (2012, 
p. 8). They posit that learning, knowledge transfer and capacity building, facilitated 
by ICT projects and programs, are key elements to making a city smart (Deakin and 
Al Waer, 2011, 2012). Similarly, J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, Theresa Pardo and Taewoo 
Nam (2015) note that “technology enables smart but it is a human capacity. ICT 
alone does not make a city smart, human actors drive the process and change” (p. ix). 
In their conceptualization of a smart city, Gil-Garcia et al. (2015) suggest that a city 
is not truly smart unless there is public sector innovation that is leveraged from smart 
city projects. Hence, to them, cities that are smart creatively combine new 
technologies and innovation within the public sector (Gil-Garcia et al., 2015). 
 
Another conceptualization of the smart city encompasses how ICT is applied to city 
systems and services to spur economic growth (Caragliu et al., 2011; Hollands, 2008; 
White, 2015); yet another explores how technology in cities could be used to 
empower citizens by adapting those technologies to their needs rather than adapting 
their lives to the technological exigencies (Kitchin, 2014b; Vanolo 2014). These 
diverse examples of the application of smart demonstrate the elasticity of the 
concept—variability that has afforded IT providers ample opportunity within the 
smart city market to partner with local government agencies in the pursuit of a wide 
range of outcomes. These desired results are also broadly defined. A smart city is 
generally depicted as one that is able to “create and maintain a strong attractiveness, 
safety and security, abundant economic opportunity, sophisticated and effective 
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infrastructures of all kinds, and a healthy natural environment based on a model of 
smart democratic governance” (Gil-Garcia et al., 2015, pp. viii-ix). In this manner, 
smart projects are portrayed as a solution to a host of city challenges. In Europe for 
example, according to the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies, “smart City initiatives can be considered a useful vehicle for cities to 
achieve their Europe 2020 targets”, which touch upon employment, innovation, the 
environment, education and poverty (Manville et al., 2014, p. 63). In this case, it is 
believed that smart city projects across each of these focus areas will help achieve 
the European Union’s overall strategy goal of “boosting growth and jobs across the 
region in order to create a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy” (Manville et 
al., 2014, p. 63). Here, as commonly elsewhere within urban discourse, it would 
seem that no matter what city system or service, smart projects are considered as 
useful tools to ameliorate and enhance returns.  
 
What is often ignored within this discourse around smart is the fact that just because 
the technology is available does not mean that it should be employed. Utopian 
conceptualizations of smart cities can lead to overlooking alternative avenues of 
promising urban development, including those that do not depend on a business-led 
model (Caragliu et al., 2011), or cheaper, low-tech solutions that could have greater 
impact. In this vein, some experts within urban discourse criticize smart projects as 
nothing but clever marketing, where the same or similar technologies are utilized but 
just packaged differently to create and increase demand. Without the backing of 
research and development (R&D) investment to create new core technologies, one 
could convincingly argue that smart projects are nothing more than off the shelf 
components that have been pieced together and compellingly packaged (Hollands, 
2008; Marvin and Luque, 2013; Townsend, 2013, p. 110). Whether truly ‘new’ 
technologies or not, the case for smart projects as presented by IT providers is 
alluring, and examples of smart projects abound across the world.  
 
For instance, Ottawa, Canada’s “Smart Capital” project aims to enhance business, 
local government and community through the use of Internet resources (Albino et al., 
2015). In the United Kingdom, local governments are trying to grow their smart city 
sector for export. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a plan for 100 
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smart cities shortly after being elected to office in 2014 (White, 2015). In the United 
States, the cities of San Diego and San Francisco have focused on applying ICT to 
water, sewer and electric infrastructure as a means to become smart. In the European 
Union, numerous cities—including Barcelona, Amsterdam, Berlin, Manchester, 
Edinburgh and Southampton—have pursued smart city policies across a range of 
sectors to enhance quality of life, spur economic growth, enhance efficiencies and 
foster sustainability (Albino et al., 2015). Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen are adopting smart city initiatives to help promote sustainability; and in 
Southeast Asia cities like Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong are promoting 
economic growth through smart programs (ibid.).13   
 
As one can see from these examples, the majority of initiatives undertaken for a city 
to be designated smart look nothing like the tabula rasa examples of Masdar and 
Living PlanIT Valley, which have been built from the ground up (see Appendix 11.1 
for additional details). Instead, most local governments pursuing smart projects adopt 
them piecemeal, project-by-project, system-by-system. In general these smart 
projects are not interconnected, with each city having its own path for smart 
technology adoption and application. Often, local governments decide to pursue this 
designation by adding smart technologies first to city infrastructure systems, such as 
water, energy or transportation—systems that are integral to a city’s existence, 
functioning and health (Braudel, 1992; Byrne and Rich, 1985; Swyngedouw, 2004). 
In Appendix 11.2, I provide examples of smart technologies applied to these city 
infrastructure systems, and how smart projects can also be utilized to inform the 
urban planning around them. As these types of initiatives spread across city systems 
around the world, they present a range of implications for cities that extend beyond 
the system to which they are applied.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 I highlight additional examples of smart city projects in Chapters 6-9 as they relate to my case 
studies. 
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2.3 Broader Implications for Urban Environments  
 
In Chapters 6-10, I explore the initial repercussions of the IBM Smarter Cities 
projects that I observed in Dubuque and Portland. Beyond these observations, there 
are a broad range of potential implications for urban environments that have been 
noted by other academics exploring the significance of the smart and related 
technological trends, including, among others, increased exclusion, autocratic 
decision making, commodification of infrastructure and social, economic, and 
political fragmentation—each are discussed briefly below. 
 
2.3.1 Networked Urbanism 
 
In most Western cities, from the 1920s until the 1960s, or the period of high 
modernism, city leaders often worked to standardize the development of water, 
energy, transport and communication infrastructures, which were typically viewed as 
public goods, and most often delivered through public or private monopolies. These 
networked infrastructures became critical aspects to city functioning, and given their 
growing normalization and ubiquity, in many ways have been taken for granted 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 10-12). Local governments and city residents have 
assumed a basic level of infrastructure functioning, but outside of that do not have 
great insight into how these systems work, nor into how they consume the resources 
these systems provide (Giddens, 1990, pp. 29, 59; Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 10-
12). As noted by Matthew Gandy:  
 
Until recently, the understanding of technological networks and the ‘hidden 
city’ [has] been largely left to engineers whilst other ‘visible’ aspects of 
urban design [have been] perceived as the traditional domain of architects 
and urban planners. (2004, p. 365) 
 
An examination of infrastructure systems can shed light on dynamics within a city, 
including the technical and governance aspects related to these systems (Dupuy, 
1991; Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 9-11). It is this type of analysis that Stephen 
Graham and Simon Marvin (2001) conduct in their book Splintering Urbanism: 
Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. In 
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this work, Graham and Marvin apply a Science and Technology Studies lens to 
examine infrastructure networks and their associated technologies, and how these are 
inextricably linked to social practices, values, policies and the economy—
ascertaining that urban infrastructure is both technical and social (2001, p. 8). They 
document the rising frequency with which these standardized network infrastructures 
are being replaced with “premium network spaces”, where higher quality 
infrastructure projects enable qualified users to withdraw from the standardized, 
public networks (Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 389-390). This trend is facilitated 
by mounting consumerism and neoliberal principles such as progressive 
liberalization and privatization of formerly public services and infrastructures. 
Examples of these “premium network spaces” include contained fiber-optic networks 
accessible only to those in a certain region; drinking water and sewage services 
secured solely for formal communities; fee-based high occupancy vehicle or express 
lanes, also known as private highway corridors; and gated communities (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001, pp. 2-5, 10-13).  
 
Smart projects may further enable and entrench these types of premium networks, 
leading to economic, political and social fragmentation within urban regions 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001). As suggested by Castells (1996, 1997, 1998), the 
processes associated with these network changes directly support the emergence of 
an increasingly urbanized, globally integrated and highly fragmented network 
society, stitched together by smart city systems. For example, socioeconomic and 
technical divides may lead to exclusion from or lack of access to some city systems, 
resulting in increased stratification within cities (Castells, 1996, 1998; M. Davis, 
1992; Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 247; Madon et al., 2009; McLaughlin and 
Muncie, 1999). While “social biases have always been designed into urban 
infrastructure systems, whether intentionally or unintentionally” (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001, p. 11), smart technologies have the potential to solidify and reinforce 
boundaries to access and exclusion (Madon et al., 2009; Star, 1999).  
 
As the public goods associated with city infrastructures increasingly become 
‘marketable commodities’ and they are integrated with smart technologies, the use of 
and access to these systems will be decreasingly perceived as integral parts of 
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modern citizenship or city resident rights (Gandy, 2004, p. 371). This restructuring 
of infrastructure systems will also reorganize “urban forms, lifestyles and 
landscapes” (Mitchell, 1999 in Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 15). Further 
contributing to this notion of fragmentation within cities is the fact that these types of 
projects may divert resources and attention away from broader urban challenges 
(Harvey, 1989a). For example, Harvey (1989a) finds that such endeavors can lead to 
adverse effects on the distribution of income: “concentration on spectacle and image 
rather than on the substance of economic and social problems can also prove 
deleterious in the long-run, even though political benefits can all too easily be had” 
(p. 16).  
 
On top of this, smart initiatives have the potential to exacerbate issues of access, 
especially if they are primarily driven by governments and business. In his book 
Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia, 
Anthony Townsend (2013) explores the dangers of the tech provider’s “top-
down” approach to urban development that comes hand-in-hand with projects 
that are overseen by large IT companies. Instead, Townsend suggests that there 
should be space for community-based “bottom-up” innovation and 
entrepreneurialism14 (pp. 18, 86, 110). One key issue with a top-down approach 
is that it implies that data and analytics are a tool of government for facilitating 
their means and furthering their ends (Townsend, 2013, pp. 86, 249). Especially 
in the case of IBM narratives, data and analytics are discussed as apparatuses for 
city leaders to improve their operations and systems—there is little, if any, 
discussion on how city residents themselves can use these to improve or enhance 
city life. However, this top-down approach does not always go hand-in-hand 
with smart projects; there are many examples of smart city endeavors emerging 
from the bottom-up, reflecting a more communitarian and participatory 
approach to urban governance (Deakin and Al Waer, 2011). This civic model of 
smart projects however is not one typically reflected or emphasized in IT 
provider approaches or narratives.  
                                                 
14 The terms top-down and bottom-up are common within change and / or organizational management 
discourse, and in general refer to actions or policies initiated at the highest level or lowest level, 
respectively (Hamel, 1996; Sirkin et al., 2005).  
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As the role of the private sector is expanding in the management and provision 
of infrastructure services within cities, it accentuates the potential for a top-
down approach. And, while doing so, it also changes the ways in which cities 
have been customarily understood—as mechanisms to support markets, versus 
being a market. Large parts of urban operations traditionally have been publicly 
owned, controlled and managed (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009; Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Yet, within the smart city market, “the 
infrastructure sector is now one of the most important sectors in international 
flows of finance, capital, technology and expertise” (Graham and Marvin, 2001, 
p.14). Linked to this expanded private sector role, is the increasing number of 
collaborative relationships (mergers, acquisitions, partnerships, etc.) between 
utility companies and infrastructure corporations (Curwen, 1999; McGowan, 
1999). This is driving urban governments to become more entrepreneurial as the 
private sector increases its involvement in public services and cities increasingly 
compete against each other in a bid to draw in business and investment.  
 
2.3.2 Government Vulnerability and Responsibility 
 
From a technical perspective, there are two rather large risks associated with the 
adoption of smart technologies: their tendency to be “buggy” and “brittle” 
(Townsend, 2013, pp. 252-280)—each of which have implications for local 
government stability and accountability if problems these problems emerge. Cities 
and city systems are quite complex. As they become integrated with smart 
technologies, they become even more complex, with the potential of system bugs 
growing exponentially with each line of code or interaction. And, given the nature of 
computing, with various coders, developers and programmers from numerous 
companies creating modules of coding that are plugged together to create perhaps 
just one computer system, it is impossible to fully test any system before it is 
implemented. Hence, bugs will emerge. System failures will become a normal part of 
city systems—just like our own personal computers, laptops, e-readers, and cell 
phones can fail, so will city systems, or parts of city systems (Townsend, 2013, pp. 
276, 280). And, finding and addressing these bugs will be even more complex than 
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the process for personal devices, for failure will be on a grander scale, in a more 
complex environment, with the potential for cascade effects and much broader 
implications for individuals, businesses and government (Townsend, 2013, p. 276). 
These bugs can emerge from nonintentional mistakes in coding, or a result from 
hacking, which present yet another grand threat (Kitchin, 2014b).   
 
On top of that, smart systems are also brittle and break. Part of this fragility stems 
from the reliance of smart systems on cellular networks and the Internet. Although 
the latter has proven stable to date, cellular networks fail often, especially when 
overloaded with users or hit by natural disasters. Another potential area for failure 
stems from the fact that many smart city systems also rely upon or integrate GPS and 
its satellite network. As more and more city systems integrate smart technologies that 
pull on these systems—cellular networks, the Internet and GPS—the potential for 
systems failing grows (Townsend, 2013, pp. 260-262). When a smart city system 
breaks or fails, from either bugs or brittleness, who is accountable? At times it can be 
unclear who is responsible, or able, to fix the problem according to capability, 
contractual, legal and / or ethical obligations. Will it be the local government? The 
IT providers? The telecommunications providers? Due to the structure of these 
projects, accountability is spread across a wide range of groups, including not only 
contractors but subcontractors as well, making it difficult to address any issues that 
emerge (McNeill, 2014). This presents risks for local governments associated with 
the stability of city services and systems as smart projects spread.    
 
Debate over who should pay for integrating smart technologies into city systems is a 
key area of contention associated with these projects—presenting local governments 
with issues related to funding responsibility. Smart projects are often unfunded 
mandates, as the notion of smart is often tacked onto something else (City in Motion 
Meeting, 2011b). While efficiencies may be gained, questions emerge around issues 
like to whom do these efficiencies accrue and how does that relate to who is paying 
for the endeavor? For example, funding for smart transportation projects, depending 
on type and scope, will fall to system users (i.e., city residents and businesses 
through taxes), local government, businesses and / or potentially state or federal 
agencies. For smart utility projects, funding sources will also vary, with potential for 
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state or federal assistance, but most often the heavy burden rests upon the end-user, 
city residents and businesses (Confessore, 2007; Dobnik, 2007; Gandy, 2004; Hakim 
and Rivera, 2007; Zifcak, 2010). Further, maintenance of these systems is something 
that is often not considered until after smart projects are fully installed, and the need 
for continued operations raises several key questions: Will these costs stay the same 
for maintenance? Will they gradually increase? What types of unexpected, and 
unbudgeted, problems may emerge to add to anticipated costs? Who pays for 
required system / software updates? To an extent with smart projects the local 
governments fall to the mercy of the IT provider to keep things running along 
smoothly; and in the case of cloud city services, the local government is completely 
reliant upon the IT provider at all times, for they provide the continual backend 
operations upon which other services depend and reside. Despite these potential 
risks, and the challenges they may pose to local governments, the adoption of smart 
city projects is still on the rise (Fast Company, 2011; PR Newswire, 2013; The 
Economist, 2010c).  
 
2.3.3 Propagating the Smart City 
 
Through the partnerships around smart projects, ideas, frameworks and approaches 
are spread. Alan Wiig (2015) in his article “IBM’s Smart City as Techno-Utopia 
Mobility”, looks at this policy mobility in his examination of IBM’s Smarter Cities 
Challenge (SCC).15 He posits that the smart city is a “mask for entrepreneurial 
governance” strategies (p. 258) by situating these strategies within recent debates 
about policy mobilities around the global transfer of governance best practices 
(McCann and Ward, 2010, 2011 in Wiig, 2015). He finds that just as with 
sustainability policy, smart city best practices are being globally transferred through 
IT providers (like IBM) through the design and implementation of these projects, as 
well as the partnerships and narratives around them (Wiig, 2015). These ‘best 
practices’ include fostering “globalized business enterprise”; for according to Wiig, 
“smart city efforts are best understood as examples of outward-looking policy 
promotion for the globalized economy” (Wiig, 2015, p. 258-259). And, instead of 
                                                 
15 I discuss IBM’s Smarter Cities Challenge further in Chapter 5.  
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local governments focusing on more traditional forms to boost business enterprise, 
such as downtown redevelopment, Wiig notes that smart city policies propose city-
wide benefit through “digital governance augmentation” (2015, p. 258-259).  
 
Another ‘best practice’ surfaced by Wiig’s examination of IBM’s Smarter Cities 
Challenge, is that “implementation of the smart city policy was secondary to the 
utility of the initiative in selling the city as a promising location for the globalized 
enterprise to set up businesses” (p. 259). In other words, Wiig found that the primary 
goals of local governments through SCC projects seemed to focus more on making 
the city seem smarter to draw in more businesses, rather than on the technological 
gains that can be derived from these endeavors. Wiig further noted that rising 
competition between cities is pressuring local governments around the world to 
adopt these practices (Jensen, 2005, 2007; McCann, 2011, 2013; Prince, 2014 in 
Wiig, 2015). So, as more and more local governments turn to smart city projects, and 
thereby potentially the associated policies, Wiig postulates that pressure will mount 
on other local government officials to follow suit or else be seemingly left ‘behind’. 
And, as local governments adopt the concept of smart, intralocal competition 
compels city officials to promote this transformation through narrative and brand. 
Conveniently, the public-private partnerships that typically serve as the foundation of 
smart projects create a perfect network to spread the associated boosterish 
messaging, or narrative themes, that local governments use to help attract funding 
and resources.  
 
Thus, it becomes a circular cycle with no set beginning or end. With rising neoliberal 
pressures, increasing competition between cities makes local governments feel 
compelled to promote their city in an attempt to draw in business and other resources 
deemed scarce. Smart projects are construed as one way to make a city seem more 
attractive. As local governments pursue these projects, they are exposed to or adopt 
the entrepreneurial approaches that integral to the design of these initiatives. As these 
endeavors are implemented, the smart concept and all that goes along with it is 
further promoted through the surrounding partnership arrangements and narratives. 
In this fashion, this cycle demonstrates the interconnections between smart project 
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strategies, engagement arrangements and narratives, and how these seemingly inform 
and reinforce each other.   
 
2.4 Conceptual Grounding for Analysis  
 
IBM’s Chief Marketing Officer, Jon Iwata, has described the firm’s Smarter Cities 
campaign as a market-making process (Iwata in Watson, 2010). Within IBM’s 
approach and strategy, cities are viewed as markets, and smart technologies are 
commodified, packaged and sold to local government clients (among others). While 
IBM staff have stated this perspective explicitly, they are by no means unique, for 
other tech providers and consultancies within the smart city market approach cities 
and smart technologies in the same manner. This view of extending “market 
discipline, competition and commodification” to the public sector stems from 
neoliberal strategies, interpretations and doctrines (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 
350) and is simpatico to entrepreneurial management approaches within urban 
environments. Hence, I grounded my analysis in conceptual literature that explores 
the relationships and interactions between the public and private sector, and how the 
private sector is purportedly gaining influence within the public realm. In the section 
below, I discuss suppositions about how neoliberal strategies and doctrines and 
entrepreneurial management approaches have manifested within urban environments 
(Agranoff, 2003; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 
1989a; Peck and Tickell, 2002), and explore how these trends interrelate with the 
concept of smart.  
 
2.4.1 The Emergence of Smart: Neoliberal and Urban Entrepreneurial Trends 
 
According to Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002), neoliberal doctrines and 
strategies began as a mode of free-market economic theory in the United States and 
gained momentum in the 1980s, mutating and transforming over time. These 
doctrines and strategies emphasize, among others, “the reduction of corporate taxes, 
the shrinking and / or privatization of public services and the intensification of inter-
locality competition” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 350), often resulting in 
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decreases in government spending to enhance the role of the private sector in the 
economy (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009; Larner and Laurie, 2010; Peck and Tickell, 
2002). Within this interpretation of governance transformation, neoliberal doctrines 
have increasingly informed urban restructuring as they filtered down to localities, 
affecting each with variation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). As these doctrines have 
been adopted by local governments, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) posit that 
they have influenced the ‘rules’ being formed around intralocal competition, hence 
“shaping the very metrics by which regional competitiveness, public policy, 
corporate performance, or social productivity are measured” (p. 387). A notion 
important to consider given that smart projects are often proffered by tech providers 
as an easy means to boost city brand, and hence gain competitive edge.  
 
Within this theoretical tradition, cities in the advanced capitalist world are construed 
as critical arenas in which neoliberal policy experiments have manifested (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002). In this line of thinking, urban environments become neoliberal 
laboratories for testing policies such as “place marketing, enterprise and 
empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development corporations, public-
private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, 
property-redevelopment schemes, business-incubator projects, new strategies of 
social control, policing and surveillance, and a host of other institutional 
modifications within the local and regional state apparatus” (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002, p. 368). Several of these policies were apparent within the smart projects that I 
examined in my case studies. As such, I posit that smart projects can be construed as 
a continuation or extension of such neoliberal policy experiments within urban 
environments given their emphasis on / ability to accentuate place marketing, 
intralocal competition, public-private partnerships, boosterism, business innovation, 
surveillance and social control, among others. It would seem that neoliberal 
tendencies have created an enabling environment for smart projects that, as 
implemented, reinforce and accentuate this transformation of urban governance.  
 
For the purposes of this work, I approach urban governance as the management of 
explicit public problems amongst the coalitions, partnerships and / or networks 
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involved in aspects of urban affairs (Ansell, 2011, p. 4).16 In this manner, urban 
governance does not just include elected officials and formal structures of 
government. Rather, it can be traced through the varied coalitions and processes 
between and among nongovernmental organizations, citizens, civic groups, social 
movements, educational and religious institutions, businesses, commerce 
associations, local financiers, real estate and property developers and appointed city 
officials, among others (Harvey, 1989a). As noted by David Harvey:   
 
Urban governance means much more than urban government. The real 
power to reorganize urban life so often lies elsewhere or at least within a 
broader coalition of forces within which urban government and 
administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play. (1989a, 
p. 6)  
 
Within this conceptualization of urban governance, the role of the private sector is 
considered—not only as actors but also in terms of the processes and approaches that 
these actors bring to managing public challenges. Thus the relationships formed 
around addressing public issues also become channels for extending a neoliberal 
ethos. As described by David Harvey in his exploration of governance 
transformation within the U.S. city of Baltimore, neoliberal trends have led urban 
governance to become much more oriented to the provision of a ‘good business 
climate’ and to the construction and promotion of all sorts of enticements to bring 
capital into cities. This has instigated entrepreneurial managerial styles within local 
governments and an increased presence and role of the private sector. In short, 
according to Harvey, “the task of urban governance is, in short, to lure highly mobile 
and flexible production, financial, and consumption flows into its space” (1989a, p. 
11).  
 
Within this shift, Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard (1996) state that the public sector has 
increasingly adopted private sector characteristics, such as “risk-taking, 
inventiveness, promotion and profit motivation” (p. 153). Yet, while there has been a 
spate of academic analysis examining urban entrepreneurial trends, (see Agranoff, 
                                                 
16 I recognize that this is one of many theoretical models and is more suited toward understanding 
urban governance within the United States, where both of my case studies are located, and may be 
less applicable to Europe, Asia and other parts of the world (Keating, 1991 in Pierre, 2005). 
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2003; Cox, 1993; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, 1989a; 
Pierre, 1999), this management style still remains loosely defined with broad 
parameters. There is little agreement on the defining features of what constitutes, or 
does not constitute, this reorientation—or how fundamental this shift has been. Some 
aspects associated with this shift, such as a focus on economic growth and / or place 
marketing, are by no means new to urban governance. There is also a lack of clarity 
around how this urban entrepreneurialism exists: does it supplement or supplant 
more traditional city managerialism? Can these two coexist in tandem, or are they 
mutually exclusive (Hall and Hubbard, 1996)?  
 
Despite the ambiguity associated with this reorientation to urban entrepreneurialism, 
data do suggest that local governments are adopting “more initiatory and proactive 
roles” and that this shift has “reconstituted the traditional relationships between 
community and state at the local level” (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, p. 155). These 
more initiatory and proactive roles adopted by local governments tend to lead to 
partnership with the private sector on more speculative initiatives that result from the 
entrepreneurial policies that are underwritten by the private versus public sector 
(Deakin and Edwards, 1993 in Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Graham and Marvin, 2001, 
p. 14). As this reorientation continues, public policy becomes more reliant on private 
funding; and concurrently, the private sector becomes more reliant upon public 
funds, helping to blur the line between the two (Agranoff, 2003; Pierre, 1999). 
Harvey, describing the impetus to this transition, noted that: 
  
…in the face of widespread erosion of the economic and fiscal base of 
many large cities in the advanced capitalist world… urban governments had 
to be much more innovative and entrepreneurial, willing to explore all kinds 
of avenues through which to alleviate their distressed condition and thereby 
secure a better future for their populations. (Harvey 1989a, p. 4, referring to 
the consensus from a 1985 colloquium in Orleans) 
 
Within the United States, where both of my case studies are located, boosterism and 
entrepreneurialism have long been key features of urban systems, and have taken 
“center-stage in urban policy formulation and urban growth strategies” (Harvey, 
1989a, p. 4). Additionally, state and national governments have increasingly 
narrowed their purview of provision due to rising economic challenges. This has led 
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to a devolution of power, placing mounting responsibility on local governments to 
provide services and infrastructure (Eisinger, 1997; Greenblatt, 2011). Within these 
constraints, local governments have turned to the private sector as partners due to the 
dearth of state funds and provided services. As a result, leaders from the business 
community “have frequently played the coordinating role in North American growth 
coalitions, with rentiers, landlords and utility companies often crucial players” (Hall 
and Hubbard, 1996, p. 157). In this process, the private sector is taking a growing 
role in shaping communities across the United States. Smart projects provide tech 
giants an entrée into this process. Due to the complex nature of these initiatives, they 
almost always involve the private sector, as these projects are typically too large, 
specialized and intricate for any local government to manage and implement on its 
own. With this involvement, there is an increased tendency to view public sector 
matters and processes through a private sector lens, leading to the adoption of 
entrepreneurial models and the thinking that comes along with them (Agranoff, 
2003; Pierre, 1999).  
 
2.4.2 Alignment with the Concept of Smart 
 
As noted by Robert Hollands, there are several assumptions that regularly go along 
with smart projects (2008); assumptions that clearly reflect the term’s lineage and 
perspective from large IT providers (Townsend, 2013, p. 7). Even a quick glance 
reveals that these assumptions align well with IBM’s definition of and approach to 
smart, which construe cities as markets, smart technologies as commodities and 
smart as a ‘standard’ for intralocal competition. And, despite the obvious potential 
conflicts between some of these assumptions (e.g. pro-business bias and 
sustainability) (Hollands, 2008), this litany of promises has led to governments 
around the world to increasingly explore what it means to be a smart city and how 
they can adopt technology to make their cities smarter:  
 Cities are increasingly competing with each other for talent, residents, 
businesses, investment and tourists (Begg, 2002), and cities designated smart 
are better able to attract and retain these resources (Coe et al., 2000; 
Hollands, 2008);  
  
 42 
 Smart technologies help spur urban renewal and economic growth (Graham 
and Marvin, 2001, p. 306; Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013, pp. 107, 222);  
 Technologies should be emphasized in city strategy for the perceived gains 
that they create (Eger, 1997; Hollands, 2008), and IT connectivity is 
inherently beneficial to city operations and city residents (Wiig, 2015);  
 The use of smart technologies helps optimize the management of resources, 
including supporting ‘sustainability’17 (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013; 
Townsend, 2013, pp. 58, 83) and improving economic and political 
efficiency (Eger, 1997; Hollands, 2008; Marvin and Luque, 2013);  
 Smart technologies routinely involve community participation, and with this, 
there is an implied consensus around implementing these technologies (Coe 
et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008; Komninos, 2002, p.188); and,  
 Smart projects necessitate a pro-business bias, including the use of business 
models, frameworks and processes (Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013, pp. 5, 
31).  
 
These assumptions of smart underscore the notion that the smart city accentuates and 
reinforces urban entrepreneurial strategies and practices (as outlined in Figure 2), 
furthering the influence of a neoliberal ethos. With entrepreneurial strategies and 
approaches there is a belief that cities will benefit by taking “an entrepreneurial 
stance to economic development” (Harvey, 1989a, p. 4); a mindset instrumental in 
creating environments conducive for smart projects to emerge, and one that is 
supported by smart assumptions. Thus, through the lens of my conceptual 
underpinnings, as smart projects are implemented, they demonstrate how cities are 
becoming “increasingly central to the reproduction, mutation, and continual 
reconstitutions of neoliberalism” by serving as “incubators for many of the major 
political and ideological strategies through which the dominance of neoliberalism is 
being maintained” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, pp. 376-377). This notion of smart 
projects functioning as neoliberal policy experiments and supporting entrepreneurial 
                                                 
17 Throughout this work, when I use the term sustainability, unless otherwise noted, I am referring to 
the mainstreamed version used in the United Nation’s World Commission for Environment and 
Development’s (1987) Brundtland Report, Our Common Future (in Cook and Swyngedouw, 2012, p. 
1961).  
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management styles in urban environments is fleshed out in Chapters 6-9, as it was 
evident in the smart projects that I examined in both Dubuque and Portland.  
 
Figure 2. Urban entrepreneurialism and the concept of smart 
Characteristics of urban 
entrepreneurialism 
Assumptions associated with the concept of smart 
A reorientation from traditional to 
entrepreneurial managerialism (Hall 
and Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 1989a; 
Wood, 2008) 
Smart projects necessitate a pro-business bias, including 
the use of business models, frameworks and processes 
(Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013, pp. 5, 31) 
Fostering and encouraging local 
growth and development (Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 1989a; 
Wood, 2008) 
Smart technologies help spur urban renewal and economic 
growth (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 306; Townsend, 
2013, pp. 107, 222)  
Inventiveness / riskiness18 (Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 1989a; 
Wood, 2008) 
Technologies should be emphasized in city strategy for the 
perceived gains that they create (Eger, 1997; Hollands, 
2008)  
Place promotion / local boosterism 
(Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 
1989a; Wood, 2008) 
Cities are increasingly competing with each other for 
talent, residents, businesses, investment and tourists (Begg, 
2002), and that cities designated smart are better able to 
attract and retain these resources (Coe et al., 2000; 
Hollands, 2008)  
Profit motivation (Hall and Hubbard, 
1996; Harvey, 1989a; Wood, 2008) 
The use of smart technologies help optimize the 
management of resources, including supporting 
sustainability (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013; Townsend, 
2013, pp. 58, 83) and improving economic and political 
efficiency (Eger, 1997; Marvin and Luque, 2013) 
 
2.5 Framework for Analysis 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, observations from early key informant interviews 
with smart project experts and consultants shaped the development of my analytical 
framework and research questions. Through these interviews, I ascertained that IT 
providers seem to interact most frequently with urban governance via: (a) strategy—
which I have defined as project objectives and how to prioritize and achieve them; 
(b) engagement—which in my research includes involved actors, the roles they play, 
and their interactions with and expectations of each other; and (c) representation—
which I have understood to be how the local government portrays the project through 
                                                 
18 While inventiveness and riskiness are not the same thing, projects that are inventive are often new, 
which means that they are most likely not well tested. Thus risk often accompanies these types of 
initiatives.  
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narrative and brand. I discuss the coding and classification from these interviews in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Based on this framework, I derived the following research questions to guide my 
investigation: How are smart projects, steered by IT providers, interacting with local 
government city objectives, priorities and approaches and what might be the 
implications of this interaction? How are smart projects changing the roles and 
expectations of local government and city residents, and what is the role of the IT 
provider within this transformation? And, how might smart project narratives and 
brands be informing the redesign of urban governance mechanisms? In the section 
below, I briefly elaborate on this framework by discussing the conceptual grounding 
of these concepts, what each means within the context of this research, and how 
these concepts relate to urban governance and interrelate with each other. In Chapter 
4, I examine these areas in-depth as they relate to smart city projects.  
 
2.5.1 Strategic Planning 
 
For the purposes of this research, I have defined strategy to refer to project objectives 
and priorities, and the processes and actions that must be undertaken by involved 
actors to achieve them. Robert Denhardt (1985) hypothesized that strategic planning 
practices typical to the private sector first emerged within urban governance in the 
1980s—roughly about the same time that neoliberal doctrines began to spread. In his 
article “Strategic Planning in State and Local Government”, Denhardt posited that 
due to the rapidity of “social and technological changes” and the “turbulence and 
complexity which such changes generate” (Toffler, 1980; Naisbitt, 1982 in Denhardt, 
1985, p. 174), public sector agencies began turning to models employed by private 
corporations to “systematically plan for their future development” (Denhardt, 1985, 
p. 174). In other words, public sector agencies adopted this practice in hope that it 
would help deal with rapid and complex change.  
 
According to Peter Drucker (2007), this type of strategic planning addresses not only 
future goals and objectives, but also what needs to be done first in order to meet 
them (p. 245-248, 267). Within this approach, a future focus is thought to enhance 
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decision making in the present; a notion that aligns well with the future orientation of 
smart project narratives, which frequently emphasize that local government actors 
must take action now to purportedly avert some impending crises. Thus, the logic 
behind using strategic planning in smart initiatives directly aligns with the way that 
project messaging is typically constructed. Further, Denhardt notes that strategic 
planning also provides “an opportunity for widespread substantive involvement” of 
stakeholders, including leaders and citizens, “in defining the direction of the 
community or the agency as it moves into the future” (Denhardt, 1985, p. 175). 
Hence, within this defined approach to strategic planning—or establishing 
objectives, priorities and how to achieve them—a wide range of stakeholders are 
involved; for formulating strategy is seen as a participatory process. This segues into 
the second concept of my analytical framework, engagement.  
 
2.5.2 Engagement  
 
Within this investigation, I use engagement to refer to the governance arrangements 
around smart projects, which includes involved actors, the roles they play, and their 
interactions with and expectations of each other. In the case study projects that I 
examined, this engagement typically took place within the structure of a public-
private partnerships, and included the involvement of citizens, for smart projects 
frequently require some sort of contribution (e.g., funding, behavior change) from 
city residents to be ‘successful’.  
 
In his 2003 article “Leveraging Networks: A Guide for Public Managers Working 
Across Organizations”, which looks at intersections between the public and private 
sectors in urban governance, Robert Agranoff (2003) states that the knowledge, 
power, resources and other means to solve complex problems are distributed across 
many individuals and organizations. This, he posits, is resulting in new forms of 
governing (ibid.). As a result, governments establish collaborative relationships with 
a wide array of nonprofit and for-profit agencies and organizations to deal with 
concerns related to the economy, health, justice, social services, the environment, 
transportation and education, among others (Rose, 1999, pp. 15-16; Rose and Miller, 
1992). Within the consequent public-private partnerships, “the public and private 
actors involved do not act separately but in conjunction, operating as a network” 
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(Agranoff, 2003, p. 8)—a notion that the private sector supports due to the 
opportunity it creates. Yet, governments also find PPPs attractive, for at the heart of 
many of these types of arrangements is an effort by local government to try and 
“attract external sources of funding, new direct investments, or new employment 
sources” (Harvey, 1989a, p. 7). The proclivity for local governments to turn to PPPs 
for urban development initiatives offers an environment primed for smart projects. 
Predictably, smart project narratives, often when created by IT providers, echo this 
need for public and private collaboration.  
 
2.5.3 Representation 
 
Finally, within this work I view representation as the ways in which smart projects 
are portrayed through narrative and brand. By narrative, I am referring to the various 
stories that are created to promote, align stakeholders and encourage support around 
these endeavors. There are often various messages within a narrative; while a myriad 
of narratives make up discourse. Narratives can help shape and inform brand, which 
refers to the symbolic associations that local governments aim to create through 
strategies to promote place. I have chosen both narrative and brand as elements to 
make up what I term as representation due to the significance that interviewees 
repeatedly placed on these two notions during my initial set of interviews (a theme 
that was reinforced continually throughout my case study research). In fact, in some 
initiatives, project narratives and brand can be as prominently emphasized as, if not 
more than, the involved technologies and the outcomes that they are expected to 
deliver (Wiig, 2015).  
 
While smart project narratives and brands are typically applied by local governments 
in a specific location, time and place, they are informed by a broader discourse 
around these endeavors created by the IT providers and consultancies selling these 
wares. James Merricks White (2015) explores this IT provider smart city concept, 
which he refers to as a global “smart city imaginary”, or a placeless imaginary that 
“draws on general trends and addresses a broad audience” (p. 3). This imaginary, 
often promoted by those selling smart city solutions, presents a future where city 
officials are able to manage or avert systemic crises—“where urban strife is 
simultaneously posed and resolved” (White, 2015, p. 3). The way that this imaginary 
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is expressed in narratives is important to note—for how urban challenges are 
described affects the types of solutions chosen to address them, as well as how they 
are addressed (Jessop, 1997).  
 
When examining the entrepreneurial city for example, Bob Jessop (1997) identified a 
close link between “economic strategies and economic discourses since it is only in 
and through the latter’s mediation that problems are identified, policies pursued and 
crises resolved” (p. 1). As cities reimagine themselves as economic, political and 
cultural entities where the local government pursues entrepreneurial activities to 
improve city competitiveness, according to Jessup (1997), what follows is a redesign 
of urban governance mechanisms, “especially through new forms of public-private 
partnership and networks” (p. 1). Jessop noted that this transformation to an 
entrepreneurial city is evident through “the wide range of self-presentational material 
emitted by cities and / or agencies involved in their governance” (1997, p. 1). 
Similarly, the narratives that shape the smart city imaginary—i.e., the seductive 
images of ideal cities that have been ‘enhanced’ and ‘improved’ through the 
application of the smart technologies—are informing the redesign of urban 
governance through smart project design and implementation. And since tech 
providers are frequently the creators of smart project narratives and significant 
contributors to the smart city imaginary, they are driving the ways in which these 
changes in urban governance are taking place.  
 
While I have separated these areas for analysis, there is not clear delineation between 
them, for strategies inform who is involved and the governance arrangements around 
these actors, while also shaping the stories told. Similarly, who is involved will 
affect the strategies formed around smart projects, as well as the narratives created to 
promote and gain support for these endeavors. And, narratives can shape what 
strategies are chosen as well as who is involved in these initiatives and what their 
roles may be. Further, it is unclear in terms of which of these areas comes first to 
then influence the others.  
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Conclusion 
 
As highlighted in the discussion above, despite fantastic claims in compelling 
narratives and attractive packaging, the premise behind the smart city—i.e., using 
data and analytics to improve decision making and resource allocation within urban 
environments—is not new. Planners and engineers have sought to make the 
management of cities more scientific for over a hundred years (Shelton et al., 2014). 
Just as the premise behind the smart city is not a novel concept, it is also not a clear 
one. There are a myriad understandings, definitions and conceptualizations of the 
concept of smart—ranging from, among others, perceiving “the city as visualized 
facts” (Kitchin et al., 2015, p. 6), to focusing on creating learning environments and 
fostering innovation (Deakin and Al Waer, 2011; Florida, 2005); from spurring 
economic development (Caragliu et al., 2009; Hollands, 2008), to enhancing 
sustainability (Duany et al., 2010; Steinert et al., 2011). In many ways, the smart city 
trend has become an urban labelling phenomenon, almost referring to all and sundry 
applications of ICT across city systems and services (Albino et al., 2015; Kitchin, 
2014b). 
 
Regardless of variation, with each smart project there are common assumptions that 
reinforce characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism, and include an emphasis on 
smart technologies in city strategy (Eger, 1997; Hollands, 2008) in a bid to: (a) 
improve city attractiveness and competitive edge, thereby helping to entice resources 
(Coe et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008); (b) spur economic development (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; Hollands, 2008), in part through an increased private sector role and 
use of their business models and practices (Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013, p. 5, 
31); (c) enhance optimization, facilitating political and economic efficiency (Eger, 
1997; Hollands, 2008) and sustainability efforts (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013); and 
(d) enhance community participation (Coe et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008; Komninos, 
2002, p.188). Alongside these assumed positive outcomes, smart city projects 
present various potential risks to local governments associated with the vulnerability 
of these systems and the responsibilities that go along with them. Further, smart 
projects may contribute to increased economic, political and social fragmentation 
across urban environments by establishing enclaves enabled by smart technologies 
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(Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 389-390), and may reinforce a more autocratic 
approach to urban planning (Townsend, 2013, pp. 86, 249). Thus, there is an exigent 
need for these initiatives to be better understood.  
 
Theory around the relationships and interactions between the public and private 
sector, and how the private sector is purportedly gaining influence within the public 
realm, provided an open aperture to shed light the potential influence and impact of 
tech providers interacting with urban governance via smart initiatives. When viewed 
through a neoliberal lens, smart projects can be construed as mechanisms through 
which urban entrepreneurial approaches are reinforced and spread. As such, these 
projects purportedly underscore the critical role that cities are playing in the 
reproduction and mutation of neoliberal trends within urban environments; a factor 
facilitated by the increasing role of the private sector in the management and 
provision of city infrastructure services (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). As a result, 
there are a growing number of collaborative relationships between utility companies 
and infrastructure corporations around smart projects (Curwen, 1999). Within these 
public-private partnership arrangements, smart city priorities, approaches and 
narratives are spread (Wiig, 2015). And, given the highly boosterish nature of smart 
endeavors, and how well they facilitate and contribute to intralocal competition, this 
creates further pressure for cities to become smart (Hollands, 2008; Shelton et al., 
2014; Wiig, 2015).  
 
My research questions pertain to the implications of IT providers interacting 
with local policy and planning processes around project strategy, governance 
arrangements and representation through narrative and brand. In this regard, I 
posit that over time as smart initiatives proliferate, this process of interaction 
will pave the way for IT providers—often more well-versed at working with 
business enterprises and national governments than municipal leaders—to more 
broadly inform urban governance processes. In effect, I believe that IT providers 
are not just selling smart technologies; they are propagating a set of assertions 
about the role, structure, function and relationships of local government. This set 
of assertions is informed by neoliberal and entrepreneurial principles, and bound 
up with the concept of smart and the IT provider perspectives and practices used 
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to implement these projects. Together, these are attractively packaged as a 
“smart city imaginary” (White, 2015) that is largely created by IT providers and 
which in practice cannot be pursued without them.  
 
It begins with the way that IT providers intend it to—the pitch. Beguiling images of 
efficient, prosperous, sustainable and seamless cities entice local governments to buy 
smart city wares. What is frequently not so apparent within the pitch, but alluded to 
within smart concept assumptions and project approach, is the implied 
transformation of urban governance that is part and parcel of IT providers’ strategies 
for cities to become smart. In my analysis, case study findings revealed three areas of 
urban governance transformation that IBM most frequently promoted to local 
governments during interactions around smart projects—shifts that conveniently 
would insert data and analytics, and hence IBM, into a wide range of urban 
governance activities and processes. These included assertions that local 
governments should:  
 Adopt a data-centric and solutionist approach and employ IT provider 
business models and practices; 
 Transform the roles of and interactions between and among local government 
and city residents, with the IT provider and / or their technologies acting as 
an intermediary within this transformation; and 
 Promote their city as being smart (thereby endorsing IT providers’ smart city 
solutions and helping to grow the market).  
 
For in effect, I found that IBM is not just selling smart city solutions and offerings. 
Rather, it is promoting principles about the reconfiguration of urban governance. I 
explore this further in Chapters 4-10.  
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3 Methodology and Approach 
 
This work is an empirical exploration of cities adopting smart technologies. In this 
chapter I elaborate on the methodological approaches I used to explore this topic and 
the challenges that I faced while conducting this research. Using conceptual 
literature as a foundation to help understand the concept of smart—including its 
emergence, evolution, variations and surrounding context—I looked to key 
informant interviews and case studies to ascertain how theories and observations 
identified in this literature manifested in actuality. This process of examination was 
informed and shaped by my insider status at IBM, a factor explored further below. 
My research is qualitative in nature and primarily concerned with local government, 
IT providers and city residents. While my primary audience for this work is the 
academic community, I hope that actors from both local government and IT 
providers can glean insight from my observations—for local government to 
attentively approach the smart city trend and for IT providers to be more aware of the 
potential impact of their work.  
 
This investigation was an iterative process. The latter two stages of research—key 
informant interviews and case studies—helped me gather multiple sources of 
evidence to compare against the theoretical propositions identified during earlier 
research, enabling triangulation of my analytical framework, data and observations 
as my work evolved. This triangulation contributed to more reliable findings, as it 
helped me identify trends and patterns that emerged across research techniques and 
sources. Despite this iterative process, there were some methodological issues that 
emerged. For example, since I primarily interviewed actors involved with smart 
projects, by default my universe of interviews did not include all of the groups or 
individuals excluded from these initiatives. While I was able to speak to a few people 
who were not affiliated with, or were excluded from, smart endeavors, this was by no 
means representative of the numbers of those ‘excluded’—a potential weakness 
when following “historical snowballing” (Bijker, 1992, p. 46). I discuss other 
methodological challenges encountered throughout this chapter. Figure 3 outlines my 
methods and approach, and the various activities that I undertook within each to 
glean insight. 
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Figure 3. Methods and approach 
Method Activity  Purpose 
Desk 
research 
Review of conceptual literature  To gain insight from theory, concepts and 
debates that relate to the smart city trend 
IT provider smart project materials 
(including IBM materials) 
To understand how tech providers define, 
describe and portray smart projects, and 
how they view these contributing to and 
affecting urban environments 
Key 
informant 
interviews 
Initial key informant interviews To help establish research scope, approach 
and my analytical framework 
Interviews with other tech providers and 
third party organizations that have 
worked on smart projects or are studying 
these projects 
To understand the IT provider perspective 
of smart projects, and the broader 
applications of this trend 
IBM staff interviews (not including IBM 
staff on case study projects) 
To understand IBM’s perspectives of and 
approach to smart projects given that it is 
the IT provider that I focus on within my 
case studies 
Case 
study 
analysis 
Interviews with local government 
officials, smart project staff, IBM project 
staff, involved third party agencies, and 
where relevant, city resident participants 
To understand how smart projects have 
evolved in the case study cities, and the 
meanings to which actors involved have 
assigned to these projects 
Participation in relevant events To aid in understanding the processes and 
engagement around these endeavors in case 
study cities 
Narrative review of smart project 
materials 
To understand how involved actors 
describe and assign meaning to these 
initiatives 
Inside 
observer 
My work with IBM related to the smarter 
cities campaign (note, I have not been 
involved in the design, implementation 
or evaluation of any smart projects in 
Dubuque or Portland) 
To shed light on IBM as an IT provider in 
the smarter city space, including its 
relevant organizational structure, processes, 
frameworks and approaches 
 
 
Although observations made within this research may point to wider tendencies of 
smart technology adoption within urban environments, they are not necessarily 
applicable to all similar types of cities or situations (Law and Mol, 2002). Given the 
structure of my case study analysis and its focus on two U.S. cities, broader 
applicability may tend to be more limited to smart efforts led by large IT providers in 
advanced capitalist environments with similar local government structures. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the ability of IT providers to insert themselves 
into urban governance processes will vary greatly depending upon city size. In many 
ways, the city of Dubuque provided an ideal example for this type of exploration—
its small size enabled IBM to interact more deeply and broadly with local 
governance process around smart endeavors; and, from a research perspective this 
smaller size facilitated my analysis. It should also be noted that at the time that I 
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launched this research, the concept of a smart city was still relatively new. The 
ongoing nature of this trend, the way in which this concept has developed and is 
evolving, and the longer-term focus required to view these projects in their entirety, 
provided challenges for fully understanding implications. Though over the years of 
my research, critical analysis and reflect of smart projects have rapidly grown. Thus, 
while some observations can be drawn from my work, these will be somewhat 
anecdotal until further related study can be completed. For the above reasons, I do 
not seek to outline ultimate positions on issues related to smart; rather, my research 
is oriented and exemplary in nature (Law and Mol, 2002; Lipset et al., 1956; Yin, 
1994). 
 
3.1 Desk Research  
 
Given the complexities of smart efforts—in terms of all that they touch and 
encompass from things tangible and intangible—I explored a broad range of 
conceptual literature emerging from sociology, urban studies, organizational 
management and political science. I chose this breadth to help flesh out the 
exploratory and descriptive aspects (Yin, 1994) of my research objectives as they 
related to smart city technologies and actors, urban development, urban governance, 
engagement arrangements, narrative and brand. This enabled me to: (a) gain 
understanding of the smart concept and how it has been conceptualized and 
presented by IT providers (namely, IBM); (b) situate my work within broader local 
government trends and political, economic and historical context; and (c) identify the 
conceptual literature to inform my analytical approach. This review also enabled me 
to further refine and situate my observations through an iterative process as my work 
developed. Given my case studies are both located within the United States, a 
predominant amount of the literature reviewed is U.S.-centric. Applicable theories, 
debates and concepts from this conceptual review are highlighted throughout this 
work, but are primarily discussed in Chapters 2 and 4; the case study chapters look at 
how these theories and debates applied in practice.  
 
To understand how IT providers are defining, describing and approaching smart 
projects, I examined materials produced by tech providers (e.g. Arup, Cisco, General 
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Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft and Siemens) active in the smart city market. I 
also examined materials created by others documenting this trend, such as industry 
analysts and the media. Since IBM is the IT provider in the case study projects that I 
examined, I reviewed a wide range of IBM’s Smarter Cities materials produced 
across various IBM divisions. To highlight narrative themes contained within IBM 
Smarter Cities materials, I closely examined six documents recommended by lead 
IBM Smarter Cities Marketing & Communications and Sales & Development staff 
as those that best represent IBM’s thinking and perspectives on smart cities 
(discussed in Chapter 5). Of all the materials I reviewed to understand the IT 
provider perspective, I used fifty items to inform my analysis. Some of the materials 
reviewed were not used to inform this stage of research as they strayed too far from 
the topic at hand. Figure 4 illustrates the type of author for materials reviewed. 
Relevant observations from this stage are included throughout this work.     
 
Figure 4. Material reviewed to inform tech provider perspective 
Author / Creator # of documents 
IBM 36 
Other Tech Providers 7 
Media 4 
Industry Analysts 3 
Total 50 
 
3.2 Key Informant Interviews 
 
A few months after I commenced my desk research I conducted seventeen initial key 
informant interviews to inform my research scope, analytical framework and 
methodology. Four of these were conducted in person, with the remainder being 
conducted by phone. They all took place in early to mid-2010. In these interviews, I 
asked four basic questions to understand how these actors understood and assigned 
value and meaning to these initiatives: (a) what is a smart project; (b) why do cities 
adopt smart technologies; (c) what types of actors are involved in these projects; and 
(d) what are typical smart project outcomes. Within these interviews, interviewees 
repeatedly raised themes related to the governance structures of these projects 
(fifteen out of seventeen interviews), partnership arrangements (fifteen out of 
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seventeen interviews), and issues related to narrative and / or brand (ten out of 
seventeen interviews).  
 
Figure 5. Initial interviews that informed analytical framework 
Interviewee type # of interviews # who 
referred to 
strategy / 
governance 
# who referred 
to partnership / 
engagement 
# who referred to 
representation / 
narrative / brand 
IBM staff who work 
on smart projects 
6 5 5 2 
Smart project 
experts external to 
IBM  
8 7 8 5 
Urban governance 
experts 
3 3 2 3 
Total 17 15 15 10 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the type of interviewee and the number of responses per 
classification grouping. Based on feedback from this set of interviews, I established 
an analytical framework that focused on governance and partnership arrangements, 
narrative and brand. As my research and observations evolved, I shifted this 
classification to strategy, engagement and representation to better capture and 
illuminate my findings. Figure 6 illustrates how I coded the topics raised within this 
initial set of interviews to deduce my analytical framework.   
 
Figure 6. Coding to derive analytical framework 
Terms I classified under 
strategy 
Terms I classified under 
engagement 
Terms I classified under 
representation  
Politics / political realities  Partners / partnership Narrative 
Human processes  Alliance Brand (city brand) 
Governance / governance 
model 
Public-private partnerships Image (city image) 
Strategy / community strategy  Network  Stories 
Priorities Engagement / participation  Reputation 
Political will Ecosystem Perceptions of city 
Management  Cooperation Vision (city vision) 
Political processes  Consensus  Sell / attract (tie to 
competitiveness)  
Bureaucracy  Relationships   
 
 
Observations from these interviews also aided in identifying additional conceptual 
literature to review and integrate into my work, most notably around issues related to 
urban governance trends, place marketing, narrative and the growing emphasis on 
data and analytics within urban environments and all that this entails. I chose these 
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individuals judiciously based on initial research to understand the smart concept. 
Yet, given these interviews were conducted at the inception of my work, I may not 
have chosen the same individuals three years into my study. For this reason, I 
consistently conducted additional interviews with urban experts and those involved 
in smart projects throughout my research to triangulate these initial findings and 
ensure the applicability of my analytical framework.   
 
 
This second set of key informant interviews gave me deeper insight into how smart 
city providers, including IBM, were conceptualizing, understanding and applying the 
concept of smart, serving as a complement to written narratives by these actors. They 
enabled me to understand how, in general, the shared perspectives of individuals 
who worked for smart city providers aligned with what was presented within 
documents created by these organizations. Questions for these interviews were semi-
structured and open-ended, and slightly varied according to area of expertise.19 These 
interviews, which were all conducted by phone in late 2010 and throughout 2011, 
breakdown as follows:  
 Twenty interviews with experts from private sector companies that work in 
the smart city market (such as Arup, Cisco, CH2MHill, HDR and 
EveryBlock.com), and other organizations working on issues related to this 
trend (e.g., OpenPlans, Mayors Institute on City Design and The Climate 
Group); and 
 Thirty-two interviews from experts within IBM to gain deeper insight on the 
organization’s perceptions of smart, narrative themes and branding, solutions 
and approaches.  
 
From these interviews, I used nine (of twenty-one) expert interviews and twenty-one 
(of thirty-two) IBM interviews for empirical data for my analysis. Interviews not 
used did not provide information directly useful to my analysis as they digressed too 
far from my area of focus. Of the twenty-one interviews from IBM, I interviewed a 
range of staff to understand the various organizational perspectives of Smarter Cities. 
                                                 
19 See Appendix 11.4 for an illustrative interview guide.  
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Figure 7 details the number of IBM staff and departments that were represented in 
these interviews.  
 
 
Figure 7. Types of IBM staff interviewed 
Department # of interviews 
Marketing & Communications; Sales & 
Development; Smarter Cities Challenge 
10 
Dubuque project 4 
Portland Project 3 
Smart subject matter expert 4 
Total 21 
 
Interestingly, almost none of the key informant interviewees (or those interviewed 
for my case studies, which are discussed below), focused on the smart technologies 
employed in smart projects or the technological aspects of these projects. This was 
true even during interviews with the IT experts. Hence, this reaffirmed my emphasis 
on the social and political, and consequent economic, aspects of these endeavors. 
One key weakness with these key informant interviews is that I interviewed 
primarily those who have worked on or are associated with smart projects, hence I 
did not speak to many of people excluded by these initiatives. Thus small factors 
excluded or overlooked by this approach could have built upon themselves, 
becoming graver as I continued to only focus on the involved actors. Findings from 
these interviews primarily informed my non-case study chapters, though 
observations are included throughout this work.  
 
It should be noted that in all of my key informant and case study interviews 
(described below) I followed human subject protocol based on principles of respect 
for participants in the research and recognition of the risks they might face in 
participating. To this end, I did not include any information in this work that 
interviewees asked to remain confidential. Informed participant consent was 
obtained verbally, and to the best of my ability I tried to ensure that each person 
understood the nature of my research, the purpose of their participation and the 
expected final outcome. Unless otherwise noted, I refer to interviewees by their title 
or role to help maintain a level of privacy. However, I do attribute direct quotes from 
individuals in instances where I have found these quotes through publicly available 
resources. To help foster full disclosure, and improve the chances of hearing all 
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feedback—both positive and negative—all interviews that I conducted for the 
purposes of this research were not recorded, rather they were captured in handwritten 
notes (Kirk and Miller, 1986; Valadez and Bamberger, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
 
3.3 City Case Studies 
 
I chose to utilize case study analysis to complement my other methodological 
approaches for I felt that this manner of examination would best be for highlighting 
how smart city endeavors are manifesting in actuality, shedding light on specific 
examples of the discursive and material realities of smart projects. This approach 
enabled me to examine smart efforts in the cities in which they were taking place 
over a period of a few years, thus helping me to make sense of and interpret smart 
efforts and trends in terms of the meanings that key involved actors brought to them 
over time. Finally, case study analysis provided me with greater ability to examine 
how IBM interacted with local governance processes and how smart projects may 
reinforce and accentuate urban entrepreneurialism and the assumptions of smart 
(Hollands, 2008). This included examining how these efforts interact with intralocal 
competition, place marketing, the prevalence of public-private partnerships, a private 
sector bias, policy mobility, the transfer of business models and practices, and an 
emphasis on efficiency that relies upon the increased use of data and analytics.  
 
Before conducting my fieldwork, I applied the following criteria to help select my 
two case study cities:  
 IBM was involved in the smart efforts being examined (which meant that at 
the time I began my research, this limited my pool of selection to roughly 
fifteen projects);  
 The city was applying technology in new ways to help inform city planning 
processes or it had already identified smart as a goal within its city strategy 
and was envisioning this process to include utilization of IT to improve the 
functioning of two or more city systems; 
 The smart projects being examined had been up and running for at least one 
year (so that adequate data would be available on the project)—though this 
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proved difficult in Portland since several smart projects fell through during 
the course of my research; 
 The cities provided similarities (e.g. focus on sustainability and ‘citizen 
engagement’20 in smart projects) that enabled comparison with each other, 
while also providing noteworthy contrasting examples, such as city size, 
governance model, approach to smart, etc.;  
 Key stakeholder groups and actors agreed to provide access to relevant data 
and to participate in interviews; and  
 Substantive data on the city’s social, economic, political and cultural 
processes was readily available. 
 
Against these criteria, a total of five potential case study cities were identified. This 
list of potential cities was then reduced through other criteria such as locality, 
resources required (e.g. travel costs to and from city), and level of responsiveness / 
interest by key involved actors, among others. Based on these criteria, I selected two 
case study cities within the United States: Dubuque, Iowa and Portland, Oregon. I 
choose Dubuque as my primary case study site because it fit all of my selection 
criteria and because it was deemed IBM’s first Smarter Cities “living lab”21 in the 
world—a site where smart technologies and their related solutions are tested and 
piloted by IBM before being replicated and applied on larger scale. The significance 
placed on this joint partnership to approach Dubuque as a living lab has translated 
into more attention to this city by IBM—and thus, more resources to help inform my 
research in terms of data gathered, evaluations undertaken, and subject matter 
experts deployed to work in this city. Additionally, the smart endeavors in Dubuque 
have garnered national and international media coverage, which I thought would be 
useful for my analysis of smart projects and city representation (Acohido, 2009; 
BBC News, 2011; Dillow, 2011; Forbes, 2007; Hamm, 2009a; Hoffman, 2009; 
Lindsay, 2010; Lohr, 2009b). As a small city, Dubuque has been able to push smart 
efforts forward more rapidly than larger cities that face cross-boundary issues 
                                                 
20 By citizen engagement, or civic participation, I am referring to “the practice of consulting and 
involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and policy-forming activities 
of the organization or institutions responsible for such functions” (Rowe et al., 2004, p. 89). 
21 I discuss the “living lab” approach in Chapter 4 and in the Dubuque and Portland cases study 
chapters.   
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(political, financial, procedural, jurisdictional, etc.). As a result, this decreased the 
likelihood of the efforts stalling or halting during my research fieldwork.  
 
I chose Portland as a second case study for comparison due to the fact that the local 
government has been seen as a leader in urban planning and citizen engagement for 
decades (Mayer and Provo, 2004; Ozawa, 2004b), and their pursuit of smart 
technologies to advance their approach in these areas raises interesting questions as 
to how an emerging smart agenda might be integrated with pre-existing 
governmental strategies that are seen as ‘progressive’ or participatory. In addition, 
the city is also seen as a leader in urban sustainability (Grist, 2007), an element often 
featured within smart city discourse. The city met all of my criteria for selection, and 
due to IBM’s close relationship with the local government, and in particular the 
former Mayor (who was in office during most of my research), I was able to have 
access to city officials that otherwise might not have agreed to my interviews. 
Finally, I was interested in the case study due to the contrasting viewpoint that the 
local government had on smart projects versus that of Dubuque. While local 
government officials within Portland were interested in seeing how smart 
technologies might be applied to urban planning processes, they approached these 
projects with reservation. Given the varying level of buy-in to the concept of smart, 
and all that that entails, I thought this case study would generate interesting data to 
contrast with the Dubuque experience, where the concept of smart was embraced 
wholeheartedly. 
 
Together, my two city case study examples shed light on how the local governments 
in small and medium-sized advanced capitalist cities are utilizing smart projects to 
help reach their desired goals, including improved sustainability and citizen 
engagement. The case study of Dubuque enables an examination of smart projects 
that mainly focused on infrastructure, where ‘technical’ issues around utilities have 
implications for civic engagement and participation. Whereas in Portland, public 
concerns were rendered in part ‘technical’ through smart initiatives. Just as these 
approaches to achieving desired outcomes varied, so did the reasoning behind them. 
In Dubuque the local government sought to foster sustainability and be perceived as 
smart to help make the city more attractive, thereby drawing in business, resources 
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and talent (which would then purportedly spur economic growth). To achieve these 
ends, the Dubuque local government engaged city residents to help solve 
sustainability problems through their choices around resource consumption. In 
Portland the local government pursued these ends to help improve the city’s 
environmental impact by making city systems more efficient through improved 
decision making for resource allocation; and engaged city residents to make urban 
planning seem more inclusive and participatory. Each of these desired outcomes—
enhanced sustainability and increased civic engagement—aligns with assumptions 
associated with the concept of smart (Hollands, 2008); while approaches to achieve 
these outcomes reinforce tendencies for a more entrepreneurial approach to city 
management. Findings and observations from my case study analysis are included in 
Chapters 6 through 9.  
 
It should be noted that my case study selection was limited by my affiliation with 
IBM, which also influenced the ways in which those interviewed in my case study 
analysis responded to me. IBM is a tech giant that has varying relationships with 
each case study city. In Dubuque, IBM set up a Global Delivery Facility (GDF) 
office as an integral part of the relationship the company established with the local 
government to implement smart city projects. This influx of resources—in terms of 
IBM brand, investment and talent, among others—caused local government officials, 
and other city actors involved in smart projects, to highly value their relationship 
with the company, and therefore were much less likely to critique the smart projects 
being implemented. In Portland, while IBM worked on various projects within the 
city, the local government felt much less obligated to IBM since it was just one of 
many IT provider partners with which the local government and other involved smart 
actors did business. Another limitation with my case study approach is that I choose 
to examine cities both located in the United States, thus confining my analysis to 
urban trends and patterns typical to this type of advanced capitalist environment. 
Similarly, the scale of these two cities may also affect the transposition of my 
observations to other urban environments of varying sizes.  
 
During my case study research, I used a tiered visitation schedule to help mitigate the 
sometimes unpredictable and slow trajectories that smart city projects can take. The 
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timing of each visit was coordinated with periods of increased activity to help ensure 
the best use of time and resources. Case study site visits generally lasted a few weeks 
per round. I conducted my site visits to Dubuque in September 2010, December 
2010, December 2011 and September 2013; and site visits to Portland in August 
2010, February 2011 and October 2013. See Appendix 11.3 for timelines detailing 
the various activities undertaken within these site visits.   
 
There have been difficulties associated with a case studies approach in this context. 
To date, smart efforts within cities have advanced sporadically, with delays in 
funding and other issues slowing or halting project progression, making case study 
fieldwork somewhat unpredictable. To help combat this, I choose case study cities in 
which there were several smart projects already being discussed or underway, and I 
adopted a tiered timetable approach to my fieldwork to help compensate for delays. 
For these same reasons, I made repeated visits to case study sites over a few years 
period, instead of remaining for one long concentrated stay. In the case of Portland, 
having a few of my potential case study projects fall through was particularly 
informing—for these experiences gave me great insight into the potential hindrances 
and frailties associated with launching and implementing of these endeavors.  
 
3.3.1 Case Study Interviews 
 
During my case study visits, I conducted interviews with key actors involved in 
smart efforts to explore how they interacted with, assigned meaning to and were 
affected by these projects. These interviews shed light on how: (a) oral narratives did 
or did not align with written narratives created by local government and smart 
project actors; and, (b) urban entrepreneurialism and the assumptions of smart are 
being reinforced and spread through stories about and interactions around smart 
endeavors. As noted above, data derived through this process may have been 
influenced by each local government’s relationship with IBM. Dubuque city leaders 
had a tendency for boosterism when describing smart initiatives perhaps to protect 
their relationship with IBM—a company seen as a valuable asset to the city in terms 
of how it is perceived to contribute to the local economy and brand. Those 
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interviewed in Portland were more likely to be candid in their response given IBM’s 
tangential relationship to the local government and its city plan.  
 
Questions for interviews conducted during case study visits were semi-structured and 
open-ended for each interview series, which varied according to city, actor, role, type 
of smart project, etc. (thus, these interview questions built on, but varied slightly 
from, the interview guide created for key informant interviews, as shown in 
Appendix 11.4). I conducted over seventy-five case study interviews with local 
actors involved in the smart endeavors in Dubuque and Portland. Roughly sixty 
percent of these interviews were conducted in person during fieldwork, with forty 
percent being conducted by phone due to unavailability during my site visits. All of 
these interviews were conducted specifically for the purposes of my dissertation 
research and are not to be confused with the IBM interviews that I observed that 
were held to evaluate the Smarter Water and Smarter Electricity Pilot Studies in 
Dubuque (described below). These interviews break down as follows:  
 
 Forty-one stakeholder interviews in Dubuque, including interviews with 
smart project team members, IBM project staff, the Mayor, the City Manager 
and Assistant City Managers, Resource Management Coordinator, 
Sustainable Community Coordinator, the City Information Services Manager, 
and representatives from funding agencies, utility companies, local 
businesses and civic organizations; and 
 Thirty-six stakeholder interviews in Portland, including interviews with IBM 
project staff, smart project staff, the Metro Council, the local government’s 
Bureau of Planning and Sustainability, TriMet, the Portland Business 
Alliance, the Portland Sustainability Institute, Portland State University and 
third party organizations involved in smart projects, among others. 
 
From these interviews, I used thirty-five for empirical analysis from Dubuque and 
twenty-four from Portland (the interviews not used, while often informative for 
background or context, did not contribute directly to the issues that I examined and 
thus were not included among my empirical data). In both Dubuque and Portland, I 
interviewed key local government and IBM actors numerous times over the years to 
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help clarify and validate my observations and findings. Figure 8 illustrates the 
breakdown by interviewee type in Dubuque and Portland. There were slight 
variations in types of interviewees between the two cities due to the differing nature 
and structure of the smart projects examined. Observations from these interviews are 
fleshed out in the case study chapters.  
 
Figure 8. Types of interviewees from Dubuque and Portland 
Dubuque Portland 
Interviewee type # of interviews Interviewee type # of interviews 
Local government 16 Local government 5 
Involved in smart project 
implementation 
6 Involved in smart project 
implementation 
6 
Utility company 2 Relevant subject matter 
expert 
10 
IBM project staff 4 IBM project staff 3 
Smart project participant 7   
Total 35 Total 24 
 
3.3.2 Participation in Related Activities 
 
During early stages of the fieldwork I participated in various smart project events 
and activities within the case study cities to triangulate fieldwork and interview 
observations, build rapport with interviewees and gain greater access to relevant data 
(Kirk and Miller, 1986; Lofland et al., 1971; Platt, 1992; Valadez and Bamberger, 
1994). While this participation was not instrumental in my analysis, it did provide 
me with broader context and understanding of the smart projects that I examined and 
each city’s approach to them. In the case of the Dubuque events, given all were 
conducted to further and promote Smarter Sustainable Dubuque, I recognized that 
only the most beneficial and favorable aspects of smart projects were presented and 
shared. Observations from these activities are included in the case study chapters:    
 Attending a Dubuque City Council Meeting on Smarter Sustainable 
Dubuque, a Dubuque2.0 Steering Committee meeting, an Iowa Power Fund 
Committee Meeting, and a dinner convening representatives from City 
Council, Dubuque2.0, the Smarter Water Pilot Study management team, the 
Greater Dubuque Development Corporation, the Iowa Power Fund, and 
utility companies (during fieldwork in September 2010); 
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 Participating in a Smarter Sustainable Dubuque Tour and a City Council Tour 
of Dubuque, held during an event showcasing the city’s smart efforts (during 
fieldwork in September 2013);  
 Participating in a “J&M Café” Session in Portland, which weekly convenes 
economists, business leaders, and technical experts interested in and / or 
working on sustainability within the city (during fieldwork in August 2010);  
 Attending several IBM internal sessions that discussed the development, 
implementation and impact of the systems dynamics modeling tool used in 
Portland (by phone throughout 2011 and 2012); and 
 Joining four City in Motion design discussions between IBM, Portland State 
University, HDR Engineering, the Dubuque Metropolitan Planning 
Organization, the East Central Inter-government Agency, which handles 
transportation planning in Dubuque, as well as the local government office 
responsible for land use planning (these discussions were all by phone in 
2011).  
 
In addition to the above, I participated in three different sets of interviews led by 
IBM in Dubuque—activities all conducted on behalf of IBM to evaluate and better 
understand the smart efforts being implemented in this case study city. The materials 
developed from these interviews have been used by both IBM and the local 
government as promotional tools to raise awareness of the city’s Smarter Sustainable 
Dubuque initiative and IBM’s Smarter Cities work. Signed consent to use and 
reference the interviews was obtained by IBM for all of those interviewed for all 
three interview sets. The first set of interviews explored constituency building and 
sustainability in Dubuque and was held with various city leaders and project 
participants. The second two sets of interviews involved participants from the 
Smarter Water and Smarter Electricity Pilot Studies. I elaborate on these sets of 
interviews below.  
 
On December 7-8, 2010, IBM’s Corporate Marketing & Communications team 
conducted a series of interviews with various Dubuquers to discuss the topics of 
sustainability and constituency building, and how these relate to the city’s 
partnership with IBM around smart projects—an effort to support IBM’s Smarter 
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Planet Leadership Series.22 These interviews were filmed, turned into videos, and 
then used for various promotional purposes by both IBM and the local government. 
Several of these interviews are available publicly on YouTube, and each interviewee 
gave consent for the interview material to be moved to the public realm. The 
interviews gleaned information on local culture, constituency building, leadership, 
collaboration, and interviewees’ perspectives of smart. In all, eleven interviews were 
conducted in this set with representatives from local government, civic 
organizations, the business community, and volunteer households that participated in 
the smart project pilots. I drafted the questions for these interviews and posed some 
of the questions during filming. Full transcripts from these interviews were provided 
to IBM, which I have used as a source document for direct quotations; those that are 
readily publicly available are included in the bibliography (see Buol, 2010; Burbach, 
2010b; Dickinson, 2010a; Dregne, 2010b; Grover, 2010; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; 
Kohlmann, 2012; Lyons, 2010a; Schultz, 2010; Steinhauser, 2010; N. Van Milligen, 
2010).  
 
Additionally, as part of the project evaluation process, IBM Research conducted two 
sets of interviews with Dubuquers who participated in the smart project pilots I 
examined. The first set of these pilot evaluation interviews, held December 8-10, 
2010, involved speaking to ten Smarter Water Pilot Study participants. The second 
set of evaluation interviews took place from November 28-December 2, 2011, and 
involved interviewing fifteen city residents who participated in the Smarter 
Electricity Pilot Study. These interviews were conducted to learn more about: (a) 
how participants were interacting with the smart technology portals; (b) if the portals 
were improving participant understanding of the resources; and (c) if the portals 
were affecting participant consumption patterns. I observed and participated in most 
of these evaluation interviews. Results from these interviews were integrated into 
pilot reports, which included anonymized interview excerpts from interviewees. 
These reports were made available to IBM employees, the local government of 
                                                 
22 The Smarter Planet Leadership Series was created to help ‘educate’ leaders implementing smart 
projects on the types of skills and capabilities that IBM staff felt were necessary for ‘successful’ 
project implementation. These lessons were encapsulated in a series of PDFs, videos, case studies and 
PowerPoint presentations made available online through various webpages on ibm.com and via 
YouTube. See: http://www-07.ibm.com/innovation/au/leadership/stories/index.html for additional 
information (accessed April 3, 2016).  
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Dubuque, and other actors involved in the smart pilots such as Dubuque2.0, and are 
available online for public consumption (see Erickson, et al., 2012; Naphade, 2011, 
2012).  
 
3.3.3 Smart Project Narrative Review  
 
A review of the narratives associated with case study smart projects allowed me to 
explore how the assumptions of smart and urban entrepreneurial perspectives are 
being woven into smart city materials and aiding in the spread of these endeavors. I 
was able to observe how factors like data centrality, solutionism, pro-business bias, 
and intralocal competition are enacted and reinforced through the stories created 
around and about smart city projects, while molded to fit the local context and 
environment. Further, this review shed light on pathways of policy mobility 
associated with smart initiatives, mobility facilitated through partnership 
arrangements and the boosterism that frequently adjoins these projects. My approach 
to this review, which is not a complete discourse analysis, was informed by the work 
of Gubrium and Holstein (2008), who note that: 
 
concern with the production, distribution and circulation of stories in 
society requires that we step outside of narrative material and consider 
questions such as who produces particular kinds of stories, where are they 
likely to be encountered, what are their consequences, under what 
circumstances are particular narratives more or less accountable, what 
interests publicize them, how do they gain popularity, and how are they 
challenged. (p. 19) 
 
Thus in reviewing smart project narratives, I have looked at who creates them, what 
story themes, or messaging, are common within them, how they are shared and 
disseminated, how they engage their intended audience, how they are used and how 
they are countered. Where relevant, I compare smart project narratives with 
messaging from IBM’s Smarter Cities strategy and approaches and the assumptions 
of smart to: (a) demonstrate how smart is being recreated around the local context; 
(b) shed light on how those involved in these initiatives are assigning meaning to 
them; and (c) ascertain how IBM may be informing these processes of recreation and 
meaning. To do so, I examined a range of narratives created by actors involved in 
smart endeavors—ranging from interviews (with me, with IBM, or recorded on 
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YouTube or in print), project documents, media coverage and materials created by 
involved actors, including that developed by IBM, the local government and other 
third party relevant actors. I viewed this narrative activity as a sense-making process 
(Ochs and Capps, 2001, p. 15). It is important to note that my intent was not to 
conduct a complete discourse analysis for this research, for I do not examine the 
structure of narratives or employ methods of analysis typical to cultural or linguistic 
studies (Hyvärinen 2008). A list of the materials used for this review can be found in 
Appendix 11.5.  
 
For the narrative review for the Dubuque case study, in addition to examining 
interviews conducted with IBM staff, smart project participants, the local 
government, and other third party actors involved in implementation, I reviewed 
materials created by those involved in smart project design and implementation—the 
local government, IBM and the quasi-governmental and private sector actors who 
aided in promoting these endeavors. In addition, I examined local, national and 
international media coverage. Of these I used fifty-four items as empirical data to 
inform my analysis; those not used did not directly relate to or inform my findings. 
Figure 9 details the sources of the materials examined.    
 
Figure 9. Dubuque smart project materials used to inform narrative review 
Author / Creator # of documents / materials 
Local Government 17 
IBM 8 
Media 19 
IBM and local government 1 
Third party actors involved in projects 9 
Total 54 
 
For the Portland case study narrative review, in addition to examining interviews that 
I conducted with IBM staff, project staff, involved third parties and the local 
government, I analyzed IBM and local government project documents, reports and 
PowerPoint presentations; the local government’s website pages; materials created 
by third party actors involved in design and implementation; and local and national 
media coverage. Of these I used twenty-two items as empirical data to inform my 
analysis—less than half of what I used in Dubuque, primarily due to the fact that the 
local government and IBM did not produce as many materials to discuss or promote 
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the smart efforts in Portland. Figure 10 details the sources of the materials reviewed 
for the Portland narrative review. Findings from my examination of this empirical 
data for the narrative review have been incorporated into the Dubuque and Portland 
chapters. 
 
Figure 10. Portland smart project materials used to inform narrative review 
Author / Creator # of documents 
Local Government 0 
IBM 9 
Media 13 
IBM and local government 0 
Third party actors involved in projects 0 
Total 22 
 
As this work developed, I realized that IBM, due to my inside observer status at this 
organization, in effect became a third case study. Throughout my research, I worked 
for IBM on its Smarter Cities campaign to some degree for several years while 
conducting this work. Given this role, I had insider status (Spradley, 1980, p. 61) to a 
major IT provider within the smart city market—a factor that provided me with 
access that has not been afforded to many others examining the smart city trend. 
While this insider status was a boon for gleaning insight into this actor, this also 
complicated my analysis, for I sat inside the object that I was trying to understand, 
making distancing myself from the topic and actor difficult at times—a risk and 
limitation that I elaborate on further below.  
 
3.4 An Inside Observer 
 
It is important to note that throughout the period of my doctoral research, I was fully 
employed by IBM, who funded this degree through their continuing education 
program, which is available on a scholarship basis to all full-time employees. 
Despite this sponsorship however, I am not required to show any of my research or 
writing conducted for this degree to any actor within the company. The idea for 
pursuing my PhD stemmed from a project that I worked on right after the Smarter 
Cities campaign was announced in early 2009. I was tasked to examine urban 
indicators to help ascertain typical city priorities and areas in which smart projects 
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might be applied—i.e., to help define what being ‘smart’ might mean in the urban 
context. Through this exercise, it became clear to me that although IBM is an 
organization highly steeped in technological expertise such as engineering, IT and 
mathematics, numerous staff initially working on this initiative seemed to lack an 
understanding of what they called “human systems”, or people and the communities 
in which they live. Given my anthropological and social sciences background, my 
interest was piqued into how IT specialists and engineers conceived local 
government, urban environments and the social systems that buttress each of these. It 
is from this context that my research emerged.   
 
My placement within IBM, where I have sporadically worked on various aspects of 
its Smarter Cities campaign, has provided both opportunity and challenges due to 
this positioning. My involvement with IBM has informed everything about this 
work—including the selection of my research topic, how I conceptualized and 
approached this investigation, and how all those with whom I interacted responded 
and shared information with me due to this affiliation. In fact, my first understanding 
of the ‘smart city’ came from IBM’s tech provider perspective. My role within IBM 
also affected my research. Since I work within IBM’s Corporate Marketing & 
Communications (M&C) department, many of my colleagues have contributed to the 
development of IBM’s Smarter Cities narratives and brand. This M&C perspective 
of the Smarter Cities campaign varies from how it is perceived in other divisions 
working on this campaign, such as, for example, Software Group or Global Business 
Services (a notion explored further in Chapter 5). Thus, this investigation has been 
an exercise in “insider anthropology” (Cerroni-Long, 2009), for I came to study the 
smart city in a situation where I was already an ordinary participant (Spradley, 1980, 
p. 61). By employing this approach I have been able to directly observe how the 
Smarter Cities campaign has emerged and transformed over the years of my 
research, and how actors within IBM have represented and reproduced the 
perspectives, models and approaches encapsulated within this campaign.  
 
During my research, I have worked on a range of efforts that support IBM’s Smarter 
Cities initiative and its expansion, thereby giving me access to a wealth of Smarter 
Cities staff, materials and resources most likely not available to those outside of the 
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company. This support has included identifying performance indicators to help 
measure Smarter Cities outputs and outcomes related to urban ‘quality of life’ (2009-
2010) and developing Smarter Planet educational modules on leadership skills and 
capabilities that aid in smart project implementation (2011-2012). Additionally, I 
have worked on promoting IBM’s Smarter Cities initiative within and external to the 
company (2013-2015). Internally, I led the development of a massive open online 
course that is geared toward educating all 420,000+ IBM staff on the company’s 
Smarter Cities point of view and solutions. The objective of the massive open online 
course is to help staff better represent IBM to clients on the topic of Smarter Cities in 
terms of, from IBM’s perspective, what it means to be a smart city, why being a 
smart city is desirable, and what local governments need to do (i.e., the solutions it 
needs to implement) to become a smart city. Externally, I worked with the IBM 
Smarter Cities marketing team and Ogilvy and Mather (an advertising, marketing 
and public relations agency) to create a social community for city leaders from 
around the world, with the goal of helping members better understand how the 
growing prevalence of data and analytics across city systems is affecting city leader 
roles, services and services provision. The community’s website featured articles and 
case studies on smart city projects that I helped create, and offered a series of virtual 
roundtables on topics thought to be of interest to city leaders (e.g. crowdfunding, 
policy advocacy). The purpose of this endeavor was to help city leaders become 
more comfortable with data and analytics, and therefore more apt to become a buyer 
of IBM solutions and / or services.  
 
Both of these marketing efforts have provided me with insight into the ways in 
which IBM marketing is globally informing city aspirations and models for growth 
and development as local governments adopt or are influenced by IBM Smarter 
Cities narratives and solutions. In effect, I reside inside of IBM’s powerful marketing 
machine and can see how its vision is cascading to cities around the world through 
blogs, press releases, conferences, events, white papers, websites, commercials, ads, 
tweets, Facebook postings, LinkedIn discussions, etc. Centrally orchestrated 
narratives on what it means to be a smart city—which is created by marketing staff, 
not urban experts or professionals—is globally disseminated daily, spreading to 
cities, local governments and city residents near and far.  
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Finally, I also served as the technical lead to the Smarter Cities Challenge team in 
Sendai, Japan to assist the local government in developing consultation strategy and 
plan recommendations for the relocation of affected groups after the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami. All of the above efforts that I have supported have been 
undertaken by IBM to indirectly or directly support the sale of Smarter Cities 
solutions, offerings and services. These Smarter Cities related roles that I have held 
within IBM have required interactions with relevant staff across IBM divisions, such 
as Marketing & Communications, Research, Software Group (SWG), Global 
Business Services (GBS) and Sales & Development (S&D), and with existing and 
prospective local government clients, enabling me insight into the interactions 
between these actors. Thus, my positioning has been strategic, and informative, in 
terms of exploring how IBM and its Smarter Cities initiative are interacting with 
urban governance. And, it has provided me with distinctive insight into the 
emergence and evolution of IBM’s Smarter Cities campaign, and all of the research, 
marketing, solutions and offerings around it, among others. Yet, despite the 
advantages to this positioning, I also recognize the risks and limitations it poses.  
 
3.4.1 Risks and Limitations  
 
While the goal of qualitative research is to diligently work to minimize the effect or 
influence of the researcher, the researcher is in fact always part of the process 
(Kvale, 1996; Mishler, 1986). In this vein, the main ethical concern associated with 
my research has been the potential bias due to my relationship with IBM. I openly 
acknowledge that my positioning within the research field has shaped my field of 
study—in terms of the nature of my research, how I access and view the field, how I 
conceive the topic and the kinds of questions that I pose in relation to it. Further, due 
to my relationship all those with whom I interacted within this research knew of my 
affiliation, and therefore their responses to and interactions with me have been 
shaped by this affiliation. In particular, case study interviewees’ responses have 
potentially been stinted, and most certainly informed, by my status as an IBMer—
particularly within Dubuque, where the local government’s relationship with the city 
is held with high regard and importance. Therefore, this entire research—the 
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formulation of my work; my perspective, conceptualization and approach; interviews 
and interactions around this examination; and my understanding of observations and 
findings—has been influenced and shaped by my insider status. Throughout this 
entire process I have been unable to step outside of the primary IT provider actor that 
I examined.  
 
Additionally, my positioning within the private sector has posed other challenges 
besides adding potential bias. While conducting this work, I have been repeatedly 
challenged by the shifts between the language, mindsets and paradigms of academia 
and those of the private sector, which can sometimes be fraught with corporate 
sloganeering and marketing ploys—traps that at times I would find myself ensnared. 
Working within the private sector has meant that I have had to critically distance 
myself from the perspectives, approaches and models used by these actors—an 
exercise that proved challenging throughout this research. Hence, to help mitigate the 
limitations posed by my affiliation with IBM, I have used outside reviewers from 
time to time who can objectively examine my work to help address any bias that may 
have emerged. I have also done my best to revise my own work reflexively in view 
of my positioning, to the extent possible. My seven years of experience as a social 
scientist with the World Bank, where I worked previous to IBM, helped ground me 
through this process. Despite these measures, it was impossible within this 
investigation to fully divorce myself from the perspective, understandings and 
interactions that my positioning within IBM brings.  
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4 IT Provider Interactions with Urban Governance around Smart 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced my analytical framework, developed to help understand 
how IT providers interact with local policy and planning processes through smart 
projects. This framework focuses on interactions around: (a) strategy, i.e., project 
objectives and how to prioritize and achieve them; (b) engagement, or involved 
actors, the roles they play, and their interactions with and expectations of each other; 
and (c) representation, or how the local government portrays the project through 
narrative and brand. In this chapter, I begin to address my research questions by 
exploring relevant conceptual theory and looking at the perspectives and approaches 
that IT providers bring to these three areas of interaction via smart projects. As noted 
in Chapter 2, to open the aperture of analysis, I view urban governance as not just 
elected officials and formal structures of government, but rather a “broader coalition 
of forces within which urban government and administration have only a facilitative 
and coordinating role to play” (Harvey, 1989a, p. 6). 
 
Below, I start by exploring debates and concepts related to IT provider interaction 
around strategy, examining how the strategies of smart projects, due to their nature 
and design, may lead to an increasing emphasis on the importance of data and a 
solutionist approach to city planning and management. Building on this discussion, I 
outline ways in which smart projects, through IT provider interaction, may transform 
governance arrangements, thereby renegotiating the relationships between the local 
government, IT providers and city residents. For, as designed by IT providers, smart 
projects insert tech companies into local government-city resident relationships, 
where they act as an intermediary between the two, resulting in shifting 
responsibilities and expectations between and among these actors.  
 
Another factor influencing tech provider interactions is the vision that these actors 
hold for local governments and how they function. I elaborate on this vision below, 
where government exists as a facilitator for other actors that are responsible for city 
services provision. This envisioned redesign of urban governance is shaped and 
informed by the narratives and brands created around smart initiatives, often building 
upon messaging from IT providers. For this reason, I end this chapter with a 
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discussion on the power of the concept of smart, how this is conveyed through smart 
narratives, and how local governments are increasingly turning to smart projects as a 
brand ‘fix’ for their cities in a bid to make their city more competitive. The purpose 
of this chapter is to begin exploration of my research questions through the lens of 
my analytical framework and to identify the key issues and debates that will guide 
my case study analysis in Chapters 6-9.   
 
4.1 Smart as a Lens for Strategy and Approach 
 
In this section, I begin to explore my research question on how are smart projects 
interact with local government city objectives, priorities and approaches, and what 
may be the implications of this interaction. As discussed in Chapter 2, smart city 
projects by IT provider design encourage local governments to function more like a 
business, reinforcing and accentuating urban entrepreneurial management practices 
(Hollands, 2008). These projects typically are framed by strategies—i.e. objectives, 
priorities and the approaches to go about achieving them—that are more akin to 
something you would find in the private sector. Unsurprisingly, the aims of smart 
projects frequently align with the assumptions associated with the concept of smart.  
 
In my analysis, I identified three key areas of potential influence from IT provider 
interaction around smart project strategy: a focus on data, approach to achieve 
project objectives and changes in required government staff capabilities. I observed 
that no matter the specific project objectives or priorities chosen, when IT providers 
interact with local governments around smart project strategy, data and analytics will 
be at the project’s core. Thus, leading to data centrality within the efforts and data as 
a central aspect of strategy. Additionally, the professed approach to achieve the 
selected objectives and priorities will emulate the models, frameworks and 
approaches of IT providers. Together, these shifts—of focusing on data and utilizing 
IT provider frameworks and approaches—may translate into a new focus on the 
skills and capabilities of city officials that do not sit within the IT department.  
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4.1.1 Data Centrality 
 
Data and analytics are the cornerstone of smart projects. By design, these projects are 
entirely reliant upon the ability to gather and analyze data, for together these 
purportedly enable local governments to “do more with less” (Shelton et al., 2014, p. 
3), to “optimize through code” (Söderström et al., 2014, p. 17). With this focus come 
by-products that are not readily recognized—namely, how the increased emphasis on 
data and analytics may affect the local governments’ goals and how to go about 
achieving them. With the rising prevalence of smart technologies, the amount of data 
generated on the city and its systems is growing exponentially; as is the emphasis 
that is being placed on the importance of data and the technologies that gather and 
analyze it (Mattern, 2013). As described by IBM, this shift to the digital era cannot 
be ignored by public sector leaders:    
 
We are currently witnessing a new wave of technological advancement that 
promises to radically transform how value is created and consumed within 
the global economy. The integration and convergence of technologies such 
as Cloud, Big Data, Analytics, Mobile and Social Collaboration, has been 
called “The 4th industrial revolution”, credited with enabling organizations 
to be more intelligent, more agile, better able to scale their operations, 
optimize supply chains, shift to new business models or even create new 
industries with unprecedented speed. (IBM, 2015a)   
 
From this IT provider perspective, data are, in a sense, a new commodity that is ripe 
for the picking of public sector leaders that have the vision to create systems that can 
harness and utilize this new power; power that unsurprisingly IBM posits can only be 
obtained through the solutions and services offered by them (IBM, 2014d, 2014i, 
2014j, 2015; IDC, 2009). In this manner, IBM staff are attempting to put IBM at the 
center of all activity and engines related to economic growth. For, according to IBM 
in this excerpt, the only path to growth comes from data—a resource that will remain 
untapped and unharnessed without IBM’s solutions and expertise. This perspective 
has implications for how urban challenges are interpreted and understood, as well as 
for the type of local government staff hired or appointed. I explore these implications 
below.   
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4.1.2 Solutionism 
 
With this emphasis on data, as smart projects spread, there is a rising deference to 
technocratic approaches where decision making is purportedly ‘evidenced-based’ as 
described by tech providers (Söderström et al., 2014; Vanolo, 2013), which attempt 
to fit data to their needs. As stated by IBM on its Smarter Cities website, local 
governments are “moving beyond policy-based decisions to reshape cities with 
insights gained from data” (IBM in Vanolo, 2013, p. 8). While urban professionals 
have informed decision making with city data for ages—considering factors such as 
population, commerce, trade, demographics, land use, mobility patterns, utility usage 
and other forms of resource consumption, among others—the integration of real-time 
data, and the amounts of data being generated and analyzed, is new (Kitchin, 2014b; 
Kitchin et al., 2015). This swell in data, longitudinal and real time, along with 
various enabling and driving technologies, is changing the way that governments 
make decisions about policy and resource allocation as data are more frequently 
being weighted along with other factors, such as social and / or political agendas 
(Kitchin, 2014b; Urban Systems Symposium, 2011). As noted by Kitchin et al. 
(2015), in this “narrowly conceived but powerful realist epistemology” of the smart 
city, urban environments are perceived as “visualized facts”; a trend that is reshaping 
“how managers and citizens come to know and govern cities” (p. 6). Purported better 
information derived from increased data and analytics is assumed to drive better 
governance, decision making and resource allocation (Wiig, 2015). Conceived in this 
fashion, the smart city cannot be attained without data (Kitchin et al., 2015), for data 
act “as a kind of master signifier or obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986) through 
which all other functions must position themselves” (Shelton et al., 2014, p. 3).  
 
This proclivity for technocratic rationalization / ‘evidenced-based’ decision making 
is underpinned by the (faulty) assumption that data emerging from smart 
technologies are neutral. However, “technology of any kind is never neutral; it has 
the potential and capacity to be used socially and politically for quite different 
purposes” (R. Williams 1983 in Hollands, 2008, p. 315). As positioned by IT 
providers, data represent reality (Mattern, 2013). Yet the veracity of data can be 
affected by what data are collected, how and how often they are collected, the 
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method of collection, and by whom and from whom they are collected. That is also 
assuming that the local government is actually collecting the data it needs to collect 
and that it is relaying the data in a way that is visually understood—for 
visualizations, without proper explanation, can easily be misunderstood as well 
(Shelton et al., 2014; Urban Systems Symposium, 2011). “While data-driven 
analyses tend to emphasize their objectivity, accuracy and neutrality, it is important 
to keep in mind that data are socially constructed, and different forms of data allow 
for competing representations of place” (Shelton et al., 2014, p. 6). Data are situated 
spatially and temporally during collection and production, and thus carries the biases 
of its creators. On top of this, the policy outcomes of data-driven decision making 
will be shaped by the forms of data used, whether quantitative, qualitative, visual or 
geographic information system (GIS)-related (Shelton el al., 2014).  
 
Data can also be unreliable. For instance a student can be mathematically gifted, but 
due to a lack of aptitude for test taking, appear to be behind his / her classmates. The 
teacher may know through day to day interactions that the student is gifted, but to 
those evaluating class progress, data will skew in the opposite direction. While this 
discrepancy is also in and of itself data, this does not easily transfer into quantifiable 
information, and thus, would most likely be overlooked by typical smart city 
solutions (Sterett, 2016). Data can also be unreliable due pressures that may result to 
alter the data, where actors manipulate the data to avoid punitive actions or recourse 
due to data usage—for example, policemen not reporting minor crimes to make it 
look like crime rates are lowering within their districts (Townsend, 2013, p. 210). A 
lack of standardization of data tracking and indicators across silos within the city 
adds to this complexity, making interoperability of data sets, transparency and 
extraction of insight difficult (Ford Foundation et al., 2014). Thus, data might have 
to be cleaned or altered before it can be combined or compared with other data sets if 
the units of measurement are not comparable, drastically diminishing the utility of 
the data. While the use of application program interface (APIs) can assist with this 
process, it is not automatic and as seamless as presented by tech providers.   
 
What is not mentioned in IT provider narratives about the promise of data and 
analytics is the messiness of big data and the time and cost that is often involved in 
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cleaning data and data sets so that they are useful. As noted by a Susan Sterett, 
Director of the Metropolitan Institute at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, in a roundtable on the National Science Foundation’s Big Data efforts 
held in March 2016 in Washington, D.C., “big data is expensive… a lot of big data 
work is janitorial, it is cost and time consuming to clean and prep data so that it is 
useful” (Sterett, 2016). While this is no different than most scientific work, which 
requires substantial data cleaning, it does mean that the promise of big data may not 
be as readily realized as some hope (Sterett, 2016). As noted by Kitchin (2014b), big 
data does have limitations, for it generally captures: 
 
what is easy to ensnare—data that are openly expressed (what is typed, 
swiped, scanned, sensed; people’s actions and behaviours; the movement of 
things)—as well as data that are the ‘exhaust’, a by-product, of the primary 
task / output. It takes these data at face-value, despite the fact that they may 
not have been designed to answer specific questions and the data produced 
might be messy, dirty, full of occlusions and biases. It is less well suited to 
contextualising such data or revealing the complex contingent and relational 
inner lifeworlds of people and places. (Kitchin, 2014b, p. 9) 
  
Thus, despite the tech provider promises about the solutions and opportunities 
hidden within big data, there are clearly constraints to the types of information big 
data is able to provide and flaws hidden within what it is actually able to relay. 
Finally, with this focus on data, there could be a tendency for local government to 
begin to manage only those things that they can measure (Bell, 2011). As a 
consequence of the “presumption that all meaningful flows of activity can be sensed 
and measured, is taking us toward a future in which the people shaping our cities and 
their policies rarely have the opportunity to consider the nature of our stickiest urban 
problems and the kind of questions they raise” (Mattern, 2013). Things raised as 
problems by the smart system may not even be problems at all; clogs such as the 
inefficiency of parent-teacher conferences, which tax teachers’ time and have 
difficult to measure outcomes. These tendencies point solutionism—which, as 
described by Evgeny Morozov, recasts “complex social situations either as neatly 
defined problems with a definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self-
evident processes that can be easily optimized—if only the right algorithms are in 
place!” (Morozov, 2013, p. 9 in Mattern, 2013). While this computational vision of 
the city is not entirely new (Mumford, 1961 and Donald, 1999 in Mattern, 2013), 
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what is novel is the reduction of cities to the automated functions of data-generating, 
collecting and analyzing, and the reification of the data produced. With this logic, all 
you need is the ‘right’ data set and the ‘right’ algorithms to solve any city problem 
(Mattern, 2013). All urban challenges, within the simplistic smart city frame, are 
reduced to engineering problems that can be resolved through quantitative analysis 
enabled by measurement (Bell, 2011).  
 
As this discussion highlights, smart city initiatives, as envisioned by tech providers, 
are said to, in some way shape or form, improve city operations and services by 
better understanding performance and enhancing decision making. Yet, what is 
unsaid within tech provider narratives of smart projects is that there are 
methodological and technical issues that may skew data, analysis and understanding 
(Kitchin et al., 2015); and that these initiatives can be costly and labor intensive. As 
another offshoot to this data centrality, city officials are increasingly expected to be 
well versed in the data gathering and analysis that is enabled through smart 
technologies, including those who sit outside of IT and technology-related offices.  
 
4.1.3 Changing Capabilities and Staff 
 
In this move to data centrality and the rise of big data—i.e., a vast increase in data 
streams and variability where data are so large and complex that traditional analytics 
are inadequate—it is generally assumed that government actors will know how to sift 
through this data, turn it into ‘intelligence’ through advanced analytics, and know 
how to use this information to allocate resources and inform decision making based 
on evidence derived from the data. While many urban professionals have been 
working with data and analytics for decades, responsibilities for associated big data 
and analytics tasks are being passed along to departments and positions not typically 
used to these types of functions. In some cases, especially in smaller or less well-
funded urban environments, there is a “divide in skill levels between civil servants 
and employees in the private sector, causing government employees to lag behind in 
terms of their full participation in the smart city” (Ford Foundation et al., 2014, p. 4). 
As noted by Gil ElBaz, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Founder of Factual, an 
open data platform developed to maximize data accuracy, transparency, and 
  
 81 
accessibility that was launched in 2009, “the technical skills required for the 
management and processing of large data sets are also complex and time 
consuming… This puts civil servants, nonprofits, and urban residents at a 
considerable disadvantage” (ElBaz in Ford Foundation et al., 2014, p. 5). A 
disadvantage not necessarily because the skills cannot be gleaned or learned, but 
rather that these are expected to be added on top of existing roles and functions, 
especially in smaller cities with more constrained budgets and smaller staffs.  
 
Further, as cities more frequently employ smart technologies, and as ‘evidence-
based’ decision making increasingly influences resource allocation and policy, more 
and more local governments feel compelled to create new roles to support these 
practices and processes. As an example of this trend, cities across the United States 
are adding new roles to local government administration—such as Chief Information 
Officers (CIOs), Chief Technology Officers (CTOs), and Chief Data Officers 
(CDOs) in cities like New York City, Chicago and San Francisco—to help better 
capture and analyze data that can be used to inform decision making and policy 
processes (Byers, 2011; Diversity/Careers, 2010; Foley, 2010; Shelton et al., 2014; 
W. Wong, 2011). These staff bring in qualifications “more commonly found in 
technology startups, such as computer programming and data analytics” (Shelton et 
al., 2014, pp. 4-5).  
 
For political reasons, no city will rely upon data alone to inform decision making and 
policy formation. However, as the reliance upon data to inform these processes 
increases, it also raises questions about the potential social impact for city residents 
(Urban Systems Symposium, 2011). How will the reliance upon data affect the way 
that the local government governs? How might it affect resource allocation and 
policy, and what will be the significance of this especially since data derived in smart 
projects is frequently divorced from context? How might this data-driven approach 
to urban governance affect social and welfare issues or minority concerns within city 
strategy? How will the notion of optimization and efficiency, as relayed via data, 
affect the human and organic aspects of city life? And, if something cannot be 
measured, will it not be considered of value?  
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4.2 Smart as a Framework, Reason and Tool for Engaging 
 
In this section, I begin to examine my second research question by looking into how 
tech providers may inform engagement around smart projects. Below I explore the 
roles and expectations of local government and city residents in these initiatives, how 
these may be shifting within these endeavors, and how IT providers may be involved 
in this transformation. As outlined in Chapter 2, within my research I use 
engagement to refer to the governance arrangements around smart projects, which 
includes involved actors, the roles they play, and their interactions with and 
expectations of each other. Typically within smart projects this engagement takes 
place within the structure of a public-private partnership, and includes the 
involvement of citizens, actors frequently deemed critical for smart project ‘success’. 
Within these governance arrangements, IT providers envision change. As described 
in an interview that I conducted with a smart city expert at Cisco, by design, smart 
projects are “ushering in a new way of governance and connecting stakeholders. 
They are not about new technologies, rather they are changing and informing local 
government relationships and interactions because of the technologies introduced”. 
In this sense, from the IT provider perspective, smart projects offer a framework, 
reason and tool for engaging various actors within the city.  
 
4.2.1 Renegotiation of Relationships 
 
Smart projects are most often initiated by local government leaders or decision 
makers, such as mayors, city councils, city managers, city chief information officers, 
municipal corporations and / or finance committees. These actors may also become 
involved in “mobilizing particular policy interventions and exporting them to other 
localities” (Shelton et al. 2014: 4), which can be seen in cities like Boston, London, 
Melbourne and Singapore. Central to the implementation of these projects are IT 
providers, for they typically supply the appropriate infrastructure to make city 
systems smart.23 For projects related to a city’s infrastructure, utility companies, 
                                                 
23 ICT providers include, among others, IBM, Cisco, Hewlett Packard, Siemens, Microsoft and 
Vodafone.  
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regulatory boards, and / or other related organizations are involved, as well as 
developers, architects, engineers and construction companies24 (Bevan and Briody, 
2009; Elfrink, 2009; IBM, 2009a; Lohr, 2009b). Critical thinking around smart 
technologies and their deployment has been informed by industry and professional 
groups, nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups and educational 
institutions.25 City residents also play a role—acting as partners, beneficiaries, 
consumers, sensors, developers (creating applications to share and help understand 
data), or in more uncommon cases, analysts or planners. Each of these actors 
involved in smart projects have a different vision of what this means—in some cases, 
even within the same organization interests and intent also vary (Kitchin, 2014a).  
 
The responsibilities, capabilities and power of these relevant actors are distributed 
asymmetrically within smart projects, as some of these actors hold more sway over 
the design, production, implementation and operation of smart initiatives. Often 
these arrangements are fluid, with some actors (e.g. tech providers) making decisions 
or taking the lead at one point during the project, then deferring to others at another 
point in the project. To oversee the design, management and implementation of these 
endeavors, formal and / or informal governance arrangements and partnerships are 
established between and among the range of actors (Hollands, 2008; McNeil, 2014). 
To some extent, these arrangements are dictated by the smart technologies involved, 
and in turn, the shape of these governance arrangements affect involved technologies 
(as well as which technologies may not be involved) (Akrich, 1992; Bijker and Law, 
1992; Law and Callon, 1992). Below I briefly explore how relationships within the 
city are being renegotiated through smart projects, with a focus on local government, 
technology providers and city residents. For each of these actors I provide a brief 
                                                 
24
 Examples of utility companies and other related organizations that have been part of a smart project 
include, among others: Veolia Environment, Pacific Gas & Electric, Baltimore Gas & Electric, and 
GDF Suez. Arup, Bouygues Construction, CH2MHill and Jones Lang LaSalle are some examples of 
developers, architects, engineers and construction companies involved in smart city projects.  
25
 Examples of industry and professional groups include, among others Code for America, the 
International Telecommunication Union, International Society of City and Regional Planners and 
Urban & Regional Information Systems Association. Nongovernmental organizations and advocacy 
groups include, among others, Global Cities Dialogue, UN-Habitat, the Global Mayors Forum, Urban 
Age and the Urban Land Institute. Relevant philanthropic organizations include the Knight 
Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies. Educational institutions such as the Bartlett Faculty of the 
Built Environment, Imperial College London and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), have 
also contributed to the examination of smart cities.    
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overview of their interests, the challenges they may face in regards to these projects, 
and how smart initiatives may shift the ways in which they engage with each other. 
 
Local Government Regulators 
 
Local governments are often initiators of smart efforts within cities, spurred by a 
variety of reasons, some proclaimed, some not. In general, local government actors 
seek to integrate smart technologies with city systems or services in hopes of, among 
others: (a) improving their understanding of city operations, functioning and resource 
consumption (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013; Townsend, 2013, pp. 16, 39, 41); (b) 
promoting, and potentially furthering, environmental and economic sustainability 
agendas (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013); (c) encouraging business development and 
the attraction / retention of talent (especially within the ICT and ICT-related sectors) 
and making the city more globally competitive (Begg, 2002; Coe el al., 2000); (d) 
increasing political visibility and / or chances of re-election; (e) leaving a legacy or 
footprint before exiting office; (f) enhancing city image and brand (Hollands, 2008); 
or (g) creating a distraction from other areas of city affairs that may not be 
considered successful or attractive (Harvey, 1989a). And, local governments seem to 
pursue smart efforts for several of these reasons, rather than having one as a singular 
goal. Many local governments seem to support the smart city concept—in the words 
of Kitchin (2014a), “municipal and national governments, along with supra-national 
states, such as the European Union, positively endorse the smart city concept as the 
path to socio-economic progress and more livable, secure, functional, competitive 
and sustainable cities” (p. 2). Despite local government attraction to the smart city 
and all that its IT provider enablers proclaim, there are difficulties associated with 
implementing smart efforts from a local government perspective that span across a 
range of financial, political, organizational, structural and ethical complexities.   
 
Smart projects often involve a large, up-front investment to which local governments 
often do not have ready access, as well as additional necessary funding for 
operations, repair and maintenance. On top of that, returns are seen, if at all, in the 
long term, quite possibly after any political payoff may result for the leaders who 
championed these efforts. Hence, these types of initiatives can be risky for any 
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political official given the short duration of political terms and the length of the 
smart project cycle. No political official wants to be seen as supporting questionable 
or controversial projects during election periods (Berger, 2011; Farais, 2010; 
Graham and Thrift, 2007). There are also variances of (political) risk associated with 
these projects. The private sector can have a vision of making a city smart and fail, 
while the public sector cannot do so without dire political consequences resulting in 
losing an election and / or harming citizen trust in and relationships with local 
government. Thus the risks for adopting smart technologies are inherently higher for 
the public sector than the private sector (Gandy, 2004; Graham and Marvin, 2001, 
pp. 97-98). Further, smart projects, through their high levels of involvement with the 
private sector, tend to be more speculative in nature, and in some cases “capital 
infrastructure [has been] increasingly used as leverage for other financial activities” 
(Gandy, 2004, p. 370). Thus capital assets, such as infrastructure systems, are 
becoming closely linked to new forms of economic development for the city—
further shifting local governments into more entrepreneurial, and risky, governance 
models.  
 
In addition, smart projects are complex projects that can span across organizational 
boundaries and departments, complicating procurement, management and 
performance measurement processes. Depending on city size, jurisdictional issues 
may also pose problems, as a city may have to work across many different 
geographic and political boundaries—borough, county, municipal and neighborhood 
to name a few. On top of that, there is a disconnect in the way that many IT 
providers view making cities smart, with a focus on holistically viewing systems and 
systems’ issues—a perspective that does not map well to government institutions 
(Grossman, 2011). In part it is for these reasons that smart discourse often alludes to 
the changes that must take place with government and governance as cities become 
smarter (Hollands, 2008), where these institutions and their processes must become 
more politically efficient (Eger, 1997, 2003).  
 
Finally, there are various ethical concerns for city leaders: “as advocates tout 
technology as the answer to various societal ills, we should take a step back and 
examine critically what this means for democracy, equity and social justice” 
  
 86 
(Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. the Dean of the University of California Los Angeles 
Luskin School of Public Affairs in Ford Foundation et al., 2014). The restructuring 
of urban infrastructure systems from integration with smart technologies will also 
reorganize urban forms and landscapes (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 15). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, these changes may contribute to fragmentation and 
socioeconomic and technical divides within urban environments, leading to more 
exclusion and alienation within cities (Castells, 1996).  
 
Despite these challenges and risks, smart projects remain alluring for local 
governments that are enticed by the tech provider solutions that can purportedly help 
tackle any urban woe (Hollands, 2008). And, as municipal leaders increasingly adopt 
smart projects, they will increasingly engage more with and rely upon tech providers 
to help address city challenges—further inserting these actors into urban governance 
processes. Based on the way that smart projects are designed by the IT provider, this 
has the potential to shape engagement between the local government and city 
residents.  
 
IT Providers 
 
For IT providers, smart means big business. These actors are central to providing 
resources and services for these projects, affecting design, implementation, 
management, maintenance and operations. Forrester Research estimates that by 2017 
smart computing technologies will represent about half of spending on IT equipment 
and software in the United States (in Bartels, 2009). Harbor Research estimates that 
Internet-enabled devices will net more than $10 billion worldwide in 2014, more 
than double in growth from 2009 (in Bartels, 2009). Demand for wireless sensors is 
also growing exponentially—according to ABI Research, in 2009 10 million radio 
chips for such sensors were sold, which is estimated to rise to 645 million by 2015 
(in Bartels, 2009). Additionally, there will be an increased need for storage; IDC 
estimated that the capacity shipped increased by fifty percent in 2010. Demand for 
analytics programs is expected to grow from $25.5 billion in 2010 to $34 billion in 
2014, according to IDC (in Bartels, 2009). Finally, there will also be growth in 
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software and the platforms needed to integrate the data streams from all kinds of 
sensors. 
 
This rapid market expansion for the technologies required for smart projects has led 
to a rush to fill the space by a wide array of IT and ICT providers, among other 
private sector actors (The Economist, 2010b). While these actors present their smart 
city solutions as being pragmatic, apolitical and city and citizen-oriented, it is clear 
that below this rhetoric are “vested interests pushing for the adoption of market-led 
and technological solutions to city administration, while at the same time seeking 
deregulation, privatization and more open economics that weakens oversight and 
enable more efficient capital accumulation” (Kitchin, 2014a, p. 2). Alongside IBM’s 
Smarter Cities campaign launch, numerous others tech companies have clamored to 
get into the smart city market, each focusing on their individual firm’s strengths.   
 
As the biggest maker of networking gear, Cisco is another smart city tech provider 
with its Smart+Connected Communities. Focusing on networking capabilities, their 
approach aims to bring together people, services, community assets, and information 
to form a single solution (Cisco, 2010, p. 2). The hardware leader Hewlett-Packard 
(HP) aims to create a Central Nervous System for the Earth (CeNSE) by building an 
infrastructure for the Internet of Things. Their CeNSE research and development 
program aims to build a global sensing network with billions of “tiny, cheap, tough 
and exquisitely sensitive detectors” (MacManus, 2009). Meanwhile, Siemens and its 
competitor General Electric (GE) are focusing on smart systems within certain 
industries, such as health care and manufacturing, as well as within energy. Siemens 
aims to bring “knowledge to power”, with smart grid technologies for the entire 
energy supply chain (Siemens, 2010). While GE’s Ecoimagination initiative 
addresses concerns for the home, alternative energy, smart meters and CO2 
emissions (General Electric, 2011). Microsoft has also made the foray into smart city 
territory by applying its enterprise resource planning system and cloud computing to 
urban environments, under their premise that “building smarter cities goes hand-in-
hand with using resources more effectively” (Microsoft, 2012). These are but of few 
of the tech providers rushing in to create and fill this market. Additionally 
engineering, design and architecture firms, among others, are also attempting to 
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acquire the requisite skills and abilities for assisting local governments with smart 
technology adoption. In their efforts to grow this business, these actors have helped 
make and inform the smart city market, while giving “institutional definition to a 
previously diffuse set of commercial and research practices. In particular, the rise of 
firms such as Siemens, Cisco and IBM (the electrician, plumber and planner of the 
smart city, as Townsend [2013] neatly puts it) have together formed a powerful 
coalition of corporate voices proclaiming the significance of smart cities” (McNeil, 
2014, p. 10).   
 
While these actors work together to make the smart city market, challenges for IBM 
and other IT providers are, and will continue to be, the intense competition growing 
within this market, identifying willing and able clients, and making a profit given 
constrained economic times. Additionally, IT providers face the immense difficulty 
of actually making these smart technologies work (McNeill, 2014). In addition to the 
wide array of complexities surrounding their implementation at a multi-system levels 
within cities, IT providers also have to contend with the legacy systems that often 
hinder the interoperability required for data exchange, and the antiquated, and in 
some cases undocumented, urban infrastructure systems that can date back over a 
century (The Economist, 2010b, 2010d; Townsend, 2013, pp. 252-280). Further, for 
most tech giants, working with local government is a foray into new territory, 
translating into a very sharp learning curve. On top of this, many IT providers are 
required to collaborate with non-traditional partners, across a range of industries, and 
with numbers of partners to which they are not accustomed to working. In some 
cases, new partners may also be competitors in the city next door (The Economist, 
2010b, 2010d). Hence, this creates a very tricky landscape to navigate that can 
potentially complicate how these already challenging efforts are implemented 
(McNeill, 2014), how they are priced and financed, and how ‘effective’ they may 
end up being. Regardless of these challenges, across almost all smart projects the 
relationships between local government and city residents within smart projects are 
strongly mediated by corporate actors, not only in terms of how government agencies 
innovate and implement policy, but also in terms of how city residents are 
constituted as civic actors (Cohen, 2001; Livingstone et al., 2007; Rose, 1999, p. 
164). 
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City Resident Users 
 
In many cases, local governments state that city residents are the primary 
beneficiaries of smart endeavors. City residents typically use the services provided 
by smart city systems, and in some way or form, also fund them through taxes or rate 
increases (Gross, 2010; Leeds, 2010; Vadari, 2010; Zifcak, 2010). In addition to 
being the stated beneficiaries, city residents can be engaged in smart projects in 
various ways, including, among others: (a) providing input and feedback on the 
systems or services integrated with smart technologies, or on a related urban 
planning process; (b) acting as application developers when local governments 
provide open source data created by smart systems; and / or (c) serving as sensors, 
with citizens willingly entering, or unknowingly contributing to, data that will help 
the smart infrastructure systems to better function (Grossman, 2011; New York City, 
2007; O’Neil, 2010). While the envisioned future for city residents is, as depicted by 
IT technology providers, one of increased leisure, resources, simplicity and overall 
high quality of life (Cisco, 2010; IBM, 2009a, 2011a; MacManus, 2009; Siemens, 
2010), there are many potential adverse impacts that may affect city residents, such 
as exclusion, lack of access, social control and increased financial and behavioral 
responsibility for community well-being (Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 158-159, 
263-264, 384; Hollands, 2008). In terms of the latter, smart projects can be designed 
to greatly facilitate this shift in responsibility.    
 
As described by Suzan Ilcan and Tanya Basok (2004), “The task of government 
today is no longer engaged in traditional planning but is more involved in enabling, 
inspiring and assisting citizens to take responsibility for social problems in their 
communities, and formulating appropriate orientations and rationalities for their 
actions” (p. 132). With this trend, as the interrelations between politics, civic 
organizations and the economy have changed, the distinction between citizen and 
consumer has dissolved. Consequently, citizenship increasingly has been redefined 
in relation to a consumer’s right to participate in the marketplace, where through 
choices around consumption, citizens can affect positive social change (Beck, 2005, 
p. 170; Glickman, 1999, pp. 1-16; McGovern, 1998). Instead of ‘good’ citizens being 
those who actively participate in civic affairs, citizens can contribute through their 
purchasing power as consumers, thus transforming the meaning of civic life 
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(Needham, 2003; Livingstone et al., 2007). Most notably, for example, one can see 
this trend when governments push campaigns and programs related to the 
environment and sustainability—where emphasis is put on changes in an individual’s 
everyday activities to reach an overall end goal (Hinchcliffe, 1996). Within this, 
public engagement moves beyond the informed citizen, who keeps aware of 
pertinent issues, to engagement that seeks action on the part of individuals through 
the act of consumption.  
 
In this context, as smart initiatives spread across cities and city systems, city 
residents are no longer being perceived as passive, but as active participants in the 
city around them as citizen consumers (Kitchin, 2015). By design many smart 
projects require delegating responsibility to city residents in terms of their behavior 
and financial obligations (Grossman, 2011). For example, in smart meter projects, it 
is assumed that if city residents are more informed about their consumption patterns 
they will make better choices and self-regulate, thus lowering consumption (though 
the data are still inconclusive around this assumption). In this scenario, for the smart 
meter project to be ‘successful’, city residents become partners with key actions they 
must take—paying for meter installation and changing their behavior (Dillow, 2011).  
 
In addition to citizens being viewed as citizen consumers within smart projects, they 
can also be construed as customer consumers (Cohen, 2001), where they are ‘buyers’ 
of the city as a product and its services. Within the digital revolution in the private 
sector, there is a rising asymmetry between sellers and customers, who increasingly 
have more power through increased access and information (Kotler et al., 2002, pp. 
36-37). Through the Internet, customers can more clearly demand and get what they 
want. This has caused businesses to increasingly focus on customer relations 
management (CRM) for products and relationship management for services in the 
private sector. Some of these CRM marketing efforts include engaging the customer 
to get a better idea of their wants, needs and experience with the service or product, 
typically through a website or app (Kotler et al., 2002). And, as smart projects have 
spread, this CRM approach has been reinforced within the public sector. Technology 
tools that open up channels between the local government and citizens—such as 311 
or a crowdsourcing panel—can be viewed as a continuation of this trend within the 
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public sector, where the local government is seeking to put the customer, or city 
resident, first by gaining a better understanding of their needs, wants and experiences 
of city systems and services (Grossman, 2011).    
 
Despite the emphasis that is seemingly put on city resident engagement in smart 
endeavors, in the end, the technologies and business and regulatory environments in 
which smart projects emerge are shaped by local governments and IT providers, not 
by city residents. Thus, they end up better suited to meet the needs of the regulators 
and providers, not users (Townsend, 2013, p. 104). That is not to imply however, 
that city residents have no power within these initiatives, nor that there are no 
bottom-up smart city projects. As city residents gain access to the knowledge created 
by smart city systems, and are able to act upon this knowledge, they gain power vis-
à-vis those who own, manage and operate these systems (Vanolo, 2014). For 
instance, a consumer who is unhappy with an energy provider’s rate structure can 
switch to a different provider who perhaps fluctuates rates throughout the day. 
Likewise, as those who own, manage and operate these systems gain knowledge on 
how these systems are used by consumers, they gain power over the consumers in 
terms of how they decide to provide these infrastructure services once they have a 
better idea of how and when they are used (Gross, 2010; Zifcak, 2010). For example, 
congestion charging rates can vary for use of bridges or tolled freeways depending 
on time and number of users—penalizing those using these systems when demand is 
highest (Ottewell, 2007; Stockholmsforsoket, 2006; United States Department of 
Transportation, 2008). While power in this context is relational, in the end it will 
stem from who has access and ownership of the data created by smart projects—
typically the implementing parties, which in most cases will be local government, 
utility providers, and / or other private sector actors including tech firms like IBM.  
 
As evidenced in this discussion, “smart cities involve the creation of new relations 
between technology and society” (Söderström et al., 2014, p. 6), issuing forth a 
renegotiation of relationships between involved local government, citizens and third 
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party actors (Shelton et al., 2014). According to the smart city provider Arup,26 the 
addition of smart technologies to city infrastructure and services “will allow us 
[smart city providers] to rewire governments by design, transforming the way they 
work internally and together with outside partners and citizens” (Buschner et al., 
2010, p. 9). This IT provider vision of transformation involves, among others, 
changes in government function (what government is tasked to do) and governance 
(how government goes about doing these tasks).  
 
4.2.2 Government 2.0 
 
In their idealized vision of future government, tech providers see themselves and 
technology as central to addressing city operations and functioning (O’Reilly, 2010, 
Chapter 2). According to one smart city provider, Arup, this new model is inevitable 
due to the nature of smart projects, and a breach from current modus operandi: “The 
smart city is so different in essence to the 20th century city that the governance 
models and organization frameworks themselves must evolve” (Buschner et al., 
2010, p. 9). An examination of tech provider materials around this transformation 
helps shed light on the types of shifts these actors hope to see within urban 
governance.  
 
To promote smart projects, IT providers posit that by local governments adopting a 
pro-business bias city leaders will be better able to tackle urban challenges. For 
example, in their white paper on smart city technologies, Arup states that local 
governments could better address city problems if they mimicked Internet-based 
systems, which have had tremendous adoption and participation rates because they 
are consumer-centric, flexible, responsive and adaptable in real time (Buschner et al., 
2010). As posited, by shifting to instrumented and interconnected urban systems, 
local governments will be able to instantly respond to real-time data, thereby 
                                                 
26 Arup is an urban design and planning firm operating within the smart city market. Their “Smart 
Cities Framework” describes a strategy for “urban information architecture”, or the organizational 
layers that support the “urban informatics”, or the public interfaces that engage citizens and urban 
activities. “Instrumenting resource systems” enable these other components, and includes sensors and 
sensor technologies. They also discuss the interactions between hard infrastructure (smart grid, roads, 
distributed networks) and soft infrastructure (social networks, communities, legal and cultural 
systems, etc.) (Buschner et al., 2010). 
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enabling a new, more adaptable and informed way of managing these systems. In the 
words of Arup, this new form of:  
 
management, operation and engagement, (is) perhaps equivalent to the 
difference between a traditional high-street bookstore and Amazon.com. 
The latter is a constantly shifting, scalable system that is automatically 
generated ‘on the fly’ by constant learning from millions of interactions in 
near-real-time, within a framework that enables both top-down intervention 
and bottom-up organization. Every single interaction within Amazon.com 
reconfigures the offering in real-time. The offering itself is largely 
constructed from the actions of its users, such that it near-effortlessly 
moulds itself around the apparent desires of its users. (Buschner et al., 2010, 
p. 4)  
 
While this type of extreme adaptability will be impossible for cities—which are 
comprised of tangible, concrete, and often static infrastructure systems—it is still 
touted as an ideal even though it is modeled after Amazon.com, a virtual store 
(Buschner et al., 2010). One example of this adaptability promoted by IT providers is 
through a push to get local governments to deliver services and back-end operations 
via the cloud. For example, according to IBM, local governments no longer prefer 
IT-heavy, on premise solutions; instead, city leaders are turning to more “agile, 
easily consumable functionality” that puts the responsibility of backend IT system 
operations (system updates, bug fixes, data protection, interoperability) onto the 
service provider (IBM, 2014b, p. 1). According to this tech provider narrative, 
moving to cloud enables quicker set up and project returns (IBM, 2014b). This new 
approach means that local governments rent capabilities versus owning them. Instead 
of buying the hardware and software necessary for smart projects, there is a monthly 
fee, thereby making the local government fully dependent upon the tech provider for 
continuation of services, maintenance and repair.   
   
Rosabeth Kanter and Stanley Litow (2009) outline this IT provider perspective of 
change within urban governance as a necessity for optimization of resources and 
processes. According to these two authors, one of whom is a Vice President at 
IBM,27 “a smarter city infuses information into its physical infrastructure to improve 
conveniences, facilitate mobility, add efficiencies, conserve energy, improve the 
                                                 
27 Stanley S. Litow is Vice President of Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Affairs at IBM. 
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quality of air and water, identify problems and fix them quickly, recover rapidly 
from disasters, collect data to make better decisions and deploy resources effectively, 
and share data to enable collaboration across entities and domains” (Kanter and 
Litow, 2009, p. 2). In addition to better managing resources, Kanter and Litow posit 
that smart technologies help improve political efficiency by addressing city 
management problems related to knowledge sharing and communication across 
government sectors and silos—such as weak civic leadership, inability to scale, low 
social capital, inadequate services and services delivery and jurisdictional issues 
(Kanter and Litow, 2009; see also Buschner et al., 2010; Dirks and Keeling, 2009).  
 
This IT provider vision of an agile, consumer-centric local government bent on 
optimization sets the stage for how these actors see the future function of 
government—where the key tasks of local government focus on enabling 
nongovernment actors to solve urban problems. To enable this vision, tech providers 
posit that local governments must leverage collaborative technologies like those that 
enabled Web 2.0 to create a “Government 2.0” (Eggers, 2007; O’Reilly, 2010). What 
Government 2.0 means exactly however is unclear. There is no commonly 
understood meaning, for collaborative technologies could apply across a panoply of 
applications, including electronic and mobile government services, the use of social 
media for alerts or awareness raising, aiding in transparency through information 
sharing, gathering input or feedback through survey or polling mechanisms, adopting 
cloud computing, crowdsourcing, mobile applications, developer contests, or the like 
(O’Reilly, 2010). Despite the lack of clarity, given that individuals are more 
connected than ever before through mobile devices and social media, tech providers 
see these means as new channels for governments to perform their tasks—whether it 
be to engage city residents, provide services or enable collaborative problem solving. 
Tech providers also see it as a means to create new markets.  
 
Moving to Government 2.0, according Donald Kettl (2009),28 would require a radical 
departure from what tech promoters refer to as traditional models of “vending 
                                                 
28 Donald Kettl is professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and a senior 
fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. His viewpoints align with the interests of 
IBM, as they support further integrating technology into the way government functions and delivers 
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machine government” (p. 29), a notion that disguises the complexity of government 
services. Citizens pay taxes and in return expect services, which if not provided or 
provided adequately leads to their participation in the form of protest, i.e. rattling the 
vending machine in hopes of fixing it (Kettl, 2009). Contrary to this, Tim O’Reilly29 
(2010) posits that the thinking of Eric Raymond30 (1999), described in The Cathedral 
& the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary, 
should be applied to the way that local governments function. Raymond, a software 
developer and open source software advocate, proposes that rather than closed-
source software development (represented by the cathedral), software development 
should be open source, in an ongoing bazaar development method. Along these lines, 
O’Reilly applies this thinking to government, noting that they should function like 
the manager of a marketplace, rather than a vending machine:  
 
In the vending machine model, the full menu of available services is 
determined beforehand. A small number of vendors have the ability to get 
their products into the machine, and as a result, the choices are limited, and 
the prices are high. A bazaar, by contrast, is a place where the community 
itself exchanges goods and services. (O’Reilly, 2010) 
 
In this scenario, the government will function as a platform that enables a vibrant 
marketplace, where (private sector) merchants compete with each other to provide 
goods and services, ushering in more choice and lower prices. What is not mentioned 
in this narrative is the consequent decreased stability and certainty of government 
given the rapidity and ease of change. The only way that Government 2.0 could exist 
as described by tech enthusiasts is if it is heavily reliant and built upon technology—
hence it is an attractive notion for IT providers trying to expand and grow the smart 
city market.  
 
                                                 
services. As an example, IBM’s Center for the Business of Government posted a blog promoting 
Kettl’s 2009 book referenced above. See: http://www.businessofgovernment.org/blog/presidential-
transition/next-government-donald-kettl.  
29 Tim O’Reilly is the founder of O’Reilly Media and has popularized the terms “open source” and 
“Web 2.0”. For example see: 
http://archive.oreilly.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/articles/paradigmshift_0504.html.  
30 Raymond’s model for collaborative software development has been studied and used by many of 
the tech giants, including Sun Microsystems, IBM and Intel (O’Reilly, 2010).  
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4.2.3 Governance 2.0 
 
Given knowledge, power, resources and other means to solve complex problems 
reside with many individuals and organizations, new forms of governing have 
emerged (Agranoff, 2003; Stone, 1989, p. 5). Consequently, governments establish 
collaborative relationships with a wide array of nonprofit and for-profit agencies and 
organizations to deal with concerns related to the economy, health, justice, social 
services, the environment, transportation and education, among others (Rose, 1999, 
pp. 15-16; Rose and Miller, 1992). Within these public-private partnerships efforts, 
“the public and private actors involved do not act separately but in conjunction, 
operating as a network” (Agranoff, 2003, p. 8)—a notion that the private sector 
supports due to the opportunity it creates. But, governments also find PPPs attractive, 
for at the heart of many of these types of arrangements is an effort by local 
government to try and “attract external sources of funding, new direct investments, 
or new employment sources”, frequently with the integration of traditional local 
boosterism (Harvey, 1989a, p. 7). 
 
Public-private partnerships first emerged in the United Kingdom in 1992 and 
subsequently spread globally (Osborne, 2000; Payne, 1999 and Whitfield, 2001 in 
Hearne, 2009, p. 11). In general, PPPs focus on either designing, building and 
finance, or designing, building, finance and maintenance (Hearne, 2009, p. 11). 
Supporters of PPPs state that these partnerships can handle the notable infrastructure 
and service deficits that have built up over the past few decades by providing private 
finance, thereby enabling improved and greater access to services and infrastructure 
that otherwise would not have been possible (European Commission, 2003; Payne, 
1999; PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2001a; and Public Private Advisory Group on 
PPPs, 2001 in Hearne, 2009, p. 11-12). Additionally, these partnerships are thought 
to offer private sector innovation and management skills that will lead to a better 
quality of service, faster delivery and improved efficiency (Department of Education 
and Skills, 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999; and Osborne, 2000 in Hearne, 
2009 p. 11-12). Yet, many of these assumed benefits of PPPs have not been 
achieved, and data show that in fact these partnerships can lead to poor value for 
money, reduced capacity in the public sector, lower accountability and rising 
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inequality (Grubnic and Hodges, 2003 and Murray, 2006 in Hearne, 2009, p. 12-13). 
Given the purpose, structure and role of PPPs, they serve as an important mechanism 
that reinforces and accentuates neoliberal and entrepreneurial trends (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Monbiot, 2003; and Whitfield, 2006 in Hearne, 
2009, p. 12-13). 
 
The proclivity for local governments to turn to PPPs for urban development 
initiatives offers an environment primed for smart projects, as smart discourse 
echoes this need for public and private collaboration. For example, one of the first 
widely shared documents extolling the benefits of smart from an IT provider 
perspective, “Informed and Interconnected: A Smarter City Manifesto”, describes 
how city leaders must work with others to meet the growing challenges their cities 
face (Kanter and Litow, 2009). This broad-based involvement, which may or may 
not exist in reality during smart project design or implementation, is linked to the 
promises of all that smart technologies can purportedly help attain: 
 
Real reform and community transformation will require that a new model 
be built, and built from the ground up. Every type of stakeholder, from 
those who plan and deliver services to those who receive them needs to be 
involved in the design. Government officials at the federal, state, and local 
levels and experts from the private and voluntary sector must be intimately 
engaged. Professionals who spend their days delivering services need to be 
at the table along with the people who receive those services. What might 
be possible through access to key data for reductions in administrative and 
operational costs or increases in accountability and return on investment? 
Nothing short of a revolution. (Kanter and Litow, 2009, p. 22)  
 
Within this revolutionary vision that IT providers have for urban governance, third 
party actors are increasingly involved, with the private sector playing a prominent (if 
not dominant) role in project implementation. Yet, how the interests of businesses, 
local government, and city residents are balanced is unclear—as the interests of these 
various actors are not always aligned (Kitchin, 2014a; Monbiot, 2000, pp. 5-17). 
While the interests of city residents and local government actors will vary depending 
upon smart project, the interests of private sector actors will remain the same; they 
will be driven by the market, with financial gains as the main goal. That is not to say 
however that corporate interests will always diverge from those of city governments 
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and / or denizens, for similar agendas may arise if there are compatible pressures on 
private sector actors within the marketplace (Slater and Miller, 2007).  
 
While there are upsides to these types of partnerships to assist in governing, with 
communities and individuals being more involved, there are also disadvantages. 
Usually projects led by PPPs are more speculative, have less accountability and the 
risks lay primarily with the local government, not the private sector. Distributed 
governance arrangements over these endeavors can lead to gaps in the required 
mechanisms for effective implementation. In some cases, these projects are pulled 
together with numerous small-scale partnerships, leading to limited coordination, 
insufficient resources, and frequently conflicting end goals. In terms of expertise 
emerging from these partnerships, all “too often their main (if not sole) material 
existence takes such forms as consultants’ reports, outline proposals, non-binding 
agreements, glossy brochures, more or less regular conferences, meetings, or 
seminars, cultural exchanges, data bases, and information centres” (Jessop, 1997). 
And, the increased emphasis on boosterism within these partnerships can drown out 
critique or pushback that may emerge (Jessop, 1997).  
 
As referenced in Chapter 2, with increased use of PPPs to pursue city objectives and 
rising privatization of public services, there tends to be greater socioeconomic 
inequity (Agranoff, 2003; Stoker, 1998). A concern to be noted given that disparities 
in equality may result from the spread of smart technologies as well; for those with 
access to smart systems and their information will be better informed than those 
without, giving them an unfair advantage (Graham and Marvin, 2001, pp. 383-384). 
Part of this risk is linked to the fact the IT provider has the potential to have greater 
influence in these projects than its city partner. In the cases where the IT provider is 
a large multinational conglomerate, this reality cannot be ignored. These tech giants 
can outweigh their city counterparts in array of resources, including size (staff versus 
population), perceived expertise and financial strength. Yet, while large corporate 
actors like IBM can clearly be in asymmetrical relationships with local governments 
given their size, “the apparent power of corporations in this space of relational / 
territorial negotiation is sometimes over-determined” (McNeill, 2014, p. 3)—a factor 
I examine further in Chapter 5.  
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Smart city initiatives are extremely challenging, and whether or not firms providing 
these solutions are ‘successful’ will depend upon internal knowledge management of 
the corporation as well as the nature of the urban problems that they are addressing. 
In general, organizations working on smart city projects are not “specialist global 
consultancies”; rather, they are usually firms comprised of consultants, systems 
engineers, software developers, marketers, and maintenance operations staff, which 
may or may not have professional urban experience (McNeill, 2014, p. 3). Further, 
giant tech providers are not one unified actor; they are complex organizations, 
comprised of varying divisions, purposes, processes, etc. Together, these 
complexities associated with tech giants diminish the potential influence they may 
have in smart endeavors.  
 
4.3 Representing Smart: a Theme in Narrative and Brand 
 
In this section begin to explore my third research question by examining how smart 
project narratives and brands may be informing the redesign of urban governance 
mechanisms. As noted in Chapter 2, I view representation as the ways in which 
smart projects are portrayed through: (a) narrative, or the stories created around 
smart projects; and (b) brand, the ways in which local governments promote place or 
specific initiatives. The influence of smart project narrative and brand is central to 
my analysis for the power of the “smart city imaginary to capture the minds of 
corporations, policymakers and average citizens makes it an important means 
through which cities are being (re)constructed in the 21st century” (Shelton et al., 
2014, p. 9). Hence, understanding this imaginary will help shed light on how the 
reimagining of the city through a smart lens may be linked to a redesign of urban 
governance mechanisms (Jessop, 1997). Below, I explore why smart project 
narratives are important to help make sense, convey meaning, persuade and create a 
shared vision to those leading and operating smart endeavors. I provide an overview 
of the messages usually contained within smart project narratives, especially those 
created by IT providers, and discuss how these messages are pervading within urban 
discourse. I end this section by examining how smart projects can be a symbolic fix 
for cities and affect place promotion strategies, such as co-opting IBM’s brand. I 
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explore IBM specific Smarter Cities narratives and brand in Chapter 5, “IBM as a 
Smart City Actor”.  
 
4.3.1 The Importance of Narrative in Planning 
 
In the urban context, the role of narrative has been recognized within planning theory 
as being important because stories provide involved actors with an understanding of 
the city planning problem they have to solve and help create a shared vision of some 
future state. Narratives are imperative to planning because they can serve as 
“powerful agents or aids in the service of change, as shapers of a new imagination of 
alternatives” (Sandercock, 2003, p. 18). The images shaped by narratives “have 
performative and causative power” (Miller, 2013, p. 11), which inform “agendas, 
research trajectories, projects and policies” (Smith, 2009, p. 462). Thus, within urban 
planning, narratives shape what is done, how it is done and who is involved, while 
enabling involved actors to imagine an alternative future and what their role in 
making that future may be (Söderström et al., 2014; Throgmorton, 1996; Van Hulst, 
2012). Smart projects create opportunity for IT providers to inform local government 
narratives about these endeavors, creating a smart city imaginary that may or may 
not spread beyond these projects to broader city representation.  
 
Narrative is a powerful tool for persuasion, and exists as a form of rhetoric—or, “the 
use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by 
nature respond to symbols” (Burke, 1950, p. 43). “Something of the rhetorical 
motive comes to lurk in every ‘meaning’, however purely ‘scientific’ its pretensions. 
Whenever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is ‘meaning’, 
there is ‘persuasion’” (Burke, 1950, p. 172). Within the context of political debates, 
rhetoric often takes on a negative connotation as empty slogans or marketing. 
However, aptly posed, rhetoric can be a compelling call to action, having an effect 
on people's decisions and behavior (Bitzer, 1968; Myers and Macnaghten, 1998). 
Narratives can be a strong means for a call to action, such as in the case of 
sustainability, a concept often linked closely to smart. In their study of the rhetoric of 
sustainability, Myers and Macnaghten, (1998) found that “effective rhetoric is a 
precondition, not an alternative, to environmental action” (p. 335).  
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The persuasiveness of narratives hinges upon, among other things, the identities that 
they help create and the commonplaces that they employ.31 These commonplaces are 
all-purpose and recurring arguments that connect “a few general categories to a wide 
range of possible realizations” (Myers and Macnaghten, 1998, p. 336). One of the 
ways that commonplaces are effective is that they can be applicable in both general 
and specific situations. Typically commonplaces are present tense and signify 
‘truths’ that most consider to be enduring. A commonplace is brief—it can be 
relayed in a sentence, phrase, or even picture. The same commonplace can be stated 
in many ways, as wording is not fixed (Jessop, 1997; Myers and Macnaghten, 1998). 
“Like proverbs, commonplaces can lead from the same unarguable, even anodyne, 
statement to widely different implications” (Myers and Macnaghten, 1998, p. 338). 
The abstraction of commonplaces is a key feature of rhetoric associated with policy 
discourse. The generalization of smart within urban discourse enables it to be 
customized and adapted by different organizations, for different audiences and for 
different purposes, all the while still upholding the basic tenets, or commonplaces, of 
smart—which align with and reinforce the assumptions of smart.  
 
While a narrative might originate from one person, communication by its very nature 
is multidimensional. Thus, narratives are not static, relayed from source to receiver; 
rather narratives set off a complex web of interactions that most often involve 
adaptation to the original narrative. How people relate to, perceive and interpret 
narratives will vary, as will how they share these narratives as they are 
communicated and disseminated (Myers and Macnaghten, 1998). In the Dubuque 
case study for example, smart project narratives were typically relayed through 
political messages, media, advertising, town meetings or other forms of discussions 
with residents, and other forms of non-traditional public relations. As third party 
organizations and citizens engaged with these narratives through community forums, 
blogs and websites, smart increasingly became embedded within city discourse 
around environmental and economic sustainability. This also empowered those 
                                                 
31 In the context of this work, commonplaces refers to the classical rhetorical tradition of listing 
frequently used arguments, or general ideas applicable to many subjects, to which a speaker might 
turn in various situations (Myers & Macnaghten, 1998).  
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participating in the co-creation of the discourse and gave them ownership, which 
helped contribute to the ‘success’ of these projects.  
 
Narratives about smart projects play important and varied roles in their design and 
implementation. Each smart project has various sets of narratives—those created by 
the IT provider, the local government, leaders within the business community, those 
affected by smart projects and those creating smart counter narratives, among others. 
The purpose of these narratives, or stories, varies depending upon author, as does the 
intended audience. Within my research, I found that most narratives about smart 
efforts: (a) proposed stakeholder gains, and future risks if smart technologies are not 
adopted; (b) served as an invitation to stakeholders to support and participate in 
smart projects; (c) outlined rules and expectations for stakeholder engagement; and / 
or (d) shared the local government’s vision of smart technology adoption within the 
city—a vision built on identified objectives and priorities, and how to go about 
achieving them. Regardless of purpose, while smart city narratives may seem 
plausible, and by many accounts utopian, this “does not mean that they are true, even 
if they are associated with ‘truth effects’” (Jessop, 1997). All narratives are selective, 
and as important it is to note what is stated, it is also important to consider what is 
not, and what is kept out of discourse. For, in a sense, narrative attempts to 
“hegemonize public and private discourse in the interests of specific accumulation 
strategies or political projects” (Jessop, 1997). Given the consensus on the need for 
cities to become smart, one could interpret this as a result of converging public 
narratives, or as Greenfield (2013) referred to it, a preemptive consensus.   
 
4.3.2 Smart Narratives and Command 
 
Despite variation in conceptualization, within smart city narratives the application of 
technologies across city systems and services is deemed beneficial (Eger, 1997; 
Hollands, 2008) and necessary to avoid future threats and risks (White, 2015; Wiig, 
2015). The future urban picture depicted in these narratives is bleak—rapidly rising 
city populations, scarce resources and the devastating effects of climate change. But, 
as the story goes, if local governments choose to employ smart technologies across 
city systems and services, perils from these threats can be minimized; citizens and 
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their way of life can be protected (White, 2015). “Urban strife is simultaneously 
posed and resolved” (White, 2015, p. 3). Missing from these narratives is alternative 
ways to slow or halt urbanization or climate change; for smart technologies only 
seem to mitigate, not avoid, the predicted future duress (White, 2015). Additionally, 
these narratives do not offer alternatives to using technologies to ‘solve’ urban 
challenges (See Graham and Marvin, 2001); nor do they discuss the adverse effects 
of smart city solutions such as the potential for growing urban inequality (Wiig, 
2015). Rather, as described in smart city narratives, the utopian future enabled by 
technology is safe, efficient, sustainable and prosperous (Hollands, 2008). And it is 
this techno-utopian future enabled by smart technologies that is promoted by IT 
providers, who have catered these types of narratives to broad audiences for wider 
appeal (White, 2015), with consequent impact in cities around the world.   
 
This [smart city] rhetoric does work in the world. It sets agendas, influences 
perceptions of what it means to be ‘advanced’, recalibrates norms and 
guides the allocation of resources. (Greenfield, 2013, Chapter 14, kl. 1390) 
 
Discourse informs policy, which shapes governance structures and approach. When 
examining the entrepreneurial city for example, Bob Jessop (1997) identified a close 
link between “economic strategies and economic discourses since it is only in and 
through the latter’s mediation that problems are identified, policies pursued and 
crises resolved” (p. 1). As cities reimagine themselves as economic, political and 
cultural entities where the local government pursues entrepreneurial activities to 
improve city competitiveness, according to Jessup (1997), what follows is a redesign 
of urban governance mechanisms, “especially through new forms of public-private 
partnership and networks” (p. 1). Jessop noted that this transformation to an 
entrepreneurial city is evident through “the wide range of self-presentational material 
emitted by cities and / or agencies involved in their governance” (1997, p. 1). 
Similarly, the narratives that shape smart city imaginary—i.e., the seductive images 
of ideal cities that have been ‘enhanced’ and ‘improved’ through the application of 
smart technologies that are promoted by tech providers—are informing the redesign 
of urban governance through smart project design and implementation. And since 
tech providers are creating these narratives and imagery, they are driving the ways in 
which these changes in urban governance are taking place. As this associated 
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discourse spreads, it further promotes and reinforces notions of high-tech urban 
entrepreneurialism (White, 2015).  
 
One main problem associated with this smart discourse is that few are questioning it 
as it rapidly spreads throughout media—though this is changing as familiarity and 
experience with smart city solutions grow. In his book Against the Smart City, Adam 
Greenfield (2013) describes this rapid dissemination, where with the launch of a 
smart city initiative, tech provider marketing departments release glossy, convincing 
materials that promote their brand and solutions across numerous social media 
channels, populating smart city discourse almost instantaneously with their 
narratives. From here, Greenfield states, technology bloggers from around the world 
who are under pressure to publish are alerted of the new technology, and readily, and 
unquestioningly, amplify these smart city messages through their blog channels. 
Within minutes of the corporation’s smart city press release, the story is being 
summarized, quoted and shared through even more social media channels 
(Greenfield, 2013, Chapter 14, kl.1344-1390). Within hours, a wealth of online 
commentary about smart cities appears, with little critical evaluation. As Greenfield 
explains, “a framing or perspective originating in a deeply interested party has 
simply become an unquestioned part of the fabric of consensual knowledge” (2013, 
Chapter 14, kl. 1356). The result, according to Greenfield, is that municipal workers 
who are pressed for time and lacking high-tech training, when they come across the 
barrage of smart city messaging throughout social media, instead of investigating 
further they reproduce the narratives throughout their institution. Soon, he notes, the 
smart city becomes a certainty:  
 
The savvier staffers start to feel confident using these terms: speaking in 
them, thinking in them. While misgivings may in fact be prevalent, there are 
likely to be relatively few in the bureaucracy who are able to express them 
forthrightly — that is to say, who are sufficiently comfortable with the 
technology to understand precisely what is being proposed, familiar with 
the way their city works to convincingly articulate why this is problematic, 
assured of their own position to feel safe in doing so and passionate about 
the issue to willingly shoulder the risk involved. When finally pressed to 
make a recommendation as to how the city's resources should be allocated, 
the easiest thing for a committee member to do is go with the flow. 
(Greenfield, 2013, Chapter 14, kl. 1367)  
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According to Greenfield, through this process a “preemptive consensus” on the 
appeal of these projects is built; a consensus that seems to span across a range of 
urban actors who are all exposed to the same smart city discourse (Chapter 14, kl. 
1377). And, within this consensus, the discourse oversimplifies the city, disregards 
hard lessons learned from the past, mutes critique through positivist messaging, 
infers neutrality of these endeavors, and details future risks to get city officials to 
seek smart city solutions now (Greenfield, 2013, Chapter 13, kl. 436-448, 1280; 
White, 2015). Yet, as my case study in Portland demonstrated, there is skepticism 
amongst local governments about the smart city trend as well; awareness that will 
grow as the trend ages and more city officials gain exposure. For those city officials 
however looking for a quick way to differentiate their city, smart solutions offer an 
attractive solution—as these initiatives can offer a brand fix for cities that may 
surpass technological gains.  
 
4.3.3 Smart as a Symbolic Fix 
 
The ways in which local governments present their city as being smart through 
narrative are often is linked to the symbolic associations they are trying to create to 
promote the city. Developing a strong brand for a company or specific product is a 
common practice within the private sector—as successful brands translate into sales 
(Hatch and Schultz, 2008). A city’s brand—or the primary symbolic associations that 
local government aims to project that are conveyed via strategies to promote place—
can accumulate ‘sales’ by helping to attract and retain talent, city residents, tourism, 
investment and business; all of which support revenue creation through taxes 
(Jansson and Power, 2006; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Kotler et al., 1993). In this 
context, cities are products, used and experienced by the end user, or consumer—
whether a business, tourist or resident (Harvey, 1989a). Cities become commodities; 
they are an asset class to the financial industry, where one can bet against the rise 
and fall of a city through the securities it issues based on its bond rating (Sevcik, 
2011). Within this framing, local governments are concerned with how their city is 
marketed and ‘sold’ through rhetorical and symbolic associations that are meant to 
represent the city. How the city is ‘packaged’ is increasingly important, for a city in 
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demand is able to attract the talent and resources it needs, while maintaining a solid 
bond rating—whereas undesirable cities have a hard time attracting and / or retaining 
residents, tourists, businesses, investment and other resources (Eger, 1997). Given 
increasing competition between cities, city brands are often created in ways that 
allude to positive change to attract resources (Wiig, 2015). According to IT 
providers, the adoption of smart technologies is an inexpensive way to enhance city 
brand and consequently attract resources (Buschner et al., 2010; Sevcik, 2011). 
 
While there is not one city brand, local governments often attempt to create, through 
various place promotion and public relations strategies, one overarching city 
representation that helps attract resources and foster a sense of identity amongst city 
denizens (Harvey, 1989a). In this context, brand is a strategy to promote place rather 
than an evocation—for example, improving the built environment or implementing 
strategies to make the city ‘green’32. Smart initiatives are a new option within 
municipal public relations strategy. They are portrayed by IT providers not just as a 
technical fix for the city, but also a symbolic one since it is assumed that they will 
boost city brand (Hollands, 2008). Smart project implementers seek to promote a 
particular brand of the city that results from becoming smart, differentiating it from 
other cities because the city is consequently more ‘efficient’, more ‘effective’, more 
‘technically-advanced’, more ‘sustainable’, more ‘competitive’, more ‘cutting-edge’, 
and so on (Cisco, 2010; Elfrink, 2009; General Electric, 2011; IBM, 2009a; Lohr, 
2009a, 2009b; MacManus, 2009; Siemens, 2010). Within smart endeavors, local 
governments may focus on portraying a smart city brand to help gain support for the 
large up-front investment; to coax city resident and stakeholder support, and in some 
cases participation; and to encourage any behavior change that the smart technology 
may require.  
 
This notion of creating a city brand through strategy is not new. Place promotion has 
been around for centuries (Ward, 1998). Initial research on city brand and place 
promotion includes Ashworth and Voogd’s (1990) Selling the City, which outlines 
general principles of place promotion and suggests that a marketing philosophy 
                                                 
32 Cites that are green are those that are considered environmentally friendly (Rode and Burdett, 2011; 
Satterthwaite, 2008).  
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should be applied throughout all aspects of urban planning. Marketing Places: 
Attracting Investment, Industry, and Tourism to Cities, States, and Nations by Kotler 
et al. (1993), outlines issues around and approaches to place promotion and how it is 
becoming more challenging with globalization. More recently, there has been a wide 
range of literature developed on place promotion by marketing and public relations 
firms that specialize on urban environments (Avraham, 2004; Jansson and Power, 
2006). Appendix 11.6 provides additional details on creating city brand and place 
promotion strategies.  
 
Developing a strong brand metaphorically puts the city on a map—providing city 
residents with a sense of place and local identity. And for the PPPs and local 
government leaders who bring about projects that contribute to city brand by 
drawing in talent and resources, it boosts their political power and influence. The 
practice of branding by local governments focuses on strategies that will help create 
positive associations with the city and diminish or override negative associations that 
might adversely affect the ability to generate revenue (Zavattaro, 2010b). Even if 
there is too much spin, and brand does not align with how the city exists in reality, 
over-zealous branding can be deemed ‘successful’ if it makes the city seem more 
competitive, attracts resources and builds local identity. In this context, it begs the 
question if smart projects could be replaced with efforts to make a “Creative City” 
(Florida, 2002; Vanolo, 2008) and yield the same results—for each of these function 
as neoliberal policy experiments in urban environments, informing the way that the 
local government approaches governance while serving to reinforce and accentuate 
neoliberal processes and maintaining the capitalist status quo. Similar to smart, cities 
pursuing a ‘creative’ brand do so to gain a competitive edge to attract talent and 
resources that may help fuel economic growth (Creative Cities, 2010). Often, with 
these types of endeavors, “the triumph of image over substance is complete”, where 
symbolic associations fail to connect with reality (Harvey, 1989a, p. 14). Municipal 
public relations become pure marketing, similar to the corporate spin created to sell 
consumer goods.  
 
In efforts to build or enhance city brand, Staci Zavattaro (2010b) notes that local 
governments “are practicing many of the same promotional and image-generation 
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techniques as private-sector PR firms use with a desire for the same ends—increased 
consumption of (city) goods and services” (Zavattaro, 2010b, p. 1). Within this range 
of adopted techniques, there are traditional strategies that often accompany place 
promotion, such as media relations and in house publications. In her research 
examining how municipalities are increasingly adopting practices of public relations 
and marketing firms, Zavattaro (2010a) found other non-traditional methods 
frequently employed: using volunteers and outside organizations (i.e., third party 
actors) as public relations surrogates, investing in the built environment to improve 
how people view and experience the city, and focusing on environmental 
sustainability by going green (typically wrapped within built environment efforts). In 
my examination of smart projects, I found that in addition to the use of these non-
traditional place promotion strategies (further elaborated in Appendix 11.6), local 
governments may combine their city brand with the tech providers for co-promotion.  
 
Cross-brand Promotion with IBM 
 
One of the reasons IBM’s Smarter Cities has been broadly received within urban 
discourse is that the associated narratives and brand built upon IBM’s long history as 
technology provider. IBM has developed technologies that have affected the world, 
including innovations such as the ATM, the floppy disk, the hard disk drive, the 
magnetic stripe card, the relational database, the Universal Product Code, the 
financial swap, the RDBMS and SQL, the SABRE airline system, DRAM and 
Watson artificial intelligence (Madrigal, 2011; Maney et al., 2011, pp. 3, 44, 47, 48, 
78, 273).33 Technological innovations such as these have helped contribute to the 
world becoming wired for transactions—with sensors and connectivity increasingly 
tracking the movement of people, goods and money in real time (Harrison in 
Townsend, 2013, p. 64), a natural precursor to smart city projects.  
 
In the past 105 years of being in business, IBM has grown into a global, corporate 
behemoth. With over 435,000 employees (Fortune, 2012a), “Big Blue” is one of the 
                                                 
33 IBM employees have been awarded five Nobel Prizes, six Turing Awards, ten National Medals of 
Technology, and five National Medals of Science (IBM, 2014h; Maney et al., 2011, pp. 122, 180, 
301)—each of these awards have contributed to the company’s brand strength.  
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largest, and most profitable companies in the world (Fortune, 2012b). In addition to 
tremendous size of staff and finances, it is seen as the number one green company 
worldwide by Newsweek’s green ratings (K. Wong, 2012), the fourth best global 
brand (Interbrand, 2014), and the sixteenth most admired company (Fortune, 2014). 
None of this happened by accident—IBM has a dedicated and aggressive Marketing 
& Communications department that focuses on developing and protecting company 
brand. Customized marketing and communications are developed for each product 
and solution, which is shared across relevant marketing and communications staff 
via online and in-person training sessions, cadence calls, books, emails, newsletters 
and copious online materials and assets. This strong company brand, which has 
included Smarter Cities, makes IBM attractive to local governments seeking to 
enhance the way they represent their city. By partnering with IBM in smart projects, 
some local governments hope this will enable them to also gain the benefits 
associated with the IBM brand (Wiig, 2015). I explore how this strategy is applied in 
the Dubuque case study.  
 
Conclusions 
 
As smart projects are more frequently implemented, local governments will become 
increasingly exposed to IT provider processes, models and approaches. An example 
of this includes the tech provider emphasis on data centrality and the measurement 
and optimization of government services and operations that stem from this 
(Söderström et al., 2014; Vanolo, 2013). Within this emphasis, it is assumed that 
with the right data, solutions to every city challenge can be found (Mattern, 2013). 
As presented by most IT providers, this data centricity and solutionism comes with a 
degree of naiveté, for the limitations of this approach are frequently overlooked or 
not mentioned, while the complexity of cities and city operations are drastically 
reduced (McNeil, 2014). These limitations and risks include an assumed data 
neutrality, data unreliability and messiness, lack of indicator standardization, 
perverse incentives for data manipulation, and myopia resulting in solutionism and 
managing only what can be measured (Kitchin, 2014b; Mattern, 2013; Shelton et al, 
2014; Townsend, 2013, p. 210). Cascading from this approach, is a subsequent need 
to add or adapt city leadership skillsets and roles outside of the IT department, 
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especially within smaller-sized cities, to help deal with the growing complexity of 
big data and analytics within and across city systems (Shelton et al., 2014).  
 
Linked to this notion of data centrality, tech providers also aspire to having their 
organizations (and their technologies) act as intermediaries between governments 
and the citizens they serve (Shelton et al., 2014). As a result, the engagement 
arrangements and expectations between and among these actors are changing. Local 
governments are increasingly looking to collaborate or partner with outside 
organizations to manage urban affairs and deliver city services through arrangements 
like PPPs (Agranoff, 2003; Stoker, 1998). And, progressively more responsibilities 
are being pushed down to citizens (Rose, 1999, pp. 15-16; Rose and Miller 1992), 
who are simultaneously being construed as citizen consumers, where civic 
participation is equated with choices around consumption (Beck, 2005; Needham, 
2003), and customer consumers, where citizens are viewed as consumers of the city 
and its services as a product (Cohen, 2001). But the tech provider vision for change 
in urban governance, does not stop there. 
 
Deepening this transformation, IT providers also envision a new role for urban 
government as well as a shift in the surrounding governance arrangements (Buschner 
et al, 2010; Kanter and Litow, 2009). In the interests of business expansion, tech 
giants are promoting a vision of government that is entirely IT provider and data 
reliant by encouraging local governments to increasingly become consumer-centric, 
flexible, responsive and adaptable in real time. In the IT provider ideal, the local 
government becomes a facilitator for other private sector or nongovernment 
organizations to manage and deliver government services (Buschner et al., 2010; 
IBM, 2014b). This outsourcing of ‘traditional’ local government function would 
make government services market-driven, further driving neoliberal principles into 
urban governance practices (Kettl, 2009; O’Reilly, 2010).  
 
Since smart projects have been portrayed by IT providers as a relatively ‘easy’ and 
‘quick’ city brand fix, this has led to increased interest in and adoption of smart 
endeavors (Coe et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008). And, as IT providers begin to inform 
smart project strategy and engagement, they also shape associated representation.  
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Smart initiatives are portrayed as the panacea to future urban woes (White, 2015)—
and the ways in which these challenges are described and addressed within project 
narratives is informing agendas, projects and policies (Jessop, 1997; Smith, 2009, p. 
462). I explore this relationship between reimagining and how it has influenced the 
redesign of urban governance mechanisms in my case study on Dubuque, where the 
local government fully embraced the concept of smart. The case study of Portland 
offers an example of how IBM’s vision for a smart city did not take hold or lead to 
significant changes within strategy, governance arrangements or narrative. Before I 
discuss my case study cities however, I provide an in-depth look at the tech giant 
involved in all of the smart projects I examined, IBM. 
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5 IBM as a Smart City Actor    
 
IBM is, and has been, a significant actor in the making and shaping of the smart 
cities market. Its size, breadth and scope all contribute to why it is an important actor 
worth close examination when seeking to understand the smart city trend. In part, 
IBM’s significance in this market comes from the actor’s sheer size—it is one of the 
largest and most profitable companies in the world (Fortune, 2012a, 2012b) and has 
made huge investments in relevant research and development, mergers and 
acquisitions (IBM, 2012d, 2014h; Maney et al., 2011, pp. 190-191, 193). As of the 
close of 2014, IBM had completed over 10,000 Smarter Cities projects in countries 
all over the world—ranging from the United States, France and Singapore to Kenya, 
Brazil, India and China. Its solutions and offerings target multiple service areas, 
including transportation, water, public safety, emergency management, healthcare, 
energy, asset management, education and social services, while engagement has 
ranged from strategy to implementation, across a mix software, hardware, 
maintenance and consultancy services (IBM, 2014b). Not only does IBM operate 
across diverse city systems, within some it is a critical actor in the provision of 
services. For example, in the transportation industry, eighty percent of the world’s 
travel reservations are processed on IBM systems. All of the world’s top five ocean 
container companies, seven of the top ten freight service providers, ten of the top ten 
rail companies, and ten of the top ten global airlines use IBM services and solutions 
(IBM, 2014b).  
 
On top of this, in the smart city market, IBM has partnered with other large 
organizations such as ESRI, Veolia, Motorola and AECOM (IBM, 2014b), further 
extending its perspectives, approach, frameworks and processes for applying smart 
technologies across city systems and services. Given this context, IBM has 
formidable potential to shape and inform urban governance processes around the 
world through smart projects, not only in terms of the projects it implements, but 
through other actors involved in this market that it may partner with or influence, 
including local governments, businesses, community organizations, and even 
competing tech firms (McNeill, 2014). Below I discuss IBM’s Smarter Cities 
campaign—how and why it emerged, how it has evolved over time and initial signs 
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of its influence, the latter of which is explored further in my case study chapters. 
Through this exploration, I shed light on the smart city from IBM’s perspective and 
how it is spreading as the tech giant sells, designs, implements and replicates these 
endeavors in cities around the world—for this perspective shapes the way that IBM 
interacts with local policy and planning processes.   
   
5.1 Smarter Cities Campaign 
 
“IBM is estimated to have spent hundreds of millions of dollars alone, educating 
mayors and concerned citizens about how to upgrade cities” (Townsend, 2013, p. 
31). According to Söderström et al. (2014), IBM’s Smarter Cities campaign34 is “the 
most developed attempt by a private company to define a smart model of urban 
development” (p. 3). By creating and maintaining the overarching story around what 
it means to be a smart city, and what local governments need to do to make their city 
smart, IBM seeks to secure and strengthen its position in this market (Söderström et 
al., 2014; McNeill, 2014). Given that IBM is a key actor involved in the reimagining 
of cities through the lens of smart, and that this reimagining is linked to redesign in 
urban governance, it is important to understand: (a) how and why IBM narratives 
have emerged and evolved over time and within and across the organization; (b) 
what key messages these narratives contain; (c) how these messages are spread; and 
consequently (d) what the consequences for the redesign of urban governance might 
be based on these narratives.    
 
5.1.1 Story Origins  
 
As businesses and national governments struggled with the growing recession of 
2008-2009, and IBM sought to find solid ground after floundering financial 
performance in the 1990s and 2000s, the company turned to new targets made 
                                                 
34 In my interview with the IBM communications executive who created the vision for IBM’s Smarter 
Planet and Smarter Cities campaigns, he noted that he was very intentional in choosing the term 
smarter over smart; for the former infers improvement without necessarily disparaging the pre-
existing state, while the latter implies that what existed before was by default inefficient, ignorant and 
unsound.  
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increasingly visible by its Smarter Planet rubric,35 which represented yet another 
significant turning point in the company’s program and marketing (McNeill, 2014; 
Söderström et al., 2014). The Smarter Planet campaign was launched by former CEO 
Samuel Palmisano on November 6, 2008 in a speech to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, where he outlined how ways of doing business are globally transforming 
due to three technological shifts—increasing instrumentation, growing 
interconnectivity, and enhanced intelligence. (I elaborate on the development of the 
Smarter Planet Campaign in Appendix 11.7). According to Palmisano, these shifts, 
through data and analytics and the new insights they help glean, are making the 
planet ‘smarter’ across all industries and sectors… including government (Palmisano 
2008). Hence with this speech, Palmisano sought to expand IBM’s reach across all 
industries and sectors, moving operations from focusing and existing merely upon 
the IT department and within the Chief Information Officer line of business. As 
encapsulated by IBM Senior Vice President for Marketing & Communications Jon 
Iwata, “Smarter Planet is a collection of markets we’re making” (Iwata in Watson, 
2010). Once Palmisano outlined this framework of global transformation, teams 
within IBM soon began to apply it to urban environments. To help solidify its 
presence in the smart city market, IBM officially registered the Smarter Cities 
trademark in November 2011 (Söderström et al., 2014).  
 
Within this market-making effort that focuses on cities is a plea for local 
governments to take action, action that involves the technologies sold by IBM and is 
influenced by a highly neoliberal strategy. As understood within the neoliberal 
tradition, the notion of a city existing as a market runs contrary to how cities have 
been traditionally understood. A century ago cities were perceived to support 
markets, not serve as a market in and of itself. Large parts of city operations were 
publicly owned, controlled and managed. This marks a shift to thinking about urban 
services and systems as market opportunities in a neoliberal mode (Boas and Gans-
Morse, 2009; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002)—and is 
reflected throughout IBM’s Smarter Cities narratives.  
 
                                                 
35 Smarter Planet is trademarked by IBM and refers to a wide range of solutions that tap into the 
“power of data and analytics, mobile technology, social business and the cloud” (IBM, 2015c).  
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5.1.2 Evolving Tales  
 
Building on the Smarter Planet narratives, IBM has created a range of stories around 
Smarter Cities to sell its related offerings and solutions. Within these narratives, the 
city is seen through a business lens, with the goal of getting city leaders to think 
more like private sector executives. For, it behooves IBM that their targeted city 
buyers see their city as IBM describes and defines it—where cities compete against 
each other for resources, where the primary goal is economic development (and the 
purported boosts in standards of living that go along with it), where efficiency and 
optimization of resources is a key objective, where technology and data are neutral, 
and where data and analytics can unlock change heretofore not possible without 
them.  
 
IBM narratives around Smarter Cities are shared through point of view (POV) 
documents that outline the organization’s overall perspective of smart cities, white 
papers that outline IBM solutions and expertise, technical “Redbooks”, advertising, 
communications, internal education and enablement, go-to-market strategy, and the 
Smarter Cities landing page and associated webpages, among others. Each of these 
materials have been constructed by different people and teams across the company, 
at different times, and with different purposes and audiences in mind—thus, there is 
not one Smarter Cities narrative. To an extent, this mosaic of smart city stories 
reflects the various divisions within IBM seeking entrée and capture within the smart 
city market. For example, Software may create narratives about Smarter Cities that 
specifically promote the sales of a particular software solution; while Global 
Business Services may create documents that instead promote not only software 
sales but also associated consulting services. Before I examine some of these Smarter 
Cities narratives, it is important to break down which various actors, or divisions, 
within IBM are creating and telling the stories—for understanding who is telling the 
story will shed light not only on the complexity associated with IBM Smarter Cities 
narratives, but also the purpose of narratives and the varied intended audiences.  
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Storytellers  
 
There is no one central team across all of IBM that focuses on its Smarter Cities 
campaign—or the initiative created to develop, support and expand IBM’s work in 
the smart city market. Instead, individuals and sub-teams from across IBM have been 
assigned to support this effort as the opportunity has grown. Research, Software 
Group (SWG), Marketing & Communications (M&C) and Sales & Development 
(S&D) were some of the first few divisions within IBM that helped develop the 
Smarter Cities campaign. Research and SWG have explored offerings by either 
adapting existing or creating new products and solutions. Marketing & 
Communications and S&D have focused on understanding the market and potential 
‘buyers’, raising awareness of IBM’s involvement in this market, conditioning and 
developing the market, and creating materials that outline IBM’s relevant expertise 
and position on what it means to be a smart city and how cities can become smart.  
 
Figure 11. Examples of efforts to support the IBM Smarter Cities campaign 
IBM business 
unit 
What it does for the Smarter 
Cities campaign 
Purpose of materials/ 
assets created 
Intended 
audience 
Marketing Organize events and generate / 
support all content activities 
around events; internal messaging 
and knowledge management; 
external communication—blogs 
and social media; support white 
paper and POV development; 
develop client decks 
Raise awareness of IBM 
presence / expertise / 
solutions in this market; 
Connect IBM experts to 
clients; Educate IBMers on 
Smarter Cities thinking, 
messaging and solutions 
Internal 
education 
and 
enablement; 
External  
Communications Press releases, analyst 
relationships 
Raise awareness of IBM’s 
presence / expertise / 
solutions in this market 
External 
Sales & 
Development 
Go-to-market strategy; Ibm.com 
website and landing pages; sales 
activation kits; toolkits for sales 
person client customization 
Sales Internal 
enablement; 
External  
Research Technical Redbooks Educate in-depth on a 
technical solution  
Internal and 
external 
education 
Corporate 
Marketing & 
Communications 
(Philanthropic) 
Smarter Cities Challenge Gain insight from cities 
work; Raise awareness of 
IBM’s presence / expertise 
in this market 
Internal and 
external 
Source: Senior IBM Staff from Smarter Cities Sales & Development and Marketing & 
Communication.   
 
Figure 11 provides illustrative examples of the divisions within IBM that support the 
Smarter Cities campaign, in particular those relevant to the narratives and brand 
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associated with this endeavor. As noted by McNeill (2014), those who work on smart 
cities have experience with marketing, communications, sales, software 
development, research, etc., but are not necessarily global smart city specialists, or 
even those with professional experience in the urban environment. Rather, IBM’s 
initial approach to its Smarter Cities campaign stemmed from its core competencies, 
not input or guidance from urban experts like city planners, architects or property 
developers (McNeill, 2014); though as IBM staff learned from these individuals 
along the way, solutions and services were adapted accordingly.  
 
Within IBM, the narratives that are considered to be the most representative of the 
company’s overall thinking around smart cities and the challenges and opportunities 
they face are the point of view documents. To date, there have been three, two 
external and one internal (IBM, 2012e, 2014b, 2014j). These documents are created 
by IBM Marketing, and informed by top Smarter Cities leadership. IBM’s white 
papers on Smarter Cities expound on the ideas conveyed in the POV documents. 
These white papers outline a specific issue within a city system, and may or may not 
refer to a product or solution to ‘fix’ this issue. Recognizing that city buyers 
exploring smart technologies will primarily not come from the IT Department, these 
white paper documents focus on what technology can do for the city and the 
outcomes it can bring. White papers are well-researched documents, and any claims 
within them must be substantiated. As one author of many of the Smarter Cities 
white papers noted in my interview with her, these works must be “‘evidenced-
based’”. These documents are usually produced by IBM Marketing, though various 
divisions across IBM can draft them. These two foundational documents—the POVs 
and white papers—are supposed to be the basis upon which all other materials and 
messaging, or narrative themes, are built. However, this does not always happen in 
practice.  
 
In addition, IBM Research creates Redbooks that highlight technical aspects of IBM 
Smarter Cities solutions, products and offerings. These documents are generally for 
those more involved with technical aspects of the projects. The Communications 
department is responsible primarily for all external communications around Smarter 
Cities like press releases. And finally, the Smarter Cities Challenge (described in 
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Chapter 2) has provided internal learning and helped raise market awareness of IBM 
and its capabilities around smart cities. Each of these groups create and disseminate 
materials related to Smarter Cities for various purposes and intended audiences. 
Appendix 11.8 provides examples of these various narratives and the different 
divisions within IBM that create them.  
 
Figure 12. IBM Smarter Cities wheel 
Given that IBM sees itself as a 
master of systems integration 
(Harrison, 2010; Harrison et al., 
2009), it has translated the concept of 
IT system integration across the 
urban landscape, classifying the city 
as a system of systems (Palmisano, 
2010a, 2010b). Accordingly, the IBM 
S&D identified ten city systems 
across which offerings are mapped, 
and to which Redbooks and white 
papers typically align. These city 
systems, reflected in IBM’s Smarter Cities wheel (see Figure 12), are a part of IBM’s 
go-to-market strategy, and hence reflect their emergence from S&D. This taxonomy 
is primarily built upon internal IBM structure and the way that IBM organizes its 
products and solutions, not necessarily what exists within cities or how local 
governments view cities and city operations. These city systems have been grouped 
into three categories and include:  
 
 Infrastructure: water, transportation, energy; 
 Planning and Management: public safety, law enforcement, government and 
agency administration, city planning and operations, buildings; and 
 People: social programs, smarter care and education (IBM, 2014d).  
 
Before internal changes were made in January 2015, IBM’s six divisions responsible 
for supporting the Smarter Cities Campaign each had their own marketing and 
Source: IBM, 2014d. 
  
 119 
communications, further diversifying messaging around Smarter Cities. With the re-
organization of 2015, smart city solutions are now distributed across a range of 
divisions now organized by industry. Behind the scenes there have been many shifts 
in global leadership for this endeavor as well, each of which have involved changes 
in Smarter Cities narratives. Since the launch of the campaign, there have been two 
different General Managers for Smarter Cities, and within the marketing department, 
there have been four changes in leadership since the campaign’s launch in 2009. 
Like many other large multi-national corporations, the internal landscape within IBM 
is always shifting, similar to a kaleidoscope of moving divisions, staff, mandates and 
best practices.  
 
Adding additional complexity to Smarter Cities narratives is that fact that countries 
often customize their own narratives, for example Ireland and Thailand have their 
own country Smarter Cities landing pages (IBM, 2014k, 2014l). Countries also 
create their own customized white papers, such as those authored by teams within 
the United Kingdom (IBM, 2011i). It is clear that, given this complex matrix of 
divisions, roles, geography, management structures and leadership, there is not one 
author of a Smarter Cities narrative, nor one department or division that drives all 
messaging. Rather a wide range of IBMers have created, and continue to create, 
varying Smarter Cities stories. That said, these stories do tend to have common 
underlying themes, which unsurprisingly link directly to the assumptions of smart 
and characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism that I outlined in Chapter 2. I explore 
this alignment with narratives from six Smarter Cities documents below.   
 
Early Messaging 
 
As outlined above, IBM Smarter Cities’ narratives frame cities and the challenges 
they face through a business lens in an attempt to get city leaders to think like 
business executives and see cities as described and defined by IBM. Through this 
lens, IBMs narratives integrate various assumptions of smart and characteristics of 
urban entrepreneurialism, including an increased emphasis on cities competing 
against each other over scarce resources (such as talent, business, investment) and 
hence the need to boost city brand, economic development, efficiency / optimization 
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and community participation—each of which can be purportedly improved by 
tapping into the potential of the data and analytics enabled by Smarter Cities 
projects. While not all assumptions appear within each Smarter Cities material, 
several are usually referenced. Together, they serve to reinforce selective messaging 
around the smart city “preemptive consensus” (Greenfield, 2013) and shape the 
smart city imaginary (Shelton et al., 2014)     
 
IBM’s first key document to outline its views of a smart city, “A vision of smarter 
cities: How cities can lead the way into a prosperous and sustainable future”, 
describes from IBM’s perspective how a city’s well-being can be enhanced and 
protected by adopting smart technologies (Dirks and Keeling, 2009). The narrative 
opens with IBM’s viewpoint on why “power and responsibility” are moving cities to 
“center stage”, with national level issues being moved to the local level (Dirks and 
Keeling, 2009, p. 3)—delineating trends instituted by neoliberal principles (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002; Eisinger, 1997; Greenblatt, 2011). Due to this shift, IBM 
describes how cities currently face increasing threats, demands and dwindling 
resources; while they are concurrently met with great possibilities—potential that 
seemingly can only be unleashed through the power of smart technologies: 
 
…cities face a range of challenges and threats to their sustainability—across 
their business and people systems and core infrastructures such as transport, 
water, energy and communication—that they need to address holistically. 
To seize opportunities and build sustainable prosperity, cities need to 
become ‘smarter’. (Dirks and Keeling, 2009, p. 1) 
 
Thus, in the first external document created to share IBM’s vision of the smart city, 
the authors underscore neoliberal influence on the devolution of state power while 
conveying assumptions associated with the concept of smart and outlining the 
necessity for smart technology adoption. To spur more immediate action, they list 
the imminent threats that can be mitigated and describe the sustainable prosperity 
that can be delivered if these Smarter Cities solutions are employed (Dirks and 
Keeling, 2009). Technology is portrayed as an enabler of this transformation, where 
change can be made that heretofore was not possible.  
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The document goes on to set the stage for what it will take to become a smart city, 
stating that it is a “journey… not an overnight transformation” (Dirks and Keeling, 
2009, p. 2). In other words, it is a progression of many smart city projects that make 
a city smarter, not just one project that magically makes a city smart—i.e., a 
continuing relationship with IBM will be required. And, the authors note, to get to 
this destination of smart, there will many different paths, for smart city solutions 
vary across city systems and services. Transformation will be required: “cities must 
prepare for change that will be revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, as they put in 
place next-generation systems that work in entirely new ways” (Dirks and Keeling, 
2009, p. 2). Hence, the narrative alludes to changes that must take place within the 
ways that local governments do their work, changes that are enabled by smart 
technologies and that will purportedly help city leaders to “better understand and 
control their operations and development” (Dirks and Keeling, 2009, p. 4). Changes 
that purportedly cannot be made or sustained without IBM and its Smarter Cities 
solutions. Finally, it is important to note that within this first narrative document 
IBM describes the city as a system of systems (Dirks and Keeling, 2009, p. 9). For it 
is this statement that provides IBM with a strong platform upon which it can enter 
the smart city market, for it is considered a master of systems integration (Harrison, 
2010; Harrison et al. 2009).  
 
This initial narrative was soon followed by another white paper that outlined how 
cities could assess their level of smartness. Soon after, numerous other narratives 
emerged from varied divisions and geographies, in speeches, white papers, 
presentations, social media, websites, etc.—each developed from an iterative process 
of trying to cater Smarter Cities narratives to a specific purpose, audience and need. 
This flurry of narrative activity led Smarter Cities management in 2012 to seek to 
clarify IBM’s perspective on smart cities and update the overall messaging based on 
technological advances, market changes and learning since the launch, leading the 
company to create its first point of view on this topic: “Smarter, More Competitive 
Cities. Forward-thinking cities are investing in insight today” (IBM, 2012e). This 
POV document reinforces numerous assumptions associated with the concept of 
smart—an emphasis on the use of technology for the perceived benefits that this 
brings; a local government focus on economic development, city competitiveness, 
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and economic and political efficiency; and a pro-business bias. It opens with 
generalized challenges that cities supposedly face, and infers that if local 
governments are not using smart technologies to help address these challenges, they 
are not “forward-thinking”. For example, it notes that “cities today are facing 
significant challenges including increasing populations, aging infrastructures, and 
declining budgets” (IBM, 2012e, p. 1); despite the fact that there are numerous cities 
around the world, especially in Europe, that face decreasing populations for instance. 
It goes on to state that “forward-thinking cities are addressing these challenges and 
taking action now—focused on staying competitive, maximizing the resources at 
their disposal and laying the groundwork for transformation” (IBM, 2012e, p. 1). 
Accentuating this point of being “forward-thinking” it notes that IBM is “seeing the 
most advanced cities focus on three areas of expertise: leveraging information to 
make better decisions; anticipating and resolving problems proactively; coordinating 
resources to operate more efficiently” (IBM, 2012e, p. 2). Hence, ‘advanced’, 
“forward-thinking” local governments are using smart technologies and developing 
these three areas of expertise. Cities not doing these things are, by default, 
backwards and stagnant.  
 
The messaging within this document serves various purposes. In part, it responds to 
the awkward position of IBM—where it is telling cities how they must deal with 
growing financial austerity while also asking for scarce funding to implement 
Smarter Cities projects (White, 2015). Thus, in addition to noting increased 
efficiency, it also lists a myriad of proposed gains that can be attained by 
implementing smart technologies, including a boost in city brand and attractiveness. 
This enhanced city brand, as described in the document, will help defer costs 
associated with Smarter Cities projects because the new smart city image will entice 
new resources, including business, talent and investment. The title conveys it all—
smart cities will be more competitive, and those local governments aiming for a 
brighter future are investing in smart technologies today.  
 
Additionally in 2012, the narratives around smart projects evolved to reflect new 
growth plays for IBM: cloud, analytics, mobile and social (IBM, 2012f, 2014j). For 
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example, IBM S&D changed the IBM Smarter Cities landing page to include these 
areas of focus and how they relate to cities becoming ‘smarter’:  
 
Smarter cities of all sizes are capitalizing on new technologies and insights 
to transform their systems, operations and service delivery. Competition 
among cities to engage and attract new residents, businesses and visitors 
means constant attention to providing a high quality of life and vibrant 
economic climate. Forward-thinking leaders recognize that although tight 
budgets, scarce resources and legacy systems frequently challenge their 
goals, new and innovative technologies can help turn challenges into 
opportunities. These leaders see transformative possibilities in using big data 
and analytics for deeper insights. Cloud for collaboration among disparate 
agencies. Mobile to gather data and address problems directly at the source. 
Social technologies for better engagement with citizens. Being smarter can 
change the way their cities work and help deliver on their potential as never 
before. (IBM, 2014d) 
 
Hence cloud, analytics, mobile and social were integrated into the process of cities 
becoming smart. An important part of this messaging to note is that these four areas 
are also seen by IBM as being key for businesses to maintain their competitive edge 
and grow their market share. Within this messaging, cities are analogous to 
businesses, city leaders to CEOs, and citizens to consumers.  
 
Story Refresh 
 
In 2013, IBM released a white paper entitled: “Improving economic competitiveness 
and vitality. A smarter approach to economic development” (Dencik, 2013), which 
also emphasizes economic growth, city competitiveness and how smart projects—
through data and analytics—can contribute to both of these 
 
Creating attractive and competitive business environments is key to the 
success of cities… whether a mature or emerging economy, locations that 
manage to create positive business environments stand to gain tremendously 
from increased economic growth, job creation and prosperity. (Dencik, 
2013, p. 1) 
 
It goes on to elucidate how cities can make this happen:  
 
cities… with agile economies achieve a successful balance between 
business and talent that leverages the development and adoption of 
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technology and innovation to achieve sustainable economic growth. They 
are able to attract, develop and retain indigenous talent while leveraging the 
potential of technology. (Dencik, 2013, p. 2)  
 
In other words, through technology adoption and pursuing smart technologies, local 
governments are able to help secure a better future for their constituents by attracting 
the business, investment and talent required for economic growth. Within this 
narrative, Dencik restates many of the assumptions associated with smart—for 
example, that smart projects spur economic growth and attract resources, and that 
smart projects make a city more competitive. Another important aspect of this 
document outlines the growing emphasis on the importance of data, reinforcing a 
push toward data centrality and viewing problems through a solutionistic lens. Here 
IBM is conveying its desire for local governments to become more data-centric. But, 
it also alludes to something more complex than data gathering—the potential 
services that may be associated with the accompanying analytics, thereby yet again 
seeking to expand IBM’s reach into the smart city market. It goes on to state that 
local governments cannot just gather data and expect gains; rather local government 
actors must be able to analyze these data in ways that enable “actionable insight”, 
and the types of advanced analytics to generate this ‘insight’ is usually only available 
through tech providers like IBM (Dencik, 2013, p. 8-11).  
 
In 2014, IBM’s point of view document was updated (IBM, 2014j) to: “Smarter, 
More Competitive Cities. Cultivating charisma, resiliency and vitality”—a work that 
basically emphasizes the same assumptions of smart from the previous POV. 
However, this POV broadened its narrative to include more citizen-centric 
messaging—tapping into another assumption of smart around community 
participation; again looking to broaden the market. For example, within the 
document’s narrative, the key to becoming ‘smarter’ is rooted in taking fundamental 
actions: “leading with vision and deep insight, building resilient, sustainable 
infrastructure, and enabling individuals’ health and productivity” (IBM, 2014j, p. 1, 
emphasis mine); thus opening up the door for smart solutions and services related to 
employment, labor skills, education and healthcare / social services. It also goes on 
to state that: “leaders are innovating across services to meet the increasing needs and 
expectations of citizens and businesses” (IBM, 2014j, p. 2), acknowledging outright 
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that city residents are a key part of the equation. This change can be traced in part to 
an attempt to better target messaging for local governments, and to help broaden 
applicability of IBM services and solutions to grow potential market share. Within 
this narrative, intralocal competition, ‘evidenced-based’ decision making, efficiency 
and network governance are also emphasized in the directive that IBM provides for 
local governments: “to build the strong, differentiating identities that attract new 
citizens and businesses, visionary cities are looking for ways to better integrate 
across functions, capitalize on new insights, create system-wide efficiencies and 
collaborate in new ways” (IBM, 2014j, p. 1).  
 
The underlying story throughout these IBM documents is clear—cities are 
increasingly competing against each other and face a wide range of imminent threats; 
to deal with these challenges and secure a prosperous future, city leaders need to turn 
to smart technologies. With the consequent enhanced abilities for data gathering and 
analytics, the story continues, leaders will be able to enhance city efficiencies and 
brand, thus extending and attracting resources that contribute to economic growth. 
While keeping true to this underlying story, Smarter Cities Marketing and S&D staff 
note that they have made iterative changes within these narratives to account for 
market realities and evolving technology and understanding, with customization for 
various audiences and intents, and revisions as the company has learned from its 
clients and business partners and as technological advancements have been made. 
Hence, as noted by one IBM Smarter Cities S&D Executive, IBM’s Smarter Cities 
narratives are in “constant renewal”, continually being “refreshed” as markets, needs, 
purposes and conditions fluctuate. Despite this, or perhaps because of this, most IBM 
narratives around Smarter Cities strive to remain simplistic in the way that they 
describe cities and city systems, infrastructure and services. This “technocratic 
reductionism” is, as described above, accompanied by smart assumptions and 
characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism, and in turn, shapes project design and 
implementation (Söderström et al., 2014).  
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5.2 Diffusion through Reductionism 
 
To make its Smarter Cities campaign globally applicable, IBM staff have had to 
reduce the complexity of cities both discursively and in terms of product (McNeill, 
2014). Generic descriptions of urban challenges are replete within IBM literature in 
an attempt to create narratives to which a wide range of city leaders from around the 
world can relate (IBM, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011i, 2012e, 2014a, 2014d, 
2014j). To address these ‘universal’ problems, IBM offers a set of standardized 
solutions that are easily replicated, scaled and implemented akin to ‘plug and play’ 
(McNeill, 2014). As described in a report providing an overview of the Smarter 
Cities Challenge projects, “one of the biggest surprises for the IBMers is how much 
cities have in common. Whether they’re overgrown towns or giant metropolises, 
fast-growing or mature, the problems cities face are amazingly similar. And so are 
the potential solutions” (IBM, 2013d, p. 8).  
This oversimplification of cities and their ills has affected how IBM staff have 
understood and approached their work. IBM staff try to broadly apply Smarter Cities 
solutions regardless of city size, socio-economic status, context and location—with 
some local governments rejecting this one-size-fits-all mentality. As noted by 
McNeill (2014), “both the ‘problem-solving’ epistemology and the flat ontology of 
how cities are understood are part of a process of reducing difference despite the 
global distribution and political heterogeneity of client cities” (p. 17). While this is 
not the first instance of reductionist approaches to urban challenges, given that most 
large tech providers seem to also espouse this notion, as smart projects spread this 
could potentially serve as an obfuscating force within urban discourse for city 
leaders seeking to genuinely understand the issues that their cities face. As the city is 
simplified in urban discourse through the growing discursive activity of tech giants 
pushing their messages, it is also reduced through the implementation of smart 
endeavors, one project at a time. For, through each Smarter Cities solution 
implemented, IBM serves as a potential conduit for the diffusion of its associated 
knowledge, practices and processes that are required to implement it.  
As an example, IBM’s Management Centers are being heavily promoted by IBM 
given the purported relative ease and associated cost-effectiveness to replicate and 
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scale these solutions (IBM, 2014b). These “cloud-based management centers help 
municipalities capture the potential of data, analytics and new modes of engagement 
via digital services” by combining “Intelligent Operations software, IBM Global 
Business Services expertise, and IBM’s broad analytics capabilities”, with the aim of 
delivering immediate value, “often getting insight from data in as little as a week” 
(IBM, 2014b, p. 2). These Management Center solutions enable IBM to vertically 
integrate across various internal brand silos—for instance consulting and software 
services—while also emphasizing its analytic capabilities. To date, IBM has created 
these Centers for emergency management, transportation and water, and plans on 
scaling them to other areas such buildings, healthcare and employment (IBM, 
2014b). The vision is that these Centers be applied universally across cities, and 
systems within a city. “For example, Miami started with just one water project, and 
now they have 19 projects helping to improve everything from bus routes to terror 
alerts” (IBM, 2014b, p. 2).  
As the application of these Management Centers spreads, there will be a 
standardization of the way that city challenges are viewed, understood and 
addressed, which will stem from the uniform way that information about these 
challenges is gathered, analyzed, presented and disseminated. By installing this 
software, city leaders are committing to understanding and engaging around city 
events in the fixed manner that is presented by the software’s programming, 
algorithms and data configuration. Thus, through the purchase of Smarter Cities 
solutions and the features of the associated software, local governments are 
implicitly agreeing to this corporately-motivated simplification of urban life and 
functioning (McNeill, 2014). This type of transfer however is not unique to IBM or 
its Smarter Cities endeavors.  
The global diffusion of corporate knowledge, practices and processes stems from the 
way that multinational corporations, including large tech firms, organize their 
information and are internally structured—which together affect how “knowledge is 
commodified, packaged, mediated, or transmitted, and how this plays out in different 
spatial locations” (McNeill, 2014, p. 5). As Faulconbridge puts it: 
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The ‘network management strategies’ used by global PSFs [professional 
services firms] to exploit, configure and construct global practice-based and 
relational spaces of learning are central to the success of the global 
production of new knowledge through social practice. As a result, both the 
‘cognitive’ (practice based) spaces and the ‘social’ (relational) spaces 
needed for learning…creates communities or constellations of learning that 
stretch beyond scale-defined boundaries… (Faulconbridge, 2006, p. 537 in 
McNeill, 2014, p. 6) 
 
In the case of IBM, it uses various different information sharing channels to 
disseminate information about its Smarter Cities solutions and narrative themes to its 
offices around the world. As cities gravitate to this type of standardization of city 
challenges through smart project solutions, it raises various questions about the 
implications of these software, hardware and consulting service purchases, and how 
they may be contributing to the view that cities are the same, with interchangeable 
systems, challenges and solutions. This standardization occurs through 
implementation, as well as through those who implement these endeavors. 
 
5.3 Smart “Traveling Technocrats” 
 
As tech giants grow the smart city market and implement their solutions around the 
world, they spread their perspectives, processes and models with other involved 
actors—stakeholders that, more often than not, willingly accept these approaches 
under the assumption that these firms are rational and informed (Ariely, 2009). In the 
case of IBM, as centralized IBM staff in various countries receive this information 
and begin to implement the associated practices and processes, they interact with 
other local actors outside of IBM. And, the more that IBM staff intermingle with 
external actors—whether local government, other tech providers, or various third 
party actors—around Smarter Cities, the more channels that are created for diffusing 
the company’s viewpoints, approaches and frameworks within this space. Wendy 
Larner and Nina Laurie (2010) note this phenomenon through their examination of 
how through networks of “travelling technocrats” of water and telecommunication 
engineers, privatization knowledge travels and begins to inform place. Further, as 
cities integrate this knowledge and the associated practices and processes transferred 
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by IBM, they begin to share it with each other, also acting as agents for knowledge 
transfer through consultants brought in to help integrate smart technologies across 
city systems (Hoffman, 2011 and McCann, 2011 in McNeill, 2014). In cases where 
the solutions did not work well, this information is also shared amongst city leaders 
as cautionary tales. This pertains to the solutions and offerings as well as the 
consulting services around them.  
 
As a provider of smart city technologies, IBM offers the associated hardware, 
software and potentially middleware required for implementation, as well as IT 
related consulting services. Historically, IT consulting has stemmed from the field of 
management consulting, which has helped open the door to the types of services 
frequently provided as part and parcel of smart projects. In his book The World's 
Newest Profession: Management Consulting in the Twentieth Century, Christopher 
McKenna (2006) outlines the history of management consulting and how it has 
shaped organizations and business practices around the world, and what risks have 
emerged as a result of the growth of this profession. In the United States, 
management consulting emerged as a discipline in the 1930s, where ‘qualified’ 
professionals advised corporate executives on strategy or financial structure under 
the assumption that these external experts were more qualified to deliver this advice 
than the people who actually ran the organizations (McKenna, 2006, p. 2-3, 8). 
While the idea of seeking external counsel was not new, in the past it was 
traditionally done for political versus commercial reasons (McKenna, 2006, p. 10). 
Facilitated by 1930s antimonopoly legislation in the United States, the profession 
grew over the next seven decades and spread internationally; and, “for better or 
worse, government officials, nonprofit managers and corporate executives came to 
depend on this new ‘mandarin’ elite, and although suspicious of the advisors’ 
motives, grudgingly accepted the utility of these experts” (McKenna, 2006 p. 11).  
 
In IBM’s case, the organization was prohibited to provide IT consulting services due 
to post-World War II antitrust regulations that sought to limit the power of 
monopolies and the containment of organization knowledge. Thus in 1956, IBM had 
to withdraw from the up and coming field of IT consulting, which was soon 
dominated by the large accounting firms that provided management consulting 
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services (McKenna, 2006, p. 21). In addition, within this U.S. Department of Justice 
decree, IBM was required to sell and not lease its machines, as well as make its 
proprietary technology available to the company’s competitors, thus limiting its 
competitive ability for the next thirty-five years (McKenna, 2006, p. 22).36 This 
antitrust case was dropped in 1982, and the consent decree expired in 1991. By 1992, 
IBM entered into the field of management consulting by inaugurating its consulting 
subsidiary, the IBM Consulting Group. By 1996, this group delivered an annual 
revenue of $11 billion, nearly one-fourth of the company’s total revenue at the time 
(McKenna, 2006, p. 23). The ability for IBM to offer these types of consulting 
services has contributed greatly to the firm’s strong presence in the smart city 
market.  
 
While there may be gains from bringing in external advisors for strategic and 
financial managerial decisions, there are also risks associated with using 
management consultants (McKenna 2006)—risks that also apply to services around 
smart initiatives. While the gains derived from the specialization of knowledge dates 
back to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), the question remains as to why 
within the field of management consulting do organizations, institutions and 
government units feel the need to pull in external professionals rather than bring this 
type of knowledge into the firm (McKenna, 2006, p. 12). Certainly, while some local 
governments have, and will continue to, create roles that support cities increasingly 
adopting and integrating smart technologies into city systems and services, and the 
management all of the related data and analytics that this will entail, external 
consulting services and solutions will still be utilized.  
 
This points to a crucial flaw within the reasoning presented by IT providers behind 
their pitch for smart city solutions. As posited by IT providers, increasing 
competition amongst cities necessitates “forward-thinking” local governments to 
differentiate their city from its competitors. And, as positioned by tech giants, smart 
city solutions are an affordable and effective way to do so (IBM, 2012e). To 
implement smart city solutions successfully, local governments must turn to IT 
                                                 
36 With IBM’s strategy focusing on cloud computing, the firm is trying, in part, to go back to the 
leasing model, where clients ‘rent’ versus own solutions (IBM, 2014b).  
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providers, who will provide the required hardware, software and middleware, as 
needed, as well as the adjoining consulting services. Yet, as these same IT providers 
work with numerous local governments, differentiating smart city approaches and 
techniques learned within one city will soon be transferred to other cities around the 
world. Thus, the ‘competitive advantage’ created by one city is quickly diminished 
as IT provider spread their wares (McKenna, 2006, p. 14).  
 
Even IBM has been fleeced through this type of experience. In the late 1950s, the 
then President of IBM, Tom Watson Jr., brought in an external management 
consultant, John Burns, who was allowed access to sensitive data, including detailed 
knowledge about the firm’s organization and methods. Within three months of 
completing the consulting assignment, Burns became head of the Radio Corporation 
of America (RCA), a direct competitor at the time (McKenna, 2006, p. 250). “For 
years afterwards, the standing joke around IBM was that if you allowed a consultant 
inside the company, your competitors would know your secrets within 6 months” 
(McKenna, 2006, p. 250). Thus, IBM itself knows that if you use consultants to gain 
a competitive edge, what they learn by assisting your firm will be transferred to your 
competitors when they seek out consulting services. And, as this is true within 
management consulting around strategy and finance, the same applies around smart 
city projects. While making a city ‘smart’ may differentiate it from its competitors 
for a time, before long this edge will be lost as smart solutions and their associated 
packaging spread. This draws into question the notation that, while the technological 
advances associated with smart initiatives are real and have the potential for 
beneficial outcomes, perhaps the smart urban labelling phenomenon associated with 
these advances offer more fad than substance (Albino et al., 2015; Kitchin, 2014b).  
 
5.3.1 A Fleeting Fad? 
 
Within business management literature, various academics have been exploring 
innovation diffusion to better understand how and why technological innovations 
spread within private sector firms. In some cases, technological innovative “fads” 
have proved to be harmful to organizations and yet continue to spread regardless 
(Abrahamson, 1991). For example in the United States, in the face of growing 
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international competition—not unlike what cities are facing amongst each other—
businesses have easily fallen “prey to every new management fad promising a 
painless solution, especially when it [has been] presented in a neat, bright package” 
(Mitroff and Johrman, 1987, p. 69 in Abrahamson, 1991, p. 588). But, simple 
formulas are bound to fail: “by definition, simple formulas cannot cope with 
complexity, and complexity is what today’s world is about” (ibid.). In this manner, 
questions arise about smart endeavors, where complex urban challenges are reduced 
to matters that can be solved with algorithms and data; where growing intralocal 
competition makes local governments feel increasingly compelled to jump to the 
newest urban “fad” to give their city a competitive edge. And, as innovation fads 
“fulfill symbolic functions such as signaling innovativeness, but do little to boost 
organizations’ economic performances” (Abrahamson, 1991, p. 588), one wonders if 
the same applies to smart cities (Wiig, 2015).  
 
Innovation fads have also been found harmful to organizations when firms rapidly 
leap from one technology to the next, so that skills required do not have time to 
develop, nor the technology have enough time to work (Lawler and Johrman, 1985 in 
Abrahamson, 1991). Similarly, innovative fads can lead organization leaders to 
rapidly jump from one problem to the next, so that problems are not resolved 
because not enough time or attention is focused on them for the chosen technology to 
work (March and Olsen, 1976 and Schon, 1971 in Abrahamson, 1991). By extension, 
it is easy to see how this could apply to smart projects, where due to increasing 
between cities, city leaders feel compelled to jump too rapidly from technology to 
technology, and problem to problem, so that whichever smart city innovation is 
chosen ends up not working since it is not given enough time to be effective. Where 
pressure for being viewed as, for example, the ‘smartest’, ‘greenest’ (“Eco-city”, see 
Register, 2006) or ‘most creative’ (“Creative City”, see Florida, 2002; Vanolo, 2008) 
means that local government effort becomes slave to image over substance.  
 
5.3.2 Examining IBM 
 
Since the emergence of academic investigation into the smart city trend, there have 
been a range of explorations that have focused on IBM, including the work of: 
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Donald McNeill (2014); Ola Söderström, Till Paasche and Francisco Klauser (2014); 
Anthony Townsend (2013); and Alan Wiig (2015), among others. These accounts of 
IBM as a smart city actor have been advanced from positions external to the firm. 
My positioning allows me to bring new insights, and certain correctives, to these 
debates. Ola Söderström, Till Paasche and Francisco Klauser (2014) look at IBM’s 
Smarter Cities campaign through the lens of Actor-Network-Theory and critical 
planning theory to describe how the company has constructed its narratives to build 
smart city market share by making IBM an “obligatory passage point” (Callon, 1986) 
in the application of smart city technologies (Söderström et al., 2014). In a sense, 
they argue that IBM’s attempt to own ‘the’ smart city story is a ploy to own the 
smart city market—by controlling the narrative, IBM controls the ways in which 
these projects expand, develop and unfold. And while this is correct, for the very 
purpose of marketing is to win and secure market share, they oversimplify IBM, its 
narratives around Smarter Cities, and the purposes for which these stories are 
created. For example, Söderström et al. (2014) mistakenly refer to IBM as a cohesive 
unit that tells ‘the’ IBM story. They assume that the same story is told across the 
corporation, and make no mention of other types of actors who tell the story. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, there is a mosaic of IBM’s Smarter Cities narratives 
emanating from this organization around smart cities. In addition, through my 
analysis I have found that local government partners can become even more vocal 
and boosterish than the corporation in storytelling, as evidenced below in my 
Dubuque case study.  
 
While the works of Townsend (2013, pp. 8-9, 15, 31-32), McNeill (2014), Wiig 
(2015) and Söderström et al. (2014) provide interesting insight into IBM and its role 
in shaping smart city rhetoric and the associated processes involved with 
implementation. However, each of these authors overemphasize the importance of 
IBM’s Smarter Cities Challenge when it comes to sales and the organization’s 
Smarter Cities strategy. The SCC is a grant facility that dedicates IBM staff services 
and time to develop specific project recommendations for a challenge city leadership 
has identified (the scope does not include actual project implementation). To put it 
simply, the SCC is a mechanism to provide city leadership with free, solicited 
technical advice. While the SCC has been instrumental in furthering the education of 
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IBMers, raising awareness of IBM’s expertise in this market, and ‘conditioning’ the 
smart city market by helping to ‘sell’ IBM’s smart city vision, according to two IBM 
staff who work with the SCC, it is part of IBM’s philanthropic arm and has 
tangential ties to sales. And, while the Smarter Cities strategy may inform the SCC, 
key IBM staff who helped derive the Smarter Cities strategy state that the SCC is not 
a central strategic focus.  
 
Wiig’s (2015) analysis of IBM smart city efforts conflates Smarter Cities Challenge 
endeavors with IBM Smart City projects. The former are very short-term pilots 
designed to deliver suggested recommendations to city leadership; the later are 
initiatives implemented for a paying client. It should be noted that many SCC 
recommendations are not implemented by city leadership after the grant expires. 
Thus within Wiig’s analysis, there is a blurring between suggested recommendations 
around a specific challenge with policies that may be transferred during actual 
project recommendation. While there may be policy mobility within both, it is much 
more likely to occur within paying projects that are implemented than three week 
technical advisory pilots. Further, Townsend (2013, pp. 82-87) and Söderström et al. 
(2014) overemphasize the importance of the Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities 
project—which was a one-year, pro bono research endeavor that did not yield a 
durable solution. Thus, to indicate it as a keystone project within IBM’s Smarter 
Cities campaign, as both do, demonstrates a lack of clarity around the smart city 
solutions and offerings that IBM actually offers. With the cacophony of narrative 
themes that has emerged from IBM around Smarter Cities, it is easy to understand 
how certain aspects of the Campaign can be misunderstood. Despite this potential for 
confusion, other tech providers have joined IBM in promoting the smart city.  
 
5.4 Spreading the Message 
 
Since 2009, IBM’s narrative content around its Smarter Cities campaign has been 
pushed through paid and owned media37—in press releases, commercials, ads, 
                                                 
37 Paid media consists of things like traditional radio commercials or newspaper advertisements, 
where the organization doing the marketing pays another firm to host their content. Owned media is 
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videos, social media, websites, PowerPoint presentations, events, interactive gaming 
websites, white papers, Redbooks, POVs and assessment tools, among others. And, 
earned media has contributed to creating and recreating smart narratives. These 
narrative efforts have been regarded as quite ‘successful’ by those within the 
marketing industry. IBM’s Smarter Planet campaign, of which Smarter Cities is part, 
has been nominated by Advertising Age38 as one of the top ad campaigns of the 
century—that said, it is only 2016 (AdAge, 2014a).  
 
Figure 13. Images of People for Smarter Cities ads  
 
Source: FL Headlines, 2013.  
 
The story around smart projects has been purposively crafted by IBM to be 
compelling and to relate to all those who read it. Visual imagery, including 
functional ads (shown in Figure 13), have also been used to raise awareness of 
IBM’s work in the smarter cities space. These ads serve a purpose—as a bike ramp, a 
seat, or cover from the rain—while also selling IBM and its Smarter Cities brand. 
Numerous of these ads were placed across Paris and London in 2013 to promote the 
launch of IBM’s People for Smarter Cities, a social website IBM created to 
encourage city resident discussions around making cities ‘smarter’. These ads have 
won a wide range of awards, including the Grand Prize at the 2013 Cannes Lions 
International Festival for Creativity for outdoor advertising, further demonstrating 
                                                 
where the organization doing the marketing creates and publishes / releases its own content (videos 
posted on free channels such as YouTube, self-published books). Earned media is organic and 
includes things like chatter on Facebook or Twitter, and / or the viral spread of videos or content 
through YouTube, email, etc. as well as news coverage (Owyang, 2012).  
38 “Advertising Age is recognized as the leading global source of news, analysis and inspiration for 
the marketing and media community. Advertising Age includes ongoing coverage of strategic topics 
for marketers from mid to large companies complemented by breaking news and a database of the 
world's best creative” (AdAge, 2014b).  
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the strength of IBM’s brand and marketing efforts around Smarter Cities (FL 
Headlines, 2013).   
 
While the term smart city predates IBM’s usage, the company’s Smarter Cities 
narratives are considered so ‘successful’ and ‘effective’ that other companies have 
started adopting Smarter Cities messaging and making it their own—such as Cisco’s 
Smart+Connected Communities. In fact, when looking at narrative themes around 
smart projects created by other IT providers, there are many similarities to those 
promoted by IBM. For example, Cisco, General Electric and Siemens all note how, 
in their opinion, through the gathering and analysis of city data, smart technologies 
enable a better understanding of city systems and how they relate to each other, 
enabling more effective systems management, and hence, a more sustainable and 
prosperous future (Cisco, 2010; General Electric, 2011; Siemens, 2010). These 
providers, along with IBM, claim the same smarter cities gains, which align with the 
assumptions associated with smart, including among others, increased city 
efficiencies, improved city brand, talent and resource retention / attraction, local 
economic development, enhanced city resident participation and sustainability. Each 
of these actors also attribute these gains to capabilities enabled by smart 
technologies, such as an enhanced ability to measure and therefore manage—
reinforcing the preemptive consensus around these endeavors (Cisco, 2010; General 
Electric, 2011; Siemens, 2010). Concurrent to this external influence IBM has had on 
the smart city market, the Smarter Cities campaign and its associated market 
externalities have also had impact on the organization.  
 
5.5 Sparking Internal Change 
 
While the role and involvement of IBM in the smart city market has implications for 
smart city reimagining and the redesign of urban governance, there have also been 
internal effects resulting in the organization’s transformation—where the smart city 
market is changing IBM. In the early days of this campaign, IBM Marketing & 
Communications and Sales & Development teams quickly learned that targeting 
cities for business meant understanding new types of buyers. Instead of focusing 
solely on the IT department and the Chief Information Officer, these units 
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recognized that IT decisions were increasingly being made within various city 
departments by a range of different types of city leaders: chiefs of police, 
transportation managers, traffic planners, utility representatives, security directors, 
health care officials, heads of social programs and city managers, among others 
(IBM, 2014c). So, to better understand this new market and these new buyers, the 
teams began creating “blueprints” and “journey maps” that would help local 
government clients understand IBM’s vision of a smart city and what needed to be 
done to implement these types of projects. At the same time, the development of 
these materials helped educate involved IBM staff at a basic level on local 
government structure, needs and functioning.  
 
Before internal changes were made in January 2015 and January 2016,39 IBM had 
six divisions primarily responsible for implementing Smarter Cities engagements—
Software Group (SWG), Global Business Services (GBS), Systems & Technology 
Group (STG), Global Technology Services (GTS), Cloud, and Research. During the 
first few years of the Smarter Cities campaign, as these teams began to better 
understand how cities operated, they realized that, in the words of one senior M&C 
executive who I interviewed, “real transformation is not just IT but building the 
competence of how to do it”. In other words, a smart project involves more than just 
adding IT to city systems—it is more than just a software or hardware sale. 
Additional training and consulting are often required to stand up these projects. 
Local government staff responsible for running these projects have to know where 
and how to find relevant data, how to check to for data accuracy and address 
inaccuracy, how to run analytics, and how to put in context what the analysis is 
telling you, among others. In effect, as IBM implemented these projects, involved 
staff learned that smart projects require expertise from across IBM brands—research, 
software, hardware and consulting—divisions that, until January 2015, operated 
                                                 
39 On January 6, 2015, Ginni Rometty, the company’s President and CEO, noted major changes for 
the company which included breaking down old divisions (or internal brands) and creating new 
divisions organized by industry, such as: IBM Analytics, IBM Commerce, IBM Security, IBM 
Watson, IBM Cloud, IBM Healthcare, and IBM Systems, among others (Rometty, 2015). Note that 
these changes affected all IBM operations, not just those that supported the Smarter Cities campaign. 
In January 2016, Rometty announced a new strategy for IBM, a focus on cognitive and cloud (Hiner, 
2016), which resulted in another round of internal reorganization.    
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independently of each other within IBM, and at times, even competed with each 
other. So, for Smarter Cities (and Smarter Planet) projects to be effectively 
implemented, significant internal changes would have to take place within IBM to 
encourage staff to work across divisional boundaries. These changes became reality 
in January 2015, effectively transforming the way IBM works internally,40 with the 
main impetus being a desire to speed the time taken to go to market and diminish 
hindrances from working within internal brand silos (Rometty, 2015). In this sense, 
the launch of IBM’s Smarter Cities and Smarter Planet campaigns created a “stable 
discursive signifier(s)” that enabled the orientation of “several vertically integrated 
elements of the firm’s core businesses” (McNeill, 2014, p. 4).  
 
With an increased focus on Smarter Cites, IBM management also recognized that 
given local governments were a new type of client, the company would quickly have 
to build expertise in this realm. So in 2010, IBM launched the Smarter Cities 
Challenge, a philanthropic program that stemmed from an existing leadership-
development program, the Corporate Service Corps. The SCC, which is still 
operating, functions like a mini “consulting Peace Corps for smart cities” 
(Townsend, 2013, p. 65), brings together a team of six IBMers from around the 
world, and across IBM divisions, for three weeks to work pro bono on a challenge 
identified by a local government that had been awarded an SCC grant, which 
basically covers the services in kind. IBM staff chosen to serve on a SCC team may, 
or may not, be involved with the teams directly responsible for implementing the 
Smarter Cities endeavors designed for paying clients. Each team is responsible for 
delivering project recommendations to a specific challenge that the city leadership 
had identified. It is then up to city leaders to act upon these recommendations or not 
(funding was not provided for implementation).  
 
According to two SCC project staff members who I interviewed, while strengthening 
IBMer leadership skills, the heuristic program has also helped IBM staff learn from 
city clients and showcase its expertise in this market. This experience has been 
                                                 
40 IBM’s work with Smarter Cities / Smarter Planet was just one data point of many that gave insight 
on the need for internal restructuring so that IBM brands, or divisions, would better be able to work 
together versus compete with each other.  
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tremendously valuable to IBM—as it has helped ramp up skills across the company 
related to local government consulting in a matter of years. According to the SCC 
landing page, over 100 cities have received US$50 million of pro bono services 
within the first three years of program operations. It is IBM’s largest philanthropic 
initiative, and has targeted cities such as Abuja, Nigeria; Accra, Ghana; Ahmedabad, 
India; Antofagasta, Chile; Belfast, Northern Ireland; Birmingham, United Kingdom; 
Bucharest, Romania; Cebu, Philippines; Cheongju, Korea; Chonburi, Thailand; 
Curitiba, Brazil; Da Nang, Vietnam; Durban, South Africa; Faro, Portugal; Nairobi, 
Kenya; and Sendai, Japan, among others. The SCC programs have varied in city size, 
challenge faced, socio-economic status and geography in an attempt to help build 
knowledge that spans global city experiences (IBM, 2014a).  
 
Yet, while the focus of the SCC engagements may be informed by IBM Smarter 
Cities strategy in terms of geographic areas to target or types of projects to fund, two 
SCC project staff state that the program is not tied to sales or part of a pre-sales 
effort (meaning that any leads generated are not tied back to individuals for follow-
up). As noted by one Smarter Cities Sales S&D lead, “some of my sales colleagues 
don’t even know what Smarter Cities Challenge means”. However, the program does 
play an important role in ‘conditioning’ the smarter cities market—it raises 
awareness of new ways that smart technologies can be applied within cities, helps 
city leaders understand Smarter Cities solution applicability and potential gains, and 
opens the door for future relationships with IBM to develop. And, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, it also has served as a means for recipient city leaders to use the initiatives 
to promote their cities as smart—primarily in an attempt to spur economic growth 
and attract new resources due to the boost in city image (Wiig, 2015).   
 
In addition to changes in organizational structure and evolution in learning and 
leadership development skills, over the past six years IBM has also developed new 
business models to help cater to local government clients. This has required shifts in 
pricing, typical project size and approach. Smaller projects have been created for 
more quick fixes and rapid returns, for both IBM and the local government. To help 
drive down costs, IBM now offers a slew of solutions that local governments can buy 
and have delivered online through the cloud. IBM has also devoted extensive 
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research to see how big data, mobile and social can be further integrated into their 
solutions to help make them more accessible and palatable to local governments 
(IBM, 2014b, 2014c).  
 
Conclusions 
 
In the second quarter of 2012, IBM reported that its revenue from Smarter Planet 
projects, of which Smarter Cities is a part, grew by more than 20%. At the end of 
2013’s first quarter, it reported that Smarter Planet revenue grew by more than 25%; 
and when combined with its expansion to include big data analytics, cloud 
computing and growth in emerging markets, together these opportunities would 
account for $20 billion in incremental revenue from 2011 through 2015 (Deagon, 
2013 and Lohr, 2013 in Paroutis et al., 2014). This data indicates that IBM has had at 
least some success in its efforts to create and capture the smart city market. Part of 
IBM’s strategy to make and shape this market has included creating a range of 
stories to sell its Smarter Cities offerings and solutions. These narratives reflect the 
various divisions within IBM seeking entrée and capture within the smart city 
market—for IBM’s approach has been so entrepreneurial that even within the 
company there is competition between and amongst different divisions to gain 
market share.  
 
Within IBM’s Smarter Cities narratives, the city is portrayed through a business lens 
so that city leaders are more apt to think like private sector executives and to see 
their city as IBM describes and defines it. In this effort of market creation, there is 
not one IBM Smarter Cities narrative; rather, stories around Smarter Cities have been 
created across divisions, roles, geography, management structures and leadership, for 
various audiences and with varied intent. Despite this variation, IBM Smarter Cities 
narratives have reinforced assumptions of smart and characteristics of urban 
entrepreneurialism by emphasizing: intralocal competition over scarce resources, the 
need to boost city brand, and how smart city solutions can spur economic 
development, enable optimization and facilitate community participation (Dencik, 
2013; Dirks and Keeling, 2009; IBM, 2012e, 2012f, 2014j). In this fashion, these 
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narratives reinforce selective messaging around the smart city “preemptive 
consensus” (Greenfield, 2013).  
 
To improve global applicability, IBM has reduced the complexity of cities both 
discursively and in terms of product. Generic descriptions of urban challenges are 
common within IBM literature so that they relate to a wider audience. This 
oversimplification of cities and the challenges they face has informed how IBM staff 
have understood and approached their work (McNeill, 2014; Söderström et al., 
2014). And, given that PPPs are frequently common for smart city project 
implementation, this reductionism spreads through associated partnering 
arrangements. The more that IBM staff work and deal with external actors on these 
projects, the more channels are created for diffusing the company’s viewpoints, 
approaches and frameworks (Wiig, 2015). And, as cities integrate this knowledge 
and the associated practices and processes transferred by IBM, they begin to share it 
with each other, also acting as agents for knowledge transfer through consultants 
brought in to help integrate smart technologies across city systems (Hoffman, 2011 
and McCann, 2011 in McNeill, 2014). Even IBM’s competitors have adopted the 
smart city nomenclature and integrated this into similar narrative themes as they 
attempt to build and gain shares within the marketplace. In this manner, IBM’s role 
and involvement in the smart city trend has had implications for how cities are being 
reimagined as smart and how this may inform the redesign of urban governance 
mechanisms.   
 
The permanency and character of this potential redesign however is unclear. While 
branding a city smart may, purportedly, differentiate one city from another, as smart 
solutions spread this perceived competitive edge will be diminished. For while the 
technological advances associated with smart projects do have the potential for city 
gains (for the local government and city residents), the attractiveness of selling a city 
as smart will be reduced over time as the market becomes saturated. That does not 
mean that the solutions / technologies now deemed smart will not persist; rather, the 
emphasis on them being smart may change.  
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In the next four chapters below, I further explore this notion of the redesign of urban 
governance through IT provider interactions by examining smart projects in situ. I 
begin with the case study of Dubuque, and look specifically at: (a) how interactions 
with IBM have informed city objectives, priorities and approaches and what might 
be the implications of this interaction; (b) how smart projects have changed the roles 
and expectations of local government and city residents, and what IBM’s role in this 
transformation has been; and (c) how smart project narratives and brand, informed 
by that promoted by IBM, have potentially informed the redesign of urban 
governance mechanisms. 
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6 Dubuque: Redesigning Urban Governance through Smart  
  
In the mid-1980s, the City of Dubuque, Iowa faced its potential death—bleak 
economic prospects, high levels of unemployment, and a mass exodus of residents 
hung heavy over the city. Despite these dire conditions, within the last two decades 
the economy and population levels have recovered and perceptions of Dubuque have 
shifted from a dying, small town to a flourishing city among Midwestern states 
(Acohido, 2009; BBC News, 2011; Dillow, 2011; Greater Dubuque Development 
Corporation, 2006, 2011a). A local government focus on sustainability, and later 
smart, have been factors perceived by the local government as integral to this revival. 
Both factors are encapsulated in the city’s Sustainable Dubuque (SD) and Smarter 
Sustainable Dubuque (SSD) initiatives, which were created to promote sustainability 
and sustainable outcomes. This compelling backdrop has made Dubuque an 
interesting case study to explore, with rich data around how the IT provider, IBM, 
has interacted with local government policy and planning processes around the smart 
projects being implemented.  
 
Figure 14. Images of Dubuque 
               
Source: Images are from the City of Dubuque’s website: http://www.cityofdubuque.org/ (accessed 
December 9, 2011). 
 
In many ways, the City of Dubuque provided an insightful example of how smart 
projects can be construed as an extension of neoliberal policy experiments within 
urban environments given the way that these endeavors, under the auspices of IBM, 
directly or indirectly emphasized place marketing, intralocal competition, public-
private partnerships, boosterism, business innovation and social control, among 
others (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Further, each of the smart projects examined 
exhibited the assumptions that often go along with the concept of smart and align 
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with characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism. It is with this conceptual lens that I 
examine Dubuque’s path to smart in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
In this chapter, I examine urban governance interactions with IBM through smart 
projects around strategy and engagement arrangements. I begin by looking at how 
the concept of smart has been integrated into the city’s existing sustainability 
strategy to form Smarter Sustainable Dubuque, an initiative created to help make the 
city more sustainable through the use of technologies (M. Van Milligen, 2013). In 
this manner, I explore how the local government and involved actors in this small 
city have pursued, engaged around and assigned meaning to smart technologies and 
their applications across specific city services and systems. I examine the practices 
employed by the local government and IBM to help achieve SSD project objectives 
and priorities, and how these approaches may reinforce undercurrents of 
privatization, commodification and marketization of public provision. I then look at 
the engagement arrangements around SSD, expressed through PPPs, and how these 
partnerships contribute to the mobility of policy and practices amongst involved 
actors (Wiig, 2015).41 I discuss how smart projects seem to be informing local 
government-city resident relationships and expectations between and amongst each 
other. I conclude that it is not yet clear if the longer-term impact will be negligible or 
something more fundamental that raises questions related to what smart projects may 
mean for civic life, government perceptions of citizens, and the relationship that 
exists between city residents and local government.  
 
Observations and findings in sections 6.1-6.3 were primarily derived by examining 
materials—such as websites, documents, video interviews and presentations, among 
others—created by the local government to describe their sustainability strategy and 
program (Sustainable Dubuque), their overall smart city program (Smarter 
Sustainable Dubuque) and individual smart city projects (such as the Smarter Water 
and Electricity Pilot Studies). These materials reflect the meanings and 
understandings that these actors have assigned to SSD projects, and helped identify 
                                                 
41 Given the scope of my work, I focus on how perspectives, approaches, frameworks and models 
employed within IBM may be transferred to actors involved in smart initiatives, primarily focusing on 
the local government. I do not focus on the possible transference of local government approaches or 
models to IBM.  
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the objectives and priorities that these actors have been pursuing and their 
approaches to achieving them. In addition, I examined materials related to the smart 
city projects in Dubuque created by IBM and other involved actors, as well as media 
coverage, to help understand other perspectives toward these efforts. Section 6.4 was 
informed by these same materials as well as case study interviews that I conducted 
for this research. Figures 8 and 9, and Appendix 11.5 provide further details on these 
sources. The purpose of this chapter is to understand how, through the application of 
concepts and theories outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, IBM has interacted with urban 
governance processes around strategy and engagement in Dubuque. I follow this 
discussion with an exploration of interactions around representation in Chapter 7.  
 
6.1  “Masterpiece on the Mississippi”  
 
Spanning less than 72 square kilometers, the City of Dubuque, Iowa has a population 
of about 60,000, with roughly 90,000 in the greater metropolitan area (United States 
Census Bureau, 2009). Thus, similar in population to cities such as Inverness, 
Scotland (Office for National Statistics, 2001), Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, 
Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014) and Benevento, Campania, Italy 
(Istat, 2015). The city serves as the commercial, educational, industrial and cultural 
center for the surrounding tristate area of Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin. While the 
city has had a long history of manufacturing, in the past two decades there has been a 
diversification of its economy to include healthcare, tourism, publishing, financial 
service, high technology and education. Dubuque has a gross domestic product of 
about $4307 million (EconPost, 2010), and despite its rocky history in the 1980s, 
was rated by Moody’s Analytics as one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
United States in 2010 (Greater Dubuque Development Corporation, 2011b).  
 
The city is situated in the American Great Plains, amongst the U.S. Corn and Grain 
Belts. Surrounded by small rolling hills of agricultural land, Dubuque’s central 
business district sits along the Mississippi River—a prominent factor in the city’s 
identity and evolution. After Dubuque was chartered in 1837, it attracted large 
numbers of German and Irish immigrants due to its location on the river and its 
abundance of land and resources. Over time, the city’s manufacturing base grew and 
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it became a booming industrial town in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The city began to stagnate after the Second World War and was hit hard 
during the economic crisis of the 1980s (Chaichian, 1989; Dubuque Public 
Information Officer, 2010; The City of Dubuque, 2009a, 2010a). In 1983, the John 
Deere Company, which manufactures farm equipment and in peak times provided 
about sixty percent of the industrial jobs in the city, laid off roughly half of its 
employees (Chaichian, 1989). City conditions worsened, becoming quite dire. As the 
1980s continued, and the effects of the Midwest Farm Crisis spread, unemployment 
went up to twenty-three percent, the highest in the nation (BBC News, 2011; 
Dubuque Public Information Officer, 2010). As a reflection of the dismal conditions, 
t-shirts and a prominent billboard in the city bleakly jested: “Will the last person to 
leave Dubuque please turn off the lights” (National Civic League, 2009; The City of 
Dubuque, 2006).  
 
Figure 15. Dubuque’s Grand River Center 
 
Source: This image is from the City of Dubuque’s website: http://www.cityofdubuque.org/ (accessed 
March 10, 2016). 
 
Narratives about the city’s recovery from this drastic decline explain how city 
leaders and residents came together to save the city by investing their personal funds 
in a dog-racing track. Their hope was to attract gambling revenue from tourists 
visiting a neighboring historic town in the State of Illinois just across the river. As 
this venture began to pay off, efforts were expanded into a gaming riverboat that was 
later opened in Dubuque’s Ice Harbor. As these projects grew, revenues were used to 
improve city infrastructure. Slowly, Dubuque began to recover (Enzler, 2010). One 
recovery project—such as the Grand River Center featured in Figure 15—turned into 
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several and the city began to thrive, prompting the local government to nickname it 
“Masterpiece on the Mississippi” (Dubuque Main Street, 2012; Enzler, 2010; The 
City of Dubuque, 2010a).  
 
The city uses the council-manager-ward form of government. Within this weak 
mayor structure, the City Manager runs the day-to-day operations and serves as the 
city’s executive leader, though the Mayor still serves as a visible political head (The 
City of Dubuque, 2009c, 2014). In addition to the City Manager, there is a part-time 
City Council, which makes policy and financial decisions and serves as the city’s 
legislative body (The City of Dubuque, 2009b). The Council is comprised of the 
Mayor, who serves as its chairman, four ward-elected members and two at-large 
members. Dubuque’s Mayor, Roy D. Buol, was first elected to a four-year term in 
November 2005, and re-elected for another four-year term in November 2009 and 
again November 2013 (The City of Dubuque, 2009c, 2014). Buol feels that his 
pursuit of a sustainability agenda has helped secure his re-elections—for 
sustainability has served as a key part of his political platform in each of his three 
elections, and he, along with the City Council, have kept this at the forefront of city 
strategy over his years in office. According to Buol in an IBM Social Media video on 
YouTube, “sustainability is good politics” (IBM, 2009b). He and his two assistant 
city managers, as noted in my interviews with them for this research, feel that a 
sustainability focus has contributed to the city’s revival in the last decade—a renewal 
that, in their opinions, also has been bolstered by the concept of smart.  
 
6.2 Sustainable Dubuque 
 
Religious and environmental groups within Dubuque have emphasized 
environmental aspects of sustainability since the 1990s.42 Building on these early 
sustainability endeavors, the then mayoral candidate Buol promoted a sustainability 
platform in the 2005 elections, framing sustainability as a means to help differentiate 
                                                 
42 According to the city’s Natural Resource Manager, examples of these groups include the Catholic 
Church, Green Dubuque, the Sierra Club, and the League of Women Voters.  
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the city and give it a competitive edge (Sustainable Dubuque, 2010b, p. 5). As stated 
by Buol in an IBM Smarter Planet Leadership Series video on YouTube: 
 
When I was elected mayor in 2005 part of my platform was I believe that… 
we needed to create a sustainable community. I told my city council 
colleagues after I was elected that cities that commit to sustainability now… 
will have a decided advantage over those that don’t in the near future. (Buol 
in IBM, 2012a) 
 
In 2007, under the aegis of Buol’s lead, a community task force—consisting of 
representatives from local government, civic associations, utility companies, 
religious organizations, environmental groups and local schools—was established to 
develop a sustainability plan to move this priority forward. Through stakeholder 
consultations and surveys to engage citizens, this Sustainability Task Force 
developed a sustainability model that was formally adopted by City Council in early 
2010 (The City of Dubuque, 2009d; Sustainable Dubuque, 2010b). The Dubuque 
sustainability model, represented in Figure 16, consists of twelve sustainability 
principles43 categorized into three buckets: economic prosperity (e.g., green jobs, 
expanding markets and saving money), environmental and ecological integrity (e.g., 
reduced emissions, clean air and water, healthy living), and social and cultural 
vibrancy to make the community more viable, livable and equitable (Sustainable 
Dubuque, 2010b, pp. 7-8, 10, 12).  
 
Figure 16. Dubuque’s sustainability model 
Economic Prosperity  Environmental Integrity  Social / Cultural Vibrancy 
 Regional Economy  Healthy Air  Green Buildings 
 Smart Energy Use  Clean Water 
 Healthy Local Food 
 Smart Resource Use  Native Plants & Animals  Community Knowledge 
 Community Design Reasonable Mobility 
 
Community Health & 
Safety 
Source: The City of Dubuque, 2015b. 
                                                 
43 The Sustainable Dubuque Task Force identified eleven Principles in 2008. In 2013, a twelfth 
principle, Community Health & Safety, was added (The City of Dubuque, 2015b). 
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Once the local government adopted this model, it established Sustainable Dubuque,44 
a public-private partnership created to develop programs and projects that support 
this sustainability agenda (Sustainable Dubuque, 2010b, p. 19; The City of Dubuque, 
2009d). The City of Dubuque’s “Mission Statement” and “2026 Vision Statement” 
also outline the local government’s focus on sustainability (The City of Dubuque, 
2009d) and their aim of “meeting present needs in a way that does not compromise 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Dubuque2.0, 2010c, p. 2). 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the broad consensus used to develop this sustainability model, 
it mirrors the “Three E’s”—environment, economy and equity—or the key 
interacting elements frequently emphasized in urban sustainability frameworks that 
are considered to be more ‘mainstream’ and / or neutral (Campbell, 1996; 
McDonough and Braungart, 2002; Wheeler, 2002; Yaro and Hiss, 1996 in Mayer 
and Provo, 2004). Of the local government staff who I interviewed, four of the 
sixteen noted that the model was purposively constructed with this wide scope to 
enable broad appeal and include something that would speak to everyone. This 
broadened approach to sustainability is an attempt to neutralize any controversy 
around the term and what these types of initiatives hope to achieve. Within such 
conceptualizations, policy officials and city leaders have sought to develop strategies 
around sustainability that are broadly consensual and non-contentious, thus not 
threatening the current status quo. Rather, sustainability in these terms usually refers 
to the economic benefits of better resource management, where capitalism is made 
greener (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 215). I discuss this depoliticization of sustainability 
and how this has been applied to smart projects in Chapter 7.  
 
Further, these four city leaders noted that there also was strategic thinking behind 
involving a wide range of stakeholders to create this model—for it was thought that 
this would help contribute to community ownership of the model while also aiding in 
                                                 
44 Sustainable Dubuque’s local partners include the Dubuque Convention and Visitors Bureau, the 
Greater Dubuque Development Corporation, the Community Foundation of Greater Dubuque, 
Dubuque Main Street, Dubuque2.0, the East Central Intergovernmental Association, envision, and 
Four Mounds, while national partners include the National Trust Historic Preservation, the American 
Institute of Architect’s Communities by Design, Climate Communities, and Local Governments for 
Sustainability (Sustainable Dubuque 2010b: 19). 
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the viral spread of messaging around the sustainability agenda as those involved 
discussed this work within their social circles. As discussed in Chapter 4, third party 
organizations like citizen-based steering committees or boards are increasingly being 
recruited to assist in spreading awareness and narratives around local government 
endeavors, with the thought that their involvement will help cut costs. Local 
governments look to these organizations to serve as channels for communication, 
with outgoing messaging and incoming input from the diverse actors involved as a 
means to help represent input from a range of constituencies (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 
81). This same type of approach used with Sustainable Dubuque was continued and 
expanded with Smarter Sustainable Dubuque as the city’s sustainability agenda was 
expanded to include the application of smart technologies.  
 
6.2.1 Smarter Sustainable Dubuque Projects 
 
In many ways, the local government’s pre-existing focus on sustainability set a solid 
foundation upon which smart projects could build. As the local government 
continued its emphasis on recovery and economic growth, and looked for ways to 
strengthen its ‘competitive edge’, it expanded its sustainability agenda in 2009 by 
forming a public-private partnership with IBM Research and other local, state and 
regional organizations45 to form Smarter Sustainable Dubuque, a program that 
focuses on ways to make the city more sustainable through the use of smart 
technologies (The City of Dubuque, 2009e). Greater Dubuque Development 
Corporation (GDDC) provided the first $30,000 in seed money. Since its launch, 
SSD has grown into a collaboration that includes over two dozen industries, eight 
state and federal agencies, and a range of smart city projects across five city systems 
and services (The City of Dubuque, 2009e). The City of Dubuque’s webpage entitled 
“How is Dubuque Getting Smarter” sums up the SSD endeavor from the local 
government’s perspective:  
 
In its quest to become a more sustainable city, Dubuque is exploring and 
using new ‘smarter’ technologies and strategies to deliver or better utilize 
                                                 
45 At launch, Smarter Sustainable Dubuque partners included IBM, the City of Dubuque, the East 
Central Intergovernmental Association, the Greater Dubuque Development Corporation, the Dubuque 
Area Chamber of Commerce, and the Community Foundation of Greater Dubuque (IBM, 2011c).  
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vital services such as water, energy, and transportation to its citizens while 
reducing the community’s impact on the environment. These new 
technologies digitize and connect city systems, sense, analyze and integrate 
data, and allow Dubuque to respond intelligently to the needs of citizens. 
(The City of Dubuque, 2011g)  
 
Within this statement, and the SD and SSD agendas, it is evident that the local 
government’s understanding and perceptions of smart align with the numerous 
assumptions that often accompany this concept: that there will be an emphasis on the 
use of technologies to achieve set city outcomes and that desired goals of smart 
projects include economic development, improvements in city competitiveness, and 
increased efficiency that contributes to sustainability (as locally defined). As 
explained by the City Manager Michael Van Milligen at an IBM Software Vision 
event in 2013, SSD is the “research function” or “technology driver” of SD, which 
exists to help achieve SD goals (M. Van Milligen, 2013).  
 
By pursuing SSD, the local government hopes to attract resources such as talent, 
business and investment to the city. IBM sees SSD as an opportunity to test smart 
city solutions and refine go-to-market strategies to help better create and capture the 
smart city market—demonstrated by IBM deeming Dubuque as its first living lab in 
the world for Smarter Cities experiments. Both of these actors are also pursuing SSD 
to raise their perceived competitiveness and brand by making Dubuque one of the 
first smarter sustainable cities in North America. Additionally through this 
partnership, these two actors are hoping to benefit from the development of new 
smart technologies and a sustainability model that can be scaled and replicated 
globally in communities of 200,000 and under—a model that hinges upon data and 
analytics primarily enabled by IT providers like IBM. In effect, both actors seek to 
export the SSD model as a ‘product’ (IBM, 2009b, 2011c; PR Newswire, 2011a). To 
date, elements of this model have been shared with cities in Australia and Turkey. As 
the former IBM Research Manager in charge of IBM programs in Dubuque joked: 
“What happens in Dubuque doesn’t stay in Dubuque” (Naphade in Greenblatt, 2014, 
p. 4). This notion of creating a smart sustainability model for export reflects in part 
the rising marketization and commodification of cities, while also underscoring the 
local government’s entrepreneurial management style and the transfer of private 
sector practices to the public sector realm—topics that I discuss further below.  
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As part and parcel of the SSD initiative, the local government also offered tax 
incentives to IBM to open a Global Delivery Facility (GDF) office within downtown 
Dubuque, with the hope that opening the facility would help create jobs, lure new 
talent and attract other businesses to the area (IBM, 2009d, 2010a, 2010c, 2011c; 
The City of Dubuque 2009e, 2010b, 2010e). This type of tax abatement is associated 
with what Brenner and Theodore (2002) call “roll-back” neoliberalism, where, they 
posit, local governments focus on creating good business climates within their city as 
a means to accelerate external investment (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 373). The 
GDF is one of IBM’s more than 80 delivery centers worldwide, where staff maintain, 
monitor and support computer software and hardware, and manage IT services for 
IBM clients. According to a senior executive with the GDDC and a senior city 
leader, as a result of opening this facility, IBM has created about 1,300 jobs in the 
city, while job growth deemed to be associated with IBM’s presence has been 
estimated to be about 2,400 jobs. However, there has been controversy around these 
numbers, with critics noting that the jobs created in reality were far less than what 
was promised. I discuss this further in section 6.4.  
 
With this type of partnership between IBM and the local government, one must 
consider scale. As of 2012, IBM had about 435,000 employees (Fortune, 2012a), 
while the population of Dubuque was roughly 60,000 (United States Census Bureau, 
2009), making IBM at that time over seven times larger than the city. It would seem 
that IBM by default of size would have much more clout that the local government 
within smart projects pursued in Dubuque. However, as noted by McNeil (2014), the 
power of IT providers in these types of relationships is sometimes overestimated—
especially by the IT providers themselves. Not only does the IT provider grapple 
with technical challenges associated with smart projects and the ability to win 
contracts, there’s also a mistaken assumption that these large firms operate as a 
single actor, when in reality they are more akin to a kaleidoscope of moving 
divisions, missions, best practices, and staff, in constant churn and renewal. Their 
perceived strength, size, is actually their weakness. I discuss this issue of scale and 
mutuality further in section 6.4.  
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Figure 17. Smarter Sustainable Dubuque projects 
 Smarter Water 
Pilot Study46  
Smarter 
Electricity Pilot 
Study47 
Smarter Travel 
Pilot Studies / 
Experiments48 
Smarter 
Discards Pilot 
Study49 
Smarter Health 
and Wellness 
Pilot Studies50 
Overview Online portal that 
enables 
participating 
HHs to view 
water 
consumption 
patterns and 
trends 
Online portal that 
enables 
participating HHs 
to view electricity 
consumption 
patterns and trends 
Smartphone app that 
uses RFID 
technology to collect 
data on volunteer 
participants travel in 
the community 
Online portal that 
enables 
participating HHs 
to view discard 
patterns 
Smartphone 
apps that senses 
movement, and 
another that 
provides data on 
goals 
Aim To provide 
residents with the 
data they need to 
cut costs, save 
resources, and 
decrease their 
environmental 
impact 
To provide 
residents with the 
data they need to 
cut costs, save 
resources, and 
decrease their 
environmental 
impact 
To provide residents 
with the data they 
need to cut costs, 
save resources, and 
decrease their 
environmental impact 
To assist and 
incentivize 
participants to 
improve diversion 
toward curbside 
recycling and 
composting  
To give 
residents the 
information they 
need to make 
smarter choices 
about their 
health and 
wellness 
# of 
participants 
303 households 765 households  Over 1,000 
volunteers 
300 households Requested up to 
250 volunteers 
Pilot 
duration 
3 months, then 
expanded to 12 
months (2011) 
5 months (2011) 2012; with a 2016 
solicitation for more 
volunteers for 
another pilot 
9 months (2013) 6 months (2013) 
Involved 
partners 
City of Dubuque, 
IBM Research, 
Dubuque2.0, 
Neptune 
Technology 
Group, ESRI 
ArcGIS, Verity 
Three, Northern 
water Works 
Supply 
City of Dubuque, 
IBM Research, 
Dubuque2.0, 
Alliant Energy, 
Interstate Power 
and Light 
Company 
City of Dubuque, 
IBM Research, The 
Jule, East Central 
Intergovernmental 
Association 
City of Dubuque, 
IBM Research, 
vendors from 
discard collection, 
materials 
management and 
tracking 
industries, state 
and federal 
agencies 
City of 
Dubuque, IBM 
Research, 
University of 
Iowa’s College 
of Public 
Health, Element 
Blue 
Finance Overall project 
costs of 
$850,000; funded 
by a mix of local, 
state and national 
funding sources 
Funded by a $1.4 
million grant from 
the Iowa Office of 
Energy 
Independence 
Funded in part by 
grants from the 
Climate Showcase 
Communities 
Program and the 
Iowa Department of 
Transportation’s 
Iowa Clean Air 
Attainment Program 
Total cost for 
Proof of Concept 
paid by city 
$39,960 
Proof of 
Concept cost of 
$50,000, paid 
through a 
Federal Climate 
Communities 
Showcase grant 
 
Within Smarter Sustainable Dubuque there have been several pilot studies and 
experiments applying smart technologies across a range of city systems, including 
water, electricity, transportation, waste management and health and wellness—
outlined further in Figure 17. As noted above, the broad scope of the city’s 
sustainability model has facilitated the ability to overlay these smart projects and 
priorities onto the existing sustainability framework. For example, one of the primary 
overarching aims of the city’s sustainability model and of the SSD agenda is to help 
                                                 
46 For more information see The City of Dubuque, 2010b; Erickson et al., 2012; and Naphade 2011.  
47 For more information see The City of Dubuque, 2010c; Naphade, 2012.  
48 For more information see The City of Dubuque, 2011f.  
49 For more information see The City of Dubuque, 2013e.  
50 For more information see The City of Dubuque, 2013f.  
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improve the regional economy and spur business growth and development; and a 
common assumption associated with smart city projects is that these endeavors help 
spur economic growth and urban revival. Another assumption commonly associated 
with smart projects is that they help optimize resources, thereby having the potential 
to contribute to sustainability efforts. The Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot Studies 
both had the aim of helping participating households make better decisions about 
resource conservation, resulting in lower consumption rates. The Smarter Travel 
experiments, which aim to provide data on traffic flows throughout the city and how 
city residents use public transportation, could conceivably contribute to both the 
sustainability aims of mobility and air quality while helping to optimize resources 
associated with travel. Additionally, the Smarter Discard project supports goals set 
around improved resource use. For the purposes of my research I only examined the 
Smarter Water and Smarter Electricity Pilot Studies in detail; these are elaborated 
below. Additional information on the other pilots within SSD can be found in 
Appendix 11.9.  
 
The Smarter Water Pilot Study  
 
Though water is not a scarce resource in Dubuque, it was selected by city leaders and 
IBM Research as the focus for the first SSD pilot since it dovetailed with a citywide 
installation of advanced metering infrastructure.51 Additionally, relevant actors chose 
it because they felt that it was the least controversial of the utilities for smart 
technology adoption. This new advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) enables data 
to be generated in near real-time and collected remotely, both necessary components 
for the pilot, which was comprised of a web-based portal system that was made 
accessible to 303 volunteer households for 15 weeks in 2011 (Erickson et al., 2012; 
The City of Dubuque, 2010b). The system collected data on participating 
households’ water usage every 15 minutes, and was transmitted every four hours to a 
cloud-based repository where it was then analyzed and used to produce feedback to 
these households via a private portal. Households could see their water usage by the 
                                                 
51 The technologies involved in this smart effort included, among others, R900 and R450 water 
meters, wireless and internet technologies and access, GIS technologies, server access, cloud 
computing, advanced algorithms and computers. These technologies, and others, functioned together 
as an AMI system (Naphade, 2010, 2011). 
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hour, day, week, month or year, in gallons, U.S. dollars or by carbon footprint 
(Naphade, 2011). In Spain, the city of Cáceres is also implementing a similar type of 
project aimed at resource conservation, where smart technologies are being applied 
to help better manage drinking water networks. Like the water portal project in 
Dubuque, this project “will introduce remote meter-reading and will be able to detect 
unusual consumption patterns”, enabling leak detection (Berst, 2013).  
 
Figure 18. Smarter Water Pilot Study portal 
 
Source: Naphade, 2011.  
 
The portal, shown in Figure 18, was designed to encourage conservation among pilot 
participants by tapping into the power of visual communication and concepts from 
behavioral economics, both techniques frequently used by the private sector when 
targeting consumers (who use products) as well as customers (who buy products). 
The portals used charts, alerts, social comparisons, weekly contests, incentives and a 
chat function (Erickson et al., 2012) to attempt to nudge household behavior in 
desired directions (Ariely, 2008, 2010; Cialdini, 2007; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Additionally, information was provided on the portal on how to make households 
more efficient. And, if a leak was detected, a notification would appear along with 
details on whom to contact from the local government for assistance (Erickson et al., 
2012; Naphade, 2011).  
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IBM Research designed the portal with feedback from the local government and 
participating households. Before the pilot began, participants were trained on 
sustainability issues, conservation and how to use the portal by Dubuque2.0, a quasi-
governmental organization created to support SSD endeavors (which I discuss 
further below). Participants were asked to record any changes in their behavior as a 
result of this training and record methods that they had found useful in water 
conservation. Feedback from these records, and from the local government staff 
fielding participant emails and calls, was used to make revisions in portal design 
during initial stages of implementation. For example, problems with associated 
logins and algorithms were found during the initial stages of pilot testing and thus 
able to be subsequently fixed (Erickson et al., 2012; Naphade, 2011). This learning 
was also transferred to inform design of the Smart Electricity Pilot Study.  
 
Actors involved in implementing the pilot included the local government, local 
technology providers, IBM Research, Dubuque2.0 and participating households. The 
local government funded the project and was responsible for rounding up 
volunteering households to participate in the pilot and training them on portal usage. 
To further entice households to volunteer for the pilot, the local government offered 
participating households priority access to free water audits, matching grants to fix 
water leaks, and an opportunity to participate in future projects for electricity and 
solid waste management (PR Newswire, 2011a; The City of Dubuque, 2010b). Local 
private sector companies were responsible for data gathering and issues related to the 
smart meters, while IBM Research was responsible for data analytics, portal 
operations and functioning, and project evaluation. The third party organization 
Dubuque2.0 was responsible for narrative creation and public relations around the 
project and its overarching goal, sustainability. Volunteer households provided their 
time and data (Naphade, 2011; The City of Dubuque, 2010b).  
 
At the pilot’s completion, IBM Research evaluated the effectiveness and outcomes 
of the system. Findings from the evaluation revealed that the portal helped: (a) 
enable water conservation (at least temporarily), with 6.6 percent reduction in usage 
amongst participants; (b) improve rates of leak reporting by eightfold; and (c) 
facilitate behavior change (again, at least temporarily) (PR Newswire, 2011a). 
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According to IBM research findings, this demonstrated, to an extent, the ‘success’ of 
portal design in helping to steer behavior. At the time of my research, the pilot had 
been expanded to over 4,000 households and businesses in the city as a result of 
interest and demand (The City of Dubuque, 2010b). As of the end of 2012, the pilot 
had saved the city US$ 290,000 in costs associated with water treatment and delivery 
(Flansburg, 2012).  
 
The Smarter Electricity Pilot Study 
 
The Smarter Electricity Pilot Study served as a follow-up pilot of portal system 
experimentation in Dubuque. This project, undertaken to “demonstrate that informed 
and engaged citizens could save money, conserve electricity, and make their 
community more sustainable”, was implemented in 2011 by the local government in 
partnership with Alliant Energy, Interstate Power and Light Company and IBM 
Research, and was funded by a $1.4 million grant from the Iowa Office of Energy 
Independence (Naphade, 2012, p. 4). More than 1,000 households initially 
volunteered to participate in the pilot, with over 700 households signing on to the 
portal once it was functioning (The City of Dubuque, 2010c). Over a five month 
period, the pilot combined incremental data, read every 15 minutes, with other 
data—such as data on household electricity profiles, weather, demographics, and 
household characteristics—to help volunteer households better understand their 
consumption patterns. The private portal system used cloud computing to deliver this 
web-based service (Naphade, 2012).  
 
The pilot’s design was informed by the Smarter Water Pilot Study and the result of 
negotiations between IBM Research, the local government, Alliant Energy and the 
Interstate Power and Light Company. Responsibilities for the actors involved varied. 
New AMI meters were installed in select volunteer households to enable Alliant 
Energy the ability to anonymize customer electricity usage data and to provide these 
data at regular intervals to the city and IBM Research for analysis. IBM Research 
provided data analytics, portal management and operations, and project evaluation 
(Naphade, 2012; The City of Dubuque, 2010c). The local government was 
responsible for securing funding, recruiting volunteer households, training volunteers 
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and trouble-shooting problems with the portal and its usage. Dubuque2.0 provided 
sustainability narratives and awareness-raising through weekly newsletters, training 
sessions and town hall and informal sustainability meetings. Participating households 
provided their data and time (Naphade, 2012; The City of Dubuque, 2010c).  
 
Similar to the Smarter Water Pilot Study, IBM Research developed a consumer 
interface system, or web-based portal, that enabled pilot participants to see their 
usage on an hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or annual basis. Charts, graphs and 
conservation tips were provided to help portal users better understand their electricity 
use. Behavioral economics techniques like social comparisons, alerts and contests for 
various prizes were used to get participants to consider changes in their behavior to 
save energy, reduce costs and lower their carbon footprint (Erickson et al., 2012; The 
City of Dubuque, 2010c). To also help drive behavior change, the portal suggested 
customized electricity-saving activities to each household based on their 
consumption patterns and usage trends and forecasts. As activities were undertaken, 
the portal provided users with feedback on their usage, tracked their progress, and 
enabled them to see the effects of the changes they made over time (Naphade, 2012).  
 
To understand the effects of the portal system and its design on behavior change, the 
savings were reported by IBM Research in three groups: all users who logged in at 
least once, and two sub-groups, those who signed up for electricity saving activities 
and those who did not. In all, the portal had an active participation rate of thirty-five 
percent (266 of 765 users). As a group, the active portal users (266 households) saw 
an average monthly savings of 3.7 percent. The ninety-seven users who signed up for 
electricity saving activities accounted for fifty-five percent of the total savings 
achieved from the pilot—which saved 17,595 kWh, worth U.S. $2,111 (Naphade 
2012a). In a similar type of experiment in the United Kingdom, the Energy Demand 
Project which ran from 2007-2011, a large-scale trial of 18,000 households also 
showed savings for households with smart meters with in-home displays, with an 
average savings of around three percent, with levels going up to eleven percent 
(Giordano et al., 2013, p. 57). This dashboard approach to management of resources 
has also been applied at the city level. For example, in London real-time data are 
provided to city residents through “city dashboards”, sharing information about the 
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weather, public transport delays, air pollution and river levels, among others 
(Kitchin, 2014b, p. 7).  
 
6.3 Shaping Strategy 
 
Throughout IBM’s interactions with the local government around these two pilot 
studies, as well as other SSD endeavors, city leaders have become increasingly 
exposed to the tech giant’s perspectives, practices and approaches. This in turn has 
had various implications for the city’s strategy. As discussed in Chapter 2, increasing 
neoliberal tendencies in advanced capitalist localities have affected not only 
institutions but also influenced competition between cities and the metrics by which 
cities compete (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 387). Within this shift, which has 
established a conducive environment for smart projects, local governments have 
increasingly adopted private sector characteristics, such as “risk-taking, 
inventiveness, promotion and profit motivation” (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, p. 153). 
In Dubuque, I saw evidence of such behavior, which seemed to be accentuated 
through smart project implementation and the consequent interactions with IBM.  
 
During the primary years of my field research in Dubuque, when the Smarter Water 
and Electricity Pilot Studies were implemented, IBM was still applying considerable 
resources to create and grow the smart city market. IBM Research was responsible 
for experimenting, piloting and testing various types of solutions and go-to-market 
strategies during this time. IBM’s main aim during these early years was to better 
understand cities and local governments and their needs, and to refine solutions, 
messaging and strategies that would enable the firm to create, grow and dominate 
this market space. After the announcement of partnership around SSD and the 
establishment of the GDF in Dubuque, there was a relatively small team of IBMers 
who consistently interacted with the local government and smart project staff and 
actors to develop and implement these projects. Almost all IBM actors were from 
IBM Research, typically staff who do not have sales quotas or sales responsibilities. 
Primary interactions were around developing, designing and implementing new 
types of smart city projects that interested the local government, with an emphasis on 
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the involved data collection, aggregation, management, analysis and presentation, as 
well as the end user experience.  
 
Various other IBM staff—such as senior management and staff from marketing and 
communications—also interacted with the local government in terms of how to best 
promote these projects on IBM’s behalf. The local government was welcome to use 
promotional materials created, but the main purpose was to benefit IBM. In my 
interviews with IBM Research, the SSD Project Manager, senior city staff, smart 
project staff and third party actors involved with smart projects, each noted that there 
was a good working relationship between involved actors; they respected and saw 
value in the partners and partnership that formed SSD. That said, given my role with 
IBM, which I made clear during all of my research interviews, I doubt that these 
actors would have voiced anything to the contrary.  
 
While IBM Research staff were not involved in identifying the twelve sustainability 
principles or the overarching sustainability model in Dubuque, they did have a seat at 
the table with the local government when it came to conceptualizing projects to 
support SSD and acted as the lead in design and implementation of these initiatives, 
with support from other local technical actors, such as utility companies and 
metering firms. Once overarching ideas for the projects were identified by IBM staff 
and the local government, IBM often then set the SSD project objectives and 
priorities and the approaches undertaken to achieve these—in effect, defining SSD 
project strategy details. Project evaluations were undertaken by IBM Research, 
meaning that the defined or assigned ‘success’ of a project was ascertained by the 
tech provider, the actor most interested in seeing projects being well received since 
the growth of the SSD project portfolio was contingent upon projects continually 
being found ‘effective.’ Yet, as important as it was for IBM to see these projects as a 
‘win’ to help keep smart projects going, it was also important for the local 
government to be able to point to SSD project ‘wins’ to justify tax dollar spend and 
strategy focus. As noted by the former IBM Research Project Manager Milind 
Naphade in the Smart Water Pilot Study Report: 
 
As cities evolve, they are increasingly being instrumented with sensors that 
enable them to collect data, conduct billing, and manage operations and 
  
 161 
resources as optimally as possible. Cities need to act on the information 
sensors provide, and they need to show improvement on key performance 
indicators (KPIs) to justify the return on investment for this sensing 
infrastructure. (Naphade, 2011, p. 8, emphasis mine) 
 
Consequently, project outcomes deemed ‘successful’ by IBM and the local 
government were promoted by both actors through press releases, project materials, 
marketing and public relations materials and social media channels. Continued 
project ‘wins’ kept IBM staff at the SSD strategy table. Each new project has helped 
ingrain tech provider perspectives into the thinking of involved local government 
actors, reinforcing the need for real-time data and analytics—and hence an IT 
provider—in attaining city goals. Anecdotal data hinting to this shift in thinking can 
already be seen. For example in an online interview with IBM, according to the 
city’s Information Services Manager Chris Kohlmann, her role and the role of her 
department are changing, shifts that she states have resulted from SSD:  
 
People no longer see our IT Department as solely a resource for fixing 
what’s broken or assistance with obtaining data with the defined parameters 
of a system. Rather, I’m now consulted for expertise on how to assist in 
making smart technology projects happen, while also being expected to act 
as a liaison between involved departments during project design and 
implementation. (Kohlmann, 2014) 
 
Hence, the role of the IT Department is being elevated. It is seen as central to new 
emerging technology projects (whether they fall under SSD or not). In addition, 
Kohlmann’s role has been elevated to serve as a liaison, or unofficial lead, who 
convenes the required groups together to get projects done. While subjective, I 
believe this points to an increased emphasis on the role that real-time data and 
analytics play within the city’s strategy and the centrality these play in achieving 
strategy ends, which is also evidenced by the formation of SSD itself. While the use 
of data and computing have informed city system management and operations for 
decades, the rising emphasis placed on the need for using and integrating real-time 
data with longitudinal data is novel, as is the way that analytics are conducted and 
results presented due to the real-time nature and volume of data being collected. In 
this regard, Kohlmann noted that it is through SSD endeavors that she and her 
colleagues have begun to better understand how data and analytics can be used to not 
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only provide better services for city residents, but also more frequently engage them 
around these more immediate types of data (Kohlmann, 2014).  
 
Whether or not real-time data and analytics actually do help provide better services 
and / or aid in more frequent citizen engagement is irrelevant—what is important is 
that the local government believes this to be the case, and thus have placed greater 
responsibility on the IT Department and its lead to this end. This ‘promotion’ of the 
department and the role of its head only serve to elevate the interests of IBM, 
potentially creating more avenues for business development as the IT office 
continues to expand in scope and importance. On top of this, Kohlmann added that 
there’s a second shift occurring with her role—moving focus from data to 
information. As elucidated by Kohlmann in the same online IBM interview:  
 
I often say that in this world, we are drowning in a sea of data, but are in a 
desert of information. In this regard, my current role heavily focuses on 
how to deliver—whether to a city official or citizen—relevant, timely and 
meaningful information in a way that fits the end user’s needs and interests. 
And this view-oriented approach will only be more important as more and 
more data is being gathered and analyzed every day. (Kohlmann, 2014) 
 
Kohlmann’s shift in language to refer to what her office produces—from data to 
information—is significant. It reflects the growing importance that is being placed 
on the ability to not only collect but also analyze data, both longitudinal and real 
time, as well as perhaps a growing mindset that within all the data being collected 
are answers—solutions that can be purportedly unearthed with the right analysis. 
These shifts have been facilitated by the fact that the existing leadership and 
sustainability strategy had already set a ripe environment for smart projects, and the 
assumptions that go along with them, to take root. Approaches on how to achieve 
strategic goals are also changing.        
 
6.3.1 Approaches and Perspectives 
 
Along with these subtle shifts informing SSD strategy, IBM also has had influence 
with the local government in terms of the approaches and perspectives adopted to 
achieve the objectives and priorities identified for SSD endeavors. Below I explore 
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three of these IT provider / private sector approaches and perspectives: viewing the 
city as a living lab, employing the agile method in project implementation and using 
behavioral economics techniques. In many ways, the policy mobility around these 
ideas—moving from the private to the public sector—reflects the belief that “the 
private sector is more efficient, productive and cost-effective than the public sector 
in providing and managing the economy and society” (Hearne, 2009, p. 8).  
 
Living Lab 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the array of pressures, challenges and responsibilities that 
local governments increasingly face create a growing willingness by local 
governments to explore more ‘risky’ and ‘innovative’ projects (Shelton et al., 2014). 
In response to this, there has been a rising trend of viewing cities as a place for 
testing and experimentation to help better address these challenges and 
responsibilities (Glaeser, 2011). This living lab concept typically involves public-
private partnerships pursuing what is deemed as ‘innovative’ research in regional 
areas where user communities are considered observed subjects as well as sources of 
innovation. While the idea of cities being used as demonstration projects is not new, 
living lab approaches to smart projects do create new opportunities for IT providers 
to influence and inform problematics around urban issues and how these challenged 
are perceived, conceptualized and addressed through the way that these experiments 
are designed (Schaffers et al., 2011; Shelton et al., 2014).  
 
The concept of a living lab stems from engineering and product life-cycle 
development—in other words, a model initially created for business purposes and 
ends (Bilgram et al., 2008). The reasoning provided for pursuing the living lab model 
within cities typically includes the assumptions that they help enhance perceptions of 
innovation, drive economic growth and provide a competitive edge (American 
Institutes of Architects, 2013). As applied to smart cities, the living lab concept 
integrates open business models of collaboration between citizens, enterprises and 
local governments (Schaffers et al., 2011), as well as open governance models in 
terms of the roles and responsibilities each actor has within the experiment. This 
living lab approach within cities has been employed globally. In Europe for example, 
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the European Network of Living Labs works to benchmark and grow living labs in 
Europe and worldwide, as illustrated in Figure 19 (European Network of Living 
Labs, 2016).  
 
Figure 19. World Map of the European Network of Living Labs 
 
Source: European Network of Living Labs, 2016.  
 
In the case of Dubuque, SSD project implementers (IBM Research staff, local tech 
providers, utility companies and local government staff) consider involved private 
sector actors and city residents as subjects and drivers of innovation. For example, in 
the Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot Studies, the local government and IBM staff 
worked with city residents in the pilot studies to gather feedback on portal 
understanding, effectiveness and impact, which in turn informed portal and project 
design (Erickson et al., 2012). At the same time, these residents were the objects of 
the experiments, for changing their behavior was key to the ‘success’ of these 
projects. While these two projects enabled the local government to test its approach 
to sustainability, they also allowed IBM to test smart city solutions under real city 
circumstances. This living lab model creates opportunities for IBM to explore the 
market potential of the solutions that they are testing, and ideally, develop more 
work to pursue within the city. In a Smarter Cities promotional video by IBM Social 
Media on YouTube, IBM Research Vice President Robert Morris described IBM’s 
interest in Dubuque: “Dubuque was the kind of laboratory, a living lab, with which 
we could experiment with our future, the future of our business, which is about the 
Smarter Planet” (Morris in IBM, 2009b). Hence, the city becomes a corporate 
laboratory, and in the view of IBM, for the gain of its future business—not 
necessarily the gain of the local government, nor the city residents.  
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Similar to more entrepreneurial projects, endeavors that employ the living lab 
approach are more speculative, have less accountability, and the risks fall primarily 
upon the local government, not the private sector (Agranoff, 2003). The private 
sector can attempt to make a city smart and fail, moving on to the next city to try 
again. On the other hand, the public sector, if part of a failed smart initiative, faces 
political consequences such as losing elections and / or harming the public’s trust in 
the local government (Grossman, 2011). Yet, at the same time, living lab projects 
provide local governments with the space to fail. In general, there is no room for 
failure within government endeavors. Given that government projects and programs 
are funded by taxpayers’ dollars, political leaders often feel that they have no room 
to experiment or test new and innovative types of projects. The living lab 
nomenclature however, implies that the project is experimental, and most likely 
implemented on a smaller scale, thereby attempting to lower expectations associated 
with outcomes (Schaffers et al., 2011).  
 
In Dubuque, this living lab nomenclature associated with SSD projects automatically 
provided the local government with a disclaimer that these projects were speculative 
and may not achieve desired results. And, SSD projects were clearly run as tests—
they were small, typically ranging from 300-1000 volunteers for each project, while 
usually lasting only a few months (Erickson et al., 2012). They were also very 
narrow in scope and focused on a specific application of technology. This small scale 
enabled the government, and IBM, to experiment with new types of projects with 
less concern for failure. For example, several of the Smarter Travel Pilot projects did 
not work. Yet, follow-on projects were able to continue and other smart projects 
emerged. There were no dire consequences from these failed efforts, other than a few 
unhappy city residents with dead cell phone batteries (Kohlmann, 2014). This small 
scale also minimized risk for IBM. It could quickly test what did and did not work 
within SSD. This type of rapid iteration is reflective of the second approach pushed 
through SSD by IBM—an implicit promotion of the agile method that historically 
has been used by developers to create software (IBM, 2015b).  
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Agile Method 
 
In Chapter 4, I highlighted the various visions that IT providers have for new forms 
of urban governance, which unsurprisingly hinge upon data and analytics, where 
local governments: (a) are consumer-centric, flexible, responsive and adaptable in 
real time, mimicking the managerial style of internet businesses like Amazon 
(Buschner et al., 2010); (b) use smart technologies to optimize for resource and 
process efficiency (Kanter and Litow, 2009); and (c) function as a platform, or 
Government 2.0, to enable competition over the goods and services provided to 
citizens (O’Reilly, 2010). Behind each of these IT provider visions (which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive), is a way of managing, coined “agile”, that aligns 
with the way that IT and tech providers develop and build technology products. In an 
internal document used to train IBMers on this method, agile is described as “a new 
way of working. It was originally created to improve software development by 
shifting its focus to end-user requirements using rapid iterative development and 
prototyping” (IBM, 2015b, p. 1). IBM has adapted this way of working so that it 
applies “across all industries and business”, and therefore is easily integrated into the 
way that IBM designs and implements projects (IBM, 2015b, p. 1). According to 
IBM in this training document, the need for becoming agile is clear:  
 
The convergence of data, cloud and engagement has enabled our clients and 
their customers to demand responsiveness and speed in every interaction, 
and to expect regular improvement to their experience. To stay 
competitive—to deliver greater client value with speed, simplicity and 
continuous improvement—IBM needs to be agile. (IBM, 2015b, p. 1) 
 
Thus in order to be client-centric, quickly respond and adapt continuously, 
organizations must become agile. A key idea behind agile thinking is to test and 
iterate quickly, and when failure is encountered, fail quickly, learn and move on 
(IBM, 2015b). Yet, what is glaringly clear is that while this form of management 
may work well for software development, where there are clear path contingencies 
and an almost linear progression, that does not mean that this approach will be 
effective or appropriate for cities; or for that matter, projects outside of IT. 
Application of this methodology to fields outside of its original intent reflects a 
naiveté about city systems and their complexity, as well as how cities and local 
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governments function. Just as IBM narratives have over simplified the city (McNeill, 
2014), so too does this approach applied to smart projects design and 
implementation.  
 
Figure 20. Waterfall versus agile method 
 
Source: IBM, 2015b.  
 
Figure 20 helps shed light on the agile method by providing a comparison between 
traditional or “waterfall” methods of software development, which leave testing and 
user engagement until the end of the process, with agile, which includes these during 
development (IBM, 2015b). Many of the narratives around smart projects and IT 
provider visions of urban governance employ the same notions as stressed with the 
agile way of working: rapid iteration and response to clients / city residents, 
collaboration throughout the design and implementation process, and continually 
improving and iterating based on feedback loops to help enable a better client / city 
resident experience (Erickson et al., 2012). For example, on its webpage “How is 
Dubuque Getting Smarter?”, the local government described SSD as follows:  
 
In its quest to become a more sustainable city, Dubuque is exploring and 
using new ‘smarter’ technologies and strategies to deliver or better utilize 
vital services such as water, energy, and transportation to its citizens while 
reducing the community’s impact on the environment. These new 
technologies digitize and connect city systems, sense, analyze and integrate 
data, and allow Dubuque to respond intelligently to the needs of citizens. 
(The City of Dubuque, 2011g)  
 
While SSD is comprised of a range of projects, IBM and the local government’s 
vision is that the end result will be an overarching dashboard that the local 
government can access to enable a bird’s eye view of the city’s operations. 
Purportedly, this dashboard will enable faster and better targeted response. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, this type of approach to smart projects, where the city is 
perceived as “visualized facts”, shapes how managers and citizens understand and 
engage with cities (Kitchin, 2015, p. 6). It is assumed that the city can be known and 
controlled through data and analytics, thereby leading to improved performance of 
city services and increased participation (Kitchin, 2014b, p. 2). 
 
While the smart projects in Dubuque to date have functioned at the household or 
individual level, the desired effect on sustainability is at the aggregate. The local 
government’s overall vision is to develop a web-portal that enables relevant city 
departments and resident households to see various resource consumption across the 
city, and to have this combined data with historical data on utility consumption, 
vehicle-miles traveled, weather patterns and demographics—all with the aim of 
enabling the better management of these resources (Lyons, 2010b; Naphade, 2010; 
Steinhauser, 2010a). With each endeavor, the local government works with IBM and 
other local partners to design, implement, monitor and evaluate these pilots, enabling 
them to revise and redesign as necessary as they are implemented. This, in theory, 
enables the local government to be more agile, to change the way that services are 
being provided as problems or issues emerge, thus enhancing residents’ experiences 
of the city. And, as more and more SSD projects are implemented, the local 
government hopes to be able to increasingly glean insight from the resulting data to 
help inform urban planning and policy formation. Through this narrow aperture, 
smart city projects are viewed as a means to help monitor, measure and manage city 
flows and processes, within both citizens and city leaders benefiting from the data 
created (Kitchin, 2014b). And, as portrayed by IT providers, feedback through the 
types of envisioned dashboards can enable the iterative process for continual 
enhancement and improvement.  
 
Enable and Nudge 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the task of government is perceived to be shifting—no 
longer is it primarily focused on traditional planning, but rather it is increasingly 
becoming more involved in supporting citizens so that they can take on 
responsibility for social problems in their communities and formulate the appropriate 
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solutions to address them (Ilcan and Basok, 2004, p. 132). In this vein, the design of 
the SSD projects reflects this perspective, for the SSD umbrella program was 
informed by the local government’s belief that the key to long-term sustainability is 
to give city residents the information that they need to make informed decisions 
about how they consume resources like electricity and water (The City of Dubuque, 
2009e, 2010a; Sustainable Dubuque, 2010b): “The overarching idea is that if you 
give citizens tools to find the inefficiencies in their lives, they’ll tighten the screws 
themselves” (Dillow, 2011).  
 
In this context, city residents become critical actors in smart projects, with the local 
government viewing them as citizen consumers who are active agents in helping to 
address sustainability. In SSD endeavors, responsibility for sustainability outcomes 
has been passed on to city residents, who are expected to provide their data and 
time—and ideally change their behavior. As part of this responsibilization 
(Livingstone et al., 2007; Rose, 1999, p. 174), where city residents can affect change 
through their consumption patterns, the local government in Dubuque has tested new 
ways to engage and relate to citizens to facilitate and further these processes through 
the SSD projects. Both the Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot Studies serve as 
examples of where the local government and IBM designed the portal to not only 
enable behavior change, but also guide decision making about behavior; in other 
words, to game the system to get their desired results.  
 
Both the Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot Study portals used techniques such as 
charts, alerts, social comparisons, weekly contests, incentives and a chat function 
(Erickson et al., 2012) to attempt to nudge household behavior in desired directions 
(Ariely, 2010; Cialdini, 2008; Thaler et al., 2010). The Smarter Electricity Pilot 
Study portal shown in Figure 21 illustrates some of these techniques, such as 
comparing households with each other (rank), using visualizations to denote spikes, 
and gaming to inspire reduced usage and bigger conservation decisions such as 
buying a new appliance (green points). Thus, while providing citizens the tools to 
help ‘address’ sustainability issues while making better choices about resource 
consumption, the local government was attempting to guide this process.  
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Figure 21. Smarter Electricity Pilot Study portal 
 
Source: Naphade, 2012.  
 
Yet the notion of guiding behavior change is not unique to portal-type projects. 
Inherent within the scope of many smart projects is the implicit goal of behavior 
change on the part of the system user. This type of implicit social control and 
potential surveillance within portal projects reinforces the notion that smart projects 
can be seen as an extension of neoliberal policy experiments taking place at the local 
level (Peck and Tickell, 2002), with the local government monitoring and attempting 
to guide citizen behavior in specific directions. Whether it be less driving (e.g., 
congestion charge), using more public transportation (e.g., integrated fare 
management) or reducing resource consumption (e.g., smart water or electricity 
meters and accompanying portals), smart efforts are frequently designed in ways to 
nudge citizen consumers to make certain decisions about the smart system and how 
they interact with it (Barr et al., 2011; Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, 2007; Thaler et al., 2010; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). As described by 
former IBM CEO Sam Palmisano in a speech at the GridWise Global Forum 2010: 
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Yes, the progress of technology is accelerating. Yes, the consciousness of 
key professions and institutions has been raised. But the crucial change—
the one that will have a truly transformative impact—is activating the 
consumer. And doing that isn't a matter of dashboards, or advertising, or 
advocacy. It means designing a system that is optimized for them. 
(Palmisano, 2010c)  
 
Often, this goes hand in hand with narratives touting the importance of citizen 
engagement. As noted by Mayor Buol in an interview with IBM for the Smarter 
Planet Leadership Series, “when citizens feel like they’re a part of a solution, they’re 
much more willing to accept the outcomes of whatever it is” (Buol, 2010). In other 
words, Buol believes that citizens need to feel like they are a part of the process in 
developing projects, especially when they will be given increased responsibility or 
costs as a result of their engagement. In some smart projects, city residents can 
decide not to accept the costs or behavior change, such as congestion charging, but 
then they may lose access to that infrastructure or service. From this discussion one 
can deduce that the way that smart projects are designed will inform who is involved, 
how involved actors engage with each other and what expectations involved actors 
have for each other.  
 
6.4 Transforming Engagement 
 
As highlighted above, city leaders invested in various entrepreneurial-type ventures 
to pull the city out of its downward spiral in the 1980s. This included bringing 
together a range of actors from both the public and private sectors to reclaim and 
reinvent the area along the city’s waterfront. Once an epicenter of the city, decades 
of neglect led the riverfront area to be plagued by environmental issues, undervalued 
property, and a mix of heavy industrial uses. In the late 1990s, the Dubuque County 
Historical Society created the America’s River project to redevelop the area. Within 
a few years, this grew from a $25 million America’s River Project into a $188 
million revitalization effort due to collaboration amongst several riverfront projects 
and across various sectors. In the end, 90 acres of underutilized, industrial, 
brownfield property were transformed into a center that highlights the educational, 
recreational, historical and environmental facets of the Mississippi River (BBC News 
2011; Dubuque Main Street 2012; The City of Dubuque 2010a). At the center of 
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each of these revitalization endeavors was a public-private partnership—which has 
since become the city’s dominant model for urban development.  
 
In a similar fashion, in the City of Baltimore, Maryland in 1978, after a highly-
contentious referendum narrowly passed to enable city land to be used for private 
development, the local government, through a PPP effort, turned neglected land into 
the Baltimore Harborplace. Due to the perceived success of the development, there 
arose a consensus around the use of public-private partnerships in almost all urban 
governance matters (see Berkowitz, 1984; Lyall, 1982; Stoker, 1986 in Harvey, 
1989a). And this has been no different for Dubuque. Public-private partnerships have 
been used to implement sustainability and smart projects, leading to, among others, 
an increased private sector role to facilitate government function and services, a pro-
business bias, and a blurring of the line between these actors (see Agranoff, 2003). I 
explore stated reasons for partnering around smart projects below, and then discuss 
how these partnership arrangements seem to be affecting roles and expectations 
between involved actors.  
 
6.4.1 Legitimacy, Risk Aversion and Expertise 
 
In a series of interviews with IBM for the Smarter Planet Leadership Series, 
Dubuque city leaders repeatedly stated that PPPs are “the way of doing business” in 
the city, most notably around large, complex (and speculative) urban development 
and renewal efforts (Burbach, 2010b; Dickinson, 2010; N. Van Milligen, 2010). This 
viewpoint was well summarized in these IBM interviews by the head of the city’s 
Chamber of Commerce, Molly Grover: “You can look out any window in Dubuque 
to see the evidence of public and private partnerships” (Grover, 2010). In the case of 
implementing SSD endeavors, the roles and responsibilities of actors involved in the 
associated PPPs have been dispersed. The provision of resources have varied across 
each smart project, but in general IBM and other local tech providers have provided 
the means by which to enable data gathering and analysis, the local government has 
provided organizational support for implementation and funding (or sought for 
funding sources), while third party organizations have assisted with the requisite 
community training and awareness-raising (Lyons, 2010b). According to those who I 
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interviewed from the local government, smart project staff, and other involved 
actors, this dispersion of responsibilities around SSD projects has served several 
purposes, including: enhancing perceptions of legitimacy, helping to defer 
accountability and gaining technical expertise that the local government itself cannot 
provide.  
 
One example of this dispersion of responsibility is the involvement of Dubuque2.0, a 
community engagement arm of the Community Foundation of Greater Dubuque 
(CFGD), a tax-exempt public charity that serves to benefit people in the local area. 
As a partnership between CFGD and the Dubuque Area Chamber of Commerce, 
Dubuque2.0 was funded by businesses, utility companies, local nonprofits, and state 
and national foundations—including, among others, Alliant Energy, Mystique 
Casino, the Dubuque Racing Association, the Knight Foundation Community 
Information Challenge, the Telegraph Herald (the local paper), and the Iowa Office 
of Energy Independence (FSG and Network Impact, 2013, p. 6). Created in late 
2009, Dubuque2.0 had the primary aims of (a) raising awareness of the 
sustainability, and later smarter sustainability, agendas by engaging businesses, 
schools, neighborhoods, and nonprofits; and (b) helping to guide community-wide 
behavior change toward SD and SSD ends (Dubuque2.0, 2010a).  
 
As smart efforts developed, this scope expanded to include: (a) hosting community 
cafés and trainings for the smart pilots that would help encourage participation and 
ensure participants understood the online electricity and water portals; and (b) 
encouraging reductions in resource consumption by offering weekly prizes and 
conservation tips through the portal, its website and blogs (Dubuque2.0, 2010b, 
2010c). Though Dubuque2.0 funding ran out at the end of 2012, it served several key 
functions for SD and SSD endeavors. Nancy Van Milligen, President and CEO of the 
Community Foundation of Greater Dubuque, explained how she saw the benefits of 
this government-third party relationship in an interview with IBM for the Smarter 
Planet Leadership Series: 
 
I think the advantages of having a third party build this initiative or build 
this vision for the future is—number one, you bring in citizen trust... we 
have no agenda except engaging the community around this sustainability 
initiative. Compared to the utility companies or the government, they have 
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built in agendas. So by having that third party you immediately, if done 
well, can build in citizen trust. You also share the workload. There are some 
activities that a non-profit for instance can do that government or the utility 
companies couldn’t. They couldn’t be using tax dollars or their 
shareholders’ dollars to maybe have a game on the internet or do some of 
the other things, the guerilla marketing, that we can engage in that is maybe 
a little bit more cutting edge or risky that taxpayers might not appreciate. 
(N. Van Milligen, 2010)  
 
Thus, according to Van Milligen, because Dubuque2.0 was a third party actor, it was 
perceived by citizens as being an objective actor, adding legitimacy to the projects—
despite the fact that the organization was created with the primary aim of helping 
promote the local government’s SD and SSD endeavors. In her mind, since 
Dubuque2.0 was an ‘outside’ actor, its interests could be perceived as separate from 
its supporting organizations, i.e., the local government, utility companies and other 
involved local private sectors actors. Implicit within this quote is the assumption that 
a third party organization can better represent and / or capture the interests of 
citizens, thereby gaining their trust, more so that the local government. Additionally, 
Van Milligen believed that the local government could assign certain activities to 
Dubuque2.0 that perhaps the local government could not do itself. For in part, the 
formation of this third party organization created a loophole for the local government 
where it could engage in more risky tasks—such as guerilla marketing for SD and 
SSD—through third party channels so as to absolve the government of blame if these 
risks did not pay off. It also reduced government accountability because 
Dubuque2.0’s efforts were not funded by local taxpayer dollars.  
 
In literature research and several other interviews with representatives from 
Dubuque2.0, the local government and the business community, I found similar 
sentiments. In general, by collaborating with Dubuque2.0, it was portrayed that the 
government was able to: (a) provide an air of independence or objectivity to the 
sustainability and smart efforts so that they are not perceived as entirely government 
projects (Dregne, 2010a); (b) complete activities for which the local government 
might be criticized (e.g. marketing of smart projects) by getting funding and 
implementing through third party channels (Dregne, 2010a; Steinhauser, 2010a); (c) 
share the workload of complex smart projects across various sectors (Dregne, 
2010a); (d) add a sense of legitimacy to a project due to the broad spectrum of the 
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various groups involved (Dregne, 2010a; Steinhauser, 2010a); and (e) further spread 
narratives through the city residents involved in Dubuque2.0 activities, with the 
residents becoming agents of public relations through their involvement (Dregne, 
2010a; Steinhauser, 2010a).  
 
Additionally, by running communications through Dubuque2.0, the local 
government was able to begin to frame sustainability and smart agendas beyond 
technology and politics, thereby limiting viewpoints that deem these agendas as 
representations of government or corporate interests. In interviews with pilot 
participants, they often were not aware of IBM’s or the utility companies’ 
involvement in these projects—though, they did recognize that the local government 
was affiliated, often resulting in improved perceptions of city leaders (Erickson et al., 
2012; Naphade, 2011, 2012a). This outsourcing of public functions like messaging 
and public engagement to an extent masked the local government’s involvement. If 
SSD failed, there were many other organizations involved that could be blamed or 
associated with its failure. If it succeeded, the government could still claim its 
involvement in the project. This also meant that the government was no longer 
controlling these functions—that messaging and the way that citizens were being 
engaged around a ‘government’ project were now being decided upon by a third 
party actor. While the government did have influence in the overall direction of 
Dubuque2.0, day-to-day operations were still independent.  
 
The local government also partnered to gain technical knowledge within SSD 
projects due to the complexity involved with these endeavors and the small size of 
the local government staff. For instance, in addition to IBM and the City of 
Dubuque’s local government working together on SSD, partners who assisted with 
technical aspects of the Smarter Water Pilot Study included: (a) the Neptune 
Technology Group, which produced R900 and R450 Smart meters; (b) ESRI 
ArcGIS, which provided geospatial services and maps for viewing the aggregate data 
for the City; (c) Verity Three, which post-processed smart meter data received hourly 
from wireless gateway; and (d) Northern Water Works Supply, which installed the 
meters for the City of Dubuque (Naphade, 2011). Similarly, there was a range of 
partners for the Smarter Electricity Pilot Study. In addition to the local government 
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and IBM, the project received technical support from: (a) The Interstate Power and 
Light Company and the Alliant Energy Company, the two utility companies that 
provided the smart electricity meters and relevant data; and (b) Verity Three, which, 
through a wireless gateway, post-processed smart meter data and sent it to the IBM 
cloud (Naphade, 2012).  
 
What becomes clear when reviewing these lists of partners is that they bring services 
and resources to the table that the local government could not provide on its own—
whereas in much larger cities, this dearth of in-house technical expertise may not be 
the same. In this case, and most likely in similar cases with smaller to medium-sized 
cities, the complexity of smart projects may necessitate the involvement of experts 
from the private sector for design and implementation, especially in the areas of IT, 
infrastructure, architecture and engineering. Further, as noted in my interview with 
Dubuque’s Information Services Manager, these private sector actors will most 
likely be needed for training, maintenance and operations as SSD moves forward. 
For local governments that increasingly pursue smart projects, and that need to bring 
in external IT provider expertise, more and more government tasks will become 
privatized in this regard. In Dubuque, this move to increasingly bring in the private 
sector for city services delivery was not seen as negative by the local government 
since more than half of the local government staff that I interviewed perceived their 
interests squarely in line with those of IBM. However, this type of perceived 
alignment may be unique—for corporate actor and local government interests 
frequently conflict (Monbiot, 2000, pp. 5-17), and even within organizations there 
can be a lack of alignment around interests.  
 
6.4.2 Expected Relationship Gains 
 
According to narratives created by smart project supporters, both IBM and the local 
government will gain from the Smarter Sustainable Dubuque endeavor (IBM, 2009d, 
2010a, 2010c, 2011c; The City of Dubuque 2009e, 2010b, 2010e). Expected benefits 
to the city include job creation resulting from the opening of IBM’s Global Delivery 
Facility, new talent lured to the city by the technologies and sustainability focus, new 
businesses attracted by IBM’s presence (i.e., due to a boost city brand), and 
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increased efficiency in service delivery from the data and insight gained—each of 
which are potential contributors to economic gain and development (IBM, 2009d, 
2010a, 2010c, 2011c; The City of Dubuque 2009e, 2010b, 2010e). Expected benefits 
to IBM include being able to test smarter city solutions in an actual city environment 
and a resulting enhanced understanding of urban environments and the smarter cities 
space—both of which IBM staff hope will enable the company to expand further and 
dominate the Smarter Cities market (IBM, 2009d, 2010c). Both actors have hoped 
that this initiative would lead to a sustainability model enabled by smart technologies 
that they could scale and replicate around the world in communities of 200,000 and 
under (IBM, 2009b, 2011c; PR Newswire, 2011a). In actuality, to date, the benefits 
of SSD have not aligned with what was expected for either partner.  
 
When discussing urban development in Dubuque, local officials and government 
materials portray IBM as an actor integral to the city’s continued economic growth, 
in part justified by the perceived similarities between the organizations’ goals. As 
described by the Mayor in an IBM Social Media video on YouTube: “It was almost 
like a natural marriage of the two to come up with this Smarter Sustainable Dubuque 
research project…” (Buol in IBM, 2009b). Here Buol is referring to both the local 
government and IBM’s interests in applying smart technologies to sustainability to 
see how the resulting solutions can be used to improve city operations, functioning 
and competitiveness.  
 
IBM narratives also stress the import of SD and SSD to the city’s economic future. 
In same IBM video, “Dubuque—Smarter City”, the narrator notes that the local 
government made sustainability a priority in 2006, realizing that, for the city, “it was 
crucial to being economically competitive” (IBM, 2009b). The narrator goes on to 
state that the addition of smart technologies toward the city’s sustainability ends 
provides Dubuque with an additional competitive edge that can contribute to, among 
other things, economic gain (IBM, 2009b). There have been many other stories 
generated by IBM telling this story of partnership and how the city will benefit from 
it—in press releases (IBM, 2010c, 2011c, 2011e), videos on YouTube (IBM, 2009b, 
2011d, 2012a), documented case studies (IBM, 2010a, 2012b), Smarter Cities events 
and webcasts (Forward & Onward, 2009; IBM, 2010d, 2012c), project evaluations 
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(Erickson et al., 2012; Naphade, 2011, 2012a), and numerous PowerPoint 
presentations created by employees around the world describing this work (Harrison, 
2010; Naphade, 2010). Each reiterates this theme that through this partnership, and 
the SSD endeavors, the city will experience economic growth, draw in new business 
and talent, and become more competitive, among others. 
 
In this fashion, IBM is, to an extent, portrayed as the city’s new John Deere, where 
the tech provider is seen as an influential part of economic development in the city—
somehow despite the fact that IBM employs a mere fraction of the number of 
Dubuquers that John Deere employed. In narratives about SSD, IBM’s presence in 
and partnership with the city are often portrayed as key to the city’s future. As noted 
by the President and CEO of the Dubuque Area Chamber of Commerce Molly 
Grover in an IBM video created for the Smarter Planet Leadership Series: “Having 
IBM here as a partner in the city and working with us to solve some of the issues and 
some of the priorities that we… work on in our community are imperative to our 
growth and continued success as a city and as a community” (Grover in IBM, 
2012a). This sentiment is echoed by the SSD Project Manager David Lyons in an 
IBM client reference video on YouTube: 
 
For a community like Dubuque, this type of partnership is critical. The 
beauty of using cloud computing in [Smarter] Sustainable Dubuque is to 
give us access to the world’s finest technology and the world’s finest 
technicians without having to make the upfront investment as a community. 
IBM is a wonderful partner for Dubuque in this [Smarter] Sustainable 
Dubuque project because there is an organization alignment on 
sustainability and the ability to use data more smartly in the future. (Lyons 
in IBM, 2011d) 
 
Here, Lyons reinforces the notion that perhaps IBM is the city’s new John Deere by 
deeming the partnership as critical to the city and its future. Building on the 
momentum initiated by the arrival of IBM, according to local government leaders in 
interviews conducted with IBM for the Smarter Planet Leadership Series, the local 
private sector has seen a rise in emphasis on green and green technology (Burbach, 
2010b; Lyons, 2010a). A few local businesses have adapted their operations, services 
and / or products to fall in line with this sustainability focus, while a few new small 
business ventures around green have also been launched (Burbach, 2010b; Lyons, 
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2010a). In fact, it was one of these new, small green venture companies that ended 
up taking over for IBM when the pilot portal projects were expanded, as IBM was 
not awarded the continuation contract for data collection and analysis. The 
emergence of these types of small venture companies, to some extent, is facilitated 
by the innovative and creative partnerships that are formed around smart projects. 
For the learning, knowledge transfer and capacity building associated with smart city 
projects enables innovative and creative exchange that otherwise may not have taken 
place (Deakin and Al Waer, 2012, p. 8). Other examples of this type of urban 
regeneration programs linked to the smart city can be found in Edinburgh, Helsinki, 
Glasgow and Dublin (Deakin et al., 2005 in Deakin and Al Waer, 2012, p. 14).  
 
6.4.3 Actual Relationship Outcomes 
 
Yet not all actors view IBM’s presence in Dubuque as a boon to the city. Criticism 
has emerged within local and national media, as well as within IBM employee 
forums. One recurring theme in this pushback critiques the amount of incentives 
IBM received from state and local government actors, estimated to be in the tens of 
millions, to minimize IBM’s cost for establishing an office in the city (Cringely, 
2012; Telegraph Herald, 2014). This included a grant to refurbish the downtown 
Roshek Building for its office (Mozinski, 2009c). These types of tax incentives / 
abatements are linked to neoliberal strategies to “lower the costs of state 
administration, capitalist production, and social reproduction within their 
jurisdictions and thereby to accelerate external investment” (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002, p. 373). These incentives were part of the local government’s efforts to make 
the city an attractive business climate for IBM. Critics feel that these incentives 
overcompensated for what the city gained in the end.  
 
Another frequent criticism lobbied against IBM is around local job creation, or the 
lack thereof. At the onset in 2009, IBM promised that it would deliver 1,300 well-
paying jobs to the city with the opening of the Global Delivery Facility (Telegraph 
Herald, 2014). However, according to some IT analyst articles and IBM employee 
forums, most jobs are low wage positions offered to recent college grads and / or 
‘trainees’ from India who stay in Dubuque for an unspecified amount of time and 
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then are sent home (Alliance@IBM, 2015; Cringely, 2012). It is unclear how many 
permanent hires have been awarded to local Dubuquers, nor how many IBMers 
spend less than a year working at this site (Cringely, 2012). Countering this 
criticism, by some narrative accounts, IBM’s presence has quadrupled employment 
in the city’s historic downtown core (Greenblatt, 2014). In my interviews with a 
senior executive with the GDDC and a senior city leader, they stated that IBM has 
created about 1,300 jobs in the city, while job growth purportedly associated with 
IBM’s presence has been estimated to be about 2,400 jobs—though each would 
hardly state otherwise due to their respective roles. Similarly, the local paper, The 
Telegraph Herald, ran an Op-ed from its Editorial Board that contradicted some 
perspectives of the foreign workforce in the IBM office—instead of portraying them 
as outsiders taking local jobs and then leaving with knowledge gained, their article 
noted that this practice has “expanded the community’s cultural diversity”, and 
though “there have been a few bumps along the way”, local inclusiveness programs 
have been launched to address these issues (Telegraph Herald, 2014). It should be 
noted however that The Telegraph Herald provided funds to Dubuque2.0, so it 
cannot necessarily be seen as an objective source. Through my research I was unable 
to ascertain exactly how many jobs were created directly or indirectly due to the 
opening of the GDF and IBM’s presence in the city.  
 
Just as local government gains fell short of what was expected, so did those for IBM. 
With the launch of SSD, IBM hoped that this endeavor would enable the firm to 
learn more about the smart city market and the applicability and viability of its 
Smarter Cities solutions, with the end goal of commodifying end results. While it 
was able to test various smart city solutions and learn during implementation, none 
of these to date have resulted in being commoditized into a replicable solution, 
though IBM has employed some of these solutions in other one-off projects. In 
addition, based on my inquiries to relevant IBM staff, it seems that the smart 
technologies and sustainability model shared with communities in Australia and 
Turkey did not get replicated elsewhere. However, that is not to say that the 
knowledge gained from this effort was not beneficial for it has been transferred to 
other projects and solutions through the work of involved IBM staff.  
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Despite these shortcomings, IBM did gain by being able to use Dubuque as a client 
reference. By adding the Dubuque case study to its arsenal of Smarter Cities stories, 
IBM aims to make its story about smart technologies and the potential they offer 
more compelling. For example, in “City of Dubuque: IBM Smarter Planet Client 
Success Video”, several city leaders, like Mayor Buol and SSD Project Manager 
David Lyons, are interviewed to share their perspectives on IBM’s Smarter Cities 
(IBM, 2011d). Both Buol and Lyons extol the value of the work and having IBM as 
a partner, thus helping to create useful client references for IBM to use to secure 
other Smarter Cities wins. This is unsurprising given the perceived need for and 
benefit of IBM’s presence within the city, and its role within the SSD endeavor. 
Other IBM smart city clients have declined to serve as references where the projects 
have not gone well, or where they have not felt the need to openly support or praise 
the work of this tech firm.  
 
It is interesting to note that when describing the Smarter Sustainable Dubuque 
initiative, both the local government and IBM portray the partnership as being 
equally mutually beneficial despite the fact that IBM is an organization over seven 
times the size of Dubuque in terms of people. Yet, the power of tech giants in these 
types of relationships is sometimes overestimated, especially by companies and their 
public relations machines. As noted by McNeil, “how global firms provide smart city 
policy and technology will be an incredibly challenging field, both logistically and 
competitively” (McNeil, 2014, p. 3). Internal knowledge management, in terms of 
best practices and lessons learned, the nature of the urban problem, and development 
of scalable, replicable and profitable models that work in various environments are 
amongst some of the challenges that tech giants will face while working within the 
smart city market, thereby weakening their positioning.  
 
In the case of Dubuque, while IBM does carry a lot of clout given its size, the local 
government has also demonstrated its power within this relationship, primarily by 
expanding SSD pilot projects with local technology firms as partners instead of 
continuing contracts with IBM. Chris Kohlmann, Information Services Manager for 
Dubuque, explained IBM’s Achilles Heel in this relationship: “A challenge for IBM 
is making these tools affordable when they go to market with cities of our size” 
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(Kohlmann in Greenblatt, 2014, p. 4). Large corporations like IBM, due to their size, 
frequently need to charge higher rates for various services and solutions than smaller, 
more nimble tech provider counterparts. This has given IBM a distinct disadvantage 
once they have established working smart city systems within urban environments. 
While in some cases smaller, local companies may not have the manpower, scope 
and / or expertise to fully integrate smart technologies across or within city systems, 
once these systems are established, they may very well have the capacity to take over 
managing and operating them. And, this is exactly what happened in Dubuque for 
both the Smarter Water Pilot Study as the experiment was expanded (Kohlmann, 
2014).  
 
As this discussion demonstrates, while both actors did experience gains from the 
SSD endeavors, benefits fell short of what was anticipated for each actor. In general 
I found that for both IBM and the local government the most prominent gain was a 
boost in brand. I explore this further in section 7.2.  
 
6.4.4 Rising Expectations  
 
In Chapter 4 I discussed how governments are progressively focusing on how to 
enable and assist citizens in tackling community problems (Ilcan and Basok, 2004). 
Along with this has come a change in the interrelations between politics, civic 
organizations and the economy, dissolving the distinction between citizen and 
consumer—making citizenship tied to a consumer’s right to participate in the 
marketplace, where through choices around consumption, citizens can affect positive 
social change (Beck, 2005, p. 170; Glickman, 1999, pp. 1-16; McGovern, 1998). 
Citizen participation in civic affairs is increasingly shifting towards contributions 
through purchasing power as consumers (Needham, 2003; Livingstone et al., 2007). 
This is most commonly seen in government campaigns and programs related to 
sustainability where there is an emphasis on changing individual behavior to reach 
sustainability goals (Hinchcliffe, 1996). Along with this shift, public engagement 
moves beyond the informed citizen, who keeps aware of pertinent issues, to 
engagement that seeks action on the part of individuals through the act of 
consumption. These shifts are reinforced and accentuated by smart projects, which 
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by design require delegating more and more responsibility to city residents in terms 
of their behavior and financial obligations. Both the Smarter Water and Electricity 
Portal Studies provided good examples of these changes.  
 
The local government in Dubuque has viewed SSD as a way to enable city residents 
to become more involved in the community’s sustainability efforts, most notably in 
terms of how they made choices about resource consumption. In a keynote 
presentation for IBM Connect 2013, a large, global conference held by IBM’s 
Software Group, City Manager Michael Van Milligen outlined this citizen 
responsibility clearly: “(we) are changing the way the city of Dubuque is servicing 
its residents… what we are doing is making our citizens the solution to our local 
challenges” (M. Van Milligen, 2013). In both of the pilot studies that I examined, 
participating Dubuquers became citizen consumers, who, by making choices about 
how they consumed electricity and water, affected progress toward the city’s 
sustainability agenda and goals.  
 
The local government knew that in order for the Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot 
Studies to be ‘successful’, they would also have to get participating households to 
agree to volunteer time, share data, and potentially change their behavior (and, 
eventually pay for the advanced meter through water rate increases). Part of the 
strategy to spur participants to action included purposive portal design that employed 
behavioral economic techniques to nudge participating households in certain 
directions, as discussed in section 6.3. In addition, the local government also 
engaged citizens to help instill feelings of ownership and responsibility. For 
example, the Community Sustainability Task Force assigned to define sustainability 
was established with broad representation, including representatives from businesses, 
schools, hospitals and environmental groups, as well as city residents. The Task 
Force reached out to individuals and groups within Dubuque by handing out surveys, 
posting information to the web, sending press releases to local newspapers, and 
fanning out into neighborhoods to get input from offices, schools, libraries and 
coffee shops. This was done not only to deepen the feelings of community 
engagement (whether significant or not), but also to aid in increasing a sense of 
ownership in SD (and later SSD) and to raise awareness of these endeavors by word 
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of mouth. The third component of local government strategy to aid in this shift—in 
addition to portal design and citizen engagement—included the use of compelling 
narratives to encourage participation and change, a factor that I explore in depth in 
Chapter 7.  
 
Conclusions 
  
The Dubuque case study provided an interesting example of how, through 
interactions with IBM around smart initiatives, the local government became 
increasingly exposed to and accepting of IBM’s business perspectives, frameworks 
and practices, and how this in turn informed strategy and engagement arrangements. 
From IBM’s perspective, Dubuque provided an ‘ideal’ testing ground given the local 
government’s embracing of smart technologies, which was encapsulated in the local 
government’s partnership with IBM to make the city a living lab for smart city 
solution experimentation (IBM, 2009b, 2011c).  
 
Several assumptions of smart (Hollands, 2008) were already present within the local 
government’s strategies and practices before the creation of SSD, such as an 
emphasis on city competitiveness, economic growth, efficiency, citizen engagement 
and private sector approaches and models (The City of Dubuque, 2015b). Therefore, 
the establishment of SSD did not represent a huge departure from existing local 
government thinking (The City of Dubuque, 2009e). However, there have been 
changes that reflect influence from IBM, including: (a) integrating the use of smart 
technologies into the city’s sustainability strategy, encapsulated in the creation of 
SSD; and (The City of Dubuque, 2009e), (b) the consequent elevated role of the 
city’s Information Services Manager and her office in other non-SSD endeavors 
where data and analytics are seen to be critical elements (Kohlmann, 2014). Together 
these two changes demonstrate how the local government has prioritized “market-led 
and technological solutions to city governance and development” and data capture 
and analysis to inform decision making (Kitchin, 2014b, p. 2). 
 
A review of SSD projects in Dubuque also shed light on the transference of private 
sector practices and frameworks to the public sector. In my analysis, I focused on 
three prevalent private sector approaches employed by IBM that I observed: the 
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living lab, agile method and behavioral economics. Given that SSD projects were 
more speculative in nature since they involved testing new solutions and offerings, 
IBM and the local government deemed Dubuque a living lab, thereby creating space 
for innovation and failure within the local government (Schaffers et al., 2011). As 
smart city solutions were tested, the agile method was employed throughout design 
and implementation to allow for flexible, iterative and collaborative project 
development with the local government and city residents (IBM, 2015b). And, 
behavioral economics techniques, typical to consumer industries, were applied to 
nudge city resident behavior in certain directions that the local government and IBM 
deemed favorable (Erickson et al., 2012; Naphade, 2011). Each of these examples 
underscore policy mobility / transfer of private sector practices to the public sector 
(Wiig, 2015) through SSD projects. 
 
In conjunction with these shifts related to strategy and approaches to achieve it, SSD 
projects have been designed, implemented and managed through PPPs, helping to 
elevate the private sector’s role and perspectives (Hearne, 2009, p. 7). In the case of 
the PPPs formed around SSD projects, IBM was able to insert its technologies and 
viewpoints into urban conversation in Dubuque. Further, through the design of the 
Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot Studies, IBM introduced itself and its 
technologies into the relationships between local government and participating 
households. Portal user interfaces were designed by IBM, and while modified by 
feedback from the local government and participants, this still meant that IBM 
shaped the nature of this local government-city resident interaction (Erickson et al., 
2012; Naphade, 2011, 2012). The portal also enabled the local government to 
indirectly pass responsibility, and increased expectations, on to city residents—for 
their decisions about resource consumption either contributed to or worked against 
the city’s sustainability objectives (Dillow, 2011).  
 
What can be seen in this case study in terms of IBM’s interactions with urban 
governance through smart projects, is that IBM was able to influence project strategy 
and engagement arrangements, and through this interaction as the number of smart 
projects grew, changes within broader city strategy and engagement began to 
emerge. These changes reflect and accentuate a neoliberal ethos (Peck and Tickell, 
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2002) and the entrepreneurial management styles that are highlighted in the 
assumptions commonly associated with smart projects (Hollands, 2008). Even the 
aspirations for SSD reflected an entrepreneurial mindset—for both IBM and the local 
government hoped to scale and replicate this smart sustainability model in 
communities of 200,000 and under around the world (IBM, 2009b, 2011c; PR 
Newswire, 2011a). I continue to explore this case study by looking at IBM 
interactions around representation of smart projects in Dubuque below.  
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7 Dubuque: Reimagining Urban Governance through Smart  
  
In Dubuque, narratives about smart initiatives have been woven into sustainability 
discourse with the creation of Smarter Sustainable Dubuque. The resulting tapestry 
has made Dubuque’s story a compelling one, appealing to various audiences such as 
city residents, local governments within the United States and around the world, the 
U.S. Federal government, IBM and the media. This is evidenced by the number of 
city residents who requested to be volunteers for the Smarter Pilot Studies, which 
surpassed the number of needed households (Naphade, 2011; The City of Dubuque, 
2010b, 2010c); the numerous invitations that local government leaders get to speak 
around the world on sustainability, branding and / or smart projects (ICMA, 2013; 
The City of Dubuque, 2013a, 2013b); the sizeable amounts of Federal funding the 
city has received for sustainability efforts (The City of Dubuque, 2011b); and the 
prominent use of Dubuque as a Smarter Cities reference case study to highlight ‘best 
practices’ of IBM’s Smarter Cities work (IBM, 2011c, 2011d, 2012a, 2012b).  
 
Figure 22. The City of Dubuque 
 
Source: This image is from the City of Dubuque’s website: http://www.cityofdubuque.org/ (accessed 
March 10, 2016). 
 
Further, Dubuque has received both national and international media coverage for its 
smart efforts. Though smart projects in Dubuque are small-scaled and not the most 
advanced in terms of ICT, city leaders have been able to construct a story of SSD 
that has quickly garnered attention from media like the BBC News, PBS, Forbes, The 
New York Times, USA Today, Popular Science, BusinessWeek, Bloomberg and Fast 
Company (Acohido, 2009; BBC News, 2011; Dillow, 2011; Forbes, 2007; Hamm, 
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2009a; Hoffman, 2009; Lindsay, 2010; Lohr, 2009a; PBS Blueprint America, 2010a, 
2010b; PBS Newshour, 2010). And, the enthusiasm shown by those involved in 
smart projects seems to be contagious—when an IBM film crew went to Dubuque to 
film video on the SSD effort, after only two days of recording interviews with some 
of the involved city leaders, a member of film crew stated emphatically: “I’m 
moving to Dubuque!”  
 
Given the allure of the smart city—and its ability to “capture the minds of 
corporations, policymakers and average citizens” (Shelton et al., 2014, p. 9)—it has 
increasingly become an attractive option for local governments seeking to enhance 
their cities’ appeal (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Eager to distance Dubuque from 
its near-death past, the local government turned to the concept of smart in an attempt 
to build and maintain a perceived competitive edge. To this end, city has emphasized 
redevelopment projects, PPPs, boosteristic narratives, place marketing, sustainability 
and smart technologies to repackage city brand—each of which aligns with various 
assumptions of smart. And, the measures seem to have been ‘successful’ given the 
attention the city has garnered. The U.S. city of Baltimore provides a good example 
of a similar type of rebranding, where narrative and place promotion created around 
a waterfront and inner-harbor development project were used to reconstruct the city’s 
brand, resulting in a change so radical that Time Magazine called it the “Renaissance 
City” on its front cover (Harvey, 1989a, p. 14).  
 
In this chapter I examine IBM’s interactions with local government policy and 
planning processes related to representation via the smart projects examined. I look 
at oral and written narratives and brand strategies that the local government and 
involved actors have employed to promote smart projects, and the city itself as these 
efforts have expanded. Within these examples, I explore how IBM—through staff, 
Smarter Cities perspectives, messaging and / or approach—has interacted with the 
way that the local government represents both smart projects and the city. I discuss 
the stories that have emerged around smart projects, how these have been customized 
to the local context to build support and buy-in, and depoliticized to help ensure 
broader appeal. I see these oral and written narratives as examples of how the local 
government is: (a) reproducing the messaging of IBM around smart city projects; (b) 
  
 189 
adopting and / or reinforcing various assumptions of smart; and (c) adopting policies 
from the private sector.  
 
I also explore Dubuque’s brand as created through the local government’s place 
promotion strategies, and these have evolved with the integration of smart. Through 
this analysis, I conclude that an emphasis on boosterism and place promotion around 
smart projects is another factor indicative of how smart projects are manifesting as 
neoliberal policy experiments. I end this chapter with a brief discussion on how this 
reimagining of Dubuque through the lens of smart has opened the door for the 
redesign of urban governance mechanisms to this end. In my research, I found that in 
Dubuque the story of smart has been conveyed not only through smart project 
promotion but also through the way that the local government has represented the 
city. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight how findings and observations from 
Chapters 2 and 4 applied to smart initiatives being pursued in Dubuque, and to 
outline interactions between the IT provider IBM and local government processes 
around representation.  
 
7.1 Stories to Bring Smart to Dubuque 
 
Dubuque’s compelling story of revival draws in intended audiences—as described 
by the city’s Sustainable Community Coordinator in a video interview with IBM:  
 
You know I came back to Dubuque after growing up about an hour from 
here and when I left I left… and said… that is not somewhere I want to live 
long term. That is not where I want to raise my kids. That is not where I see 
opportunities for young people. And a lot of that I think came out of the 
very hard place that they [Dubuquers] were in in the ‘80s. And after being 
here three years, I tell that story of the ‘80s [of Dubuque’s revival] almost 
like it is my own. (Burbach, 2010b)  
  
Narratives around the city’s recovery tend to include a few key themes: collaboration 
across sectors (which exist primarily in the form of PPPs), citizen engagement and 
sustainability, with an emphasis on the latter as the local government’s centerpiece 
for urban growth and development (Buol in IBM, 2012a; Burbach, 2010b; N. Van 
Milligen, 2010; The City of Dubuque, 2009d, 2010b). Together, these three narrative 
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themes have influenced the local government’s strategy, engagement practices and 
approach to representing the city. Within the last few years, the concept of smart has 
been added to this thematic mix. 
 
In this section, 7.1, I discuss excerpts taken from: (a) the fifty-four materials I used 
to inform my narrative review (video and written content); and (b) the thirty-five 
interviews that I conducted with those involved in smart projects in Dubuque.52 
Within these, I focused primarily on the key materials created by those responsible 
for promoting the smart umbrella program in Dubuque (the local government, IBM 
and the third party organization Dubuque2.0) and on interviews with the senior 
government staff and third party actors most closely involved with smart project 
implementation (i.e., the heads of Dubuque2.0, the IBM Research Project Manager, 
the project manager for the smart umbrella program, key representatives from the 
GDDC and the city’s Assistant City Managers, Sustainable Community Coordinator, 
City Manager and Resource Management Coordinator). I equally weighted 
narratives derived from written / video content and interviews that I conducted. I 
then compare these narratives with messaging from IBM’s Smarter Cities campaign, 
the assumptions of smart, and IT provider perspectives and approaches to: (a) 
demonstrate how within Dubuque smart is being recreated around the local context; 
(b) shed light on how those involved in these initiatives are assigning meaning to 
them; and (c) ascertain how IBM may be informing these processes of recreation and 
meaning.  
 
Most of the initial narratives about SSD (and the individual smart projects within this 
effort) were typically created by smart project implementers and supporters, 
including: (a) city leaders, such as the Mayor, City Manager, Assistant City 
Managers, Sustainable Community Coordinator and Resource Management 
Coordinator; (b) Smarter Sustainable Dubuque project staff; (c) involved leaders 
from the business community and civic associations, such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Greater Dubuque Development Corporation, and Dubuque2.0; and 
(d) involved staff from IBM. As time has progressed, IBM-sponsored SSD stories 
                                                 
52 See Figures 8 and 9 in section 3.3 for a breakdown of these materials, and Appendix 11.5 for a 
listing of the materials for the narrative review.  
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have been created for more global audiences and appeal, while local authors have 
worked to craft narratives in closer alignment with the Dubuque context. Intent 
behind SSD narratives varied, and generally included: (a) highlighting proposed 
stakeholder gains to ‘sell’ the endeavors (Buol, 2010; PR Newswire, 2011a; The City 
of Dubuque, 2010b; The City of Dubuque and IBM Social Media, 2011); (b) serving 
as an invitation to stakeholders to support and participate in smart projects, thereby 
attempting to secure engagement (The City of Dubuque, 2009e, 2010b, 2010c, 
2011e); (c) outlining rules and expectations for this stakeholder engagement 
(Dickinson, 2010a; Dubuque Public Information Officer, 2008; Grover, 2010; 
Sustainable Dubuque, 2010b; The City of Dubuque and IBM Social Media, 2011; N. 
Van Milligen, 2010); and / or (d) sharing the local government’s vision of smart 
technology adoption and the desired associated outcomes (IBM, 2011c; The City of 
Dubuque, 2010b, 2010c, 2011e, 2011f; The City of Dubuque and IBM Social Media, 
2011).  
 
In each of these uses of narrative, the stories were highly malleable and able to 
concurrently resonate with a wide range of individuals and stakeholder groups. 
Smart stories were made broadly applicable since various narrative aspects could 
easily be constructed to resonate with local concerns without changing the 
underlying concept of smart or its associated assumptions. In general, SSD narratives 
draw heavily on those created for Sustainable Dubuque and those created by IBM for 
its Smarter Cities campaign, yet are customized to fit local context, culture, history 
and socio-economic conditions. Through this process of narrative creation, the 
concept of smart has been opened up beyond things solely technical, aiding in 
promoting individual and community responsibility, household economies and the 
business case for resource conservation. 
  
7.1.1 Creating a Fertile Ground 
 
In my examination of sustainability narratives in Dubuque, including those 
associated with SD and SSD, I found three main storylines typically used to 
introduce sustainability and smart, gain support / buy-in and encourage participation; 
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these center around a protagonist with a mission, good versus evil and triumph over 
adversity. I begin with the ‘hero’, Dubuque’s Mayor, as portrayed by IBM: 
 
Buol’s own life story, steeped in Midwestern traditions, made him an able 
messenger. Raised in his grandparents’ home, where he moved at a young 
age with his mother and six siblings, Buol planted, harvested and consumed 
his first corn crop—upon a few square feet in his grandparents’ backyard—
at the age of six. (IBM, 2012b)  
 
This excerpt from IBM’s City of Dubuque Smarter Planet Leadership Case Study 
provides an excellent example of how the story of SSD has been crafted by IBM to 
engage its intended audiences. The typical story of SSD, when told by IBM or city 
leaders, begins with an ‘underdog’ city beating all odds for economic recovery, with 
a folksy hero emerging at the helm. According to Buol, his interest in sustainability 
began when he became a grandfather, which spurred a growing concern about the 
world his generation is leaving behind. A concern that, Buol says, compelled him to 
get city actors in action to do something about it (Buol, 2010; Buol in IBM, 2012b). 
So, Buol started having conversations with the residents of Dubuque about 
sustainability. As a retiree from 30 years at John Deere and a former Director of 
Landscaping & Grounds at a local university, Buol had spent most of his 
professional career in roles that touched the environment (The City of Dubuque, 
2012e).  
 
Thus, during his campaign, when city residents voiced concerns about water quality, 
recycling, green space, public transit and downtown revitalization, Buol selected 
sustainability as a key focus for his political platform in the 2005 mayoral elections 
(The City of Dubuque, 2012e). In addition to citing environmental reasons as to why 
a sustainability focus was important for the city, Buol also highlighted that it would 
be a way to differentiate the city (Sustainable Dubuque, 2010b, p. 5). The creation of 
SSD and using smart technologies to further sustainability ends has been perceived 
by local government as a way to continue this city differentiation (Buol, 2010; Buol 
in IBM, 2012b; The City of Dubuque, 2009e). This assumption that smart city 
projects can help differentiate urban environments is replete within IBM messaging 
around smart cities, as discussed in Chapter 5 (see Dencik, 2013; Dirks and Keeling, 
2009; IBM, 2009a, 2009b, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011d, 2011e, 
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2012a, 2012b, 2012e, 2014d, 2014j, 2015a). And while numerous smart city 
narratives around SSD in Dubuque noted that this differentiation would help attract 
talent and resources and spur economic growth (Buol, 2010; Dickinson, 2010a; 
Dregne, 2010b; Grover, 2010; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; IBM, 2009d, 2010a, 2010c, 
2011c, 2011d, 2012a; Lyons, 2010a; Telegraph Herald, 2014; The City of Dubuque 
2009e, 2010b, 2010e), there was also effort within smart project narratives to 
customize stories for individuals and local businesses versus highlighting generic 
citywide gains. Within this customization, there were references to IBM Smarter 
Cities narrative themes and the assumptions of smart.  
 
The River and Farm  
 
To help ensure that smart narratives resonated with city residents, smart project 
supporters often played upon the city’s physical landscape, location and rural and 
Midwestern roots. For example, many SSD narratives reference the Mississippi 
River—an integral element to the city’s identity and brand. The Mississippi River 
has been at the heart of the city’s evolution, including its settlement, early growth, 
economic revival, downtown revitalization and sustainability agenda (Enzler, 2010; 
Iowa Rivers, 2013; The City of Dubuque, 2010a). As a central feature of the city, the 
river is a physical reminder of place; and according to the city’s Public Information 
Officer, in many ways, the city’s image depends upon the river. It has been cited as a 
factor that has contributed to the city winning the designation of third most beautiful 
place in the United States by USA Weekend Magazine (Flansburg, 2012), the best 
place to raise a family by Forbes (Levy, 2010), and “River City of the Year” by Iowa 
Rivers Revival (2013).  
 
As explained by a senior city leader in a video interview with IBM for the Smarter 
Planet Leadership Series, when city leaders realized they needed to create a vision 
for the future, it seemed to make sense to start with the river, which was perceived to 
tie the community together: “But in the visioning there was an opportunity to bring 
people together to share ideas, to share memories and stories about what the river 
meant to them… What did it mean to have a river that was healthy today and in the 
future?” (Hawks-Goodmann, 2010). According to five of the sixteen local 
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government officials that I interviewed, they felt that the river’s presence has helped 
to better connect city residents to the environment and sustainability, and so they 
highlight the river in their SD and SSD narratives. For example, one senior city 
leader noted in my interview with her that the river was a good way to unite people 
within the city, as it symbolized common experience: “We’re all concerned about 
rivers. We’re concerned about clean water. We’re concerned about bio-diversity. 
We’re concerned about commerce. There are many different attributes and aspects of 
rivers that are easy to grab onto and pull those threads together”. In a similar fashion, 
a leader within the business community noted during my interview with him that: 
“the river… reminds us on a daily basis of how precious this resource is… the notion 
of sustainability, because of our environment, is…more a part of the everyday life of 
our citizens”. Thus, by weaving the river into SSD narratives, local government staff 
involved in creating the initial stories around SSD felt that they were linking this 
initiative to a prominent aspect of the town to which all Dubuquers could relate.  
 
Figure 23. Agricultural artwork and influence in Dubuque 
   
Source: Images are from the City of Dubuque’s website: http://www.cityofdubuque.org/ (accessed 
December 9, 2011). 
 
This notion of location was extended within narratives to envelop aspects of cultural 
life assumed to be typical to the city’s geographic space. As described by Dubuque’s 
Sustainable Community Coordinator in a video interview with IBM, “By beginning 
to talk about particularly where we’re at in the Midwest, there is a strong agricultural 
heritage” (Burbach, 2010b). Centrally located within the American Breadbasket, 
Dubuque sits within the state of Iowa, where eighty-nine percent of the land area is 
in farms, and one in six Iowans are employed because of agriculture. Consequently, 
agriculture is still a dominant force in the state’s economy (National Association of 
States Department of Agriculture, 2007; Wilde, 2009). Even within urban 
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environments in Iowa, there are agricultural nuances, influences that have been 
strengthened by an influx of people relocating from neighboring rural areas (United 
States Department of Agriculture, 2011; Wilde, 2009).  
 
Several of primary actors involved in constructing Dubuque’s early stories of 
smart—i.e., twenty percent of the local government actors that I interviewed and two 
head staff from Dubuque2.0—noted that they consciously referred to this agricultural 
heritage and their ancestors’ involvement in it to illustrate to city residents that the 
concepts of sustainability—and hence smart—are not new to the area or its people. 
Reinforcing this point, a senior city leader shared her story of how smart and 
sustainability link to the community’s past in an interview with IBM: 
 
I think about our ancestors… my grandmother who conserved everything; 
who recycled; who used the water from the cistern to water the garden and 
wash the dog. Grandpa’s, you know, kind of ethic of conservation that is 
pervasive in a family over generations. And we’re not that far in America 
from those people who knew how to live more sustainably. (Hawks-
Goodmann, 2010)  
 
In stories around sustainability, sustainable practices are portrayed as a resurgence of 
a way of living that the community’s ancestors knew well, ways that emerged from 
the necessity and practicality of farming life. As stated by another senior city leader 
in the same IBM video:  
 
We looked back and our best practices were things that our grandparents 
and our great grandparents were doing and these are people who maybe 
didn’t even have an eighth grade education but they knew what they were 
doing because they knew about managing their life, managing the 
environment around them… these were all things that our grandparents and 
great grandparents did and they’re just best practices that are resurfacing. 
(Steinhauser, 2010b)  
 
The city’s Resource Management Coordinator further reinforced this point in my 
interview with him, stating that he felt Dubuquers placed an emphasis on 
conservation due to their German and Irish roots and their agricultural heritage.53 
                                                 
53 In the mid-1800s, large numbers of Germans and Irish migrated to the United States. By the late 
1800s, both groups were settling throughout the U.S. Midwest to pursue opportunities in agriculture 
(Sisson et al., 2007, p. 210).  
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Here the narrators are emphasizing familiar practices over new technologies. As 
noted by Dubuque’s Sustainable Community Coordinator in an IBM interview:  
 
You don’t start out talking about wind turbines and solar panels. You start 
out talking about the garden that their grandma has that they always got the 
best tomatoes from and you say yeah, that is sustainability… When you 
start to talk about sustainability in that way, that it is not something new that 
is a catch phrase that is come about in the last five years, it is something 
we’ve been doing forever, we just didn’t call it sustainability yet. (Burbach, 
2010b)  
 
Within these excerpts, while storytellers do not emphasize data or technology, they 
do focus on themes related to the assumptions of smart (Hollands, 2008), as well as 
optimization and efficiency and how these tie to sustainability. The latter of which 
are central to IBM Smarter Cities messaging, but expressed in a way that is more 
likely to resonate with Dubuquers. In Chapter 5, I discussed how IBM integrates 
these themes within several of its key works on Smarter Cities, where smart 
technologies are portrayed as critical to optimizing resources (Dencik, 2013; Dirks 
and Keeling, 2009; IBM 2012e, 2014j). As seen in these excerpts of SSD narratives, 
smart technologies were not the focus; rather, emphasis was placed on what they 
purportedly helped local governments and households enable… in the words of IBM, 
“maximizing resources at their disposal” (IBM, 2012e, p. 2)—a theme that was able 
to be closely aligned with familiar agricultural practices / culture.  
 
In addition to this, smart project supporters also linked stories to what they 
considered to be Midwestern traits—namely, in this context, being frugal and 
wanting to conserve (Erickson et al., 2012), evoking again this notion of efficiency. 
As noted by a senior city leader in my interview with her: “We are a… traditional 
Midwest community… Our citizens are fairly modest, fairly conservative and 
frugal”. Similarly in an IBM video interview, a leader from the business community 
stated that this Midwestern frugality and reluctance to waste money and resources 
contributed to city residents supporting the sustainability agenda in Dubuque and 
SSD projects:  
 
First of all, as mid-westerners, we don’t like to waste stuff, okay? 
Especially something as precious as water... Another sell was the fact that 
water costs money; it costs the city money to pump it… We soften every 
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drop of water that is taken out of the aquifer for our municipal water system 
and then provide it to our…our residents and our companies. There is 
expense to that, so the less we use, the less expense we have. So there is a 
savings to the taxpayers. And, of course, the water pilot allows savings to 
the individual homeowner too. (Dickinson, 2010)  
 
In a video interview with IBM, the Mayor also emphasized this point, stating that he 
felt that the sustainability and smart agendas were able to connect with Dubuquers 
because the associated narratives emphasized savings: “When I think of what 
messages resonated the best… the one to save money, save resources. 
Midwesterners… we’re pretty conservative in many ways and that whole idea of, 
you know, re-use, recycle, is a good message that people can grab on to” (Buol, 
2010). Further, IBM staff found in their interviews with participating households in 
the Smarter Water Pilot Study that volunteers repeatedly emphasized the pragmatism 
and frugality of Dubuquers—labeling themselves as thrifty, people of common 
sense, and people who hate waste (Erickson et al., 2011). This desire to conserve 
seemed to be the primary driver to their involvement in the pilot study, reaffirming 
the approach that SSD narrative authors took to frame smart efforts along these lines. 
These are but a few examples of how local government staff and smart project 
supporters constructed SSD narratives to better relate to city residents by making 
them sound familiar—molding the narratives to the local landscape, culture and 
perceived traits, while still integrating some of the assumptions of smart that are 
reinforced in narratives created by IBM. On top of this, smart and sustainability 
narratives also often included references to supporting a greater good to help garner 
local support and buy-in; thus tying into IBM messaging around taking action now to 
secure a better future (Dencik, 2013; Dirks and Keeling, 2009; IBM, 2012e, 2014j).  
 
Taking the High Road 
 
Within Iowa, approximately forty-six percent of the population goes to church once a 
week or almost once a week (The Gallup Organization, 2006)—a trend also 
prevalent within Dubuque, where roughly sixty-five to eighty-five percent of the 
population is Catholic (Association of Religion Data Archives, 2000).54 These strong 
                                                 
54 In comparison, Catholics make up about 23% of the overall population in Iowa (Kosmin et. al., 
2001).  
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religious tendencies within Dubuque have, in part, contributed to the spread and 
growth in popularity of sustainability within the city (Schultz, 2010). According to 
the Dubuque’s Sustainable Community Coordinator in a video interview with IBM, 
the local government actors “didn’t just set (sustainability) as a priority because that 
is what they thought. They had had numerous groups in the community… come to 
them and say hey, this needs to be at the forefront” (Burbach, 2010b). Religious 
groups played an important part of this lobbying before SD and SSD were created 
(Burbach, 2010b). A good example of this link between environmentalism and 
religion within the city is the work of Sister Francine Quillin, pastoral associate of 
Dubuque’s Resurrection Catholic Parish. Sister Quillin feels that sustainability is a 
matter of stewardship and the responsibility of everyone: “God said we are to take 
care of the earth” (Sister Quillin in Flansburg, 2012, p. 4). Doing their part, her 
parish has launched several efforts to help improve the environment, such as 
installing recycling containers and implementing a Lenten fast from plastic bags in 
2011. According to Quillin, this has helped to bring the parish together, creating 
purpose and shared identity through their combined efforts, which they wear as a 
badge of pride (Flansburg, 2012, p. 4).  
 
While smart and sustainability narratives were not constructed by SSD supporters 
and local government to specifically emphasize religious aspects as reasons to 
support and participate in SSD efforts, these stories were designed to reference an 
‘intrinsic rightness’ of sustainability—a belief that seems to stem from these 
religious groundings. Similar to the badge of pride worn by Sister Quillin’s parish, 
schools across Dubuque have begun competing against each other to see who can do 
the most ‘good’, flying Green Vision Education flags as a mark of the number of 
environmental efforts they have pursued (Flansburg, 2012). In my interview with the 
city’s Resource Management Coordinator, he summed up enthusiasm for 
sustainability along these lines, noting: “I think that part of this is that it is not a new 
thing. That it is a lot of basic values that we learned, you know, in our homes, in our 
churches, you know, in our schools. And that it makes good financial sense for us 
and it makes for a more livable environment”.  
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In SSD narratives the ‘intrinsic rightness’ of sustainability was also often linked to 
Dubuque’s futurity by story authors—reflecting back again to a common theme 
within IBM narratives around Smarter Cities. In IBM’s messaging, it is portrayed as 
being imperative that local leaders (and implicitly citizens) take action now to avoid 
future threats and risks, with smart technologies being key to enable better decision 
making around these actions (Dirks and Keeling, 2009; IBM, 2012e; White, 2015). 
Citizens and their way of life can be protected, but only if they ‘do the right thing’ 
now (White, 2015). Over half of the local government staff who I interviewed 
stressed the importance of living more sustainably so that their grandchildren could 
enjoy the same high quality of life that is experienced by Dubuquers. In video 
interviews with IBM, both the Mayor and the Resource Management Coordinator 
stressed that future generations could experience dire consequences if city residents 
did not start to change their consumptions patterns now, using this message to try 
and drive community engagement and behavior change. As noted by the Mayor in 
this video:  
 
You know if you have children or grandchildren you don’t have to be a, you 
know, real deep thinker to realize that unless we do something as 
individuals and businesses and governments you know future generations 
are going to suffer and suffer greatly. …For me that message seemed to 
resonate with everyone. (Buol, 2010)  
 
In this statement, Buol overtly links the security and well-being of future Dubuquers 
to the community’s participation in conservation efforts now—adding a message of 
urgency to this notion of doing the ‘right’ thing. And, showing how this mindset 
spreads, many of the Smart Water and Electricity Pilot participants interviewed by 
IBM repeatedly said that they were cutting back on resource consumption because it 
felt like the ‘right thing to do’, and that it was part of their responsibility to cut back 
now so that future generations could benefit (Erickson et al., 2011). So, not only was 
local government echoing this messaging, but so were participating households in 
the study. The notion of contributing to a greater good was also referenced alongside 
‘intrinsic rightness’ in SSD narratives by another senior city leader in this same IBM 
video series:  
 
I think that the secret to Dubuque’s success around collaboration is that 
we’ve always had the ability to vision something that would transcend our 
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community. You know to find something that is bigger than we are and that 
captivates our imagination but it also captivates the imagination of elected 
officials and of people from around the country and around the world. 
(Hawks-Goodmann, 2010) 
 
By design, Smarter Planet and Smarter Cities narratives have been crafted to spur 
intended audiences to want to be part of something larger than themselves—an intent 
that coincides with how the local government of Dubuque feels that narratives 
around local smart projects should be crafted. In fact, this type of messaging appears 
to have been so convincing that participants use the same narratives to describe the 
significance of this work. When surveyed about why they joined the Smarter Water 
Pilot Study, participants referenced saving money as the first reason, with a desire to 
be part of something larger than themselves as the second (Erickson et al., 2011). 
One senior city leader outlined participant reasoning in an email correspondence to 
me: 
 
…when we asked [participants] why they wanted Dubuque to be the first 
smart city in North America and endorse the IBM pilot there were two main 
responses, one was not a surprise and the other was. The top reason was to 
save money and resources. This was no surprise for our Irish German 
heritage. Midwesterners, and in particular Dubuque citizens, tend to pride 
themselves on things such as being modest, frugal and resilient. The second 
reason the citizens of Dubuque stated why they wanted to be in the pilot—
they want Dubuque to be a leader in the nation for sustainability. 
 
These survey results that she refers to demonstrate that participants viewed both 
household and community gains as important reasons for their involvement; in other 
words, contributing to a greater good was important to them. These results also show 
that participants bought into the SSD narratives which extolled the purported 
outcomes that these projects would deliver. Along these same lines, the city’s 
Sustainable Community Coordinator found that while many Dubuquers volunteered 
for smart projects to save money, they also wanted to do their part for the city’s well-
being. As she stated in an IBM video interview:  
 
It is really about people understanding at the end of the day it is about more 
than the dollars you save on your utility bill and it is about more than the 
carbon that you’re not emitting into the air. It is about the quality of life 
and… and the happiness that you feel as part of your community. (Burbach, 
2010b) 
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Findings from IBM’s evaluation of the Smarter Water Pilot Study substantiated these 
observations—“framings of resource conservation ranged from it being an intrinsic 
part of local (rural) values of frugality, to religiously-informed beliefs about 
stewardship, to good business sense, to civic minded promotion of the city’s image” 
(Erickson et al., 2012, p. 10). Yet, while this type of narrative customization seems 
to have worked within Dubuque, given the small city size and the homogeneity of 
the population, I do not think that it would be as effective or easy to duplicate this 
type of approach in larger cities that are more complex and diversified. In addition to 
this local contextualization and framing, narratives were also customized by the local 
government and those responsible for promoting SSD by ‘market segment’ to reach 
key intended audiences: businesses and resident households—two groups whose 
increasing needs and expectations, according to IBM, can be met through the 
application of smart technologies (IBM, 2014j, p. 2).  
 
7.1.2 Customizing Messaging 
 
Self-interest is a powerful motivator for change. (M. Van Milligen, 2013) 
 
To speak to the specific interests of stakeholders, the local government and SSD 
project promoters created sub-stories that spoke specifically to two key groups—
businesses and households. As reflected in the quote above made by the City 
Manager at an IBM event, these messages were constructed to focus on the interests 
deemed most important to these groups. An Assistant City Manager echoed this 
sentiment in an IBM video interview: “You have to understand… look through their 
lens and you have to reach out to their terms because that is how they’ll own the 
solution and help you try to reach to others” (Steinhauser, 2010b). In other words, 
the narratives were constructed in ways to appeal to the targeted audiences so that 
they would buy-in and support SSD, but also help spread messaging about it.  
 
Savings was a key theme that resonated across both targeted groups and thus was 
woven into SSD narratives by local government authors and SSD promoters—again 
a theme that reinforces smart assumptions and IBM messaging around the enhance 
efficiency that smart technologies purportedly enable. Information from the initial 
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community survey implemented by Dubuque2.0, which queried residents on issues 
related to SSD, and from early feedback from pilot participants gathered by IBM 
showed that while customization might be necessary, narratives that emphasized 
savings would appeal to both businesses and households. As noted by the SSD 
Project Manager, “When we said, ‘If you make these three changes in your home, 
you can save $8.16 a month’, that worked” (Lyons in Flansburg, 2012, p. 3). And in 
an IBM video interview the Mayor agreed with this notion that money was a key 
driver to help get support for SSD projects: “When you talk about saving money you 
know everybody’s ears perk up, whether you’re an individual tax payer or you’re a 
business” (Buol, 2010). Efforts were also made by involved local government staff 
and SSD promoters to make sure that the narratives around SSD were made relevant 
to households, and explained in ways that they could readily understand and relate to 
their daily lives. Part of this tactic included adding stories that related benefits to 
individual experiences. For example, within an IBM Client success video on the 
Smarter Water Pilot Study, Information Services Manager Chris Kohlmann talked 
about the difference the portal made in her household: “The most exciting thing to 
me probably came the first time I saw the water portal. I had a four-gallon per hour 
leak in my household. I was astounded by that amount!” (IBM, 2011d). 
 
In my interview with the SSD Project Manager, he said that he also talked to 
representatives from the business community to see if SSD made sense to them, and 
to encourage their support and buy-in. In general, it seemed that local businesses 
supported the effort but made it clear that those running SSD would need to be able 
to explain how businesses would be able to save money, conserve resources or be 
more competitive because of these efforts. President and CEO of the Dubuque Area 
Chamber of Commerce Molly Grover explained this sentiment in a video interview 
with IBM:  
 
…business wants to know what’s in it for me… It used to be that green was 
a taboo word in the business world… and now sustainability, because it 
deals with a comprehensive issues from the community… [businesses] want 
to know how they can better manage resources to impact their bottom line. 
(Grover, 2010) 
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Thus, similar to how narratives geared toward households were customized by those 
leading and promoting SSD efforts, messaging targeting the business community 
was tailored to outline how they would gain through savings or increased 
competitiveness. This conscious effort made by local government and SSD 
promoters to integrate the benefits of SSD across varied affected actors was done to: 
(a) facilitate project acceptance and buy-in (as defined by the local government in 
terms of the number of volunteers who came forward for each project) (The City of 
Dubuque, 2010b, 2010c); and (b) encourage the required behavior change to reap the 
promised ‘benefit’ (Naphade, 2011, 2012a). And, while narratives were customized 
for specific groups, there was a concurrent effort to keep discourse around smart and 
sustainability mainstream to ensure broader appeal.  
 
7.1.3 Excluding to Depoliticize  
 
Over the last few decades, “technocratic management and consensual policy-
making” have depoliticized public discourse, a trend quite notable around the topic 
of sustainability (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 214). As argued by Erik Swyngedouw 
(2010), the elevation “of climate change and its consequences onto the terrain of 
public concern and policy has evacuated dispute and disagreement from the spaces 
of public encounter to be replaced by a consensually established” or post-political 
frame that is based on the “inevitability of capitalism and a market economy as the 
basic organizational structure of the social and economic order” (p. 215). The 
consequent urban sustainability framework promotes the economic benefits of better 
resource management, touting the financial gains from efficiency. Approaches 
promoted in this framework are market-led and technocratic, and focus on greening 
capitalism, whilst glaringly lacking discussions around issues like social justice and 
inclusion that are often associated with urban environments and technological 
advancements (Cook and Swyngedouw, 2012). Thereby, according to Swyngedouw 
(2014), removing from these frameworks the ability to make real change that will 
allow more socio-economically egalitarian transformations. Moving beyond the 
“apocalyptic imaginaries” (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 214) associated with climate 
change, current sustainability rhetoric is a common topic within cities—within town 
halls, environmental groups, public demonstrations, academia and even households 
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(Cook and Swyngedouw, 2012, p. 1960). This ‘neutralized’ framing of sustainability 
was apparent within Dubuque, as was the attempt to depoliticize city government in 
their work around SD and SSD.  
 
When looking at smart narratives within Dubuque, this type of depoliticization can 
be seen by which messages are being included and which are being excluded within 
the promotion of SSD. To the extent possible, smart project supporters have 
consciously tried to depoliticize sustainability (and smart) so that it is framed in a 
way that supports the capitalistic structure of American society, and not associated 
with the “apocalyptic imaginaries” around climate change. While climate change and 
global warming are frequently listed as two driving reasons behind sustainability 
agendas within cities (Hammer, 2011), they have been left out of rhetoric around 
sustainability in Dubuque primarily since within the city these are seen as highly 
charged, controversial topics. Seven of the sixteen local government staff who I 
interviewed stated that the population is split over whether or not they believe these 
trends are happening, and even if city residents do believe they are, there is 
contention around what should be done about it. Hence, environmental issues within 
the city can quickly become charged.  
 
For example, in an IBM video interview, the city’s Sustainable Community 
Coordinator explains the reactions that she sometimes gets when people hear her 
title: “There is certainly a group out there… that always thinks when they hear my 
title, Sustainable Community Coordinator, oh, she’s a tree hugger” (Burbach, 
2010b). In support of Burbach’s sentiment, several Smarter Water Pilot Study 
participants interviewed expressed disdain for green and ‘tree-huggers’, using these 
terms in a derogatory fashion (Erickson et al., 2012, p. 10). When questioned about 
this adverse perception of climate change and global warming, interviewees felt that 
the city’s sustainability agenda was not directly related to these phenomena; rather it 
focused on conserving resources. Interestingly, several of these same pilot 
participants interviewed who articulated a dislike for green, also volunteered in 
groups and activities related to resource conservation—or one could argue, efforts to 
save the environment (Erickson et al., 2012).  
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During my interviews with smart project stakeholders from the local government and 
business community—i.e., the primary local parties responsible for creating and 
sustaining smart and sustainability narratives—over a third stated that closely 
associating the sustainability agenda with climate change and global warming would 
polarize debate and alienate some city residents from the agenda. City leaders also 
noted this concern in video interviews filmed by IBM. For example, as noted by an 
Assistant City Manager:  
 
It is no small thing to have elected officials quite honestly go out on a limb 
and say we are going to make sustainability a priority… most people would 
just interpret that as oh they just want to take care of the earth and they’re 
just tree huggers and that is a very divisive conversation that happens across 
the country… that is the kind of vote that loses people in elections. 
(Steinhauser, 2010b)  
 
For this reason, city leaders have done their best to couch sustainability and related 
smart endeavors in apolitical terms in both oral narratives and project materials 
(Sustainable Dubuque, 2010a, 2010b; The City of Dubuque, 2010d). For example, in 
an IBM video interview, the Mayor recognized that references to global warming 
and climate change were not resonating with city residents and thus he reframed his 
narratives to focus on conservation and sustainable behavior and practices, noting 
that he did not “use those terms anymore” (Buol, 2010). In the same video series a 
leader in the business community involved in both the smart and sustainability 
agendas, summarized the political positioning in Dubuque quite well:  
 
Concern about our global environment has been so politically polarizing 
and we understand that in Dubuque, and we’ve tried to trump that with… 
not having this be a…partisan issue and realizing that in order for us to have 
a buy-in, whether it is to the individual citizen or to the employer in our 
community, we need to be able to explain what’s in it for them. (Dickinson, 
2010)  
 
To help separate global warming and climate change from sustainability in Dubuque, 
and to ground benefits in a way that mattered to city residents, the local government 
and its selected Sustainability Task Force were careful in how they defined 
sustainability for the city. Within environmental literature and practice, sustainability 
models often encompass aspects related to the natural and built environments, while 
also including social and economic aspects. This expanded view enables broader 
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interpretation and variation around the social construction of the problem of global 
warming and climate change (Camagni et al., 1998). Yet, it is within this wider 
aperture, or ‘middle-of-the-road’ environmentalism, that Swyngedouw (2010) feels 
hope of truly addressing global warming and climate change dwindles. Within 
Dubuque, framing sustainability as such has enabled the depoliticization of discourse 
around sustainability and the smart agenda conceptualized within it. As described by 
a senior city leader in a video interview with IBM:  
 
Every single one of those principles, we could tie something to in this 
community, whether it is a safe place for a child after school, whether it is 
effective education, whether it is healthy local foods, whether it is quality of 
life issues, park, health issues, personal health issues, mental health 
issues—everything we do we can tie to one of our eleven sustainability 
principles. (Steinhauser, 2010b)  
 
The perceived benefits of this broader framing of sustainability were summed up by 
a business community leader, who highlighted the appeal of a more expansive 
sustainability definition, basically stating that no matter what each Dubuquer is 
passionate about, he or she can find it within the way that sustainability has been 
framed within the agenda (Grover, 2010). The Mayor, when describing SSD efforts 
in IBM Smarter Planet Leadership Lessons series video, notes this broad appeal, but 
goes further to say that sustainability has been made sustainable within Dubuque by 
getting a wide range of city actors involved, not only in defining sustainability, but 
also in developing and implementing related projects (Buol, 2010). This observation 
of general acceptance of the sustainability agenda as framed around resource 
conservation was also made in evaluations of the pilot studies (Erickson et al., 2012; 
Naphade, 2012).  
 
Critique  
 
To the contrary however, according to the Dubuque’s Resource Management 
Coordinator, this leaning away from political debate, or “watering down” of 
sustainability, has led to the exclusion of certain groups from sustainability 
processes, namely those with what’s perceived as a more ‘aggressive’ environmental 
agenda who consider something other than the depoliticized, consensual framing of 
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sustainability. From what I could gather during interviews with this interviewee, 
groups and individuals most closely associated with sustainability—coming from 
professional organizations, the hard sciences and / or environmental studies—have 
been marginalized from implementing the city’s sustainability agenda and 
subsequent projects. While some individuals from these groups were involved in 
defining the city’s sustainability model and its eleven principles, this interviewee 
noted that follow-up activities and projects to implement this agenda have often 
excluded these environmental groups. Based on this exclusion, critics have called the 
local government’s distancing from more ‘scientific’ grounding a form of “green-
washing” (Schultz, 2010b).  
 
To an extent, some of this criticism rings true. From my interviews it became clear 
that local government, leaders within the private sector and the third party group 
Dubuque2.0, consciously decided to approach sustainability from a broader post-
political perspective, mainly to avoid being seen as ‘extremist’ in approach. Thus, 
the exclusion of what were perceived to be ‘aggressive’ environmentalist groups, in 
my opinion, is a result of trying to appeal to the masses and building broad citizen 
consensus—especially given the negative connotations associated with green, 
climate change and global warming within the city. That said, a few representatives 
from the city government and local business community who I interviewed (three of 
the twenty-two) felt that environmental groups had worked well with their projects. 
 
As the sustainability and smart agendas have grown within Dubuque, groups have 
emerged to counter these agendas and the rhetoric associated with them. There has 
been a small emergence of Tea Party activists55 who have lashed out against a 
multitude of local government objectives, most notably sustainability (The Dubuque 
Town Crier, 2011a, 2011b). These Tea Party activists have denounced Dubuque’s 
City Council as “socialist progressives” due to their support of smart growth 
principles, which are supposedly espoused in the city’s sustainability agenda. These 
                                                 
55 The Tea Party movement (TPM) describes itself as an American grassroots political movement that 
promotes fiscal responsibility, a constitutionally limited government and free market economics. It is 
recognized as a conservative and libertarian movement (as defined and perceived within the United 
States) and has sponsored protests and supported political candidates since 2009 (Tea Party Patriots, 
2011).  
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activists link the local government to a United Nations “conspiracy” for restricting 
American freedom through the U.N.’s Agenda 21, and warn against smart growth 
being supported locally—“it is about protecting our own backyards against the home 
grown threat” (The Dubuque Town Crier, 2011a, 2011b). The local government, 
while aware of this criticism, has not responded to or acknowledged these viewpoints 
within SSD narratives. Despite criticism of green-washing and claims by Tea Party 
activists, from what I could gather during field research, the sustainability and smart 
agendas seem to be perceived in apolitical terms, at least among local media 
coverage and those interviewed for this research.56  
 
Reinforcement  
 
While there has been some pushback around smart projects within urban discourse in 
Dubuque, within the oral and written narratives that I reviewed I found that most 
reproduced IBM Smarter Cities narrative themes while also reinforcing several 
assumptions of smart. The most common areas of overlap related to efficiency, 
savings, optimization and acting now so as to avoid some future threat or risk—all of 
which tied to sustainability and citizens being involved in efforts to promote it. 
These narratives reflected how involved actors interpreted smart projects (i.e., as 
mechanisms to enable efficiency and optimization, and thus contribute to 
sustainability and citizen engagement), as well as how they wanted other involved 
actors to also behave within these initiatives (i.e., use fewer resources). Smarter 
Sustainable Dubuque narratives also underscored how smart technologies would 
differentiate the city, thereby helping to purportedly attract talent and resources and 
spur economic growth. Given the way that sustainability, and smarter sustainability, 
is described, the smart city “preemptive consensus” (Greenfield, 2013) emerging 
from Dubuque reinforces the current market-led status quo by greening capitalism, 
while also reinforcing the responsibilization of citizens (Rose, 1999, p. 174). This 
consensus demonstrates how neoliberal trends, while shaping smart project strategy 
                                                 
56 Since I primarily interviewed actors involved with smart projects, by default my universe of 
interviews did not include all of the groups or individuals openly against or excluded from these 
projects. While I was able to speak to a few people who were not affiliated with smart endeavors, this 
was by no means representative of those excluded or critical of these projects. 
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and engagement, also seem to be influencing the way that these endeavors are 
represented, and the emphasis that is placed upon this representation.  
 
7.2 Branding Smarter Sustainable Dubuque 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, local governments feel increasingly compelled to ‘sell’ 
their city in attempts to attract and retain talent, city residents, tourism, investment 
and business—all of which support revenue creation through taxes (Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996; Kotler et al., 1993; Wiig, 2015). In this context of ‘selling’ cities, 
they become products, used and experienced by the end user, or consumer—whether 
a business, tourist or resident (Harvey, 1989a). According to IT providers, the 
adoption of smart technologies is an inexpensive way to enhance city brand and 
consequently attract resources, making the city a more attractive product (Buschner 
et al., 2010; Sevcik, 2011). Hence from this perspective, smart projects seemingly 
offer not only a technological but also a brand fix. This purported double boon was 
apparent in Dubuque, where the city experienced a significant boost to its brand with 
SSD—so much so that gains attributed to the SSD brand seem to outweigh benefits 
from more traditional forms of return on investment (ROI) on smart projects like 
operational efficiencies. To an extent, the necessity for this ‘sale’ can supersede the 
need for actual operational gains— where smart initiatives fulfill a symbolic 
function, but do little to boost economic performance or attain the other more 
tangible gains that the projects were promised to deliver (Abrahamson, 1991; Wiig, 
2015).  
 
Below I look at the strategies the local government has taken to boost city brand in 
Dubuque and discuss how IBM has interacted with this process. To inform this 
section, 7.2, I looked at materials—including documents, websites, presentations and 
video interviews, among others—created by the local government to promote the 
city of Dubuque, SSD and individual smart city projects that are being, or have been, 
implemented. I also looked at media coverage related to Dubuque and its pursuit of 
smart city projects and sustainability. Case study interviews I conducted for this 
work also informed this section, but to a lesser extent than they did in section 7.1. 
Figures 8 and 9, and Appendix 11.5 provide additional details on these resources.  
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7.2.1 Brand Enhancement 
 
In city brand promotion associated with SSD projects, the local government portrays 
Dubuque as a small, Midwestern city that has been able to transform itself into a 
model for smart and sustainability (Buol, 2010; Dickinson, 2010; Dregne, 2010b; 
Hawks-Goodmann in IBM, 2012a; Lyons, 2010a). According to brand promoters, 
the approaches to smart and sustainability employed by the local government 
contribute to the city’s uniqueness and desirability—drawing in businesses, 
resources, individuals and other local governments to experience, or learn from, what 
Dubuque has to offer (Grover, 2010; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; Lyons in The City of 
Dubuque and IBM Social Media, 2011). As noted by Dubuque’s City Manager 
Michael Van Milligen in his keynote presentation at an IBM Software event:  
 
I’m honored to be with you to demonstrate how technology and community 
engagement are changing the way the city of Dubuque is servicing its 
residents… by the time I’m done I’m hoping that you’re going to want to 
live in Dubuque, Iowa. (M. Van Milligen 2013)  
 
In their presentation “Economic Development: Branding Your Community”, Cori 
Burbach, Dubuque’s Sustainable Community Coordinator, and Rick Dickinson, 
President and CEO of the GDDC, shared their perspective of enhancing city brand to 
promote economic growth for an International City / County Management 
Association (ICMA)57 webinar (ICMA, 2013). In this presentation, Burbach and 
Dickinson described how SD and SSD help differentiate Dubuque in the areas of 
business retention, business attraction, regional marketing and incubating new 
businesses. They state that SD and SSD brands have been ‘successful’ because they 
are more than just a logo—rather, they articulate the primary benefits of being in 
Dubuque and offer a strong value proposition that, they feel, provides the city a 
competitive edge (ICMA, 2013). The SSD value proposition is to provide “residents 
and businesses with information and tools they need to do what they want” to help 
“save money, conserve resources, and improve the local economy and environment” 
                                                 
57 The International City/County Management Association is an organization that focuses on 
supporting local government management to help create sustainable communities and an enhanced 
quality of life worldwide (ICMA, 2008).  
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(ICMA, 2013)—and, unsurprisingly, SSD narratives support this value proposition, 
as evidenced in my discussion in section 7.1.  
 
Along these same lines, in an interview with the local paper the Telegraph Herald, 
the Mayor and SSD Project Manager talked about what they hoped the city would 
gain with the brand they have been creating around SSD (as well as the 
implementation of the program itself). Mayor Buol called the partnership with IBM 
“another defining moment in Dubuque’s history” due to the way that SSD will 
purportedly improve infrastructure expenditure savings and create new jobs, through 
its implementation as well as through the new business it attracts (Mozinski, 2009b). 
In the same article, the SSD Project Manager David Lyons noted that some of the 
green jobs associated with Sustainable Dubuque were already in place, and that these 
jobs represented the “Dubuque economy going into the next new marketplace” 
(Lyons in Mozinski, 2009b). Lyons added that by partnering with IBM in SSD, other 
businesses will be enticed to invest in Dubuque (Mozinski 2009a, 2009b)—a 
reference that opens up the issue of co-branding with IBM, which is explored below.  
 
As these excerpts demonstrate, the intent behind enhancing city brand, through SSD 
and other initiatives, is to spur economic growth and development. By differentiating 
the city with the application of smart, the local government feels they can draw in 
desired talent and resources to fuel this growth (Buol, 2010; Dickinson, 2010a; 
Dregne, 2010b; Grover, 2010; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; Lyons, 2010a; Telegraph 
Herald, 2014; The City of Dubuque, 2009e, 2010b, 2010e). And, it would seem that 
benefits do lean more toward enhanced image more so than optimization ends. To 
date, the reported operational efficiency gains for SSD projects have included: (a) a 
reduction in water utilization by 6.6 percent and eightfold increase in leak detection 
and response among Smarter Water Pilot Study volunteer households (PR Newswire, 
2011a), leading to saving the city U.S. $290,000 in water management (Flansburg, 
2012); (b) a total savings of U.S. $2,111 amongst participating volunteer households 
over a three month period for the Smarter Electricity Pilot Study (Naphade, 2012); 
and (c) the creation of 1,300 jobs in the city (Telegraph Herald, 2014).  
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While these gains are notable for a city of this size, indirect gains attributed to the 
SSD brand seem to dwarf these outcomes. The implementation of SD and SSD has 
also helped the local government gain over US$27 million in federal funding (The 
City of Dubuque, 2011b). These funds are from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and have been used to leverage investment from local 
and state government as well as private businesses and non-profits, including 
US$10.6 million in additional federal and state grant funding that leverages ARRA 
funding and is being used to create jobs and improve the sustainability of Dubuque 
(The City of Dubuque, 2011b). Further, according to a senior executive with the 
GDDC, job growth associated with IBM’s presence has been estimated to be about 
2,400 jobs. Given these outcomes, it would seem that in Dubuque returns to date for 
the enhanced city brand outweigh more direct efficiency outcomes from 
implementing SSD projects. These gains have contributed to the wide range of 
accolades that have been bestowed upon the city over the past decade – a number 
that has grown with SD and SSD implementation. From being ranked as the best 
place to run a small business to the most livable city, from being called one of the 
most connected communities in the United States to one of the smartest cities in the 
world. With each new award, the SSD brand seems to be reinforced and strengthened 
(Burbach, 2010a; Greater Dubuque Development Corporation, 2013; IBM, 2011d; 
Levy, 2010; Lindsay, 2010; Smedley, 2010; The City of Dubuque, 2011a, 2013d).  
 
However, funding, job growth and recognition aside, if placed under scrutiny, the 
marketing and messaging associated with SSD do seem to have surpassed 
achievements on the ground. The projects within SSD are small, but the attention and 
buzz generated around these efforts allude to something much larger. A similar 
misalignment can be seen with the example of the Smarter Cities Challenge Digital 
On-Ramps project in the U.S. city of Philadelphia. Here, IBM recommendations 
were encumbered by various social and technical difficulties that involved actors 
were unable to overcome (Wiig, 2015):  
 
Once the smart solution entered the messy reality of urban governance, of 
entrenched poverty in a de-industrialized inner city with few employment 
opportunities, the discourse of change faltered. IBM’s report for 
Philadelphia acted as a guide, but by its very nature, written by outsiders 
unfamiliar with the local context of poverty and the lack of economic 
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opportunity, the report could not anticipate the social and technical 
challenges faced by the team tasked with implementing the policy (Director 
of Innovation Management, 2012 in Wiig, 2015, p. 269).  
 
Yet, “despite the supposed intent of addressing widespread socioeconomic inequality 
through an app”, the primary impact of this smart city project was the promotional 
value it gave the city (Wiig, 2015, p. 269). Hence, narratives around this SCC 
imitative focused on the possible economic change due to this entrepreneurial 
approach, while underneath this the solution did not help address what it set out to 
solve (Wiig, 2015). What is interesting to note is that despite this misalignment in 
Dubuque, during my interviews with city leaders, SSD volunteers and supporters, 
and within the relevant media coverage that I reviewed, there seems to be, for the 
most part, acceptance of and enthusiasm for the SSD brand being generated (and the 
narratives associated with it). To an extent, I believe this acceptance and boosterism 
is partly due to the fact that while the SSD brand promoted does not match reality on 
the ground, it is perceived to resonate with it; in other words, the smart imaginary 
created through brand and narrative is seen as being connected to what exists in 
reality. Even if there is too much spin, and brand does not align with how the city 
exists in reality, over-zealous branding can be deemed ‘successful’ if it makes the 
city seem more competitive, attracts resources and builds local identity despite the 
misalignment. In cases symbolic associations fail to connect with reality (Harvey, 
1989a); municipal public relations become pure marketing, similar to the corporate 
spin created to sell consumer goods.  
 
7.2.2 Place Promotion Strategies 
 
In Dubuque, the local government has used both traditional and non-traditional place 
promotion strategies. Dubuque city leaders have employed traditional marketing and 
public relations strategies such as media relations, in house publications and logo 
creation to help increase awareness and understanding of SD and SSD (Dregne, 
2010a, 2010b). One good example of these traditional approaches includes logos 
developed for SD and SSD, where images were created to help intended audiences 
quickly associate a project or material with the concepts and organizations behind it. 
The SD and SSD logos in Figure 24 both reference sustainability and use the same 
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color scheme to illustrate their connectedness. The leaf within the SD logo helps 
make the connection to the environment, and the sets of parentheses included in the 
SSD logo quickly remind the viewer of the link to wireless technology. 
 
Figure 24. Dubuque logos for SD and SSD 
         
Source: The City of Dubuque, 2013c; Dubuque2.0, 2010b.  
 
The local government has also used traditional approaches, such as regularly 
providing press releases, online announcements and email list serve notifications of 
developments associated with SD and SSD. Yet, the brunt of the local government’s 
public relations strategies for SD and SSD has not been focused on employing 
traditional marketing or public relations activities. According to Dubuque’s Public 
Relations Manager, the annual budget for marketing is just U.S. $2000—clearly not 
a local government priority when it comes to building the SSD city brand. Rather 
than invest funds directly into traditional forms of brand development, the City 
Manager instead feels that investments should be made in projects that will directly 
support the brand that the city is trying to create, with the hopes of garnering 
coverage through earned media (The City of Dubuque, 2009d). Hence, various non-
traditional forms of public relations have been employed in Dubuque to help 
promote the SD and SSD brand. These non-traditional strategies include using a third 
party organization to help with public relations, improving the built environment, 
promoting sustainability and co-branding with IBM. Below, I briefly explore the 
three former methods and go into detail on co-branding with IBM.  
 
Non-Traditional Public Relations  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, local governments are increasingly using citizen boards 
and committees to be carriers of their public relations messages (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 
82). Each interaction of the committee or board provides an opportunity to spread the 
government’s message to third parties and the city residents involved, who then in 
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turn have the ability to further transmit the messages (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 48). 
Directly involving the community was one non-traditional public relations strategy 
used in Dubuque. To help inform the formation of the SD Task Force and SSD 
Steering Committee, local government leaders first surveyed for relevant 
organizations that they felt should be included, such as local businesses, education 
organizations, civic groups, service clubs, neighborhood organizations and religious 
institutions. While getting information from these groups on who should be involved, 
they were concurrently making these groups aware of the SSD project so that these 
groups, in turn, could also spread messaging through word of mouth. The same 
approach was taken to shape Dubuque2.0, the agency that managed public relations 
and awareness raising around the city’s smart and sustainability initiatives (ICMA, 
2013).  
 
Another non-traditional marketing approach that the local government has employed 
to help enhance the city’s image and shape the brand being formed around SD and 
SSD has been focusing on improving the city’s built environment (Zavattaro, 2010a). 
In general, local governments want their cities to be perceived based on their 
aesthetic appeal, with alignment between desired perceptions and how users view the 
city. This focus on built environment appeal stems from the understanding that 
people internalize their surroundings, thus to enhance city brand, local governments 
must improve how their cities are experienced in terms of both natural and man-
made environments. The more aesthetically pleasing a city’s built environment, the 
better it is perceived (Carlson, 2002). Linking brand and the built environment with 
efforts to revive the economy, the local government of Dubuque has “tried every 
economic development trick in the book—casinos, a pedestrian mall, a riverfront 
convention center” (Greenblatt, 2014, p. 2). Each of these efforts has contributed to 
transforming the city, as well as perceptions around it. As smart technologies have 
been added to the sustainability agenda, the smart concept has been included into this 
reimagining of Dubuque.  
 
With the opening of an IBM Global Delivery Facility in downtown Dubuque, IBM 
has also had a small role in altering the city’s built environment (and associated 
brand) with the launch of SSD. While cities have always depended on private sector 
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actors to create jobs and put up buildings, new urban development projects 
associated with or being led by large corporate actors seem to create clusters of 
growth that go beyond just the building or campus that they have built (Greenblatt, 
2014). When IBM moved into downtown Dubuque, they signed a 10-year lease to 
occupy the Roshek Building, which was at one time the largest department store in 
Iowa and since 2010 has been listed on the U.S. National Register of Historic Places. 
As part of IBM’s agreement to occupy this market in an area that had been somewhat 
plagued with vacancy and neglect, it worked with The City of Dubuque and 
Dubuque Initiatives to upgrade the facility by making it a green building that uses 
industry-leading, energy-efficient technology (IBM, 2009d). In an IBM Press 
Release on the announcement of this effort to update the Roshek Building, Mayor 
Buol commented, 
  
We are extremely proud that IBM chose Dubuque for this project and 
particularly thrilled about the role that Dubuque’s sustainability initiative 
played in that decision. IBM's decision to locate in the Roshek Building, 
through adaptive reuse of a historic structure in the heart of our downtown, 
illustrates our shared commitment to sustainable development, historic 
preservation, and community revitalization. (IBM, 2009d)  
 
Five years later, as a result of IBM moving in, there are more coffee shops, a more 
vibrant nightlife, more restaurants, and more general activity in the blocks 
surrounding the office due to the influx of workers into this space. While the Roshek 
Building renovation was just one building downtown, it seems that several city 
leaders perceive that its effect has gone well beyond its walls. For, they feel that the 
presence of IBM in Dubuque’s downtown area contributes to its perceptions of being 
an attractive area to other companies (Greenblatt, 2014).  
 
Finally, sustainability has also been part and parcel of non-traditional place 
promotion strategies to entice resources to Dubuque. As noted by Richard Moe, 
President of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, in promotional materials by 
the local government:  
 
Some may think of Dubuque as an industrial town whose best days are 
behind it, but they’re wrong. This city has positioned itself on the cutting 
edge of the single-most important issue of our time [sustainability]. I don’t 
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know of another city this size that gets it as fully as Dubuque. (Moe in 
Sustainable Dubuque, 2009) 
 
One of the key factors that drew IBM to Dubuque was the local government’s focus 
on sustainability. In promotional materials created for the city by the local 
government, Milind Naphade, the former IBM Research Project Manager who led 
IBM’s SSD efforts, summarized this attraction: “IBM selected Dubuque as a smarter 
city pilot because of its leadership in sustainability” (The City of Dubuque, 2010f). 
Building on the momentum initiated by the arrival of IBM, the local private sector 
has seen a rise in emphasis on green and green technology. A few local businesses 
have adapted their operations, services and / or products to fall in line with this 
sustainability focus, while a few new small business ventures around green have also 
been launched (Burbach, 2010b; Lyons, 2010a). In addition to these three non-
traditional strategies, the local government has also promoted the city based on its 
relationship with IBM.  
 
Co-Branding with IBM 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, numerous local governments have partnered with IBM’s 
Smarter Cities Challenge in hopes that their cities would gain benefits from the 
associated IBM brand (Wiig, 2015). In this vein, over seventy-five percent of those 
who I interviewed in Dubuque felt that the city’s partnership with IBM has greatly 
enhanced the city’s brand. As noted by one Dubuquer: “IBM coming into the city 
was a huge confidence boost for people” (Dubuque resident in Greenblatt, 2014). 
Historically, Dubuque has been perceived as a primarily blue-collar city. However 
the arrival of IBM, a white-collar industry, has purportedly shifted perceptions, 
changing attitudes and narratives about the city for those within and external to 
Dubuque. Describing this phenomenon in my interviews with them, two senior city 
leaders and a GDDC senior executive noted that they feel there has been a 
psychological impact on the community by the presence of IBM—it is a source of 
city pride. As stated by the GDDC executive I interviewed, IBM’s presence moves 
Dubuque to a “new playing field”, from blue to white collar: “the psychological 
impact is greatest on people, business and city officials… it reaffirms the benefits of 
playing well together”. IBM’s arrival is seen as yet another ‘success’ due to PPP 
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efforts within the city, and the accompanying change in perspective, taking Dubuque 
from blue to white collar, helps expand the scope of future SSD narratives. As stated 
by Mayor Buol, IBM’s presence basically means the city is essentially 
“preapproved” when other companies are considering relocation to the city (Buol in 
Greenblatt, 2014). Overall, partnership with IBM and the SSD endeavor are seen as 
game-changers for the city and its image. According to a senior executive from the 
GDDC in an interview that I conducted with him, “the intangible benefits cannot be 
overstated—community pride, brand awareness, partnership with IBM, etc. Simply 
put, Dubuque's image is better because of this [SSD] initiative.”  
 
IBM’s presence is also linked to changes within the city’s perceived social milieu; 
hence providing more grist for SSD narratives. With the opening of the IBM office, 
there was an influx of young professionals into Dubuque. According to twenty-five 
percent of the local government officials interviewed, this has already had a notable 
impact. For instance, the city’s Sustainable Community Coordinator Cori Burbach 
observed:  
 
IBM’s workforce is very diverse. They have challenged the community to 
add new things. We have new ethnic restaurants—Thai, Indian. We have an 
Indian grocery store. We have new loft apartments. It is spurred [additional] 
development of the downtown. Old warehouses are being rehabbed; the first 
floors are restaurants and offices, and the second floors and up are 
residences. (Burbach in Flansburg, 2012, p. 5)  
 
Echoing this notion of IBM helping to diversify Dubuque, Greenblatt (2014) notes 
that now the city “boasts two cricket leagues to accommodate the many South Asians 
and other new residents who are addicted to the game” (Greenblatt, 2014, p. 3). 
Whether or not there has been legitimate or sizeable demographic changes that have 
led to social and cultural diversification within the Dubuque, city leaders are using 
the presence of IBM to shift the city’s brand away from being perceived as a 
homogeneous, agricultural and blue-collar city to a more multi-cultural, white-collar 
environment—an environment that also has a changing workforce, not just in terms 
of demographics but also age. Due to Dubuque’s aging population, business and city 
leaders are striving to make the city increasingly attractive to the roughly 18,000 
university level students studying in Dubuque so that more stay after graduation. 
These leaders are using smart and sustainability as a lure to help make this happen. 
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According to the City Manager, Michael Van Milligen, one of the main goals for SD 
and SSD is youth retention, ideally attracting much of the regional population of 
college students to come and live in Dubuque (M. Van Milligen, 2013). As described 
by the CEO of the GDDC in an IBM video interview: 
 
Technology is part of the lure for that new generation which we hope to 
keep and attract to our community. They live in a different world than my 
generation did… They want to see connectivity. They… care about their 
community, their nation, their world. They’re concerned about their 
environment…and they want to be drawn to a place that addresses those 
same concerns. (Dickinson, 2010)  
 
By focusing on sustainability and smart technologies, city leaders are hoping that this 
will aid in talent retention and attraction. To this end, narrative and brand promotion 
around smart and SSD are often crafted in ways to target youth, as described by one 
city business leader in an IBM interview: “What’s beautiful about this is that the 
younger generation who sees this as a way to make a difference, both for their lives 
personally, but also to make this a Smarter Planet; a better place to live for 
themselves and for their children” (Dickinson, 2010). In addition changing 
workforce, another narrative theme created to promote brand is the perception that 
the capacity for growth and innovation within the city has increased. As noted by the 
city’s Sustainable Community Coordinator in an interview with IBM:  
 
[City residents] saw IBM come to Dubuque because of our sustainability 
initiatives. They see now that our economic development professionals are 
able to recruit businesses who are interested in coming to a community that 
has these values and so they want to say you know what, when somebody is 
looking for a new sustainable service they’re going to look in Dubuque 
because that is what businesses believe in here. (Burbach, 2010b) 
 
Smarter Sustainable Dubuque and the city’s partnership with IBM are credited with 
helping to spark this innovative transformation toward reaching the city’s 
sustainability goals. Like a contagion, the creative problem-solving approach to 
sustainability that has been attributed to SSD is perceived to have spread beyond its 
projects, acting as a catalyst to other emerging sustainability efforts within the city 
(see Deakin and Al Waer, 2011, 2012). And, in the process, according to related 
narratives, new businesses are emerging and jobs are being created (Greater 
Dubuque Development Corporation, 2006, 2011a). It is clear that within SSD 
  
 220 
narratives originating from Dubuque city leaders, the endeavor is perceived to have 
transformed the city—improving brand, fostering growth and development, and 
attracting resources. As summed up by the Vice President of Programs of the CFGD 
in an IBM video:  
 
If we can do the smart city program well and it becomes part of the 
infrastructure of our community, we will have established an important 
competitive edge which will attract future opportunities, economically, 
socially and environmentally. (Dregne, 2010b)  
 
As leaders from Dubuque’s local government and business community have shared 
the city’s experiences at conferences and events around the world, they mention 
IBM, providing the company with valuable attention and endorsement (The City of 
Dubuque, 2013a, 2013b). Further, the same press coverage that has highlighted 
Dubuque as an up and coming smart city has listed IBM as the local government’s 
partner, garnering the company national and international attention in the smart cities 
space—including coverage in well-respected news sources like the Economist, New 
York Times, BBC News and BusinessWeek (Acohido, 2009; BBC News, 2011; 
Dillow, 2011; Forbes, 2007; Hamm, 2009a; Hoffman, 2009; Lindsay, 2010; Lohr, 
2009a). In this process, the local government has tied its brand to that of IBM, while 
IBM also has used the SSD projects to help increase its brand in the smart city 
market (IBM, 2009b, 2010c, 2010d, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2012a and 2012c). This 
type of co-branding with IBM can also be see with the company’s smart city projects 
in: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where IBM and the city partnered to integrate citywide 
data from some 30 agencies in a centralized command center (IBM, 2010b; IBM, 
2011b; Paes, 2012; Singer, 2012) and Melbourne, Australia where the city 
participated in the Smart City Challenge to look at how the city deals with disruptive 
events and emergencies that may impact the city (City of Melbourne, 2016; IBM, 
2015d). With both of these cities, both IBM and the local government promoted 
these endeavor to help further their respective brands.    
 
Conclusions 
 
Dubuque presents a good example of how IT provider interactions around smart 
projects can affect city representation; for through smart projects with IBM, the local 
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government has integrated messaging about smart not only into narratives about SSD 
projects, but also into those about the city. These SSD narratives demonstrate how 
messaging from IBM Smarter Cities has been adapted and made relevant to the 
Dubuque context and audience, where the local government and involved third party 
actors have customized smart to local history, landscape, culture and target group. 
Woven within this local customization are also assumptions of smart such as 
efficiency and optimization to assist with sustainability promotion, applying smart 
technologies to spur local economic growth and development, citizen participation, 
and the need to act now to avert future risks and threats (Burbach, 2010; Buol, 2010; 
Dickinson, 2010; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; IBM, 2012b; Steinhauser, 2010b; The 
City of Dubuque, 2012e).  
 
Within these stories, there is a shifting of smart discourse away from ‘big’ and 
potentially contentious sustainability issues (Swyngedouw, 2010)—climate change, 
resource depletion, environmental damage, etc.—towards the thrifty and resourceful 
self-understandings of Dubuquers. This sheds light on how corporate platforms, such 
as IBM’s Smarter Cities narrative framework, can be fairly generic in terms of both 
technology and rhetoric, enabling them to be adapted and accepted in different 
contexts. In general, SSD oral and written narratives provided examples of how the 
local government is: (a) recreating IBM Smarter Cities narrative themes; (b) 
adopting and / or reinforcing various assumptions of smart; and as a result (c) 
adopting policies from the private sector around city competitiveness, brand and 
promotion.  
 
Additionally, I found that the Dubuque local government is placing an increasing 
emphasis on place promotion to boost city competitiveness (Wiig, 2015). Within 
these place promotion strategies, the local government bolsters traditional strategies 
with non-traditional approaches (Zavattaro, 2010a). This includes co-promoting with 
IBM, where city officials have become active advocates for IBM, endorsing the tech 
giant through their efforts to promote Dubuque at conferences, webinars and other 
events (Burbach, 2010b; Dickinson, 2010; Greenblatt, 2014; The City of Dubuque, 
2013a, 2013b). I found that in this case study, the biggest gain from the local 
government’s pursuit of smart projects and its partnership with IBM, has been the 
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perceived boost in city brand. Yet, what exists in reality may fall short of the image 
created around the SSD initiative, for most smart projects have been small, of limited 
duration and did not use the most advanced technologies. Still, SSD has been 
deemed ‘successful’ by those involved since it is seen as having helped make the city 
more competitive and aided in attracting resources (Greater Dubuque Development 
Corporation, 2011a; Grover, 2010; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; The City of Dubuque 
and IBM Social Media, 2011).  
 
Thus, in the Dubuque example, IBM policies, approaches and practices to make the 
city smart, or at least appear smart, have been integrated into city strategy and the 
SSD initiative, with subsequent effects on related governance arrangements. This has 
led to changes in city objectives and priorities, and how the local government goes 
about achieving them. And, through the PPPs to implement these endeavors, changes 
are taking place within the local government in terms of roles, like that of the IT 
Department, and as well as in terms of expectations between the local government 
and citizens. Alongside this transformation, narratives about smart projects, SSD and 
the city have emerged, reinforcing these shifts in strategy and engagement. In this 
manner, representation through narrative and brand in Dubuque are indicative of 
how, through interactions with IBM, aspects of urban governance are being 
influenced and redesigned through smart projects (Shelton et al., 2014). Since IBM is 
creating the foundation for these forms of representation, they are influencing the 
ways in which these changes are taking place. 
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8 Portland: Seeking Solutions from City Residents through Smart 
  
The City of Portland, Oregon has gone from being regarded at the turn of the 20th 
century as one of the most dangerous port cities in the world, plagued by organized 
crime and racketeering (Olsen, 2012), to being seen as a bastion for sustainability, a 
forerunner in urban planning and a center for progressive political values (Weber, 
2014). The city has a reputation for offering a good quality of life, with picturesque 
views, affordable living, an extensive public transportation system and a flourishing 
civic community (Grist, 2007; Maerz, 2011; Mayer and Provo, 2004). This 
‘attractiveness’ has enticed city residents and business alike, and is frequently 
attributed to the local government’s focus on sustainable urban planning and its 
willingness to engage the public with associated processes (Johnson, 2004; Mayer 
and Provo, 2004; Putnam et al., 2003).  
 
Figure 25. Images of Portland 
          
Source: Photo images were obtained from: Ashland Daily Photo, see: 
http://traveljapanblog.com/ashland/tag/portland/; Paul Nelson, Visit Downtown Portland Facebook 
Page, see: 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.301815310522.336571.271004920522&type=1; and the 
Northern American Raspberry and Blackberry Association webpage, see: 
http://www.raspberryblackberry.com/. 
 
Contrary to the Dubuque case study, where IBM’s influence made inroads into local 
governance policy and planning processes via interactions around smart projects, 
Portland provided an example of a local government reticent to accept the smart city 
imaginary and skeptical of its promised outcomes. Smart technologies have not been 
a prevalent factor in the city’s strategy or in the way that the local government 
represents the city. Rather, the local government’s primary interest in smart 
technologies, in terms of its relationship with IBM, has centered on exploring how 
such projects could be used as tools to help inform urban planning processes and 
facilitate engagement around them. Despite this differing interpretation and approach 
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to smart technologies from Dubuque, the Portland case study still demonstrated how 
smart projects can be construed as experiments that reinforce assumptions of smart 
(Hollands, 2008) and a neoliberal ethos (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Through this 
lens of analysis, in Chapters 8 and 9 I explore how the Portland local government 
and involved actors have construed and approached smart projects, and how, if at all, 
interactions with IBM have come to affect urban governance. I do so through the 
analysis of case study interviews and interactions with actors involved in the projects 
that I examined, and by looking at materials created around these initiatives.  
 
In addition to a varied perspective of and approach to smart technologies, the 
Portland case study also shed light on potential adverse implications of these 
initiatives, providing caution signs along the path to smart. Initially in Portland I set 
out to examine a smart grid project and a systems modeling project called Systems 
Dynamics for Smarter Cities (SDSC). However, difficulties surrounding the grid 
project left me seeking for other endeavors to examine. This led to me following two 
other IBM smart city projects that did not get off the ground. Through the 
examination of these failed attempts, I found two potential weaknesses of smart 
projects, both externalities that fell outside of IBM’s purview. Firstly, that these 
projects can fail due to a lack of data, despite all the data that they purportedly 
generate. Secondly, that like many other city initiatives, they are vulnerable to 
political whim. I discuss these ‘failures’ further below. After two years of problems 
securing a second smart city initiative to examine in Portland, I was able to identify 
another viable option: a crowdsourcing research project.  
 
In this chapter, I explore IBM interactions with urban governance around strategy 
and engagement via the smart projects examined. I begin by looking at the city’s 
strategy, the Portland Plan, which sets conducive conditions for smart projects to 
emerge—namely through an emphasis on responsibilizing citizens (Beck, 2005; 
Rose, 1999, p. 174) for Plan implementation and the rising presence of private 
sectors actors involved in local policy and planning processes (Harvey, 1989a). I 
then discuss the crowdsourcing research project, which highlights how online 
platforms can be used as means to empower city residents (Kitchin, 2014b; Vanolo 
2014), while also passing responsibility onto them (Beck, 2005; Rose, 1999, p. 174). 
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Based on findings from this research commissioned by IBM, I outline some of the 
advantages of using technology to engage city residents—such as gaining input from 
a larger number of residents, being able to provide unified information for citizen 
review, and enabling a ‘neutral’ environment for comment and feedback (Mahmoudi 
and Seltzer, 2012; Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). I also illustrate how such an 
approach can lend itself to participants making decisions solely based on their own 
needs rather than those of the community as a whole, and thus potentially 
contributing to segregation within civic affairs (Ford Foundation et al., 2014; Turkle, 
2011).  
 
Observations and findings in section 8.1 were primarily derived by examining 
materials—such as websites, documents and presentations, among others—created 
by the local government to describe their city strategy, The Portland Plan, and the 
smart projects they explored. These materials reflect the meanings and 
understandings that the local government has assigned to smart projects, and identify 
the objectives and priorities that these actors are pursuing and how they plan to go 
about achieving them. In addition, I examined smart project materials created by 
IBM to help understand their perspectives toward these efforts in Portland. Section 
8.2 was informed by these same materials as well as case study interviews that I 
conducted for this research. Figures 8 and 9, and Appendix 11.5 provide further 
details on these sources of information. The purpose of this chapter is to apply 
observations from Chapters 2 and 4 to the Portland case study and to examine how 
crowdsourcing efforts may inform local government planning and policies via 
project strategy and engagement, and what the repercussions of these endeavors may 
be.  
 
8.1 The Portland Edge 
 
Located in the northwest of the United States, Portland is poised between Mt. Hood 
and the rugged Pacific shoreline, near the confluence of the Willamette and 
Columbia rivers (Ozawa, 2004a). To its south lies the Willamette Valley, known for 
its production of wine, berries, vegetables and hops. This surrounding landscape 
offers city residents a wide range of recreational activities, mountain views and close 
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ties to the natural environment (Mayer and Provo, 2004). The city’s size is about 350 
square kilometers (United States Census Bureau, 2012a). Over two million people 
reside within the Portland metropolitan statistical area; within the city’s municipal 
limits there are roughly 587,000 people (Portland State University Population 
Research Center, 2013a, 2013b), making the city’s population comparable to that of 
Helsinki, Finland (City of Helsinki, 2015), Stuttgart, Germany (City Population, 
2014), Glasgow, United Kingdom (National Records of Scotland, 2011) and Genoa, 
Italy (U.N. Data, 2012). Similar to Dubuque, the population in Portland is relatively 
homogenous, with over three-fourths being non-Hispanic white—although, this is 
changing annually with increasing racial and ethnic diversity. Unlike Dubuque 
however, the city is young; the median age is thirty-five, with only eleven percent 
ages sixty-five and older (United States Census Bureau, 2012b).  
 
Figure 26. Portland’s Hawthorne Bridge  
 
Source: Image from Wikipedia. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portland,_Oregon (accessed 
September 9, 2013). 
 
The city is led by the Portland City Council, which is comprised of the Mayor, four 
Commissioners, and an independent auditor who serves a checks-and-balances role 
for the Council and is responsible for public resource use accountability. The four 
Commissioners, along with the Mayor, each serve as administrators to various 
different city bureaus and departments (Portland Online, 2013h). The current Mayor 
is Charlie Hales, who took office in January 2013, replacing the former Mayor Sam 
Adams.58 On a broader scale, the city of Portland and its surrounding metropolitan 
region are served by Metro, the only directly elected metropolitan planning 
organization within the United States. Within this model, citizens can influence 
                                                 
58 Since the majority of my fieldwork was conducted during the term of the previous Mayor, Sam 
Adams, the brunt of my observations will reflect Mayor Adams’s policies and administration. 
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regional land use, transportation planning and solid waste management by their votes 
for the Metro government, which is responsible for these activities across the 
Portland metropolitan area (McCauley, 2009).  
 
For decades, Portland has had a reputation for being a city where people want to 
live—attracting residents and businesses with its appealing landscape, green policies 
and practices, exceptional public transportation, affordability, thriving civic 
community and self-proclaimed ‘unique’ culture (Grist, 2007; Maerz, 2011; Mayer 
and Provo, 2004; Ozawa, 2004a; Scalza, 2012). Portlanders often refer to these 
attributes as the “Portland Edge” (Mayer and Provo, 2004). One of the primary 
economic drivers to the initial growth of Portland was its location alongside two key 
rivers and its proximity to the ocean—a factor that has enabled the city to play a 
pivotal role as a trading gateway with the rest of the world, exporting the wealth of 
resources located in the surrounding area.59 As the city has shifted from being a 
natural resource-oriented economy to one based on knowledge, high technology 
firms have taken root. During the 1980s, the Portland region was known as “Silicon 
Forest” due to its rapidly rising number of high technology firms and consequent 
innovation, where annual patent registration remained roughly three times that of the 
U.S. national average from 1975 to 1999. Throughout these two decades, the city 
experienced rapid economic growth that drew in significant numbers of single, well-
educated youth (Mayer and Provo, 2004). The city has an annual GDP of $137 
billion (United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2007). 
 
Over the last decade however, job losses in the technology sector have contributed to 
a rise in the city’s poverty rates. High unemployment and homelessness plague the 
city, while the state of Oregon’s overall conditions have also worsened, with low 
living wages, skyrocketing hunger rates, and a rising gap between the rich and the 
poor that has grown four times faster than the national average (Mirk, 2009; Prince, 
2004). As a result, some urban experts feel that the stratification between Portland’s 
wealthy and well-educated population and its working class poor might rise to levels 
similar to that of Manhattan over the next few decades (Kotkin, 2010, p. 18).  
                                                 
59 This movement of goods has shaped the development of the city’s infrastructure, including the 
warehouses and railroads necessary to enable this trade (Mayer & Provo, 2004). 
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In the face of these economic challenges and their social consequences, the local 
government has been striving to maintain the Portland Edge by taking new 
approaches to three key areas for which the city is renown: sustainability, urban 
planning and community engagement (Ozawa, 2004b). Unlike the case in Dubuque, 
the application of smart technologies to these three areas is not a focal point of the 
city’s strategy, the Portland Plan, which makes no mention of smart technologies. 
However, the local government has done exploratory work to see how technology 
may be applied for better outcomes in regards to sustainability, urban planning and 
community engagement. Further in contrast to Dubuque, according to one-third of 
those who I interviewed in Portland, the local government has approached smart 
technology projects with measured pause and skepticism, with the exception of the 
city’s former mayor. Though city leaders have been interested in seeing how 
technology and smart projects could potentially inform urban planning processes 
(which touch upon sustainability and community engagement), they have questioned 
the value of smart projects, wondering if they would offer cure or palliation for the 
challenges the city is facing. Instead of being viewed as a panacea, the local 
government seems to construe smart as another form of urban entrepreneurship, akin 
to the “Creative City” (Florida, 2002; Vanolo, 2008) or “Eco-city” (Register, 
2006)—the latter of which aligns with their EcoDistrict work (EcoDistricts, 2016).   
 
8.1.1 The Portland Plan 
 
Due to Portland’s surrounding natural environment and its abundant resources, 
planning in the region has been a focus of the local government for over one hundred 
years. City officials have been careful to slow urban sprawl, striving to preserve the 
environment while also maintaining a perceived high quality of life (Mayer and 
Provo, 2004). Consequently, Portland has earned the reputation for being a leader in 
sustainability and urban planning. It is considered the most environmentally friendly 
city in the United States and the second most in the world (Grist, 2007).60 Further, it 
                                                 
60 In terms of political leaning, Portland is regarded as one of the most ‘progressive’ cities within the 
United States—in part due to the city’s numerous social programs for vulnerable groups such as the 
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is seen as a city where aspiring urban planners can go to earn applied credentials. As 
the American “Capital of Good Planning” (Abbott, 2004), Portland is regarded as a 
pivotal center for sustainability, regional planning, growth management and 
innovative urban policies (Mayer and Provo, 2004). So, in this regard, the city differs 
from Dubuque, where a perceived lack of ‘strong’ city brand has led the local 
government to emphasize brand enhancement through a range of place promotion 
strategies. Portland’s reputation for being a ‘successful’ urban community is often 
attributed to leadership at the community, local and state levels, and decades of city 
residents getting involved in urban governance processes through consultations, 
town meetings, demonstrations, volunteer activities, charrettes and focus group 
sessions, among others (Orloff, 2004; Ozawa, 2004a). This attentive approach to 
urban planning, and the consultation processes undertaken to inform it, is 
demonstrated by the Portland Plan.  
 
The Portland Plan is a strategic planning process led by the local government that 
outlines the city’s objectives, programs and desired outcomes for the next twenty-
five years (Portland Online, 2013a). To develop the Portland Plan, more than 20 
government agencies, numerous businesses and civic organizations, and thousands of 
residents were involved in a range of town hall meetings, focus group sessions and 
other consultative processes that included soliciting feedback in person as well as 
online. The consultation process lasted over two years, included over 300 public 
meetings and gathered over 20,000 comments during four phases where: (a) 
background information was made openly available and the public / businesses 
identified goals for nine action areas; (b) the goals were reviewed for additional 
feedback and prioritization; (c) Portlanders shared ideas for obtaining these goals and 
priorities at fairs and community meetings; and (d) the draft Plan was presented to 
the public for final review and input during public hearings and work sessions 
(Portland Online, 2013a). In part, the local government used this broad consultation 
strategy to make sure that the Plan was perceived as inclusive and to reflect shifts in 
accountability for the Plan’s implementation. 
 
                                                 
homeless, civically and politically active residents, and environmentally friendly policies and 
programs (Mayer & Provo, 2004). 
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The result of this process, the 2013 Portland Plan (shown in Figure 27), is described 
by the local government as a means to address “some of the community’s most 
pressing challenges, including income disparities, high unemployment, a low high 
school graduation rate and environmental concerns” (Portland Online, 2013a, p. 1). 
Similar to the approach to sustainability taken in Dubuque, the Plan is centered on 
the “Three E’s”—environment, economy and equity—a theoretical framework often 
used in regional or sustainable development plans (Campbell, 1996; McDonough and 
Braungart, 2002; Wheeler, 2002; Yaro and Hiss, 1996 in Mayer and Provo, 2004). 
This broadened approach, as discussed in Chapter 6, assumes a maintenance of the 
existing socioeconomic structure, where sustainability generally entails better 
management of resources (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 215). 
 
Figure 27. Overview of the Portland Plan  
 
Source: Portland Online, 2013a, p. 2. 
 
Given my focus on smart technologies, what is first apparent when reviewing this 
strategy is the absence of reference to technology, for “healthy connected city” refers 
to being able to bike or walk to anything that you need within your community not to 
connection through ICT (Portland Online, 2013a). The fact that the Portland Plan is 
bereft of references to smart technologies and projects alludes to the possibility that 
the local government and stakeholders involved in building the Plan do not view 
smart projects as key to helping achieve city outcomes. Yet, while the Plan does not 
specifically detail the need for smart technologies, aspects of the city’s strategy and 
how it was developed do reinforce urban entrepreneurial conditions that are 
conducive to smart projects.  
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8.1.2 Laying the Foundation for Smart 
 
The Portland Plan and the processes used to create it promote the use of PPPs to 
address urban affairs. For example, before the Plan process began, the local 
government and varied sponsors held an Inspiring Communities series to help inform 
city residents about the issues the Plan would cover and to share best practices used 
in other cities related to these issues (Portland Online, 2013b). Figure 28 gives an 
idea of the types of actors involved in shaping the Portland’s future strategy, ranging 
from government agencies and academic institutions to private sector actors like 
IBM (Portland Online, 2013a). Bringing in this wide array of actors to develop and 
implement the Plan has helped the local government diffuse risk, responsibilities and 
resources across a network (Agranoff, 2003; Kooiman, 1993; Stoker, 1998). It also 
can be construed as an effort by the local government to attempt to attract external 
funding and investments to aid in Plan implementation (Harvey, 1989a). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, those that support the use of PPPs vie that these partnerships 
can assist in providing private finance to public initiatives, thereby enabling 
improved and greater access to services and infrastructure (European Commission, 
2003; Payne, 1999 and Public Private Advisory Group on PPPs, 2001 in Hearne, 
2009, p. 11-12).  
 
Figure 28. Inspiring Communities series sponsors  
Source: Portland Online, 2013b. 
 
IBM was a sponsor of the Inspiring Communities series—and while a consultative 
process versus a partnership to implement a project, by engaging in this series IBM 
staff hoped to turn the former into the latter; or, at the very least influence the city’s 
strategy so that technology and smart city concepts would become integral to the 
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Plan, affecting not one but several city systems. This sponsor role also enabled IBM 
to build deeper relationships with the mayor and the city’s Bureau of Planning and 
Sustainability, both of which later became partners in the Systems Dynamics for 
Smarter Cities project. This type of sponsorship is typical to IBM marketing 
processes, where marketing is viewed as a service and service is viewed as 
marketing (Iwata, 2011). In other words, IBM provides various services pro bono 
while it builds key relationships and shares relevant expertise that IBM staff feel will 
help win future deals. Despite IBM’s efforts within this series to guide conversation 
and approach to the Plan, the application of smart technologies was not integrated 
into the Plan. Hence smart city solutions like those sold by IBM were not deemed by 
participants involved in developing the Plan as a priority to achieve city outcomes.  
 
Another entrée for smart projects was created within the city’s strategy with the local 
government’s emphasis on city residents being critical actors within Plan 
implementation to achieve desired outcomes. The Plan outlines a range of actions 
that individuals can undertake to help contribute to Plan goals through activities at 
home, at work and / or within their classroom or organization (Portland Online, 
2013g). And, while it reads as standard and fairly anodyne rhetoric of city planning, 
it conveys, in part, the perceptions that the local government has of city residents and 
what their roles should be within achieving city goals. As noted in Chapter 4, with an 
entrepreneurial approach to local government, responsibilities are increasingly being 
pushed down not only to the secondary and tertiary sectors, but also to the citizen 
(Beck, 2005, p. 170; Giddens, 1998; Stoker, 1998). In this responsibilization (Rose, 
1999, p. 174), citizens become responsible actors to help achieve government 
outcomes; and as the Dubuque case study demonstrates, smart projects can help 
facilitate this process.61 As noted in the document, the Portland Plan “is not just a 
City of Portland or government plan, it is a plan that individual Portlanders can, and 
must, help implement” (Portland Online, 2013f).  
 
                                                 
61 Though, by no means do all smart city projects involve delegation of responsibility to citizens. This 
seems to be more typical with projects that require end user behavior change for the desired project 
outcomes to be achieved (e.g., sustainability initiatives).   
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In the remaining sections of this chapter and in Chapter 9 I examine the two case 
study projects that I explored in Portland. Figure 29 provides details on these two 
endeavors: (a) a crowdsourcing research project overseen by Portland State 
University, which was conducted to help IBM better understand how citizens can be 
engaged to inform urban planning; and (b) a systems modeling project, Systems 
Dynamics for Smarter Cities, that was undertaken to help improve city planning and 
strategy development, while potentially boosting sustainability outcomes by enabling 
increased efficiency of city operations.  
 
Figure 29. Smart projects examined in Portland 
 Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities 
Project62 
Crowdsourcing to Inform Urban 
Planning Research Project63 
Overview An online portal that integrated data from 
across city systems to enable city leaders to 
explore interactive visual maps and simulate 
macro-level policy changes  
A research project that examined 
the open innovation technique of 
crowdsourcing to inform urban 
planning 
Aim To test the idea of modeling systems 
dynamics within an urban environment with 
the understanding that if ‘successful’, the 
model could be commercialized and turned 
into an offering 
To ascertain how crowdsourcing 
may be applied to urban planning  
Duration 1 year (2010-2011) 1 year (2011-2012) 
Involved 
partners 
IBM staff, Portland State University, Forio 
Business Solutions, and government 
representatives and subject matter experts that 
specialized on housing, economy, budget, 
government services, transportation, asset 
management, utilities, health and wellness, 
public safety, education, arts, culture, 
neighborhood and housing, design and 
planning 
Portland State University  
Finance The development of this software was at no 
cost to the city given it was an IBM test case 
This project was funded by an IBM 
Faculty Award paid by IBM 
Research  
 
 
8.2 Bottom-Up Urban Planning 
 
While the majority of IBM smart cities projects seek to apply technologies to city 
systems and services through top-down, technocratic approaches, researchers within 
the company were also curious about exploring bottom-up approaches that could 
                                                 
62 For more information see IBM, 2011b, 2011f. 
63 For more information see Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 2012; Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012. 
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spur innovation within urban environments and potentially open up new avenues of 
business opportunity (City in Motion Meeting, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). In this vein, 
IBM Research staff began considering how methods like crowdsourcing and 
crowdsensing might be applied to inform urban planning and the implementation of 
city strategies to expand the smart city market. This exploration by IBM Research of 
more citizen-focused smart projects pre-dates IBM Smarter Cities narratives around 
targeting city residents by roughly two years (see for example IBM, 2014j). Yet, I do 
not think that IBM narratives shifted to include a citizen-centric focus as a result of 
this these efforts of IBM Research; rather, these new messages more likely reflect 
market realities and a continual effort by IBM to gain smart city market share.  
 
Two different pilot projects that focused on city residents were pursued by IBM 
Research, both of which fell through during their initial development due to the 
novelty, costs and uncertainty associated with these endeavors. On the third try of 
exploring possibilities within this realm, IBM Research staff were able to solidify a 
research project that explored the literature around open innovation and 
crowdsourcing applied to urban planning processes. For the purposes of my research, 
I have included this project in my analysis as it enables an examination of the 
application of crowdsourcing to urban planning, where city residents become 
involved in problem solving and decision making about city services and 
infrastructure via digital infrastructure. 
 
8.2.1 Failed Crowdsensing Pilot 
 
IT providers and local governments are increasingly exploring how city residents can 
serve as data sources, where people can voluntarily gather and upload data, or 
unknowingly contribute data by something as seemingly innocuous as carrying a cell 
phone. This technique, called crowdsensing, is made possible with mobile and 
wireless technologies, and enables people to act as voluntary or involuntary sensors 
through their mobile phone or other connected devices, such as tablets, GPS and 
laptops. Navigation devices are a good example of crowdsensing; they tap into 
cellular networks to gather insights on people’s movements and provide information 
on traffic delays (Pereira et al., 2011). Another example is the Crowd4Roads project, 
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a three-year initiative launched in 2016 that is funded and supervised by the 
European Commission. This project aims to engage drivers and passengers to adopt 
“more sustainable car usage habits and road maintenance policies” by establishing a 
“synergistic relationship between BlaBlaCar, the largest ride sharing community 
worldwide”, and SmartRoadSense, a “crowd sensing system which exploits the 
accelerometers of car-mounted smartphones as non-intrusive sensors of road surface 
quality” (Crowd4Roads, 2015).  
 
The first crowdsensing pilot that IBM Research staff tried to launch was also focused 
around transportation. Stemming from the relationship built with the Portland State 
University during the SDSC project, IBM Research staff set up a fellowship grant 
with Ethan Seltzer, Professor at Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning and 
Interim Director of School of Art+Design at Portland State University, to lead the 
design of the pilot (City in Motion Meeting, 2011b). Given the success attributed to 
the smart pilot projects in Dubuque, the city was seen as a fertile testing ground for a 
crowdsensing solution rather than the Portland locale. Through internal discussions 
within IBM Research staff, the idea for a First of a Kind (FOAK) research project 
was born, called City in Motion (CIM). IBM Research staff and Seltzer were curious 
to see how real-time data generated by city residents could help inform land use and 
transportation planning decisions, as well as longer term urban plans. The idea was 
to gather mobile phone data to get a better idea of how people move throughout the 
city, when they move, what form of transportation they use, and what patterns of 
movement they form. This would then be integrated with other forms of real-time 
data—e.g. car GPS, bus GIS sensors, traffic cameras, taxis, Mapquest, Google Maps, 
etc.—as well as more traditional forms of information like zoning and census data 
that land use and transportation planners traditionally use (City in Motion Meeting, 
2011a, 2011b).  
 
As the idea germinated, the number of stakeholders involved in CIM project 
planning grew. From IBM, cloud computing and transportation experts were 
consulted or pulled into the fold. Discussions were held with the local Metropolitan 
Planning Organization, the East Central Inter-government Agency, which handles 
transportation planning in Dubuque, as well as the local government office 
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responsible for land use planning (City in Motion Meeting, 2011c). Representatives 
from the architectural and planning firm HDR Engineering, Inc. were also consulted 
to help figure out how these data could help emergency planning, architecture and 
engineering firms, which work with lots of data but often do not know what other 
types of data are available to inform their work, how to gather new data, and how to 
understand all of the data that can be gathered and translated into insight. After 
months of discussions however, the FOAK proposal failed. In the spirit of the 
FOAK, which involves IBM donating time and expertise to test a new idea, the hope 
had been that certain mobile companies operating in Dubuque would provide 
anonymized local user data at low or no cost to help inform the project. Instead, the 
cellular companies came back with a price for the data that IBM was not willing to 
pay, especially for such a small, experimental (and unpaid) project (City in Motion 
Meeting, 2011c).  
 
And herein lies an important, and seemingly contradictory, observation to note—that 
smart projects, can fail due to a lack of data, despite all of the data that they help 
create, capture and analyze. Whilst smart initiatives do involve integrating digital 
infrastructure into city systems and services, they often do so through PPPs that 
involve a wide range of actors; actors that may have conflicting or varying interests 
around the project (Monbiot, 2000). Within these PPPs, each actor may be 
generating and / or analyzing their own data—to which the local government and 
other partnering organizations may or may not have access. Within a smart project, 
local governments do not automatically have ownership of the data generated, 
though in most cases, they will have some form of access. In Dubuque for example, 
the local government had access to aggregate level data from the utility company for 
the Smarter Electrical Pilot project; it did not however, have access to data at a 
granular level for privacy reasons (Naphade, 2012).  
 
In the case of this failed pilot, IBM and its CIM partners attempted to get the local 
mobile phone company to join in the pilot and donate the data needed to run the 
analysis necessary to inform transportation planning. However, while IBM was 
willing to do this project pro bono, the mobile company wanted to charge for this 
endeavor (unsurprisingly, their main goal is to turn a profit). While the data 
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necessary to implement the pilot existed, it was financially inaccessible to Dubuque 
city leaders or other CIM partners. This illustrates how having access to the ‘right’ 
types of data is central to smart projects; and, how easily smart projects can quickly 
fail without this access. As a workaround to this vulnerability, Seltzer proposed that 
instead the team use crowdsourcing as a means to inform urban planning, where data 
would be provided voluntarily from the city residents themselves instead of via 
crowdsensing.  
 
8.2.2 Failed Crowdsourcing Pilot 
 
Smart projects by design encourage partnerships across a range of urban actors who 
are often involved in innovation (Deakin and Al Waer, 2011, 2012). For this reason, 
these initiatives align well with crowdsourcing,64 an open innovation technique that 
is common within the private sector to guide business decisions, processes and 
development (Howe, 2009). The concept of crowdsourcing, when described, sounds 
similar to themes found within citizen engagement and planning literature, for it 
refers to the cooperative creation of ideas and applications outside of the boundaries 
of any single firm, including involving the users of a system or product (Gassman 
and Enkel, 2004 in Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). In his analysis of the potential of 
crowdsourcing, Brabham (2010) notes that: “the crowd’s strength lies in its 
composite or aggregate of ideas, rather than in a collaboration of ideas. … This 
‘wisdom of crowds’ is derived not from averaging solutions, but from aggregating 
them” (Brabham, 2010, p. 1125 in Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). One example of a 
mass collaboration project that is crowdsourced is Wikipedia, where anyone can 
contribute or alter information, and others can verify or delete the information 
provided—its wisdom is derived from the crowd. Within the city context, 
crowdsourcing is a form of open innovation where local governments tap into the 
‘wisdom’ of city residents through the Internet (Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). A 
willingness to apply this private sector technique to public issues reflects, to an 
                                                 
64 The term crowdsourcing is usually attributed to Jeffrey Howe, who wrote several Wired magazine 
articles on the topic (2006) and a subsequent book (2009). According to Howe (2006, 2009), 
crowdsourcing, a consequence of outsourcing problem-solving to companies in India and China, is the 
unearthing of knowledge and talent from people in many different places who are loosely affiliated 
through the Internet (Seltzer & Mahmoudi, 2012). 
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extent, the perception that the private sector is more innovative (Hearne, 2009, p. 11-
12). 
 
Once the crowdsensing FOAK failed, IBM Research staff and Seltzer brainstormed 
other ways to apply his research fellowship to running a crowdsourcing pilot. Since 
Seltzer was based in Portland, it became an obvious possibility as a site for the 
project. In addition to location, two other factors helped influence the decision to use 
Portland as the pilot city: (a) the local government’s emphasis on engaging city 
residents through consultative, decision making and policy-forming activities; and 
(b) an existing online portal designed to gather input from city residents on city 
policies and resource allocation called Opt In.  
 
Portland’s local government frequently employs consultative processes that involve 
city residents (Johnson, 2004; Putnam et al., 2003; Witt, 2004). For example, the 
Portland Plan process took several years due to the numerous rounds of town 
meetings and sessions held for gathering and engaging stakeholders (Portland 
Online, 2013a, 2013b). As such, integrating a bottom-up approach to inform urban 
planning is not a novel idea for Portlanders. Seltzer hoped to build on this practice 
and create a pilot that linked to members from the existing online Opt In panel, 
which was created by Metro to get feedback from residents on decisions and 
planning related to the Portland metropolitan area (Metro, 2014). As referred to by 
an expert who I interviewed from Portland State University, Opt In is like “civic 
engagement 2.0”. This Opt In panel65 is used to question and survey members on a 
range of issues like “housing, sustainability, parks, clean drinking water, urban 
growth and development, garbage, and more” (Metro, 2014).  
 
In general, Opt In managers implement one to two surveys per month. The response 
rate depends on the survey, with between 3,000-6,000 people participating in each 
survey or question with only one reminder sent. There is no Opt In budget to run the 
surveys, rather each government department that chooses to use the panel must pay 
                                                 
65 In my interview with the head of DHM Research, he noted that at the time the pilot idea was 
explored in the fall of 2012, there were 10,000 panel members. By the end of 2013, Panel membership 
was over 18,000. 
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the associated fees. For each survey there are fifteen to twenty questions with space 
for open-ended comments. Metro and its partners receive only anonymous, aggregate 
reports of participants’ survey responses, which are shared on the Opt In website for 
both members and local decision-makers to review (DHM Research, 2014; Metro, 
2014). According to a community engagement expert from Portland State University 
and the head of the firm that runs the Panel, results are about equal to or better than 
random sampling. And, given the high costs of traditional public consultation, these 
experts feel that Opt In is attractive because while there are costs involved, using the 
Panel is cheaper than traditional methods.  
 
The Panel surveys are run by DHM Research, a private sector organization that 
provides clients assistance with “communications, marketing, planning, and policy-
making through focus groups, telephone and online surveys, and the development 
and utilization of online panels” (DHM Research, 2014), in effect privatizing related 
messaging and public engagement for these projects. Opt In partner agencies include 
the Northwest Health Foundation, AARP, Inc. (formerly American Association of 
Retired Persons), the United Way of the Columbia-Willamette, and the Portland 
State University College of Urban and Public Affairs (Metro, 2014). Part of the 
reason for this diversification of actors, as noted by the head of DHM Research in 
my interview with him, is that people would be more likely to join if the Panel was 
associated with a trusted name. Therefore a range of groups were recruited to 
become involved so as to appeal to a range of individuals. In my discussions with 
Seltzer about the Panel and its use for the crowdsourcing project, he said that he 
found the idea of piloting a crowdsourcing exercise with the Opt In Panel attractive 
due to the fact that Panel members are already used to using technology to provide 
input to inform urban planning decisions and policies. In addition, the Panel has 
broad representation—it is stratified by demographics (age, race, socio-economic 
status), geography and bi-partisanship (Panel members are almost evenly split 
between Republicans and Democrats) (DHM Research, 2014).  
 
However, despite the attractiveness of utilizing Opt In for a crowdsourcing 
experiment, the idea fell through. According to a Metro official who I interviewed, 
this was partially due to timing. Seltzer contacted Metro with the idea right after 
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there was push back from the Republican Party about the way an Opt In survey was 
worded. Consequently, a small group was quite vocal against the Opt In Panel. For 
this reason, the executive from the Metro government noted that Metro was hesitant 
to engage the Panel again so soon after the event, especially if the crowdsourcing 
experiment was found to be controversial. So, even though there was an existing 
infrastructure to run the pilot—a group of Panel members, a platform for 
participation already built, and IBM resources on hand to run the experiment—the 
effort failed for political reasons. Metro did not want any more negative exposure 
around the Panel or its operations. And so, another smart project vulnerability 
emerged from reviewing these failed pilots—aversion to the political risks involved 
with these types of initiatives. While some city leaders may initiate smart projects to 
deflect attention from other failed endeavors (Hollands, 2008), they also realize that 
these projects also present risk, which is more likely to immediately fall upon the 
involved local government actors than their private sector partners (Agranoff, 2003; 
Stoker, 1998).  
 
8.2.3 Crowdsourcing to Inform Urban Planning Research Project 
 
After these two failed pilots, IBM Research and Seltzer agreed to apply the 
fellowship grant to a literature review that would be undertaken by Seltzer and 
Dillon Mahmoudi, a PhD Student and Research Assistant with Portland State 
University’s Urban Studies and Planning Department. Conducted in “an effort to 
encourage a cross-disciplinary dialogue between planners and those engaged in 
innovation processes in other sectors”, the two examined the purposes and 
expectations of citizen participation and the open innovation technique of 
crowdsourcing (Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012, p. 1). They then looked at how 
crowdsourcing has been applied to urban planning to provide insight on approach 
and effectiveness. In contrast to IBM’s approach in Dubuque, which was top-down, 
this project explored how to facilitate a bottom-up, participatory approach to urban 
governance by using smart technologies (Deakin and Al Waer, 2011).  
 
This focus in their research touches upon two assumptions commonly associated 
with smart projects: (a) that smart project necessitate a pro-business bias, reflected 
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by the private sector techniques that defined this endeavor (Hollands, 2008; 
Townsend, 2013, p. 5, 31); and (b) that smart technologies routinely involve 
community participation, and with this, there is an implied consensus around 
implementing these technologies (Coe et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008; Komninos, 2002, 
p.188). It should be noted that while IBM Research funded this initiative and helped 
decide upon the overarching topic, they were not involved in the project as it 
developed in terms of research contributions, feedback on drafts or input on 
direction. Instead, they were primarily interested in the final conclusions and 
observations of the work, and how these then could be applied to adapt existing or 
create new marketable solutions.  
 
Seltzer and Mahmoudi began by reviewing literature on open innovation 
(Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Gassman and Enkel, 2004; Speidel, 2011) and 
crowdsourcing to see how each might be aligned and / or applied to urban planning 
(Evans-Cowley and Hollander, 2010). The purpose of this exercise was to see if 
crowdsourcing could be used as a ‘good’ tool to facilitate public consultation. Within 
this review, Seltzer and Mahmoudi found that open innovation and techniques like 
crowdsourcing do seem to share commonalities with the objectives of public 
consultation, for both seek to gain the involvement of ‘users’ of a system or product 
(i.e., city residents in an urban context), and therefore would be applicable to urban 
planning. As noted by Evans-Cowley (2011),  
 
City and regional planning is a perfect discipline for crowdsourcing because 
planners are constantly identifying problems and working to find solutions. 
Planners excel in framing problems and soliciting input from the public, and 
they intuitively recognize the power (of) the public to solve problems as a 
group. (p. 3)  
 
One reason that is helping to make crowdsourcing a more attractive option for local 
governments is the increasingly pressure they face to do more with less resources 
(Shelton et al., 2014). Recognizing that while traditional public consultations 
processes can be quite expensive and time consuming, local governments still take 
the view that they help gain useful information and confer legitimacy on projects and 
plans. Furthermore, these processes, by pulling together a broad range of input, often 
provide greater resilience to local government initiatives. Given these pronounced 
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benefits and the growing constraints on time and money, local governments have 
looked to business sector open innovation techniques like crowdsourcing to facilitate 
or enhance public consultation (Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 2012; Seltzer and 
Mahmoudi, 2012).  
 
To provide insight on approach and effectiveness in applied practice versus theory, 
Mahmoudi and Seltzer looked at a project in Omaha, Nebraska to get a better idea of 
how crowdsourcing has been applied to inform urban planning. The project they 
examined was implemented by MindMixer, an Omaha-based firm created to 
“develop tools for applying open innovation and crowd wisdom to planning” and 
policy making—one of the few firms now operating in this market. MindMixer’s 
first citywide website, Engage Omaha (www.engageomaha.com), was designed to, 
in the words of MindMixer CEO and Co-Founder Nick Bowden, “augment the city’s 
outreach efforts to its citizens … most importantly to gather feedback on the city 
budget to help prioritize different services that each department is offering over the 
course of the next budget year for the city” (Bowden in Gerlock, 2011). Engage 
Omaha represents a growing trend of local governments turning to crowdsourcing or 
other Internet-mediated mechanisms for public consultation processes; and as such, 
is yet another channel in which technology is being integrated into city systems, 
operations and services delivery.  
 
In their review of Engage Omaha, Mahmoudi and Seltzer found that while 
crowdsourcing engagement is not as robust as ideal, it can still be deemed valuable 
by participants. Participating Omaha residents valued the interaction with city staff 
around budget formulation. Omaha city staff valued the legitimization of the plans 
that they felt was gained via feedback from a larger, diverse cross-section of the city. 
City staff additionally saw value in the ability to disseminate information with links 
related to each topic’s problem statement, giving participating city residents 
immediate access to the same information and additional details if they so choose. 
And, through the increased participation enabled by Engage Omaha, Mahmoudi and 
Seltzer found that the city of Omaha was able to go beyond its institutional 
boundaries in ways it otherwise may not have for city resident input (Mahmoudi and 
Seltzer, 2012). Thus, Mahmoudi and Seltzer deemed the Engage Omaha budgetary 
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exercise ‘successful’ since both city residents and the local government felt it added 
value.  
 
Similar crowdsourcing projects have been tested in cities like Hamburg, Germany, 
where NextHamburg, a citizens’ think tank, is crowdsourcing the city together with 
citizens through a citizen-driven platform and incubator that is enabling them to 
influence politics (Petrin, 2015). Another example comes from China, where the 
Beijing Transport Research Center and the World Bank are looking for areas that 
transportation planners should be paying attention to by crowdsourcing feedback on 
issues related to cycling and walking infrastructure through the website, smart phone 
apps, SMS or social media. The user-generated reports are then mapped and 
visualized and made available for public discussion (Web Urbanist, 2016). 
 
Challenges 
 
While Mahmoudi and Seltzer described the potential advantages and benefits of 
crowdsourcing in this review, they also noted several challenges associated with 
these types of projects. Firstly, attracting and sustaining participation from a large 
and diversified group over time is challenging—people get pulled away by life’s 
demands, interests wane, and unmet expectations lead to discouragement. And, even 
getting initial active participation is challenging (Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 2012; 
Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). According to Seltzer, crowdsourcing participation 
seems to follow a 1-10-89 rule—where one person will come up with an idea, ten 
people will support and / or discuss it, and eighty-nine others will lurk, watching this 
activity from the sidelines. Hence online participation seems fairly limited to just 
reviewing shared information. Yet, Seltzer notes that there is still a way to get value 
out of the lurkers by tracking their viewing and reading behavior and making it 
available to stakeholders, enabling better understanding of the issues or discussions 
of top interest (Seltzer, 2012). Secondly, Seltzer and Mahmoudi note that another 
key problem with these types of projects is that, due to the nature of crowdsourcing, 
local governments may not always know who is participating in the process, or 
whether the key stakeholders they would like to have participating are engaged. 
While the private sector may want to engage with any innovator during open 
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innovation, local governments tend to want to engage only their own constituents 
(Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 2012). This lack of transparency is a limitation especially 
for efforts where governments want to ensure they include input from targeted 
groups.  
 
A third challenge identified relates to how this process is approached. In their 
analysis, Seltzer and Mahmoudi found that for these processes to be ‘effective’, local 
governments must clearly define what they want out of the process. For example, 
they should outline the impact or outcome they would like to achieve rather than a 
specific solution or approach used to obtain this outcome. To assist in the problem 
solving associated with reaching these desired outcomes, the local government 
should also share the concepts associated with the problem, what relevant factors 
may be unknown, as well as what city leaders realistically can and cannot do to solve 
the problem so that crowdsourced solutions are viable options (Mahmoudi and 
Seltzer, 2012; Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). In other words, crowdsourcing can be 
an effective tool to inform urban planning if the problem being crowdsourced is 
specifically defined and clear expectations are set for what types of information or 
recommendations will fall within the local government’s scope associated with the 
exercise.  
 
Another caution around crowdsourcing techniques relates to the fact that unlike with 
commercial activities, crowdsourcing in the public sector is focused on political 
processes and values verses profit. Ultimately, urban plans are “socially constructed 
and are political statements, requiring, ultimately, a great deal of face-to-face 
interaction rather than anonymous Internet-based activity” (Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 
2012, p. 12). Hence, while crowdsourcing does have potential with urban planning 
processes, it should be complemented by more traditional public consultation 
techniques and conducted within a narrow band of specific applications. In their 
recommendations, Mahmoudi and Seltzer note that after a planning problem and its 
goals have been outlined, crowdsourcing could be useful to help identify options to 
meet plan goals (2012). And, as this practice becomes more common, over time, 
what does and does not work in terms of application will become more and more 
apparent.  
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This research around crowdsourcing and urban planning raises several questions 
about the practice. Are town meetings and online platforms serving different types of 
city constituents? How does the medium of interaction affect the type and quality of 
feedback or input provided, and is this interaction perceived as ‘meaningful’? How 
can local governments ensure that only city residents are participating in 
crowdsourcing projects? Who gains from moving urban planning discussions online? 
How does the role of the tech provider affect the way that the online platform is 
designed, seen and interpreted by users? And, how might the role of the tech 
provider affect engagement, and perceptions and expectations that city residents and 
the local government have for each other? In the section below I explore some of 
these issues, and how they coalesce with the assumptions of the smart concept. In 
particular I look at the shifting relationships between local government and city 
residents and the application of business models to public sector processes—both of 
which are encapsulated within crowdsourcing efforts to inform urban planning.  
 
8.2.4 Apps for Urban Planning 
 
As described by Seltzer and Mahmoudi (2012), crowdsourcing can be part of a 
bottom-up strategy to inform urban planning. It enables gathering input from more 
city residents that might not have been possible with more traditional public 
consultation processes like town hall meetings and surveys. Within my fieldwork 
research, I found two divergent interpretations of what this turning to crowdsourced 
urban planning may signify in relation to local governance engagement 
arrangements: (a) a positivist view of these initiatives and the opportunities they 
bring, which was unsurprisingly best articulated by the head of the tech firm that 
provided crowdsourcing services for Opt In; and (b) a more critical analysis of what 
this technology trend might mean for relationships between and among local 
government and city residents.  
 
To gain insight into the operations of Opt In, I spoke with Adam Davis, the head of 
DHM Research, the small marketing and political analysis firm that operates the Opt 
In Panel. As expected, Davis viewed these types of projects as a boon for local 
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governments and city residents alike. But, Davis is not alone with this belief; many 
within the tech industry feel that digital will help empower democracy due to the 
“efficiency and transparency gains from using ICTs for engaging the public” (Ford 
Foundation et al., 2014, p. 10). “By creating open data platforms… government is 
democratizing the data” (ElBaz in Ford Foundation et al., 2014, p. 10). City CIOs 
and CTOs also align themselves with this thinking, for it can often lower 
consultation transaction costs (Ford Foundation et al., 2014).  
 
For Davis, panels like Opt In are a good solution for the public engagement system 
in the United States, which according to him is broken due to the busyness of 
everyday lives, the deterioration of overall civic engagement66 and a lack of civility 
within local politics. In his experience, town hall meetings quickly devolve into 
name calling and shouting matches, with little respect for those involved. So from 
Davis’ perspective, the use of technology to enable participation is a good alternative 
for engagement because it enables people to voice their opinion on a specific issue 
that they otherwise may not have been able to share, while also divorcing some 
emotion from the process, which may enable more people to feel comfortable 
participating. 
 
In Davis’ view, interacting online through crowdsourcing or panels like Opt In is a 
new form of engagement, a way to deepen interaction and get more people involved 
in urban governance. With the use of such online platforms, those implementing the 
exercise can ensure that all those who participate get the exact same information, 
something that may not occur with town meetings. And, by design, the Opt In panel 
is controlled and vetted so that only residents living inside the Portland Metropolitan 
area can participate. To assist with transparency, the results of surveys are posted on 
the platform so that members can understand overall voting. What is not clear 
however is how this type of feedback filters into the local government’s decision-
making / resource allocation processes. Figure 30 provides an example of an Opt In 
                                                 
66 The diminution of civic engagement is explored in-depth by Robert Putnam is his examination of 
social capital and civic engagement within America (1993, 1995; Putnam et al., 2003). Putnam 
defines “social capital” as the “features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995). By “civic 
engagement” he is referring to “people’s connections with the life of their communities, not only with 
politics” (Putnam, 1995).   
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survey on grant program awareness and application in North Portland (DHM 
Research, 2014).  
 
Figure 30. Example of Opt In Panel feedback 
 
Source: DHM Research, 2012. 
 
While online crowdsourcing panels like Opt In may enable more to participate, a 
seemingly ‘neutral’ environment and uniform / standardized information sharing, the 
thought of shifting engagement to this type of interaction pulls into question what it 
might mean for the relationships between local governments and city residents. For 
in this type of consultation, there will also be a tech provider and / or technology that 
will sit as an intermediary between the two; thus raising several concerns. Will the 
allure of ‘participating’ in urban governance processes through hand-held devices 
persist, or will the novelty wear off leading to disengagement? Will city residents 
consider entering their opinions in the appropriate fields on a webpage or taking an 
online survey a ‘meaningful’ enough action that will lead them to come back and 
repeatedly participate? Will this method lend itself to certain types of people 
dominating the conversation? How is feedback integrated into decision-making 
processes, and what is the transparency around this process? And, while these 
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questions about the potential implications of crowdsourcing emerge, there is a deeper 
undercurrent that comes to mind. What will be the implications if we continue to 
displace human interaction around urban governance processes with interaction with 
each other via technology? Will we still have compassion and understanding for 
those in need or who have different interests within our community? How will local 
governments foster a sense of community if interactions between city residents and 
local government only exist through a laptop or hand-held device? And, how might 
smart technologies affect ‘citizenship’ and what it means to be involved in civic 
affairs as smart technologies proliferate? As noted in the beginning of this chapter, 
the implications of the digital citizen engagement that smart technologies enable still 
remain unclear.  
 
Technology as the Intermediary 
 
Sherry Turkle (2011), in her book Alone Together: Why we expect more from 
technology and less from each other, notes this rising trend: “We bend to the 
inanimate with new solicitude. We fear the risks and disappointments of 
relationships with our fellow humans. We expect more from technology and less 
from each other” (Turkle, 2011, p. xii). And, as Turkle argues, if technology is 
distancing us from each other in our personal relationships, are techniques like 
crowdsourcing doing the same via the Internet at a community level? Crowdsourcing 
techniques might be more affordable ways to get additional input from certain 
demographic groups within a city, but is the information gathered worth the 
relational cost? In a sense, crowdsourcing and online panels like Opt In are 
decentralizing decision making to the extreme, where individuals cast their vote or 
respond with no respect to or consideration for how the impact may affect others.  
 
Because face-to-face discussions do not take place, participants do not get to hear 
other viewpoints or perspectives; they do not necessarily have to read them if they 
are posted online. Hence, participants’ decisions are made solely customized to their 
own individualized needs and concerns. An over reliance on technologies for public 
engagement in this sense can lead to or intensify civic segregation. Paul Dourish, 
Professor and Co-Director of the Center for Social Computing, Informatics and 
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Computer Science at University of California, Irvine, notes that the digital city is 
more fragmented, “individualistic and disjointed” by nature than the physical city, 
and thus “is particularly problematic for civic participation” (Ford Foundation et al., 
2014, p. 10).  
 
Another concern to consider with such approaches to public consultation is that if the 
local government implements the crowdsourced solution, this involves 
experimentation with the solution recommended and created by users. Instead of 
applying known solutions that have been previously tested, in cases where 
crowdsourced solutions are implemented the local government faces more risk—it is 
a gamble somewhat akin to a startup within the private sector, a risk more local 
governments are willing to take in efforts to cut costs. Yet the stakes for failure are 
much higher within public sector initiatives (Agranoff, 2003), where trust and 
relationships can be permanently or seriously damaged by repeated government 
failure in meeting city resident expectations.  
 
Further, the practice of moving consultation processes online mirrors typical 
marketing practices of the private sector, demonstrating another example of smart 
projects encouraging a pro-business bias (Hollands, 2008). The use of technology to 
facilitate the consultation process can be seen as an extension of customer relations 
management practices that are promoted within the private sector as means to help 
lure and retain customers (Kotler et al., 2002, p. 14). Just as retail stores or banks 
may create an app to build a ‘relationship’ with its customers, crowdsourcing apps 
for urban planning can be seen as an extension of the same. With this crowdsourcing 
approach to inform urban operations and planning, city residents become customer 
consumers (Cohen, 2001), where they consume the city and its services as a product. 
As envisioned by IT providers, urban planning apps will enable local governments to 
share information with and glean insight from their customer consumers to improve 
the way that they function and provide services, just like retail websites and apps that 
enable customers to provide feedback which is then integrated into product design 
(Buschner et al., 2010). In this manner, crowdsourcing platforms will enable local 
governments to court their resident customer consumers—raising questions around 
the nature of future citizen-local government relationships.  
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Conclusions 
 
While this chapter looked into interactions around strategy and engagement via a 
research project on crowdsourcing for urban planning, it also revealed cracks in the 
smart city veneer that did not seem readily apparent in the Dubuque case study 
became visible. Even before these projects were designed and implemented, the local 
government expressed reserve, suggesting that city officials questioned the allure of 
the smart city imaginary. My interviews with those involved in the crowdsourcing 
research project revealed that rather than seeing the smart city imaginary as a 
complete departure from the past, they viewed smart technologies as incremental 
advancements in gathering and analyzing data on city systems and services, with the 
primary difference being the integration of real-time data and enhanced ability for 
analysis and visualization. In addition to revealing differing perceptions of smart city 
projects between actors in Portland and Dubuque, this case study also shed light on 
some of the frailties associated with smart projects. Through the exploration of the 
failed pilots associated with Portland, I found two clear weaknesses with smart 
projects—that these projects can, ironically, fail due to a lack of data (despite all the 
data they help generate), and that like many other city endeavors, they are vulnerable 
to political whim.  
 
Unlike the smart city experience in Dubuque, the city’s strategy, the Portland Plan, 
did not include reference to smart technologies or place emphasis on using 
technologies to help achieve city goals. The Plan was formed through broad 
consultation with city residents, civic groups and businesses, and although IBM 
became involved in this process in an attempt to get the smart city theme woven into 
this Plan, local government and those consulted did not view this approach as a 
priority for the city and hence did not include it in the strategy (Portland Online, 
2013b). While this omission may seem discouraging for IBM and other smart city 
providers in terms of opportunities in the city, aspects of the Plan still help lay a 
foundation for smart projects to emerge in the future. Firstly, through the 
consultation process to develop the Plan, the local government included a wide range 
of actors that could be involved in public-private partnerships for Plan 
implementation (Portland Online, 2013b). These PPP arrangements, typically sought 
  
 251 
after by local governments in an attempt to attract external funding (Harvey, 1989a), 
stem from the perceived innovation and management expertise of the private sector 
(Hearne, 2009, p. 11-12) and a pro-business bias (Hollands, 2008). In this manner, 
this paves the way for entrepreneurial policy experiments like smart projects or 
initiatives such as the “Creative City” (Florida, 2002; Vanolo, 2008) or “Eco-city” 
(Register, 2006). The second area in which the Plan lays a foundation for smart 
projects is with the emphasis it places on city residents becoming responsible to aid 
in Plan implementation (Portland Online, 2013b).  
 
In parallel to the local government viewing city residents as key actors for Plan 
implementation, IBM Research was keen to better understand how technologies 
could be used to engage city residents to inform urban planning. The resulting 
crowdsourcing research project highlighted the advantages to using technology to 
engage city residents—such as gaining input from a larger number of residents, 
being able to provide unified information for citizen review, and enabling a ‘neutral’ 
environment for comment and feedback (Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 2012; Seltzer and 
Mahmoudi, 2012). This bottom-up, participatory approach offers an alternative to the 
types of smart projects driven from the top-down (Townsend, 2013, pp. 86, 249), 
such as those implemented in Dubuque. However, this research also pointed to risks 
posed by this open innovation technique, such as participants making decisions 
solely based on their own needs rather than those of the community as a whole, a 
practice that could intensify segregation within civic affairs (Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 
2012; Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). In this vein, the smart city is more fragmented 
and disjointed than the physical city, and thus presents new challenges for civic 
participation (Ford Foundation et al., 2014). While a research endeavor, this project 
looked at how business techniques, i.e., open innovation (Chesbrough and 
Appleyard, 2007), could be applied to public sector processes (Evans-Cowley and 
Hollander, 2010). In this manner, it reinforced two assumptions linked to smart 
initiatives: a pro-business bias (Hollands, 2008) and community participation with 
implied consensus (Coe et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008; Komninos, 2002, p.188). 
 
While the ramifications of using technologies to engage citizens remain unclear, this 
research project shed light on various concerns—around who is engaged, how 
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meaningful is the interaction, how might this affect other forms of citizen 
engagement and interaction, and how will this insertion of technology / the IT 
provider into the local government-city resident relationship affect their perspectives 
of and expectations for each other. As envisioned by the IT provider, this insertion 
enables radical change, altering the relationships between policy makers / managers 
and citizens (Buschner et al., 2010). While this Portland example was quite different 
from the smart city projects that I explored in Dubuque, it still underscored the 
notion that smart projects are examples of neoliberal policy experiments as they are 
imbued with an entrepreneurial management style (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) and 
accentuate the assumptions of smart (Hollands, 2008). I continue this exploration of 
Portland’s journey with smart in the next chapter with an examination of the SDSC 
project.  
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9 Portland: Exploring Solutionism while Questioning Smart 
 
In many ways for IBM Marketing, the city of Portland was an ideal place to test its 
system of systems approach to modeling city operations (IBM 2011b, 2011f). The 
local government’s recognized expertise in long-term urban planning (Abbott, 2004) 
and emphasis on sustainability (Grist, 2007) created an opportune framework for 
shaping the modeling exercise. Additionally, as a medium-sized city, it enabled 
expanding the realm for testing a smart city solution beyond the small city of 
Dubuque. Unlike the projects in Dubuque where IBM Research took the lead, the 
Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities effort was created and overseen by IBM 
Marketing. The resulting simulation tool existed as an online portal that enabled city 
officials to visualize how changes in resource allocation and policy may affect future 
states of various city systems.  
 
Figure 31. The Portland skyline at night 
 
Source: Image from Wikipedia. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portland,_Oregon (accessed 
September 9, 2013).  
 
At the heart of this project, which involved the gathering and analysis of vast 
amounts of data, the city was perceived by the IBM team as “visualized facts” 
(Kitchin, 2015, p. 6) that could be used by the local government to help manage and 
govern the city. Through this solutionist approach to urban planning (Mattern, 2013), 
project staff posited that with the ‘right’ data and algorithms, city leaders would be 
able to glean valuable, actionable insight from this systems modeling tool. 
Underscoring this approach are neoliberal principles that prioritize “market-led and 
technological solutions” to governing and managing the city and data capture and 
analysis to inform decision making about city operations and resources (Kitchin, 
2014b, p. 2). Concurrently, two assumptions of smart are also reflected in this 
project; that smart technologies: (a) help optimize the management of resources, 
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including supporting sustainability (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013; Townsend, 2013, 
pp. 58, 83) and (b) necessitate a pro-business bias, including the use of business 
models and frameworks (Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013, pp. 5, 31). In this 
manner, this project, like those examined above, can be construed as another 
manifestation of neoliberal policy experiments in an urban environment (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002). I explore the SDSC project through this lens in the chapter 
below.   
 
I begin with an overview of the history and thinking behind urban modeling 
exercises, and how these informed the SDSC project. I discuss IBM’s vision for the 
project, and how this aligned with local government planning objectives and 
processes. I highlight the unexpected gains from this work, as well as the perils that 
these types of projects pose to cities and urban governance. I then look at how the 
lack of IT provider interactions around project and city representation reflected a 
lack of support and buy-in vision within the local government for IBM’s Smarter 
Cities. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how findings from Chapters 2 and 4 
apply to the Portland example, and shed light on IBM’s interactions with the local 
government around strategy, engagement and representation through this endeavor.  
 
9.1 Modeling Urban Activity and Environments 
  
In the SDSC project, modeling exercises, more typical to business analytics, were 
developed to glean insight on interactions between city systems to inform urban 
planning around sustainability and economic development. As discussed in Chapter 
2, this approach to modeling city systems is not new, for it dates back to the 1950s, 
when military, computer science, business and electrical engineering applications 
were tested in urban environments (Townsend, 2013, pp. 79-81). In my interview 
with the SDSC project lead, Justin Cook, he noted that the work of Jay Forrester was 
a key influencer in the conceptualization and development of this effort. In the 
1950s, Forrester, building on Norbert Wiener’s “cybernetics”, founded “systems 
dynamics”, a means by which one can simulate the interactions of things within 
dynamic systems. Forrester first applied this concept to industrial business cycles, 
and then moved on to apply it to urban activity in his work Urban Dynamics 
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(1969)—an endeavor that attracted global attention, with many questioning the 
feasibility of modeling complex, social systems like cities (Radzicki and Taylor, 
2008 in Hennessy et al., 2011).  
 
By the mid-1970s, urban planning professionals and scholars had moved away from 
this type of approach. Arguably the most well-known critique of Forrester’s work is 
Douglas Lee’s (1973) article “Requiem for Large-scale Models”, which outlines the 
primary reasons that system dynamics modeling does not yield accurate results in 
cities—noting that these models are not comprehensive enough, too large, overly 
complicated, too expensive, too mechanical, and based upon questionable 
assumptions and equations (Lee, 1973). Instead, Lee suggested the use of simple and 
transparent models, ones that could better coexist with the randomness (e.g. 
hurricanes or terrorist attacks) and unpredictable factors (e.g. human behavior) that 
emerge in cities (Goodspeed, 2011; Lee, 1973). As discussed in Chapter 2, Joe Flood 
(2010), through his examination of the application of computer models in New York 
City, also found fault with these models. In this case, the consequent over-zealous 
focus on efficiency and an overreliance on technocrats and algorithms that emerged 
led to poor decisions around fire department staff and resources, leading to a decade 
of fires that burned across the city (Flood, 2010, pp. 19-24, 263-277). He cautioned 
that such modeling approaches may lead to similar reductionist mindsets in other 
cities, creating gaps and inadequacies in city services with the potential for the same 
types of adverse results.  
 
Yet, despite the failings and challenges of past applications of systems modeling, this 
idea has emerged again within urban discourse—in some instances perhaps as a 
marketing ploy, while in others as a positivist investigation into how this thinking 
could be updated and applied for better outcomes (Batty, 2013; West, 2011). This 
revised approach to systems modeling seeks to apply complexity science to cities, 
whereby cities can purportedly be improved by an enhanced ability to measure and 
therefore manage. To explore this notion further, IBM sponsored its first Urban 
Systems Symposium in 2011, with panel experts like Economist Paul Romer 
(Professor, Stern School of Business, New York University) and Activist and Writer 
Stewart Brand (former author / publisher of Whole Earth Catalog). It was at this 
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event that IBM presented its systems dynamics work in Portland (Lindsay, 2011); 
and, to some extent, demonstrated its lack of familiarity with the urban planning 
profession and its evolution—a tendency not unique to IBM, but rather common to 
many of the IT providers in the smart city market (McNeill, 2014). I explore IBM’s 
SDSC project, and how IBM has interacted with urban governance via this project 
around strategy and engagement in section 9.2 below. Materials created by IBM and 
the local government to describe this effort—such as media coverage, websites, 
project documents and presentations—informed this analysis. Case study interviews 
with project actors also contributed to this analysis. Figures 8 and 10, and Appendix 
11.5 provide further details.  
 
9.2 Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities 
 
Within numerous IBM narratives, cities are viewed as being: “made up of a complex 
system of systems that are inextricably linked” (IBM, 2011b), and that given the 
complexity of cities and their systems and the way that local governments often 
manage them in silos, understanding how these systems interact and will continue to 
do so over time has not yet been possible (Dencik, 2013; Dirks and Keeling, 2009; 
IBM, 2011b, f). As discussed in Chapter 5, framing cities from this system of 
systems perspective has been an IBM strategy to help justify its role in the smart city 
market and to portray itself as an immediate expert, for the firm has long been 
perceived as a master of systems integration from a tech perspective (Harrison, 2010; 
Harrison et al. 2009). Based on this understanding of cities and their systems, IBM 
sought to test the idea of modeling systems dynamics within an urban environment 
with the understanding that if ‘successful’, the model could be commercialized, 
turned into an offering, and replicated throughout cities around the world.  
 
Drawn to Portland for its reputation in urban planning and sustainability, an IBM 
team approached Portland’s local government with the idea of piloting new digital 
analytics software enabled by new computing power and analytics that, as claimed 
by IBM, would allow city leaders visibility across city systems, in real time and over 
the long term (IBM, 2011b, 2011f). After several meetings between IBM staff and 
various government officials, the local government agreed to a pilot, which was 
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launched in April 2010. To develop the systems model, IBM facilitated workshop 
sessions with representatives from 18 local government agencies and over 75 local 
subject matter experts from a range of disciplines to help identify interconnections 
between city systems. Building on this information, IBM staff, researchers from 
Portland State University, and developers from Forio Business Simulations, a 
systems software company, gathered data and identified the algorithms to use within 
the simulation tool (IBM, 2011b, 2011f).  
 
The model was populated with ten years of historical data, combining roughly 7,000 
different indicators from across city systems—such as housing, education, public 
safety and transportation—with 3,000 equations to demonstrate the interactions 
between the variables associated with these indicators (IBM, 2011b, 2011f). The 
resulting modeling tool enabled city leaders to explore interactive visual maps and 
simulate macro-level policy changes through an online portal that integrated these 
data from across all city systems. In addition to purportedly helping city leaders 
understand how the city functions and operates, the model was built to support the 
development of metrics for the Portland Plan (IBM, 2011b). Figure 32 provides 
examples of screenshots from the tool (note that the tool is no longer running, these 
images are from an internal IBM presentation).  
 
Figure 32. Images from the Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities tool 
         
Source: IBM Brand System Strategy, “Systems Thinking for a Smarter Reconstruction”, March 23, 
2012. Internal Document.   
 
By toggling different controls on the online platform, planners could create 
simulated predictive responses around various urban issues—issues that 
hypothetically could now be better understood due to the model’s ability to help 
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break up the “information silos that so far have hampered an integrated view of how 
an action in one policy area can affect other areas” (Zeitler, 2011). The lead IBM 
staff who worked on the project called the model a “strategic thinking” and 
“decision-making” tool, which could “help policy makers explore the ripple effects 
of different options and the interdependencies of different city systems” (Cook in 
Townsend, 2013, p. 83). And, it is this description of the simulation tool that made 
former Mayor Adams an enthusiast for the development of this project. When 
describing some of the challenges local governments face Adams noted:  
 
…Lack of insight, lack of research. I hate to say it, I’m a nerd—but it is 
data. Not data in and of itself, but insight. The notion of what can we do 
better with the resources that we have, is really, really key. In a lot of cases, 
it is the matchmaking of needs and wants that comes with analysis and 
insight. (Adams in Camner, 2010)  
 
In this context, Adams wanted to move his administration from the “sticks and 
bricks” of data to information—a transformation that he saw possible with the 
systems modeling tool (Adams in Camner, 2010). Counter to the Mayor’s 
enthusiasm for the model, several experts from the Portland Bureau of Planning and 
Sustainability and Portland State University were cautious and skeptical about this 
urban modeling experiment, for they were aware of how similar efforts had fared in 
the past and were debunked over 30 years ago. In documents describing the project, 
Cook and his team acknowledge previous failed efforts (i.e., those of Forrester) and 
outline how their model differed by employing modeling approaches from both 
economics and urban studies (Hennessy et al., 2011). Other differences between 
these approaches included: (a) variation in number of equations, Forrester used only 
118 while Cook and team used over 3,000; (b) the process by which the model was 
developed—Cook and a large team of relevant city experts from the local 
government and Portland State University built the model in Portland, while 
Forrester acted alone; and (c) increased visibility and transparency with the online 
simulation platform, for it was made available to those who helped co-create it and 
the assumptions being made could be readily seen; Forrester’s model however was 
perceived as a ‘black box’67 (Hinchcliffe, 1996), where one could see inputs and 
                                                 
67 I further discuss the notion of black-boxing city systems below.  
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outputs, but have no real transparency or understanding of how the resulting outputs 
were obtained (Hennessy et al., 2012).  
 
Yet, the differences, and / or similarities, between the two models are not important 
for the sake of my argument when analyzing this project. Rather, what is important is 
the fact that: (a) the entire project is built on the notion of solutionism—or the belief 
that with the ‘right’ data and the ‘right’ algorithms, any problem within the city can 
be solved; (b) the model reflects a continuation of business approaches being applied 
to urban environments to help better understand and manage them; and (c) interest in 
developing this type of positivist approach seems to be growing (again) with the 
emergence of “urban systems” and “urban science” (Batty, 2013; Urban Systems 
Symposium, 2011; West, 2011). This type of modeling approach is especially more 
common with city’s pursuing sustainability agendas and / or attempting to address 
issues of climate change. In Bali, Indonesia for example, modeling efforts are being 
undertaken to help “increase the capacity of local systems to understand how their 
urban practices contribute to environmental degradation (and thereby, climate 
change), and how specific decisions about those practices can achieve positive 
change” to improve outcomes (OECD Global Science Forum, 2011, p. 4). For IBM, 
an organization perceived as being an expert in systems integration (Harrison, 2010), 
this rise in the belief of systems modeling and how it may contribute to urban science 
represents a potential rise in business opportunities. 
 
9.2.1 Testing Turnkey Urban Planning  
 
Given the experimental nature of SDSC, in my interview with the IBM project lead 
he noted that the contract with the city to develop the model stemmed from a FOAK 
proposal—meaning that IBM deferred costs incurred while developing the project so 
that it could test the new technology. Hence, throughout the development of the 
model, IBM approached Portland as a living lab experiment (IBM, 2011b; Yasin, 
2011), where subjects within the experiment were also construed as drivers to 
innovation (Schaffers et al., 2011). This living lab model proved valuable for IBM. 
The collaboration enabled IBM to apply its emerging Smarter Cities experience and 
test drive its modeling capabilities at the metropolitan level—a market in which IBM 
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had not typically operated prior to its Smarter Cities campaign. Further, by 
participating in this urban planning process, it enabled IBM to gain insight city 
planning—where, according to IBM narratives, improvements could be made with 
IBM’s assistance (IBM, 2011b, IBM 2011f). In effect, IBM, an IT provider, was 
claiming the ability to improve the process of urban planning, without any real 
professional urban planning experience to back up this claim. As outlined in its 
related press release for the project:  
 
Based upon IBM's experience in working with and conducting assessments 
of cities around the world, they’ve found that strategic planning in many 
cities is still being done in stovepipes without a holistic view of impacts / 
consequences across systems. By leveraging systems dynamics modeling 
techniques, IBM will be able to help other cities plan ‘smarter’. (IBM, 
2011b)  
 
Most importantly, or at least deemed so at the time, the experiment enabled IBM to 
use Portland as a Petri dish for developing consulting services and software that the 
organization hoped it could scale, replicate and sell globally (Zeitler, 2011). IBM 
Marketing envisioned that the urban modeling software would become increasingly 
popular for local governments interested in longer-term planning. And, they felt that 
individual models could be adapted from the software developed for Portland to 
analyze specific situations at additional costs for customization to any city around 
the world (IBM, 2011b; Mincer, 2011). As discussed in Chapter 5, similar to IBM’s 
thinking around the Smarter Cities Challenge, the organization understood city 
problems to be ‘universal’, where a set of standardized solutions could be replicated, 
scaled and implemented (McNeill, 2014). For instance, when describing the systems 
thinking project, the IBM project manager noted: “we’ve been trying to model across 
cities” (Cook in Yasin, 2011). And, according to former IBMer Naveen Lamba, who 
also supported the systems modeling project, the model could be easily applied 
globally to cities of different size and structure (Lamba in Zeitler, 2011). This 
assumption that the systems modeling project, and any smart city solution, can be 
equally applied and scaled to any city around the world is replete within IBM’s 
Smarter Cities narratives (IBM, 2009a, 2011a, 2012e, 2013a, 2014b, 2014i, 2014j), 
and represents an oversimplification of cities and their challenges—a purposive 
reduction to increase market applicability (McNeill, 2014). This has influenced IBM 
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stories about smart cities, as well as project design and implementation, regardless of 
city size, socio-economic status, context and location.  
 
The notion of creating this “urban planning in a box”, a tool that can be globally 
scaled and replicated and is built upon the same types of data sources and algorithms, 
only underscores IBM’s lack of understanding of cities, and all of their varying sizes, 
demographics, organizational structures, legal processes, codes, laws, regulations, 
political models, cultures, socio-economic environments, infrastructure, age, 
concerns and mandates, among the myriad of other variables that make cities distinct 
(Kitchin, 2014b). IBM staff assumed that the same types of data sets and algorithms 
used in the Portland model would be universally applicable—what was designed for 
one microcosm could be applied to all. In its designs for this plan, IBM staff even 
noted that Forio, the co-developer for the Portland simulation, could be substituted 
with a range of vendors.  
 
Despite these ambitious plans for commoditization, IBM has not sold the simulation 
tool to any cities. In part, the challenge for urban simulation tools like the SDSC 
model lies in the balance of value gained versus the effort invested to develop and 
maintain the model. In the end, less than a year after the completion, the Portland 
local government decided not to pay for the maintenance of the model and its online 
platform, thus closing it down. According to Joe Zehnder, Chief Planner with the 
City of Portland’s Bureau of Planning and Sustainability, the model “proved… to be 
something where we weren’t really going to be able to maintain or use it—in a way 
that people were going to have confidence in—to illustrate these relationships” 
across city systems (Zehnder in Townsend, 2013, p. 84).  
 
9.2.2 Unanticipated By-products 
 
In the end, the SDSC project did not inform the 2013 Portland Plan; yet IBM staff 
reported that it did help influence some of the metrics chosen for the Plan. While the 
solution did not become a replicable model, in my interviews with the IBM project 
lead, a local urban expert and a government staff member, each noted that there were 
beneficial outcomes that had little to do with the technology involved. While IBM’s 
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gains from the project were those to be expected—e.g., experience working closely 
with a city client and the ability to test the viability of a solution before further 
investment to go to market—gains for the local government were unexpected. In my 
interviews with the local government, three of five noted two clear valuable 
outcomes from this work: the new relationships and collaborative models that 
emerged, and a deeper understanding of how Portland is a system of systems. 
Summing up a main goal of the year-long pilot, Zehnder stated:   
 
We wanted to break down our typical policy or investment silos like 
transportation, housing, economic development and the environment and 
look at how policy and investments within any of those areas could play a 
role in accomplishing a limited and shared set of priorities. (Zehnder in 
Yasin, 2011)  
 
And, through the consultation process used to develop this model, silos began to be 
broken. The majority of those whom I interviewed involved with the project noted 
that they felt the biggest benefit of the project was in the relationships it helped build 
across local government silos during model development. While Portland’s 
government agencies communicated with each other before this project, Zehnder 
noted that this experience and the integration of their respective data did offer “more 
depth” (Zeitler, 2011). For example, in my interview with Radcliffe Dacanay, a city 
planner from Portland’s Bureau of Sustainability, he noted that the method to 
develop the systems thinking model offered participants “enlightenment” around 
how the city functioned as a system and systems interacted with each other, a process 
facilitated by the face-to-face exercises to develop the tool: “The systems dynamics 
exercises were a good way to get people to see outside of their own interests; to see 
beyond their rice bowl to other rice bowls”. In a similar vein, Dubuque’s Information 
Services Manager, Chris Kohlmann, noted that due to the rise of smart technology 
projects in the city, there were a lot more face-to-face interactions between 
departments that had never worked with each other before, as well as a forcing of 
greater collaboration across new and existing government channels:  
 
In many ways, the use of smart technologies has initiated conversations that 
help us cross boundaries and get people out of their silos to collaborate. For 
example, the Smarter Water Pilot brought many different departments to the 
table, several of which had never worked together before. Besides the 
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obvious stakeholders related to the water distribution network, we brought 
together experts on buildings, water treatment, engineering, finance, 
mapping / GIS, public relations and IT, among others. (Kohlmann, 2014) 
 
Though Kohlmann notes that there is still progress to be made before there is a fully 
integrated network across city systems, these smart projects did help to bridge silos 
and foster innovative collaboration. These observations underscore findings from 
Deakin and Al Waer, who posit that the learning, knowledge transfer and capacity 
building linked to smart initiatives fosters innovation and creative partnerships 
(2012, p. 8). Thus in both cities, smart technologies informed the governance 
arrangements around these projects, which prompted communication across groups 
that traditionally did not collaborate together, while helping to strengthen existing 
relationships.  
 
Five project staff who I interviewed—including a member of IBM staff, three local 
government officials, and a local urban expert—also noted that local government 
officials gained insight on how city systems interact with each other and how 
Portland operates as a system of systems. While city leaders understand that cities 
operate as interconnected systems, the real challenge lies in knowing how to best 
manage across these systems. Zehnder summarized their experience with the project 
by noting involved local government staff gained “an increased awareness that, like 
all cities, [Portland] operated in silos”, where government departments were not 
collaborating effectively. In this way, Zehnder noted that the simulation platform 
was “a useful tool to challenge your thinking and assumptions” (Zehnder in Zeitler, 
2011).  
 
Additionally, those who participated in these workshops said that they found them to 
be informative and productive, especially due to the “hexagon modeling method”68 
that was employed. This method, which enables collaborative thinking through 
visualization, was used to inform the simulation model by illustrating how the 
                                                 
68 The hexagon modeling method can be used to help map out systems thinking. It is “an approach to 
bridging the gap between the generalist thinking of decision makers and the specialism of modellers 
by concentrating on the preliminary issue conceptualisation stage of modelling. A new type of visual 
facilitation is described using hexagons as a flexible mapping technique to bridge the gap between 
thoughts and models” (Hodgson, 1992, p. 1). 
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involved groups viewed city system interrelationships within Portland. Two local 
government interviewees noted that local government staff who had been involved in 
the exercise had begun using the hexagon modeling method in their own planning 
and citizen engagement workshops because of the insight it enabled for participants. 
This outcome—the acceptance and use of a typically business process to clarify 
thinking—directly supports the notion of a pro-business bias within smart projects, 
and that smart projects can be a means by which business frameworks, processes and 
approaches are spread (Wiig, 2015). This sheds light on yet another way IT providers 
can influence urban governance through smart projects, not only during 
implementation, but also potentially after.  
 
9.2.3 Unexpected Perils 
 
Whilst there were gains deemed beneficial by the local government, this project also 
highlighted the potential dangers that smart initiatives may present: (a) the gap 
between the smart project vision sold to the city and what the project implementation 
team can actually deliver; (b) the use of tools for urban planning activities created by 
IT providers with no or limited experience in urbanism; and (c) the lack of 
transparency resulting from complexity and mistaken assumptions.   
  
Vision and Inexperience 
 
The project outcomes of increased communication across city agencies and an 
enhanced understanding of city operations as a system of systems were deemed 
valuable by local government staff and involved local experts. Yet, according to one 
local urban expert who I interviewed, they stand out in stark contrast to the initial 
sales pitch that IBM staff gave to the then Mayor Adams on the model and what it 
could do for city planning. Based on the IBM sales presentation, Adams thought the 
tool, through its predictions, would tell him what to do in order to make the city 
more sustainable. In my interview with the IBM project lead however, he noted that 
the IBM implementation team better understood the limitations of the tool— 
including its static nature, its reliance upon the accuracy of the involved algorithms, 
and its ability to foreshadow potential, rather than actual, outcomes. This over-
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zealous presentation reflected the salesperson’s lack of understanding of the systems 
model and highlighted the differentiation between the depth of technical knowledge 
required for sales team versus other IBM divisions affiliated with project 
implementation.  
 
As the project moved forward, the IBM implementation team, together with local 
government experts, worked to realign the mayor’s expectations and understanding 
of the model, attempting to temper promises from the sales pitch in terms of 
capabilities and outcomes—driving home the fact that the systems thinking tool was 
not a crystal ball. Instead, the IBM project lead tried to stress that the tool could be 
used as a way to educate city leaders about city systems interrelations so that they 
could ask better questions during the planning process. The divergence between 
smart city sales pitches and implementation raises another set of issues associated 
with smart projects—how marketing and sales staff are driving and creating smarter 
cities visions, rather than experts who may have a better understanding of what is 
possible and what is not.  
 
Through my experience at IBM, I have learned that this discrepancy between the 
sales pitch and the viewpoints of the implementation team reflects departmental 
divisions within the company and varied areas of expertise. As summarized by one 
IBM Smarter Cities salesperson who I interviewed, “the struggle is how IBM can 
help once cities buy the IBM vision. The IT costs associated with smart solutions 
sometimes means that it is difficult to deliver on the vision originally sold to the 
city”. Often sales persons, who are required to meet quarterly quotas to keep their 
jobs, are the first point of contact that a potential local government client would have 
with IBM. What they promise an offering can do sometimes does not align with what 
the implementation team can actually deliver—a discrepancy that can cause 
headaches for IBM (or any other technology provider) in the latter stages of the 
project cycle, and lead to potential ruin for a local government that is being held 
responsible by its city residents to deliver value for invested taxpayer dollars. If this 
practice is common amongst all technology giants in the smarter cities space, it could 
mean that the visions of smarter cities sold to local governments will almost always 
fall short of what is delivered. And herein lies the risk to local government—for if 
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city leaders over promise to their constituents what smart projects can do, it will not 
only contribute to deteriorating public trust in and perceptions of the local 
government due to unmet expectations, but could also cost local politicians their 
jobs. And, in the longer term, there could also be risk for the IT providers who 
overpromise and under deliver, for cities officials do communicate with each other. 
While the effects of this practice may not be immediate, eventually the IT provider 
will suffer from diminished sales due to poor track performance in this regard.  
 
The second peril raised by this project relates to who is shaping our cities as smart 
projects proliferate. In the case of the SDSC project, the idea did not emerge from 
IBM’s Research Department; rather it was born in IBM Marketing. Soon after the 
Smarter Planet campaign launched, the company explored the concept of systems 
thinking and how it could be applied across industries, including the public sector. 
As the Smarter Cities campaign emerged, the head of IBM Marketing & 
Communications wanted to know how, through the work that IBM does, systems 
thinking could be applied to cities—hence, the SDSC project was born. What this 
illustrates within the overall smart cities trend is that people without experience in 
urbanism are creating visions, and consequently values, of what cities should be, and 
it is this emerging smart city imaginary that is (re)shaping urban governance in cities 
around the world where local governments are actively pursuing smart technologies.  
 
The third peril raised from this project stems from a lack of transparency. For the 
complexity and mistaken assumptions that often accompany these efforts may enable 
various forms of obfuscation: a black boxing of city systems, a conflation of reality 
with what the systems model represents, attempts to ‘optimize’ public matters, and 
mistaken assumptions of model neutrality.  
 
Obfuscation 
 
Simulation models may contribute to making urban planning processes opaque. 
According to discourse around smart projects, especially that produced by tech 
providers, these endeavors purportedly make the invisible visible by providing data 
throughout a system and across systems, thereby raising local government and 
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resident awareness of the city systems around them. This purported visibility is 
enabled by interfaces (e.g., websites, apps or audio-visual displays) that are designed 
to make complex data and information gathered from city systems easily consumable 
and understood (Buschner et. al., 2010; Kanter and Litow, 2009). In this way, smart 
technologies, as purported by IT providers, are a key to open the black boxes of 
infrastructure systems to those who have access to the data that they create (Cisco, 
2010; General Electric, 2011; IBM, 2009a; MacManus, 2009; Siemens, 2010). This 
is put forward despite the fact that, in reality, smart projects add another layer of 
complexity through the addition of sophisticated technologies to the city systems that 
are already not well understood by local government actors and city residents. Even 
without malicious intent, incompetency could have widespread affects across an 
entire city system. The complexity associated with smart projects, layered upon 
already complex city systems, makes one wonder if the largest risk associated with 
smart projects is that they become black boxes even closed to those who have the 
skills to understand them (Siegele, 2010).  
 
While IBM has not sold any of these simulation tools, as cities increasingly use and 
rely upon smart technologies and the data they create, these types of exercises to 
understand linkages between city systems will become more common. It is feasible 
to envision cases where city leaders make decisions from data, sets of data, or 
complex models integrating data without knowledge of how any of the information 
employed or created was gleaned. If city leaders rely upon this information for 
policy recommendations, while not understanding how it was derived or what might 
be the limitations of this information, it black boxes the resulting policy making and 
resource allocation decisions. Former Mayor Adams demonstrated this is quite 
possible with his quick willingness to accept any information from the simulation 
tool without really questioning how the information was acquired or what might be 
the parameters of the model’s use. Former IBM Master Inventor and Distinguished 
Engineer Colin Harrison, who helped devise IBM’s Smarter Cities strategy, noted 
early on during model development in Portland that Adams had:  
 
formed an idea in his mind of what this model was going to be able to do… 
the planners thought that he was viewing this model as a kind of oracle. He 
could ask any planning questions of the oracle, and it would tell him what 
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the right thing to do was. The planners got very, very nervous about this, 
and we had to work through this to make sure that he understood that 
models aren’t oracles. (Harrison in Townsend, 2013, pp. 88-89)  
 
Contributing to this black box effect is the tendency that the representations these 
models create are conflated with reality—yet another risk imposed by these projects. 
Compelling visualizations of data analysis can make the results of analytics seem 
quite real. Yet, numbers do not reflect reality. Data will be flawed, incomplete and 
perhaps misunderstood without proper context, conditions will change, algorithms 
may be wrong, and that which is being measured will be affected by the mere 
process of its measurement (Kitchin, 2014b). Not understanding these limitations 
could pose a real threat for cities and their urban planning processes if these types of 
modeling tools are broadly adopted. For these reasons, access to and ownership of 
the model concerned some of Portland’s city leaders involved in pilot development. 
Since former Mayor Adams did not recognize the model’s limitations, involved local 
experts who I interviewed did not want access and ownership to reside with only one 
person. As one expert stated in my interview with him, “no one knows how to handle 
the gun”.  
 
This concern links to yet another risk presented by smart projects that emerged 
within this case study, the emphasis placed on optimization—an assumption 
common to smart projects (Hollands, 2008). The premise of the model was to enable 
cost reduction and efficiency—a supply versus demand-driven approach to urban 
planning. While a common and effective method in the private sector for supply 
chain management, Portland’s urban experts felt that this method was not 
appropriate for cities. Instead, in my interviews with them, they stated that local 
government should employ approaches that stress value and are informed by 
demand. As one Portland urban expert noted in my interview with him, “cities are 
about people and that doesn’t come out of a model”. Along these lines, Zehnder 
reflected back on the project, noting:   
 
as we sat down with the modelers, we had to make the point to them that we 
will not be able to convince our constituents to trust anything coming out of 
a ‘black box’… the whole act of choosing variables is a political one, a 
value-laden one. (Zehnder in Lindsay, 2011) 
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Yet, in the way that IT providers present the concept of data-driven decision making, 
the neutrality of data and technologies employed is often assumed; despite the fact 
that “technology of any kind is never neutral; it has the potential and capacity to be 
used socially and politically for quite different purposes” (R. Williams, 1983 in 
Hollands, 2008, p. 315). “The very act of choosing what to measure and what not to 
measure not only compromises the integrity of any model’s ability to reflect reality, 
but also the prerogatives of the ones building the model” (Lindsay, 2011). The 
systems thinking model, by its very design, places an emphasis on measurement, 
which then translates into managing only that which can be measured (Bell, 2011; 
Mattern, 2013). If used to inform urban planning, data relevant to city functioning 
that is not entered or factored into the model will not be part of the resulting 
simulation upon which resource allocation and policy decisions are made; thereby 
skewing the model through data omission.  
 
In many ways, the SDSC project represents the technocratization of local 
government, with the infusion of technology, IT experts and technology providers 
into urban governance processes (Söderström et al., 2014). In this case, data and 
algorithms were made central to the urban planning process with the aim of 
informing resource allocation and decision making. Yet, despite the willingness to 
apply a solutionist perspective in this endeavor, the local government decided against 
continuing to keep the model operational once the pilot ended; in effect, rejecting 
this type of approach to urban governance.   
 
9.3 The Untold Story of Smart  
 
In this next section, I explore IBM interactions with urban governance around 
representation through narrative and brand. To inform this investigation, I examined 
excerpts taken from: (a) the twenty-two materials I used to inform the Portland 
narrative review; and (b) the twenty-three interviews that I conducted with those 
studying or involved in smart projects in Portland.69 Within these, I focused 
                                                 
69 For details on these interviews and materials see Figures 8 and 10 in section 3.3, and Appendix 
11.5.  
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primarily on the authors / interviewees who were primarily responsible for designing 
and implementing the smart projects that I examined, including the IBM project lead, 
the lead researcher from Portland State University, and key staff from the Bureau of 
Planning and Sustainability. I also reviewed media coverage to ascertain how the 
projects were being portrayed externally.      
 
While the city narratives and brand promoted by local government in Dubuque were 
significantly informed by SSD and smart projects, these aspects of representation 
were not affected in Portland. I found no materials produced by the local government 
or IBM that promoted the crowdsourcing research project, and only a few instances 
where the local government mentioned the SDSC project. Instead, promotion of 
SDSC was done by IBM and the media. In part, this could potentially be due to the 
fact that the systems modeling project only lasted one year and that the other 
initiative that I examined was research. That said, the initial Smarter Water Pilot 
Study in Dubuque touched only 300 households and lasted just three months—yet it 
still led to a ground swell of attention that caused the local government to reimagine 
the city with smart. If narrative and brand were such strong elements of the smart 
projects in Dubuque, where the reimagining of smart started to inform the redesign 
of urban governance, why did the same not occur in Portland? 
 
I posit that, in part, this lack of smart representation stems from the fact that Portland 
already has what is seen as a strong city brand—it is perceived as a leader in 
sustainability, urban planning and citizen engagement. Consequently, according to 
one of the city’s public relations experts who I interviewed, the local government’s 
narratives and brand support these perceptions, and have done so for decades. And, 
given the city’s high rankings and reputation, the local government does not seem 
keen to alter what appears to be working. Additionally, I postulate that the other 
reason that smart was not a theme in project or city representation is due to the local 
government’s skepticism of the value of smart projects. Despite this skepticism of 
IBM’s vision of smart, there were attempts by IBM staff to try and contextualize 
Smarter Cities narratives in ways that fit with the local context to help ‘sell’ the 
concept of smart.  
 
  
 271 
9.3.1 Smart Resistance 
 
As noted above, neither the local government nor IBM created narratives around the 
crowdsourcing research project. There was however a push for media coverage 
around the SDSC, where the local government and IBM promoted the endeavor 
(IBM, 2011b; Lindsay, 2011; Mincer, 2011; Sanina, 2011; Yasin, 2011; Zeitler, 
2011). Though the coverage was not as widespread as that experienced in Dubuque 
around its smart projects, the Portland story was picked up by Fast Company 
(Lindsay, 2011), PC World (Zeitler, 2011) and The Washington Post (McDuffee, 
2011), and promoted by the local government on The City of Portland’s website 
(Sanina, 2011) and by IBM on ibm.com and its YouTube channel (IBM, 2011b, 
2011f). What’s important to note is that within the narratives created by IBM around 
this project, IBM inserted itself into the urban planning process. With IBM narratives 
associated with systems modeling and this project, IBM’s marketing department 
attempted to weave IBM into Portland’s future by creating narratives that 
emphasized IBM’s viewpoints on urban planning complexity, uncertainty and 
deficiencies with the city’s existing planning practices—problems that could be 
solved, according to these narratives, with IBM’s involvement.  
 
For example, former IBMer Naveen Lamba noted that, in his opinion, cities are not 
managed in the best possible way—local governments typically do not recognize that 
cities are a collection of interconnected systems, “each domain is a complex system 
by themselves, but the way things actually happen, all these systems interact with 
each other and the system is really a system of systems” (Mincer, 2011). While in 
reality, city leaders already know this—the real challenge lies in knowing how to 
best manage across these systems, something for which no actor has all the answers. 
In order to help sell IBM’s solution and approach, IBM narratives also emphasized 
the complexity of city systems and their interrelations, and the need for advanced 
computing to help illuminate these systems and interrelations. Michael Littlejohn, 
former IBM Vice President of Strategy for Smarter Cities, outlined how the 
unintended consequences of policy can be avoided with these types of models:  
 
while other analytical approaches rely on breaking a problem down into 
smaller and smaller pieces, the model we’ve created recognizes that the 
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behavior of a system as a whole can be different from what might be 
anticipated by looking at its parts… Using this model, the City of Portland 
can experiment with different scenarios to see how their decisions might 
affect various parts of the city over the next 25 years. (IBM, 2011b) 
 
Thus according to Littlejohn, this IBM solution helps unlock the complexity and 
uncertainty of city systems and gives insight into the effects that might occur from 
policy and resource allocation decisions made today—something he feels is not 
possible without the data and analytics provided by IBM. This type of crystal ball 
promise is enticing, especially to lesser experienced, technophile government 
officials like former Mayor Adams. In another attempt to promote IBM’s Smarter 
Cities vision, IBM officials noted that the tool is key for city leaders to better 
manage their cities because of, what they call, existing shortcomings in planning 
processes:  
 
Municipal government is still very much a world of silos… the various 
departments—transportation, education, public works, and so forth—often 
have very little interaction with each other, dramatically increasing the 
possibility that an action in one area of government will have an unexpected 
effect on another area. (Littlejohn in Mincer, 2011) 
 
In other words, in these IBM narratives, city systems are complex, how they interact 
is uncertain, and the fact that cities operate in silos means that city officials are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to urban planning—all shortcomings that IBM can 
purportedly help overcome. In press releases about the systems modeling project, 
IBM noted that “new policies implemented in one part of the city can affect other 
city efforts, citizens, businesses and the environment in unexpected and sometimes 
counter-intuitive ways. IBM’s System Dynamics for Smarter Cities model is 
designed to help mayors and other municipal officials reduce the unintended 
negative consequences of municipal actions on citizens, as well as uncover hidden 
beneficial relationships among municipal policies” (IBM, 2011b). According to the 
narrative, these unintended consequences and hidden benefits would seemingly go 
unnoticed or unanticipated without IBM’s solutions.  
 
IBM narratives directed at Portland also emphasized the IT provider perspective that 
urban planning to date has been haphazard and done by happenstance—therefore 
stressing the need for a tool to make order of this purported disorder. At the Urban 
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Systems Symposium in 2011 that I attended, a leading IBM Smarter Cities strategist 
noted while facilitating the event how city leaders can “finally” be more “scientific” 
about the way they went about urban planning—implying that to date, there has not 
been a rigorous approach to this process (Urban Systems Symposium, 2011). 
Unsurprisingly, this caused quite a stir amongst the audience, which was mainly 
comprised of urban professionals and academics. Reinforcing this IT provider 
notion, one article on the Portland project noted that “smart cities don’t happen by 
accident”, implying that without these types of modeling solutions, city officials 
have been guessing or using their gut instincts to inform urban planning (Haller, 
2011). Yet, despite strong positioning within IBM and media narratives around the 
need for a systems thinking tool to better plan and manage urban affairs, neither the 
solution nor the associated narratives around smart took hold in Portland. 
 
Portland’s local government’s uncertainty about the value of smart endeavors made 
it less likely that IBM, through its projects, would interact with local government 
around city strategy or representation. In the end, the local government decided not 
to test crowdsourcing via the Opt In Panel and shut down the SDSC model shortly 
after its completion. According to two local urban experts and four local government 
staff who I interviewed, there was a rejection of IBM’s vision of and approach to 
being a smart city. Hence, it makes sense that rhetorical and symbolic associations 
associated with smart projects and its assumptions were not woven into the local 
government’s strategies for creating city narratives and brand. So, while smart 
projects continue to proliferate in Dubuque as a central focus of local government 
strategy and city representation, in Portland the local government remains skeptical 
and is not making the application of smart technologies a central focus of the city’s 
strategy, or supporting it via the ways that local government represents the city.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter explored IBM’s interactions with the local policy and planning 
processes around strategy, engagement and representation associated with the 
Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities project. In this endeavor, the city was 
perceived as “visualized facts” (Kitchin, 2015, p. 6), where data and analytics were 
central to informing decision making about resources and policy. With this approach, 
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it was assumed that the ‘right’ data and algorithms could optimize city operations to 
improve sustainability outcomes (Mattern, 2013). Thus, this effort reinforced two 
assumptions commonly associated with smart projects: that these endeavors help 
improve efficiency and resource management (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013; 
Townsend, 2013, pp. 58, 83) and that they require the use of business models and 
approaches (Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013, pp. 5, 31). This prioritization of 
“market-led and technological solutions” to managing city operations and of data 
capture and analysis to inform decision making, reflects the neoliberal undercurrents 
of this effort (Kitchin, 2014b, p. 2).  
 
According to those who I interviewed with local government and project staff, the 
project delivered beneficial outcomes including increased communication across 
government agencies and an enhanced understanding of interrelations across city 
systems (see also Yasin, 2011; Zeitler, 2011). Surprisingly, the primary gains from 
this effort were not the technological advancements or their outcomes; rather, they 
were the resulting governance arrangements and processes required to implement 
this work. Through my examination, I found several risks that may be associated 
with these types of initiatives—problematic concerns that can be extrapolated to 
other similar types of modeling projects. These included challenges such as the fact 
that these projects can be misunderstood in terms of their capabilities and limitations, 
and that due to their complexity, rather than illuminate, they can make the systems 
seem opaque, blackboxing the city system being examined (Hinchcliffe, 1996). In 
addition, they are frequently designed and implemented by tech giants with limited 
urban experience (McNeill, 2014), further potentially hindering the transparency that 
these models purportedly deliver.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, such models are problematic due to the centrality that 
they place on measurement, for they can lead to managing only what can be 
measured (Bell, 2011). And, by reducing the city and urban challenges (McNeill, 
2014), this systems modeling approach recasts complex issues and events as “neatly 
defined problems with definite, computable solutions” (Morozov, 2013, p. 9 in 
Mattern, 2013). Despite the repeated past failures tied to urban modeling efforts 
(Flood, 2010), IBM still invested time and effort to develop and test this simulation 
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tool. In the end, after the model was completed, the local government decided not to 
pay for continued operations, thereby rejecting this approach to managing city 
systems and operations. Further, IBM was unable to commoditize and sell this 
approach to other cities.  
 
The hesitancy by the Portland local government to fully implement this project was 
linked to IBM’s inability to get the local government to ‘buy’ into IBM’s Smarter 
Cities vision and incorporate its narrative themes around smart into project and / or 
city representation. Part of this IBM ‘failure’ (assuming their end goal is to create 
and sell smart city solutions) can be linked to pre-existing local government 
skepticism to systems modeling and its use for managing city operations. While the 
local government was interested in testing smart technologies and understanding 
how they may better enable planning, sustainability efforts and citizen engagement, 
they also remained skeptical of the purported benefits claimed by IBM. One-third of 
the local government officials who I interviewed in Portland expressed concern over 
this type of approach. The local government did not view smart technologies as a 
panacea to various city woes—sustainability challenges, economic decline, etc. 
(White, 2015)—rather they were seen as one of numerous potential tools in their 
urban toolkit to address city challenges. Additionally, the city already has a strong 
city brand (Grist, 2007; Maerz, 2011; Mayer and Provo, 2004), and therefore the 
local government was less inclined to change it to an image linked to smart.   
 
In this manner, this example provided a useful contrast to the City of Dubuque, 
where the local government embraced the concept of smart wholeheartedly. Despite 
this variation in perspective, SDSC strategy objectives and approach, similar to all 
other smart projects that I examined, reinforced the notion that smart projects can be 
viewed as neoliberal policy experiments (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) that further 
entrepreneurial management styles (Hollands, 2008). In my last chapter below, I 
examine these two different city experiences, and extrapolating from observations 
within these case studies, I share my concluding remarks on IT provider interactions 
with urban governance via smart project strategy, engagement and representation.    
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10 Conclusions 
 
Information and communication technologies are increasingly being infused into city 
systems and services as part of a growing trend to make cities smart (Kitchin, 2014b; 
Townsend, 2013). To better understand potential implications of this trend, my 
investigation explored how IT providers, through smart projects, are interacting with 
urban governance via corporate and policy strategies, modes of engagement with 
public and civic actors, and forms of representation concerning both smart 
technologies and the cities where they are being implemented. My research pursued 
several queries: How are smart projects, steered by IT providers, interacting with 
local government city objectives, priorities and approaches, and what might be the 
implications of this interaction? How are smart projects changing the roles of and 
expectations between and among the local government and city residents, and what 
is the role of the IT provider within this transformation? And, how might the smart 
city imaginary, captured in project narrative and brand birthed by IT providers, be 
informing the redesign of urban governance mechanisms? To shed light on these 
questions, using key informant interviews and case study analysis, I looked at how 
the IT provider IBM interacted with urban governance in the U.S. cities of Dubuque, 
Iowa and Portland, Oregon.  
 
Throughout this research, I was employed by IBM, which placed me as an inside 
observer to this analysis, and shaped and informed all aspects of my investigation, 
presenting distinct opportunity and limitations. While this positioning enabled me 
unique access for my research, it also meant that my objectiveness, interactions and 
interviewee responses in both my case study and key informant interviews were 
colored to an extent by this bias, despite measures undertaken to mitigate it. Case 
study selection was also limited, for smart city competitors were unlikely to share 
their data with an IBM employee. IBM’s relationship with the local government in 
each city also influenced the ways that those interviewed responded to me. Given the 
presence and role of IBM in Dubuque, smart project actors were less likely to share 
negative feedback than those in Portland, where IBM is just one of many IT provider 
partners. Findings from this investigation are narrowed by the size and scale of the 
cities examined, and by the fact that both case studies are located within the United 
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States, thus confining my analysis to urban trends and patterns typical to similar 
types of advanced capitalist environments. Thus, this work must be considered in 
this context.   
 
The resulting analysis provides snapshots of two very different paths to smart. On 
one path, the local government charged forward without hesitation, seeking the 
promised smart city imaginary just beyond the horizon. The other local government 
however treaded slowly, considering the value of the journey and the desirability of 
the destination. By looking at these contrasting examples, my work contributes to the 
mounting cannon of smart city literature by adding empirical and analytical details 
that compliment previous academic study of discourse around the concept 
(Greenfield, 2013; Hollands, 2008; Shelton et al., 2014) and technical aspects of 
smart technologies and policies (Batty, 2013; Harrison et al., 2009; West, 2011). 
Through my investigation, I provide an in-depth view of the IT provider IBM 
alongside the rise of the corporate entrepreneurial smart city, and from these 
findings, suppositions on what these initiatives might mean for municipal 
administrations and city residents in comparable urban environments.  
 
10.1 Observations and Findings 
 
Despite the remarkable claims in compelling smart city narratives and packaging, the 
idea of using data and analytics to improve decision making and resource allocation 
within cities is not new (Shelton et al., 2014). Further, just as the premise behind the 
smart city is not a novel concept, it is also not a clear one—there are a myriad of 
understandings, definitions and conceptualizations of smart (Caragliu et al., 2009; 
Deakin and Al Waer, 2011; Duany et al., 2010; Florida, 2005; Hollands, 2008; 
Kitchin et al., 2015). This label is liberally applied to almost any application of ICT to 
city systems and services (Albino et al., 2015; Kitchin, 2014b). Regardless of variation, 
with each smart project there are common assumptions (Hollands, 2008) that 
reinforce entrepreneurial management styles, including: integrating smart 
technologies into city strategy (Eger, 1997; Hollands, 2008); emphasizing city 
competitiveness to entice resources (Coe et al., 2000; Hollands, 2008); promoting 
economic development; embracing a pro-business bias (Graham and Marvin, 2001; 
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Hollands, 2008); encouraging community participation (Coe et al., 2000; Komninos, 
2002, p.188); and optimizing to enhance political and economic efficiency (Eger, 
1997; Hollands, 2008) and sustainability efforts (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013). 
These assumptions buttress strategies and doctrines that continue and advance the 
privatization, commodification and marketization of public provision. In this 
manner, smart projects underscore the critical role that cities are playing in the 
reproduction and mutation of neoliberal trends within urban environments (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002)—a process that I found taking place through tech provider 
interactions around the strategy, engagement and representation of smart projects.  
 
Based on my research and observations, I believe that as smart projects 
proliferate, this expansion will pave the way for IT providers—often more well-
versed at working with business enterprises and national governments than 
municipal leaders—to more broadly inform urban governance processes. In my 
case study analysis, I found that as IBM interacted with local policy and 
planning processes around smart project strategy, engagement and 
representation, the firm was able to promote its perspectives on the role, 
structure, function and relationships of local government. For, IBM is not just 
selling smart city technologies; rather, it is propagating assertions about data 
centric and solutionist approaches, the transformation of roles and interactions 
between and among local government and city residents, and the promotion of 
cities becoming smart. These proposed shifts conveniently insert data and 
analytics, and hence IBM and other tech providers pursuing similar 
opportunities, into a wide range of urban governance activities and processes—
thereby helping to develop and expand the smart city market (Buschner et al., 
2010; Cisco, 2010; General Electric, 2011; Kanter and Litow, 2009; MacManus, 
2009; Microsoft, 2012; Siemens, 2010).  
 
10.1.1 Dubuque 
 
The small Midwestern town of Dubuque has been, for IBM, an ideal living lab in 
which it can test its smart city solutions due to the city’s receptiveness and size, both 
of which facilitated project design and implementation. Smart projects in Dubuque 
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began with a partnership between the local government and IBM to create Smarter 
Sustainable Dubuque (SSD). This initiative aims to improve city sustainability by 
applying technologies to city systems and services, and has included pilots focusing 
on utilities, transportation, health and wellness and trash / recycling. In addition to 
sustainability outcomes, the local government hopes that SSD will help improve city 
brand, and consequently the city’s competitive edge and its ability to entice the talent 
and resources that will fuel economic growth (The City of Dubuque 2009e, 2010b, 
2010e). While individual project goals have varied, each pilot has emphasized citizen 
engagement, primarily in the form of behavior change. Of the numerous SSD 
projects, I focused on the Smarter Water and Smarter Electricity Pilot Studies, which 
leveraged AMI to create a web-based portal system that enabled households to view 
details on daily utility consumption to aid in decision making about resources. Both 
projects demonstrated how through interactions around project strategy, engagement 
and representation, IBM was able to promote its vision for local government. 
 
Strategy objectives and priorities for these pilot studies, as well as others within the 
SSD program, reinforced entrepreneurial management styles and smart concept 
assumptions, including: emphasizing efficiency, optimization and the use of 
technologies to achieve city aims (Eger, 1997; Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013); citizen 
participation to help achieve these endeavors (Coe et al., 2000; Komninos, 2002); 
and a pro-business bias (Hollands, 2008). During implementation, I observed several 
private sector / IT provider practices being employed, such as utilizing a living lab 
approach to mitigate risk (Schaffers et al., 2011), the agile method for rapid iteration 
(IBM, 2015b) and behavioral economics to steer city resident behavior (Ariely, 
2008; Cialdini, 2008). As smart assumptions, entrepreneurial management styles and 
IT provider business practices were adopted, a data-centric and solutionist approach 
(Mattern, 2013) was increasingly apparent within local government operations. For 
example during my fieldwork, the city’s Information Services Manager stated that 
she had noticed changing perceptions of her role and the role of the IT department—
where they were increasingly being expected to take a more predominant leadership 
role in SSD and non-SSD projects. More and more local government officials and 
offices consulted her and her office to better understand how they could use sensors, 
real-time and / or big data, and advanced analytics to increase their projects’ impact 
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and better track project progress. She attributed this change to an increased emphasis 
that local government actors were, in her words, placing on the role that data and 
analytics play within the city’s strategy and the centrality these play in achieving 
strategy ends (Kohlmann, 2014). 
 
In this case study, I also noted that IBM was able to promote its assertions around the 
changing roles of city residents and local governments through interactions around 
project engagement. For instance, by design, the web-based portals employed within 
the pilot studies facilitated the responsibilization of city residents and reinforced the 
notion of city residents being citizen consumers (Beck, 2005; Needham, 2003). Both 
the Smarter Water and Smarter Electricity Pilot Studies were created with the 
premise that if city residents have the right information they will make more 
‘informed’ choices about the way that they consume resources (The City of 
Dubuque, 2009e, 2010b, 2010c). As described by City Manager Mike Van Milligen 
(2013), the local government is “changing the way the city of Dubuque is servicing 
its residents… what we are doing is making our citizens the solution to our local 
challenges”.  
 
In this context, rather than city residents being passive recipients of government 
services, they are becoming involved in the way that these services are shaped, 
delivered and consumed. And, they are increasingly seen as active agents in solving 
the challenges Dubuque faces (Dillow, 2011). The design of SSD projects has 
facilitated both of these changes, where through the sharing of data / information, the 
local government has been able to reinforce and inform a shift in the role of city 
residents by also transferring expected financial and behavioral responsibilities 
(Rose, 1999). Hence, through interactions around partnerships and governance 
arrangements in these endeavors, IBM assertions about the role of local government 
and city residents were shared, and while most likely these assertions were not the 
sole impetus for these changes, IBM’s vision did add to the momentum of this 
transformation.    
 
Finally, interactions around project strategy supported IBM’s assertion that the local 
government should promote Dubuque as being smart, thereby endorsing the notion 
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of the smart city, and in some cases, also explicitly recommending IBM. During my 
investigation, I found the Dubuque local government to be a strong supporter of 
smart projects—as evidenced by the formation of SSD and its partnership with IBM 
(The City of Dubuque, 2009e). Consequently, messaging from IBM’s Smarter Cities 
campaign has been adapted and made relevant to the local context and audience, 
enabling the shifting of smart discourse away from complex sustainability issues to a 
more simple representation that aligns with local self-understandings and city 
context (Burbach, 2010b; Hawks-Goodmann, 2010; Steinhauser, 2010b). These 
efforts of promotion in Dubuque seemed to be so effective70 that it could be argued 
that the most significant impact of smart projects to date has been the boost to city 
brand (rather than, for example, operational efficiencies). This is evidenced by the 
significant returns that the local government attributes to its smart narrative and 
branding strategies, including the additional multi-million dollar grant funding that 
the city received to continue smart and sustainability projects (The City of Dubuque, 
2011b).  
 
In addition to IBM messaging being integrated into city narratives around smart, 
there have been efforts by the local government to co-brand with IBM due to the 
organization’s perceived brand strength (Greenblatt, 2014; Wiig, 2015). Several city 
leaders who I interviewed felt that with the SSD partnership and the opening of 
IBM’s Global Delivery Facility in Dubuque, the city gained a significant boost to its 
brand, both internally amongst Dubuquers and externally to those outside of the city. 
They also felt that IBM’s presence has helped change perceptions of Dubuque from a 
blue-collar to white-collar urban environment. Thus, within local government 
narratives and branding around smart, IBM has been a focus, and therefore endorsed 
alongside efforts to promote the city (Burbach, 2010b; M. Van Milligen, 2013).  
 
In sum, within Dubuque, interactions with local government policy and planning 
processes around smart project strategy, engagement and representation, created 
opportunities for IBM to promote its assertions about the redesign of urban 
                                                 
70 As a result of efforts to ‘sell’ Dubuque as a smart city, it has received a wide range of local, national 
and international recognition (Acohido, 2009; BBC News, 2011; Dillow, 2011; Forbes, 2007; Hamm, 
2009a; Hoffman, 2009; Lindsay, 2010; Lohr, 2009a), including being ranked as one of the ‘smartest’ 
cities in the world (Fast Company, 2011). 
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governance mechanisms. These assertions took hold, at least during my period of 
study, as evidenced by the addition of smart concept assumptions to the city’s 
sustainability strategy, the adoption of tech provider business practices, the 
transformation of the CIO role and office, changes in the local government’s 
perceived expectations and role for city residents, and the co-promotion of the city 
with IBM. 
 
10.1.2 Portland 
 
Unlike in Dubuque, the city of Portland, from IBM’s perspective, proved to be a 
more challenging environment for its smart city vision and projects. The local 
government, while curious about the application of smart technologies, was skeptical 
about the smart city imaginary and the promised outcomes that come along with it. 
Though city leaders have been interested in seeing how technology and smart 
projects could potentially inform urban planning processes and contribute to 
sustainability efforts, they have questioned the value of these initiatives, wondering 
if they would offer cure or palliation for the challenges that the city is facing. Instead 
of viewing smart projects as a panacea, the local government is more avidly pursuing 
another form of urban entrepreneurship, the Eco-City (Register, 2006).  
 
For my case study analysis in Portland, I looked at two projects: a) a crowdsourcing 
research project overseen by Portland State University, which was conducted to help 
IBM better understand how citizens can be engaged to inform urban planning; and 
(b) a systems modeling project, Systems Dynamics for Smarter Cities (SDSC), that 
was undertaken to help improve city planning and strategy development, while 
potentially boosting sustainability outcomes by enabling increased efficiency of city 
operations. In my investigation of these efforts, cracks within the smart city veneer 
emerged—for the potential adverse consequences of these types of initiatives 
became more apparent than in the Dubuque case study. In addition, two of the smart 
city projects that I tried to examine failed before the projects could launch, further 
demonstrating frailties. In the end, neither project examined yielded a durable 
solution or initiative; in part demonstrating the local government’s resistance to 
IBM’s smart city strategy and approach. That said, through interactions around smart 
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projects, IBM was still able to reinforce its vision for how local governments should 
function and operate, as well as how, why and with whom it should engage.  
 
While the use of technologies was not a focus in the city’s strategy the Portland Plan 
(Portland Online, 2013a), various assumptions of smart were apparent within it; 
namely, an emphasis on citizen engagement (Coe et al., 2000; Komninos, 2002), 
efficiency and optimization (linked to sustainability) (Hollands, 2008; Miller, 2013), 
and a pro-business bias (Hollands, 2008). This created an opening for IBM to share 
its related assertions about strategy and engagement—that local governments should 
become data-centric and solutionist, adopt tech provider business practices, and 
transform the roles of and interactions between and among local government and city 
residents, while involving IBM in this process.  
 
While examining the SDSC project, I found that the local government demonstrated 
an openness to this data-centric and solutionist approach, as well as a willingness to 
test IT provider frameworks like systems thinking when they agreed to partner with 
IBM to pursue this initiative. In this project, IBM and the local government created a 
simulation model that epitomized a data-centric and solutionist approach (IBM, 
2011b, 2011f), for the premise of this model was built upon the notion that with the 
‘right’ data and algorithms, city leaders would be able to make better decisions about 
resource allocation, policy and future planning (Bell, 2011; Mattern, 2013; Shelton et 
al., 2014). Yet, as this initiative developed, it revealed a central weakness of smart 
projects—that they are conceived and led by IT providers, organizations that 
typically do not understand the complexities associated with cities and city 
operations, and the experiences of urban planning (McNeill, 2014). This reality 
contributed to the local government deciding not to keep the tool operational, for 
several local government actors did not trust the model or the simulations it produced 
(Zehnder in Townsend, 2013, p. 84). Despite this rejection of the IBM project by not 
continuing funding, I found that several government experts who had worked on 
SDSC had adopted business practices from this effort. In my interviews with these 
government actors, they discussed their adoption of a method that IBM used to help 
derive the model (i.e., the hexagon method) and noted how they were applying it in 
their own work with other government offices. This demonstrated the ease and speed 
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with which IT provider practices could be transmitted to local government actors—
even if the projects associated with these practices did not persist.  
 
In addition, my examination of SDSC revealed how smart projects can influence the 
ways in which city actors engage with each other. To an extent, this project served as 
a forcing function to bring city officials from various government departments 
together face-to-face, enabling agencies that do not traditionally interact to 
communicate with each other (Yasin, 2001; Zeitler, 2011). In this case, instead of 
technology eliminating or mediating social interactions, it increased them. Several 
interviewees from the local government and experts who helped develop this project 
noted that because model development required bringing together such a wide range 
of government actors and experts at the same time to discuss the same issues, they 
felt that the biggest gains from this project were not from the model itself, but rather 
the governance arrangements and networks created to implement this work. In this 
manner, this project reinforced the notion that smart projects by design encourage 
partnerships across a range of urban actors, frequently leading to learning, 
knowledge transfer and capacity building that may not have taken place otherwise 
(Deakin and Al Waer, 2011, 2012). 
 
Interestingly, while the SDSC project brought involved individuals together, initial 
findings from the crowdsourcing research project demonstrated that the use of these 
techniques in urban planning may have the opposite effect. While proponents for 
crowdsourcing argue that this method enables the gathering of more feedback from a 
larger number of residents in a ‘neutral’ environment, research indicates that this 
approach can lend itself to participants making decisions based on their own needs 
and their needs alone (Mahmoudi and Seltzer, 2012; Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). 
Over time, this could lead to intensified segregation within civic affairs, thereby 
affecting future engagement, while also augmenting resident expectations that cities 
should be ‘customized’ to each individual’s needs (Ford Foundation et al., 2014).  
 
In terms of getting the local government to promote Portland as a smart city, IBM 
was completely unsuccessful in both projects. As noted above, the local government 
has approached smart initiatives with reservation; and in the context of the projects 
that I examined, this has translated into a rejection of IBM’s Smarter Cities vision, 
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with the concept of smart having no subsequent impact on city objectives, priorities 
or representation, and with nominal effect on approach to city strategy and 
engagement around these projects. Yet, that is not to say that some of the 
assumptions of smart and urban entrepreneurial characteristics were not already 
present within local government strategy or practices. For those that already did 
exist, interactions with IBM around smart project strategy and engagement served to 
reinforce these notions.  
 
Juxtaposed against each other, these two case studies show areas of overlap and 
difference. In both case studies, entrepreneurial management styles and the 
assumptions of smart were prevalent in each of the smart projects examined. As 
such, these projects demonstrated how smart initiatives can serve as neoliberal policy 
experiments in urban environments (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In this manner, 
through tech provider interactions with urban governance around these endeavors, 
perspectives, approaches and practices can be transferred that continue and advance 
the privatization, commodification and marketization of public provision. Further, 
these case studies also highlight difference. One local government embraced smart 
and, through interactions with IBM around smart projects, integrated this concept 
into strategy, affecting engagement and representation. The other local government 
however, explored smart technologies yet remained unconvinced of the promised 
outcomes of smart, and therefore IBM’s interactions had negligible effects on 
strategy, engagement and representation.  
 
10.2 Implications 
 
Data promises to be for the twenty-first century what steam power was for 
the eighteenth, electricity for the nineteenth and fossil fuels for twentieth—
that is, the creator of enormous wealth and progress. (Rometty in Dencik, 
2013, p. 4)  
 
As evidenced in the quote above by IBM Chairman and CEO Ginny Rometty, 
from the IBM perspective, data are a new commodity within which lies great 
opportunity—opportunity that can only be captured with the aid of an IT 
provider (Dencik, 2013). In the urban context, IBM has compellingly packaged 
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this idea of unharnessed opportunity and presented it to city governments around 
the world to create, expand and dominate the smart city market. As IBM and 
other similar smart city IT providers interact with urban governance via smart 
project strategy, engagement and representation in cities around the world, there 
are various implications on how this may affect local government policy and 
planning processes. These implications are tied to the assertions that IBM, and 
similar IT providers, promote alongside their wares—that local governments 
should:  
 Adopt a data-centric and solutionist approach and employ IT provider 
business models and practices; 
 Transform the roles of and interactions between and among local government 
and city residents, with the IT provider and / or their technologies acting as 
an intermediary within this transformation; and  
 Promote their city as being smart.  
 
10.2.1 Data-centricity and IT Provider Approaches  
 
My first research question examined how smart projects, steered by IT providers, are 
interacting with local government city objectives, priorities and approaches, and 
what the implications of this interaction might be. By design, smart city projects 
emphasize the measurement and optimization of government resources and 
processes, leading to a heavy focus on data and the assumption that with the ‘right’ 
data sets and algorithms, city problems can be resolved. This approach establishes 
the IT provider as an intermediary to resolving any and all city challenges, for within 
this thinking ‘problems’ cannot be identified nor ‘solutions’ found without the 
insight enabled by data and analytics (Bell, 2011; Mattern, 2013). The extension of 
this thinking, as envisioned by IBM and similar IT providers, portrays governments 
of the future as almost entirely data, and hence IT provider, reliant (Buschner et al., 
2010; Eggers, 2007; IBM, 2014b; Kanter and Litow, 2009; O’Reilly, 2010). Often 
alongside this advocated reliance, there is a transference of private sector / tech 
provider practices (Wiig, 2015)—a mobility of policies that are steeped in 
entrepreneurial strategies and a neoliberal ethos. Through my case study analysis, I 
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found that through interaction around smart projects, IBM promoted data centricity 
and solutionism in an attempt to shape project objectives, priorities and approaches.  
 
Smart city solutions, as described by IT providers, can purportedly enhance the 
transparency of city systems through the improved ability to collect, aggregate and 
analyze data. Yet, systems within cities are complex. Layering complex technologies 
within and across these systems, while providing the potential to glean insight on 
operations, also accentuates complexity and creates the potential to lessen versus 
ameliorate comprehension of system functioning. If systems become too complex, 
they will be black boxed to the point that no one expert can understand them 
(Townsend, 2013, p. 14). Further, decisions about data and algorithms in smart 
projects are political, not solely technical—including decisions about what data is to 
be collected, how and how often it is to be collected, as well as what data should be 
overlooked, and why. Choices about the algorithms to use for analysis and how and 
in what format findings are relayed, are also value-laden. Assumed data neutrality 
creates the potential for misunderstanding the information generated by smart 
projects, thereby obfuscating how city systems and services are truly functioning and 
what might be their actual outcomes (Townsend, 2013, pp. 88-89). 
 
Further, as emphasis is increasingly placed on measurement (Bell, 2011) and data, 
more and more local government decisions become ‘evidenced-based’ (Shelton et 
al., 2014). Within this, data optimization is seen as a key end goal (Greenfield, 2013, 
Chapter 13, kl. 436-448, 1280; White, 2015). Yet, it is unclear what it means for a 
city to be ‘optimized’, and what optimization may mean for city residents. Early 
indications point to social and economic fragmentation within cities as a result of 
‘optimized’ networked infrastructures, as these systems tend to leave behind those 
most vulnerable or unable to afford access (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Over time, 
one may find that an ‘efficient’ and ‘optimized’ city may not be an attractive one.  
 
Additionally, smart projects tend to be more speculative than typical public sector 
initiatives, exposing local governments to increased risks as their cities become test 
beds for new types of approaches, frameworks and models that are borrowed from 
the private sector (Hollands, 2008). While some private sector practices work well 
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for business, it is unclear if they are appropriate for public provision. For example, 
while agile is highly conducive for managing software development, this method of 
rapid iteration—based on planning, learning and failing quickly—could prove risky 
in terms of stability of government services and provision, and potentially endanger 
citizen trust in government. There is also risk around the way that smart initiatives 
are frequently managed and implemented through PPPs, thereby leading to questions 
around accountability if problems emerge, possibly threatening maintenance and 
continuity of operations if clear and detailed lines of responsibility and contingencies 
are not outlined at project inception (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 14). This is 
particularly a concern with the rising trend of moving city services to the cloud—a 
change depicted by tech providers as the solution to offload ‘pesky’ backend IT 
management functions.  
 
Hence, the assertion that local governments should adopt data-centric and solutionist 
approaches and IT provider practices raises questions around how, if adopted, these 
approaches and practices will potentially: (a) skew understanding of city systems and 
services, and reshape associated values of provision; (b) contribute to exclusion and 
vulnerability; and (c) expose local governments to higher levels of risk associated 
with the stability and continuity of city systems and services.  
 
10.2.2 Urban Governance Transformation  
 
My second research question looked at how smart projects are changing the roles of 
and expectations between and among the local government and city residents, and 
the role that the IT provider is taking in this transformation. From the view of IT 
providers, smart projects are ushering in new forms of governance and new ways for 
connecting stakeholders within cities (Buschner et al., 2010; Kanter and Litow, 
2009; O’Reilly, 2010). This includes the desire tech providers have to “rewire 
governments, transforming the way they work internally and together with outside 
partners and citizens (Buschner et al., 2010, p. 9). This IT provider vision of 
transformation, also shared by IBM, involves, among others, changes in government 
function (what government is tasked to do) and governance (how government goes 
about doing these tasks). In my case studies, I found that, like other IT providers in 
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the smart city market, IBM has a clear vision for the role, structure, function and 
relationships of local government, which the organization shared through 
interactions around smart projects.  
 
In the interests of business expansion, tech giants are promoting a vision of 
government that is entirely IT provider and data reliant by encouraging local 
governments to increasingly become consumer-centric, flexible, responsive and 
adaptable in real time. In the IT provider ideal, the local government becomes a 
facilitator for other private sector or nongovernment organizations to manage and 
deliver government services (Buschner et al., 2010; IBM, 2014b). This outsourcing 
of ‘traditional’ local government function would make government services market-
driven, further driving neoliberal principles of privatization into urban governance 
practices (Kettl, 2009; O’Reilly, 2010). Also included in this tech provider-desired 
transformation is a change in the associated roles of and expectations between and 
among city residents and local governments. The responsibilization of citizens is one 
such example (Rose, 1999, p. 174), for smart projects may be used to facilitate the 
transfer of responsibility from the local government to city residents; and in some 
cases, even be designed to encourage specific behavior or responses (Ariely, 2008; 
Cialdini, 2007). Another example of these desired role changes includes inserting 
tech providers into the relationship between local government and city residents, 
where these firms or their technologies serve as an intermediary between the two—
such as in the case of crowdsourcing efforts and smart meter portals.  
 
This government function and governance transformation, as envisioned by IT 
providers, has potential implications for cities, including, among others, changes in 
the nature of civic life. By design many smart projects require delegating more and 
more responsibility to city residents in terms of their behavior and financial 
obligations (usually those that are initiated top-down) (Needham, 2003; Livingstone 
et al., 2007) and are designed in ways to nudge citizen consumers to make certain 
decisions about the smart system and how they interact with it (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). As such, smart projects reinforce the notion of citizenship being redefined as 
a right to participate in the marketplace, where through choices around consumption, 
citizens can affect positive social change (Beck, 2005, p. 170; Glickman, 1999, pp. 
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1-16; McGovern, 1998). Instead of ‘good’ citizens being those who actively 
participate in civic affairs, citizens can contribute through their purchasing power as 
consumers, thus transforming the meaning of civic life (Needham, 2003; Livingstone 
et al., 2007).  
 
This proposed transformation also has implications in terms of the support it 
provides to the notion of city customization. Crowdsourcing and other similar online 
techniques, for example, could potentially lead to an over decentralization of 
decision making (Ford Foundation et al., 2014). With these open innovation or 
feedback techniques, participants provide feedback without hearing other viewpoints 
or perspectives, for these do not have to be read if viewed online (Seltzer and 
Mahmoudi, 2012). This contributes to participants increasingly customizing 
feedback to their own needs and concerns, and expecting these to be met. In time, an 
over reliance on technologies for public engagement could contribute to civic 
segregation if not balanced with more traditional consultation processes (Ford 
Foundation et al., 2014).  
 
Hence, the assertion that local governments should transform their roles and 
interactions between and among local government and city residents and insert the 
IT provider into this process of transformation, raises various questions and concerns 
about how this may affect government function, governance, expectations between 
and among local government and city residents, the nature of civic life and citizen 
engagement, and where and how IT providers are situated within these processes.  
 
10.2.3 Smart City Promotion 
 
My last research question examined how the smart city imaginary, as portrayed in 
narrative and brand birthed by IT providers, may be informing the redesign of urban 
governance mechanisms. The “smart city imaginary” is a placeless utopian vision 
that “draws on general trends and addresses a broad audience” to promote the idea of 
a smart city by presenting a future where city officials are able to manage or avert 
systemic crises through the use of smart city technologies. In this imaginary, “urban 
strife is simultaneously posed and resolved” (White, 2015, p. 3). The way that this 
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imaginary is expressed in narratives is important to note—for how urban challenges 
are described affects the types of solutions chosen to address them, as well as how 
they are addressed (Jessop, 1997). Through interaction around the representation of 
smart projects, I found that in smart city narratives IBM staff simplified and 
standardized cities and the challenges they face to help ensure the global 
applicability of their Smarter Cities campaign. These narratives were promoted 
extensively across various media and combined with the IBM brand alongside an 
emphasis on city brand and its link to competitiveness and economic development. I 
observed in my case studies that through smart project implementation, IBM also 
promoted the idea that local governments should sell their city as smart to help 
increase their perceived competitiveness. While not stated outright, the goal was to 
also get the local government to, through this promotion, implicitly endorse the 
smart city, use of smart technologies and, in some cases, IBM. 
 
To make the smart city imaginary globally applicable, IT providers have reduced the 
complexity of cities in their associated narratives designed to engage city leader 
‘buyers’. In addition to cities and city challenges being over simplified, so are the 
solutions to address them so that they can be standardized and easily replicated and 
scaled (McNeill, 2014). As cities gravitate to viewing standardized versions of urban 
challenges that are promoted through smart discourse (Greenfield, 2013, Chapter 14, 
kl. 1377), various concerns emerge stemming from this reductionism, for one size 
does not fit all in the city context. A congestion charging solution effective in 
Barcelona may not work in Shanghai or Delhi—and in the worst case scenario, may 
actually worsen mobility issues. Mistakes as such could be quite costly in terms of 
money, time and citizen trust, among others. Yet, buy-in to this reductionist 
messaging is not a given, as evidenced in the Portland case study—for, acceptance of 
and receptivity to the smart city imaginary varies by local government. While it is 
unclear how this reductionism has affected local governments and their approaches 
to urban affairs during my study, it is clear that it has shaped and informed IBM’s 
approaches and solutions (McNeill, 2014). 
 
Concurrent to reductionist messaging, within these initiatives there is also an 
emphasis placed on the need to promote smart projects and the cities pursuing them 
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(Wiig, 2015). This focus, to an extent, is a reflection of the trend to commodify 
urban environments. Local governments are increasingly concerned with how their 
city is ‘packaged’ and ‘sold’, for a city in demand is purportedly able to attract the 
talent and resources it needs (Eger, 1997). In this sense, smart technologies are 
perceived as an inexpensive way to gain a competitive edge by boosting city brand. 
Conveniently, the PPPs that typically serve as the foundation of smart projects create 
a perfect network to promote these endeavors through the use of boosterish 
narratives—deemed critical under the perceived pressure of increasing intralocal 
competition (Wiig, 2015). This raises questions around how this might affect local 
government-city resident relationships and interactions, as well as to what point will 
the desire to create clever marketing about the city supersede the aspiration for local 
governments to deliver quality services. Related to this brand emphasis, large IT 
providers within the smart city market typically have a strong company brand (e.g., 
Microsoft, HP, GE, IBM and Cisco). This may encourage local governments to 
become more willing to co-promote their city alongside the IT provider (Wiig, 
2015). This raises concerns around the intermingling of brand—for, if a local 
government becomes overly dependent on linking its city brand to one IT provider, 
what happens if / when that organization moves on to the next city or technology fad.   
 
Within this tech provider emphasis on smart city promotion however there is a 
crucial flaw in reasoning. As posited by IT providers, increasing intralocal 
competition necessitates ‘forward-thinking’ local governments to differentiate their 
city from its competitors—with smart city solutions deemed as an affordable and 
effective way to do so (Buschner et al., 2010; Cisco, 2010; Dencik, 2013; IBM, 
2012e, 2014d). To implement smart city solutions successfully, tech providers urge 
local governments to turn to them to provide the required hardware, software and 
middleware, as needed, as well as the adjoining consulting services. Yet, as these 
same IT providers work with numerous local governments, differentiating smart city 
approaches and techniques learned within one city will soon be transferred to others. 
Thus, the purported competitive advantage is diminished as IT providers spread their 
smart city wares (McKenna, 2006, p. 14).  
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Hence, various concerns become apparent when looking at smart project 
representation and the tech providers’ desire for local governments to promote their 
city as smart. These include, among others: (a) over simplification of cities and city 
challenges leading to the selection of ineffective or inappropriate solutions; (b) 
commodification of the city to the point that “the triumph of image over substance is 
complete” (Harvey, 1989a, p. 14); and (c) local governments investing in a means to 
improve city brand that will soon be outdated. In this regard, IBM has already turned 
its focus from Smarter Cities to cities in the “Cognitive Era” (Dixon, 2016), where 
artificial intelligence capabilities are now being applied to solutions for urban 
environments.  
 
10.3 The Path to Smart  
 
Smart projects do not represent a distinct disruption from the past in terms of how 
technology, data, analytics have been applied to city systems. And while the trend of 
local governments choosing to employ smart city technologies may continue, over 
time, the smart labelling phenomenon, similar to other forms of urban 
entrepreneurship, will fade. This is already evident in IBM’s move toward cognitive 
systems and solutions, where artificial intelligence capabilities are added to 
‘enhance’ and ‘improve’ existing smart city solutions. According to IBM, being 
smart is no longer good enough (Dixon, 2016). Yet while the trend of the smart city 
may sunset, the significance of local governments deciding to take this journey may 
not be so fleeting, in terms both conceptual and concrete.  
 
Conceptually, smart initiatives serve as mechanisms to further reinforce 
entrepreneurial and neoliberal strategies and doctrines, which when applied to urban 
environments, act as supporting influences to the privatization, commodification and 
marketization of public provision. On top of this, with each local governments’ 
choice to pursue smart technologies, and each technological solution chosen, 
tangible path contingencies are established in terms of hardware, middleware and 
potentially software. Similar to how ancient Roman roads in Britain still serve as 
conduits (Young, 1996), some experts warn of the path contingencies that will be 
solidified with smart projects. As noted by Hill (2013):  
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Literally hardwiring urban services to a particular device, a particular 
operating system, is a recipe for disaster, not efficiency… Put simply, city 
fabric changes slowly yet technology changes rapidly… There is a worrying 
lack of thought about adaptation in this desire to install the consumer tech 
layer as if it were core building services. (Hill, 2013 in Kitchin, 2014b, p. 
10) 
 
Though, while technological corporate lock-in is not automatically inevitable, it is an 
ideal of many tech providers offering smart city solutions (Kitchin, 2014b). This 
notion of lock-in becomes an even larger concern given that if one looks at 
innovation research, the hype around technological advances is often fleeting—for, 
the success of an innovation may be short-lived or rendered moot over time by 
parallel or alternative innovations arising elsewhere (Harvey, 1989a). This does not 
mean that the solutions and technologies currently deemed smart will not persist. 
Rather, the emphasis on them being smart will most likely change. If one looks to 
IBM, this evolution is already in process with the addition of cognitive capabilities.  
 
Understanding the implications of local governments adopting smart technologies 
and applying them to city systems and services however is still critical, for while 
smart may soon no longer be the desired destination, the conceptual and physical 
path contingencies of this trend may persist. And while this investigation shed 
additional light on some of the potential ramifications of this trend, as noted in the 
discussion above, there is still more research to be done around the questions and 
concerns that smart initiatives raise for urban governance and what this may mean 
for municipal administrations and city residents.   
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11 Appendices 
 
11.1 Examples of Cities Applying Smart Technologies 
 
In early 2011, Fast Company ran an article highlighting what they considered to be 
the world’s ‘smartest’ cities: Songdo, South Korea; Lavasa, India; PlanIT Valley, 
Portugal; Skolkovo, Russia; Masdar, United Arab Emirates; Wixi, China; King 
Abdullah Economic City, Saudi Arabia; Dubuque, Iowa; Ho Chi Minh City, 
Vietnam; and Nano City, India. What is interesting to note about this list is that half 
of these cities do not yet exist as a functioning city (Fast Company, 2011).71 
Songdo,72 South Korea for example, when finished will be home to roughly 65,000 
people and showcase the latest in green technologies. To date, it is the world’s most 
expensive privately developed city, costing about U.S. $35 billion. Songdo is part of 
Cisco’s “Smart+Connected Communities” initiative, and will serve as a test bed for 
Cisco’s vision of a ubiquitous telepresence where everything is wired. In apartments, 
smartphones unlock front doors; air-conditioning, blinds and security systems are 
controlled by displays; and in-home videoconferencing can take place with doctors, 
businesses or local government. A Command Center is centrally located to manage 
the entire city, and will monitor traffic flows, weather patterns, security cameras, 
accidents and emergency response (Fast Company, 2011; The Economist, 2010c). As 
of 2016, about sixty percent of the planned infrastructure and buildings were 
completed (Arbes and Bethea, 2014).  
 
PlanIT Valley,73 outside of Porto in Portugal, is the first city to be designed like 
software, and is complete with its own urban operating system, a reflection of its 
roots from Microsoft. Conceived by software startup Living PlanIT, the city will 
have about 225,000 residents when completed, almost all will be partner employees, 
coming from Cisco, Accenture and McLaren Electronic Systems. By first building a 
                                                 
71 I include these examples solely for illustrative purposes. It should be noted that Fast Company did 
not provide any information on selection criteria for these cities, and that the companies primarily 
responsible for implementing these projects often advertise within this magazine.  
72 For details see: http://www.songdo.com/. 
73 For details see: http://living-planit.com/planitvalley.htm.  
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simulation of the city that allows detailed planning, Living PlanIT hopes to avoid 
some of the major costs of construction—such as designs being used only once, 
energy-inefficient buildings and materials wasted by being thrown away. The city is 
estimated to cost about U.S. $19 billion (almost double what was projected), and for 
the most part will be constructed by prefabricated parts (Jaffe, 2013). “Eventually the 
entire city and its buildings will be run by an ‘urban operating system’ that integrates 
all parts and combines them into all kinds of services, such as traffic management 
and better use of energy” (The Economist, 2010c). 
 
In the United Arab Emirates, Masdar74, which has the goal of being completely 
carbon neutral, has received a wide array of attention, from high praise to sharp 
criticism. The desert city, which will eventually house up to 40,000 residents once 
completed, uses both low-tech and high-tech design to try and meet its goal. Built 
using centuries-old Arabic building principles, it naturally creates shade and catches 
breezes with its curves, elevation and angles. Further, the entire city has been built 
on a raised platform to facilitate the maintenance and the installation of new gear. All 
city systems are instrumented—solar panels create energy, catchments collect dew 
and rainwater, and driverless electric cars are the only way to get around the city 
besides walking. However, the over use of sensors on everything and the command 
center approach to running the city has led way to criticism of it being controlled by 
“Big Brother.” The city’s isolation and exclusivity have also caused critics to label it 
as a gated community for the elite closed off from the real world (Fast Company, 
2011; Ouroussoff, 2010; The Economist, 2010c). It is predicted to be completed by 
2020 at the earliest, with a total cost of at least $20 billion (Jaffe, 2013).  
 
This type of construction however, to create cities from scratch, will be the rarer path 
to smarter cities. These types of projects are extremely expensive and require 
generous government backing in the forms of cheap land and tax breaks, among 
others. Rather, this move to apply smart technologies to city systems will primarily 
take place within existing cities, where development moves forward step by step, one 
project at a time (Fast Company, 2011, The Economist, 2010c).  
  
                                                 
74 For details see: http://www.masdarcity.ae/en/index.aspx. 
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11.2 Examples of Smart Technologies Applied to Infrastructure and Urban 
Planning 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, most local governments adopt smart technologies in a 
piecemeal fashion—project-by-project, system-by-system. Often, local governments 
decide to pursue the smart designation by adding smart technologies first to city 
infrastructure systems, such as water, energy or transportation. Of the kinds of 
systems that IBM and city governments have tried to re-order through smart 
technologies, I describe three below as illustrative examples: water, electricity and 
transportation. I follow with a brief look at the application of smart technologies to 
urban planning, which informs the way that these infrastructures develop and evolve.  
 
Water 
 
Smart water projects, as described by IT providers, can help manage end-to-end 
water distribution—from the reservoir, to the pumping station, to smart pipes, to the 
holding tanks, to the smart meter at the user’s site. Water systems that integrate 
smart technologies are said to be able to monitor their own health, remotely sensing 
damage, assessing water availability and predicting demand. As promoted by tech 
providers, these solutions help communities use and re-use water supplies, accurately 
monitor the condition and use of water, enable flexible pricing strategies, manage 
sewage flow and containment, and provide alerts for flooding. As such, IT providers 
see smart technologies as a key part of addressing the world’s water crisis for it, in 
their words, better enables the monitoring and allocating of this resource (IBM, 
2009a, 2011; Suzenet et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009). In the Netherlands for example, 
sensors and smart technologies have been employed throughout the low-lying Delta 
region to help ensure water quality and maintain safe water levels (Government of 
the Netherlands, 2016).  
 
While there may be some truth to the altruistic narratives around smart projects 
helping protect this scarce resource, the primary reason that IT providers, water 
utilities and local governments responsible for providing water treatment or services 
pursue these projects is for financial reasons. IT providers profit from the 
implementation and maintenance of these projects; water utilities and local 
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governments gain from better tracking and control of water, leading to more accurate 
billing. And, the costs to install these systems are more often than not passed along 
to the end user. This is one of the reasons why consumers remain wary of smart 
meter projects that affect their individual household. Often with AMI projects, there 
is: (a) a lack of clarity around who pays for the smart meter upgrade; (b) uncertainty 
about how households benefit; (c) inadequate household consultation by utility 
companies around project details (Gross, 2010; Zifcak, 2010); and (d) consumer 
mistrust toward the utility provider (Giordano et al., 2013, p. 75). While households 
may better understand their consumption due to a meter upgrade and an 
accompanying portal, this does not necessarily lead to a big reduction in monthly 
bills, as most households need a certain amount of water to function. Other concerns 
noted by city residents in terms of the move to smart water projects include: privacy 
and anonymity—with whom will the data be shared, and what information will be 
shared if it is passed on to a third party; meter accuracy and security in terms the 
meter being hacked or shut off; transparency in terms of rate structures and access to 
data created; choice around utility provider and rate structures (Leeds, 2010; Vadari, 
2010); and even health concerns associated with the radio frequency transmitted 
(Guy, 2010).  
 
Of the physical infrastructure systems made smart, water may be the most politically 
charged, especially with its “linkage to a rights-based conception of access to water 
and sanitation” (Gandy, 2004, p. 369). Smart initiatives, on the other hand, are often 
conceptualized around fee-based access to whatever is being made smart. Water 
rights, access and pricing are highly contentious issues that local governments and 
policy makers will increasingly face, especially as smart technologies are further 
applied to these systems and the numbers of people excluded from these systems 
grow. On top of this potential shift, exclusion from water networks and supplies is 
rising around the world—making water a privilege for those with more resources 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 130). “Water has always been closely intertwined 
with the flow of capital”, and with a greater control over water through smart 
technologies, this poses a greater threat to lack of access to water for the 
underprivileged (Gandy, 2004, p. 369). To date however, according to anecdotal 
information provided by an IBM technical expert who works with smart water 
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technologies, the most common smart water projects have dealt with issues related to 
flood control, management and alerting, which overall seem to be more popular with 
the general public.  
 
Electricity  
 
Smart grid technologies, as described by IT providers, create a digital, automated, 
participatory electrical network that provides the potential to significantly improve 
electricity efficiency through better monitoring and control of the energy network as 
a supply chain from provider to end users. With these smart technologies, energy 
companies can purportedly quickly locate and diagnose power outages, re-route 
power and inform consumers when power will be restored. Further, the immediate 
availability of data enables real-time understanding of power demand, which 
supposedly helps power companies improve delivery and incorporate energy from 
different sources, such as wind and solar (Accenture, 2009; IBM, 2009a; Kaefer and 
Klein, 2008).  
 
According to one enthusiast, “a smart grid will do for utilities, what the Internet did 
for information” (Craig Murray, Country Energy, Australia in IBM, 2009a, p. 12). In 
this statement, gains are clearly seen for the utility company, which can benefit from 
improved operations and billing. Richer data also enables utility companies to better 
ascertain when a new power station may be needed, or when it can be deferred by 
shifting to other sources of energy to help power the grid. In the end, the utility 
company looks to smart technologies for their gain, not necessarily gains for their 
end users. So while utility companies gain from this increased insight, enabling them 
to better manage power, households in general are not able to drastically change their 
consumption patterns (Gross, 2010; Zifcak, 2010). As in smart water meter projects, 
the end users, households, are still unsure about what exactly they may gain from 
these AMI-enabled projects. In a European Commission study of smart grid projects 
in Europe, Giordano et al. (2013) found that while various studies have been done to 
better understand “consumer’s perceptions, understanding and willingness to pay for 
the development of smart grid technologies,” there is also a “need to address 
erroneous beliefs and misconceptions that still exist about them and to strive for 
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trust, transparency and feedback to gain consumer involvement and acceptance” 
(Giordano et al., 2013, p. 71).  
  
Transportation  
 
From the IT providers’ perspective, smart technologies—such as cameras, sensors, 
social media updates from system users, dynamic signage, signals, fiber optics, 
network connectivity and analytics—can be applied to transportation systems to help 
reduce adverse environmental impact, while also assisting with issues related to 
supply and demand. The broad spectrum of smart technologies for transportation 
includes, among others: road user charging (highway, bridge and city-wide tolling), 
integrated fare management with public transportation, and traffic prediction (bus 
arrival, dynamic tolling, traveler information, and decision support) (IBM, 2009a; 
Siemens, 2010). According to smart technology providers, the benefits of integrating 
these technologies with transportation systems are numerous, and can include: (a) 
reducing traffic congestion with solutions that monitor, manage and predict traffic, 
helping to prevent gridlock; (b) empowering city residents by giving them real-time 
information on traffic problems and suggesting alternative routes or offering better 
public transport options; and (c) improving overall transportation systems 
efficiencies, thus supposedly benefitting all system users (IBM, 2009a; Siemens, 
2010).  
 
Despite these touted gains, which have yet to be broadly substantiated, city residents 
are often reluctant to jump on the smart transportation bandwagon. Congestion 
charging provides one example of end user reluctance. While the implementation of 
congestion pricing schemes often results in reduced congestion within urban zones, it 
has also sparked much criticism (e.g., San Francisco, London, and Manchester). 
Experience from the few cities where congestion pricing has been implemented 
shows that social acceptance is critical (e.g. Stockholm) (Ottewell, 2007; 
Stockholmsforsoket, 2006; United States Department of Transportation, 2008). 
Public discontent with congestion pricing, or the outright rejection of congestion 
pricing proposals, stems from a wide range of concerns, including: fears that the 
revenues will become just another tax (Hakim, 2007; NY1 News, 2007; Smith, 
2009); privacy will be violated (Confessore, 2007); consequent economic burden and 
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negative effects on neighboring communities (Hakim and Rivera, 2007; Safirova et. 
al., 2006; Schuster and Madore, 2007); adverse effects to retail businesses and the 
economic activity in affected areas (BBC News, 2007; Mayor of London, 2006, p. 5; 
Muspratt, 2004); and inequality issues—where driving becomes a privilege of the 
affluent because low income earners cannot afford road charges (Dobnik, 2007). 
Despite some public reluctance, and a keen understanding of the social, economic 
and political implications of smart transportation efforts, many local governments 
still pursue these solutions as an attempt to improve city mobility.  
 
Urban Planning 
 
Urban planners have sought to gather feedback from, or at some level involve, city 
residents to help shape and inform urban planning since roughly the 1960s75 
(Arnstein, 1969; Seltzer, 2012). Technology, according to some urban experts, is a 
tool that can aid in the democratization of urban design (Evans-Crowley, 2011; 
Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). Utilizing technologies to help inform urban planning 
is not new; for decades data from infrastructure systems has been gathered and 
analyzed to help inform management, operations and future planning of sectors. 
What is new however, according to IT providers, is the ability to gather mass real-
time data from city residents and to have the capability to analyze this unstructured 
data along with the structured data76 garnered from city systems (Buschner et al., 
2010; Cisco, 2010; IBM, 20011b; Kanter and Litow, 2009). As described by IT 
providers, the solutions that purportedly enable this type of analysis and system of 
systems perspective create an increased understanding of city operations from an 
individual and cross-systems scale, thus ostensibly allowing for increased 
efficiencies, improved operations, and even the ability to predict future scenarios, 
hence improving long-term planning and resource allocation (IBM, 2011b; Kanter 
and Litow, 2009).  
                                                 
75 This is primarily the case for cities in the West (Arnstein, 1969).  
76 Structured data are data that “resides in a fixed field within a record or file, it includes data 
contained in a relational database and / or spreadsheet, where data types (numeric, currency, 
alphabetic, name, date, address) are often restricted. Structured data are easily entered, stored, queried 
and analyzed. Unstructured data are all of the things that cannot readily be classified, such as photos, 
graphic images, videos, streaming instrument data, webpages, pdf files, PowerPoint presentations, 
emails, blog entries, wikis and  word processing documents” (Beal, 2014). Unstructured data makes 
up about eighty percent of enterprise data (Preimesberger, 2013). 
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Another trend within urban planning is to attempt to engage city residents in ways 
that are considered ‘meaningful’ through the use of technology. While gathering 
feedback from city residents via email, texts or websites may involve new channels 
for communication, it does not create new forms of citizen engagement, for local 
governments have sought city resident feedback on city functioning and services for 
decades (Roberts, 2004; Seltzer and Mahmoudi, 2012). The use of technology, 
however, does create the potential for more people to provide feedback. Further, 
some local governments are looking to technology to see how it may be able to 
create new ways to engage city residents, including, but not limited to: passing on 
responsibility to citizens for helping address community problems, gathering input 
through crowdsourcing (collaborative problem solving enabled by the Internet), 
providing open data for citizens to become application developers (thus providing 
services the local government may not be able to afford to do), using city residents as 
sensors, or crowdsensing (i.e., where people serve as sensors through, for example, 
cell phone location data or GPS), and listening to city sentiment through social 
media platforms (Grossman, 2011).   
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11.3 Case Study Site Visit Timelines and Activities 
 
Figure 33 details the various activities undertaken within my site visits to Dubuque 
from 2010 through 2013.  
 
Figure 33. Dubuque case study site visit timeline and activities 
 
 
Figure 34 outlines the activities I conducted during my site visits to Portland from 
2010 through 2013. 
 
Figure 34. Portland case study site visit timeline and activities 
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11.4 Case Study Interview Guide 
 
Below is the initial set of questions that I used to interview actors involved in case 
study projects in both Dubuque and Portland. In some cases, I conducted several 
interviews with the same interviewee over time to better illuminate findings or delve 
deeper into a specific issue. For these interviews, questions were designed 
specifically for that interview / interviewee. Over time, this list evolved to better fit 
my analytical framework.  
 
 What type of smart project is being implemented in your city?  
 Why do you think the local government is pursuing smart technologies?  
 What is your role in the smart project?   
 What are the project goals / expected outcomes? What does the city hope to 
gain?  
 How has this project been promoted?   
 What other organizations do you work with on this project?  
 Who are the key stakeholders involved in decision making, funding and 
implementation? 
 How do stakeholders interact with each other? 
 How do smart projects affect collaboration between the public and private 
sector? The public sector and citizens?  
 How are local actors engaged?  
 How do the involved technologies affect collaboration among actors? 
 What levers are used to influence decisions and actions among stakeholders, 
and who has access to these levers? 
 How does access to and ownership of data factor into these decisions and 
actions?  
 Have there been efforts to engage citizens? What have been the results of 
these efforts? What have been the advantages and disadvantages to citizen 
engagement? 
 How are issues negotiated across local, state and federal boundaries?  
 How do existing governance arrangements shape smart projects, and how 
have smart projects affected governance arrangements?  
 How have these projects affected services delivery?  
 How are these projects described / promoted?  
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11.5 Materials Used to Inform Narrative Review 
 
Dubuque materials used to inform narrative review 
 
Local 
government - 19 
materials 
IBM – 8 
materials 
Media – 17 
materials 
IBM and local 
government – 1 
material 
Involved 3rd 
party actors – 9 
materials 
Buol, 2010  Erickson et al., 
2011 
Acohido, 2009  The City of 
Dubuque and 
IBM Social 
Media, 2011 
Dickinson, 2010 
Burbach, 2010b IBM, 2011c BBC News, 2011  Dregne, 2010a 
Dubuque, PIO 
2010 
IBM, 2011d Dillow, 2011  Dubuque2.0, 
2010c 
Hawks-
Goodmann, 2010 
IBM, 2012a Enzler, 2010  Grover, 2010 
Schultz, 2010 IBM, 2012e Flansburg, 2012  Lyons, 2010a 
Steinhauser, 
2010a 
Naphade, 2010 Forbes, 2007  Lyons, 2010b 
Steinhauser, 
2010b 
Naphade, 2011 Hamm, 2009a  Sustainable 
Dubuque, 2010a 
The City of 
Dubuque, 2009e 
Naphade, 2012 Hoffman, 2009  Sustainable 
Dubuque, 2010b 
The City of 
Dubuque, 2010a 
 ICMA, 2013  N. Van Milligen, 
2010 
The City of 
Dubuque, 2010b 
 Iowa Rivers, 
2013 
  
The City of 
Dubuque, 2010c 
 Levy, 2010   
The City of 
Dubuque, 2010d 
 Lindsay, 2010   
The City of 
Dubuque, 2011e 
 Lohr, 2009a   
The City of 
Dubuque, 2011f 
 PBS Blueprint 
America, 2010a 
  
The City of 
Dubuque, 2013a 
 PBS Blueprint 
America, 2010b 
  
The City of 
Dubuque, 2013b 
 PBS Newshour, 
2010 
  
M. Van Milligen,  
2013 
 PR Newswire, 
2011a 
  
  The Dubuque 
Town Crier, 
2011a 
  
  The Dubuque 
Town Crier, 
2011b 
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Portland materials used to inform narrative review 
 
Local 
government - 0 
materials 
IBM – 9 
materials 
Media – 13 materials IBM and local 
government – 0 
materials 
 IBM, 2009a Boyer, 1979  
 IBM, 2011a Buchanon, 1975  
 IBM, 2011b Haller, 2011  
 IBM, 2011f IFC, 2012  
 IBM, 2012e Keep Portland Weird, 2013  
 IBM, 2013a Lindsay, 2011  
 IBM, 2014b Maerz, 2011  
 IBM, 2014i McDuffee, 2011  
 IBM, 2014j Mincer, 2011  
  Sanina, 2011  
  Turnquist, 2010  
  Yasin, 2011  
  Zietler, 2011  
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Materials reviewed to understand tech provider perspective 
 
IBM - 36 materials Other tech providers 
– 7 materials 
Media – 4 materials Industry analysts – 3 
materials 
Bevan and Briody, 
2009 
Buschner et al., 2010 
(Arup) 
Lohr, 2009b World News, 2014 
(Frost & Sullivan) 
Dencik, 2013 Cisco, 2010 The Economist, 2010b PR Newswire, 2013 
(Navigant Research) 
Dirks and Keeling, 
2009 
Elfrink, 2009 (Cisco) The Economist, 2010d Forrester Research, Inc., 
2013 
Dirks et al., 2009 General Electric, 2011 Watson, 2010  
IBM, 2009a MacManus, 2009 (HP)   
IBM, 2009c Microsoft, 2012   
IBM, 2010 a Siemens, 2010   
IBM, 2010b    
IBM, 2010c    
IBM, 2010d    
IBM, 2010e    
IBM, 2011b    
IBM, 2011c    
IBM, 2011d    
IBM, 2011e    
IBM, 2011f    
IBM, 2011h    
IBM, 2012a    
IBM, 2012b    
IBM, 2012c    
IBM, 2012d    
IBM, 2012e    
IBM, 2012f    
IBM, 2013a    
IBM, 2013b    
IBM, 2013c    
IBM, 2014a    
IBM, 2014b    
IBM, 2014d    
IBM, 2014e    
IBM, 2014f    
IBM, 2014g    
IBM, 2014i    
IBM, 2014j    
Kantor and Litow, 
2009 
   
Palmisano, 2008    
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11.6 City Brand and Place Promotion 
 
Many factors can affect the way a city is viewed or perceived, including: citizen 
characteristics, population size, socioeconomic status, business environment, 
political power, crime rate, employment rates, location, historical background, media 
coverage, tourist attractions, physical appearance, etc. These in turn affect that 
strategies taken to create a city brand, which may target and affect various audiences, 
such as city residents, tourists, investors, agents of commerce, and state and national 
decision-makers, among others (Avraham, 2004). Given these various factors and 
audiences, place promotion can be complex. Local governments can shape their city 
brand through various strategies ranging from urban planning and development to 
public relations and marketing. Strategies to improve city brand can be internally or 
externally focused. Internally-focused strategies are “concerned with identity 
building and strengthening the pride of the residents living in a place, thus creating 
an attractive environment with the ability to maintain its residents and business and 
in the long run also attract new citizens, tourists and business” (Jansson and Power, 
2006, p. 6). On the other hand, outwardly-focused strategies are “concerned with 
external communication and is directly related to attracting investments, knowledge 
workers, visitors and tourists to a place” (Jansson and Power, 2006, p. 6). Each of 
these audiences will have different perceptions of city brand, which also operates at 
many different spatial and temporal levels—state, regional, national and 
international, and can vary according to season (Jansson and Power, 2006). 
 
According to Hatch and Schultz (2008), strategies to improve city brand should 
blend aspects of both differentiation and belonging—differentiation from other cities 
(i.e., competitors) and a sense of belonging to something special for key actors 
(Hatch and Schultz, 2008). Further, if a city’s brand is to resonate with city residents 
and to those external who are familiar with the city, the image created should be 
connected to “local identity and debates” (Vanolo, 2008, p. 371). Place promotion 
experts, for instance, recommend that local governments develop brand strategies 
that focus on enhancing or improving the city through urban planning and 
development efforts that support the brand promoted rather than investing solely in 
marketing a logo or catchphrase (Avraham, 2004; Kotler et al., 1993), paralleling 
approaches to branding in the private sector. In her research examining how 
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municipalities are increasingly adopting practices of public relations and marketing 
firms, Zavattaro (2010a) found other non-traditional methods frequently employed: 
using volunteers and outside organizations (i.e., third party actors) as public relations 
surrogates, investing in the built environment to improve how people view and 
experience the city, and focusing on environmental sustainability by going green. I 
explore these below.  
 
One consequence of this rising emphasis on city brand is a shift in roles of who does 
this type of work. “Public relations is not a subsystem performed by public relations 
professionals, but by all members of the organization” (Falkheimer, 2007, p. 290). In 
other words, it is not just one department within local government responsible for 
public relations, rather all government employees are being tapped to assist with 
messaging and advocacy (Falkheimer, 2007). As noted in my section on engagement 
around smart projects, third party organizations are increasingly being recruited to 
assist local governments in governing. In terms of public relations, these 
organizations are used by local governments to “gain insight into their strategic 
priorities and help cut costs by using volunteers instead of city employees to tackle 
problems” (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 81).  
 
While the idea of outsourcing city functions to third party groups or consulting with 
citizens is not new, “the role these entities tangential to an organization can play in 
shaping messages and images” seems to be rising, where “citizen boards and 
committees are filled with people who can become more than volunteers but carriers 
of the [public relations] message” (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 82). Each interaction—
“which seems to be arranged on a continuum from the simplest form of interaction 
(employee-as neighbor) to specially convened blue ribbon panels”—is an 
opportunity to spread the government’s message to third parties and the city 
residents involved, who then in turn have the ability to further transmit the messages 
to other city residents (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 48).  
 
One offshoot of this local government focus on brand and the consequent concern 
with public relations, is that citizens are increasingly being construed as consumers 
(Kotler and Lee, 2007, p. 117). Through this lens of citizen consumer, the types of 
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information city residents receive from, and the way that they are engaged by, the 
local government varies. Instead of receiving solely factual information, local 
governments aim to create dialogues with citizen consumers around certain issues to 
inform their consumptive behavior. These dialogues however may or may not be 
sincere attempts for conversation, depending on the public relations spin on the 
information being shared (Kotler and Lee, 2007, pp. 9-11; Zavattaro, 2010b, p. 196). 
For, while public relations practices are becoming more common and accepted in 
municipalities, there has been criticism of this practice. “In the case of the PR model, 
it appears that the adoption took place without much thought, if any, being given to 
the consequences, intended or otherwise, of employing this approach in a setting 
substantially different from its private-sector habitat” (Heise, 1985, p. 203). Though 
Arthur Heise (1985) may acknowledge that public relations creates a potential way 
for government to connect with the public it serves; he argues that the connotations 
of public relations are too severe to overcome, so public organizations should avoid 
importing this private-sector practice. Contrary to Heise’s viewpoint however, there 
are many scholars who view public relations within the municipal context as a 
legitimate way to build community and foster relationships with city residents 
(Zavattaro, 2010a, pp. 43-44).  
 
Another non-traditional public relations strategy that cities use to enhance their 
image, as highlighted by Zavattaro (2010a), includes a focus on aesthetic and 
affective appeal, which is “meant to capture emotive, image appeals” that local 
governments can “use as selling points” (p. 83). Within this method, local 
governments focus on how they want the city to be viewed and experienced by those 
within or passing through it, and shape built environment efforts so that they align it 
with desired perceptions. This approach stems from the understanding that people 
internalize their built surroundings, thus to improve brand, local governments must 
focus on how the natural and built environment they provide is experienced (Carlson, 
2002; Tuan, 1974, 1977). Local governments shape a city’s built environment 
through urban planning, and within the past two decades this has often been 
combined with a desire for promoting sustainability. Strategies for going green could 
include efforts to preserve air and water quality, enhancing public transportation, 
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recycling programs, land preservation, and promoting Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design development, among others (Zavattaro, 2010b).  
 
While aesthetic and sentimental appeal hinge upon imagery, this tactic linked to the 
built environment “relies on physical aspects the city creates and can sell but is 
directly linked to affectivity” (Zavattaro, 2010a, p. 90). In this sense, physical 
changes can be as important as mental images that show a city is changing. Thus, 
brand transformation is more likely to take hold if it is linked to and coordinated with 
the physical transformation of the built environment, which can be tied to a focus on 
sustainability that is pursued to further enhance brand (Jansson and Power, 2006). 
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11.7 Birth of a Smarter Planet  
 
The Smarter Cities campaign began with one of the key authors for Sam Palmisano’s 
2008 Smarter Planet speech to the Council of Foreign Relations. I interviewed this 
IBM Corporate Executive Speechwriter to learn more about what Smarter Planet and 
Smarter Cities meant to him and how he shaped the development of the associated 
narratives. In our discussion, he noted that, “to be self-aggrandizing, I wanted the 
Smarter Planet campaign to teach the world to sing in perfect harmony”. This refers 
to a seminal marketing ad made by Coca Cola in 1971, called Hilltop, that while 
selling Coca-Cola, also aimed to sell a feeling and idea through a narrative and 
imagery that inferred shared commonality (Coca Cola, n.d.). An important marketing 
ad to note because it focused not just on the product or its benefits, but on how the 
product would make you feel—through imagery and song, the ad told a story that 
conveyed meaning, assigned belonging and persuaded, all at a level targeting the 
individual.  
 
Bill Backer, the creative director for the Coca-Cola account at McCann-Erickson, got 
the idea for the commercial when he and colleagues were forced to overnight at the 
airport in Shannon, Ireland due to heavy fog in early 1971. The next morning, once 
irate passengers from the night before were joking and chatting over Coca Colas. 
Backer noted “I could see and hear a song that treated the whole world as if it were a 
person—a person the singer would like to help and get to know” (Coca Cola, n.d.). 
In this same vein, the IBM Corporate Executive Speechwriter strived to create an 
overarching Smarter Planet narrative that targeted individuals and evoked an urge or 
desire to be part of something bigger than themselves, to believe in the possibility of 
making the world a better place through the use of advanced technologies. As 
summarized by Iwata at an Industry Summit in 2010, with Smarter Planet IBM was 
not introducing a new marketing campaign, it was “initiating a conversation with the 
world to forge a shared belief” (Iwata in Watson, 2010).  
 
Given that Smarter Planet solutions, as initially described, were creating new 
workloads, new applications and new ways of doing things, “[IBM] had to develop a 
different vocabulary to be able to explain it both to [IBM staff], and to [its] 
customers” (Iwata in Watson, 2010). When building the overarching Smarter Planet 
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message, upon which Smarter Cities messaging was constructed, the IBM Corporate 
Executive Speechwriter first focused on identifying commonplaces, or problems that 
almost everyone could agree on—i.e., there had to be consent that what was being 
described was an issue. He did not focus on creating universal clarity around the 
issue, rather he described the situation in a way that would get general buy-in. 
Consequently, it is not a coincidence that the problems identified in the original 
Smarter Planet message, which launched with Palmisano’s speech and continued 
through a series of Op-ads (or Op-ed like advertisements), aligned with the typical 
Corporate Social Responsibility report, touching upon challenges faced within areas 
like food, water, transportation, public safety and the environment—all issues that 
affect cities as well. With this broad aperture for Smarter Planet narratives, IBM was 
enabling itself to stake a claim to not only transforming business but also society 
(Watson, 2010). As described by Iwata, “we’re making a new market, admittedly… 
but we’re trying to build a better world in the process” (Iwata in Watson, 2010). 
Thus, the stage was set for IBM to create, define and attempt to dominate new 
markets across a range of industries and sectors that could be made smart. While 
initial efforts focused on a broader scale, targeting private sector enterprises and 
national governments, state and local government were eventually added as potential 
buyers.  
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11.8 Examples of IBM Smarter Cities Narratives 
 
Figure 35 provides some examples of the range of Smarter Cities narratives, such as 
CEO speeches, white papers and points of view, as well as examples of documents 
that have been customized by country and division. As noted in Chapter 5, each 
division within IBM has different aims depending on which solution / service they 
are trying to sell, and which part of the market they are trying to capture.  
 
Figure 35. Examples of sources for IBM Smarter Cities narratives 
Date Title Type Author(s) Identified purpose 
2008 “A Smarter Planet: The 
Next Leadership Agenda” 
Speech to 
the Council 
on Foreign 
Relations, 
New York 
City 
Sam Palmisano 
(and an 
executive 
speech writer), 
Corporate  
To introduce the Smarter 
Planet framework to an 
external audience 
2009 “A vision of smarter 
cities: How cities can 
lead the way into a 
prosperous and 
sustainable future” 
White 
paper 
Susanne Dirks 
and Mary 
Keeling, GBS 
Institute for 
Business Value 
To introduce the concept of 
smart and why cities need to 
be smarter as the challenges 
of urbanization grow 
2009 “How Smart is your city? 
Helping cities measure 
progress” 
White 
paper 
Susanne Dirks, 
Marky Keeling 
and Jacob 
Dencik, GBS 
Institute for 
Business Value 
To outline what it means to 
be a smart city, and show 
how cities can assess and 
monitor progress toward 
becoming smart 
2009 “Towards a Smarter 
Economy: A Roadmap to 
Making it Happen” 
White 
paper  
IBM Australia  To illustrate what smart 
means across city systems 
within the Australian context 
2010 “Building a smarter 
planet, city by city” 
Speech to 
the Smarter 
Cities 
Forum, 
Shanghai 
Sam Palmisano 
(and an 
executive 
speech writer), 
Corporate 
To outline the urgency for 
cities to become smart, with 
examples of how cities can 
become smarter 
2011 “The modern city—from 
vision to reality” 
White 
paper 
IBM United 
Kingdom 
To outline the challenges UK 
cities are facing, and how 
these can be addressed 
through smart projects 
2012 “Smarter, More 
Competitive Cities. 
Forward-thinking cities 
are investing in insight 
today” 
Point of 
View 
Marketing To highlight how forward-
thinking cities are becoming 
smarter and more 
competitive through data and 
analytics 
2012 “IBM Smarter Cities 
Public Safety—
Emergency 
Management” 
White 
Paper 
IBM Industry 
Solutions, SWG 
To outline IBM’s positioning 
around how cities can make 
their public safety / 
emergency management 
smarter 
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2012 “Social media and the 
city” 
White 
Paper 
IBM United 
Kingdom 
To outline cities can harness 
the power of social media to 
become smarter  
2013 “Improving economic 
competitiveness and 
vitality” 
White 
Paper  
Jacob Dencik, 
GBS Institute 
for Business 
Value 
To outline how cities can 
become more economically 
competitive and sustainable 
by harnessing smart 
technologies 
2014 “Smarter, More 
Competitive Cities. 
Cultivating charisma, 
resiliency and vitality” 
Point of 
View 
Marketing To highlight the capabilities 
cities need to become 
smarter and more 
competitive, and the skills 
needed by city leaders to 
make their cities smarter 
2014 “Smarter Cities: How 
cities can create value 
from data, cloud and 
engagement” 
Point of 
View 
(internal 
only) 
Marketing To provide IBMers with an 
overview of IBM’s POV on 
cities, the issues they face, 
and how IBM solutions can 
help cities address these 
issues 
2014 “IBM Smarter Cities. 
Creating opportunities 
through leadership and 
innovation” 
Brochure IBM Industry 
Solutions, SWG 
To provide an overview of 
how cities can become 
smarter across city systems, 
and outline what city leaders 
need to do to make their 
cities smarter 
Source: Senior IBM Staff from Smarter Cities Sales & Development and Marketing & 
Communication.   
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11.9 Smarter Sustainable Dubuque  
 
In addition to the Smarter Water and Electricity Pilot Studies, there have been 
several other projects as part of SSD. The local government, in partnership with IBM 
Research, launched a Smarter Travel pilot study in 2012 to better understanding how 
citizens move throughout the city and to help participants be more aware of the 
distances they travel each day. This smartphone application was developed by IBM 
Research and used RFID technology to “collect anonymous data on how, when and 
where volunteer participants travel with the community” (The City of Dubuque, 
2011f). IBM Research analyzed the data, and the City of Dubuque and its transit 
partners used the findings to “implement practices and policies that incorporate 
lower-cost and lower-impact travel options within Dubuque” (The City of Dubuque, 
2011f). Given the experimental nature of this work, IBM Research provided the 
smart technologies needed for these experiments at no cost to the local government. 
Dubuque2.0 assisted with volunteer recruitment. While initial data from these 
experiments enabled the city to adjust and add public transportation routes (The City 
of Dubuque, 2011f), this project and a few smaller, related Smarter Travel 
experiments encountered various technical issues. According to my interview with 
the city’s Information Services Manager and the SSD Project Manager, these issues 
included difficulties installing (and uninstalling) the required application, having the 
application burn through cell phone batteries, not getting cooperation from mobile 
companies to share anonymized data that would enable tracking aggregate citizen 
movement, having no way to communicate with those participating in the 
experiment due to anonymized downloading, and having the application fail in terms 
of sharing information on distances traveled with participants.   
 
Expanding the SSD portfolio, the local government and IBM Research launched a 
Smarter Discard project in 2013 that tracked changes in residential waste diversion. 
Throughout the pilot—which aimed to “assist and incentivize” city residents to 
recycle and compost—data was collected to help inform the local government’s 
decision making around “policies, staffing, and equipment related to improving 
discard (trash / recycling) management and diversion to beneficial use” (The City of 
Dubuque, 2013e). Similar to the electricity and water pilots, a portal enabled the 300 
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volunteer households to view and understand their discard patterns (for trash, 
recycling, food scraps, yard debris) and compare them to other similar households 
(The City of Dubuque, 2013e). Also in 2013, the local government, IBM Research 
and the University of Iowa’s College of Public Health implemented a Smarter Health 
and Wellness pilot which looked at how technology and community engagement can 
help individuals achieve their health and wellness goals. This pilot consisted 
primarily of two smartphone applications: the first provided “micro-sensing” 
technology that sensed movement, while the second enabled data collection on 
activities, goals and comparative feedback on each individual’s performance and 
self-assessed well-being. IBM was responsible for providing an aggregate 
“CityView” Community Engagement Platform for the program, and making 
available mobility and individual engagement / data collection mobile applications 
for Android smartphones (The City of Dubuque, 2013f). 
 
As more and more SSD projects are implemented, the local government hopes to be 
able to increasingly glean insight from the resulting data to help inform urban 
planning and policy formation. While each of these pilot projects are operating, city 
management has access to the anonymized data being created, which is presented at 
an aggregate level in a web-based portal that allows the local government to monitor 
resource consumption and the overall sustainability footprint of the volunteer 
households. For example, if the Smarter Water Pilot Study further expands, the local 
government hopes to use the data gathered to inform the city’s water management 
responsibilities—treatment, distribution, and billing—with the aim of enabling the 
city to make more informed decisions about water production and distribution to 
help lower associated costs (The City of Dubuque, 2010b). One example of a similar 
type of model can be found in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where the local government has 
established a Centro De Operacoes Prefeitura Do Rio. In this center citywide data 
from thirty different agencies is integrated and combined with other data like 
weather to enable enhanced city operations across agencies, while alerting 
employees and the public if emergencies or problems arise (Kitchin, 2014b). The 
aim of the Center, similar to that of Dubuque officials, is to break down walls 
between city silos to improve performance of citywide operations across agencies.  
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